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From Sufism to Ahmadiyyat
The presence o f Jam a‘at-i Ahmadiyya has reinvigorated the debate on Islamic 
orthodoxy in South Asia’s Muslim mainstream. Assessing Mirza Ghulam A hm ad’s 
career has been made difficult by the polarized nature o f the questions surrounding his 
reputation which oscillates between messianic saviour and antichrist, where one extreme 
represents pristine orthodoxy and the other a perverse infidelity beyond the pale o f Islam. 
The pre-eminence o f M irza Ghulam Ahmad over his disciples, the esoteric ambiguity o f 
his spiritual claims, the emphasis he placed on internal and external reform, and the 
exclusivity o f his early followers are indicative o f a medieval Sufi order. The advent o f 
modernity, however, with the community’s lack o f the isolation and the politics o f 
colonial subjugation, influenced and shaped the development o f an unexpected Ahmadi 
identity. The Ahmadi identity is not wholly based on M irza Ghulam A hm ad’s 
controversial claims, but also a result o f  the socio-political context o f the early twentieth 
century South Asian environment from which it emerged. British rule in India initiated a 
reassessment o f Muslim institutions and an evaluation o f M uslim political autonomy 
leading up to the partition. Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya’s involvement in major political crises 
such as the conflict in Kashmir, the partition itself, and the Punjab disturbances o f 1953 
gradually led to the politicization Ahmadi Islam. As the notion o f Ahmadiyyat became 
increasingly politicized the formation o f the Ahmadi identity evolved, and the dichotomy 
between Ahmadiyyat and Islam widened. This thesis traces the development o f the 
Ahmadi identity from its Sufi style beginnings to a formalized construct that has the 
potential to shed its Islamic origins altogether. As this process continually progresses, 
Ahmadiyyat may develop into a unique religious movement with a unique religious 
identity distinct from Islam.
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Abstract
The presence of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya has reinvigorated the debate on Islamic 
orthodoxy in South Asia’s Muslim mainstream. Assessing Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s 
career has been made difficult by the polarized nature of the questions surrounding 
his reputation, which oscillate between messianic saviour and antichrist, where one 
extreme represents pristine orthodoxy and the other represents a perverse infidelity 
beyond the pale of Islam. The pre-eminence of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad over his 
disciples, the esoteric ambiguity of his spiritual claims, the emphasis that he placed 
on internal and external reform, and the exclusivity of his early community of 
followers are all indicative of a medieval Sufi order. However, the advent of 
modernity and the politics of colonial subjugation influenced and shaped the 
development of an unexpected Ahmadi identity which evolved in an increasingly 
globalized world. The Ahmadi identity is not wholly based on Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad’s controversial claims, but is also a result of the socio-political context of the 
early twentieth century South Asian environment from which it emerged. British rule 
in India initiated a reassessment of Muslim institutions and an evaluation of Muslim 
political autonomy leading up to the partition. Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s involvement in 
major political crises, such as the conflict in Kashmir, the partition of India itself, and 
the Punjab disturbances of 1953, gradually led to the politicization of Ahmadi Islam. 
As the notion o f Ahmadiyyat became increasingly politicized, the formation of the 
Ahmadi identity evolved, and the dichotomy between Ahmadiyyat and Islam 
widened. This study traces the development of the Ahmadiyya identity from its Sufi
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style beginnings to a formalized construct that has the potential o f shedding its 
Islamic origins altogether. As this process progresses, Ahmadiyyat may develop into 
a unique religious movement with a distinct religious identity that is separate from 
Islam.
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Introduction
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya is arguably the most controversial movement in 
contemporary South Asian Islam. My initial presumption when undertaking this 
study was that any modern reform movement within the context of South Asian Islam 
that was based on such extravagant claims by a charismatic leader must have had 
some connection to Sufism, since the success of Islam in South Asia has been 
intimately connected to the influence of Sufism amongst the mainstream. 
Interestingly, I discovered that the founder o f Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad of Qadian, India had a precarious connection to ecstatic Sufis and modernist 
teachers who rejected traditional methodology in favour o f individual interpretation 
and individual experience of the Divine. In these regards, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s 
mission was not unique. We find a precedent for tall claims based on ecstatic or 
mystical experiences throughout the history of Islam. We also find an impetus within 
the more immediate context of modernist movements in Islam for the rejection of the 
tradition and its methodology through the rejection of the four legalist schools of 
thought. The advent of modernity and the politics of colonial subjugation influenced 
and shaped the development of an unexpected Ahmadi identity, which evolved in an 
increasingly globalized world. In many ways, Ahmadi ideology represents this 
combination of medieval mysticism with modernist individualism, which developed 
under the sphere of British colonial rule. Although much has been written on 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya in almost every major language, few studies consider the 
broader scope of this context as instrumental in understanding Ahmadi Islam.
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A considerable amount of Ahmadi literature can be characterized by 
aggressive proselytistic argumentation. Consistently choosing this type of writing 
style as the primary means of communicating the Ahmadi worldview may have 
contributed to the overall antagonism towards the movement. One could argue that 
this heightened state of controversy surrounding Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya during its first 
century has significantly shaped the development of the Ahmadi identity. Although 
the movement has always been controversial, it is important to recognize that 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was not exclusively in a state of conflict with traditional Islam, 
but rather Ahmadi interpretations of religion were equally antagonistic towards 
Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, and Muslims alike. This style of religious argumentation 
has been a salient feature in Ahmadi literature and can be seen as early as Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad’s first major work, Barahm-i Ahmadiyya (The Proofs of Islam).1 
However, it is important to recognize that an environment like 19th century Punjab 
was well suited for this type o f inter-religious contestation, where a rich diversity of 
cultures and religious communities coexisted in close proximity until British colonial 
rule had upset the balance of power and initiated a search for a new equilibrium 
between religious rivals. The introduction of British rule as an unquestionably 
dominant force in the subcontinent had invigorated disputes amongst the prevailing 
theological proponents who represented the Sikhs, Hindus, evangelical Christians, 
and Muslims. As this dynamic unfolded, political authority became better established 
and more difficult to dispute, which enabled the struggle to restore religious authority 
amongst community leaders to take 011 a false sense of urgency before the new
1 The title B arah w -i A hn iadi)ya  literally means ‘The Proofs o f  Ahmad’ though it is more appropriately 
translatable as ‘The Proofs o f  Islam ’ or ‘Ahm ad’s Proofs o f  Islam ’.
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balance of power could be resettled. For Muslims, the end result was that creative 
intellectuals and religious reformers scurried to re-establish their interpretive 
ideologies of Islam during the period that shortly followed the Mutiny of 1857.
The efforts of many leading individuals and movements towards the end of 
the 19th century had a profound impact on the face of South Asian Islam through the 
20th century. It was this time period that saw the openings of the Dar al-‘Ulum at 
Deoband, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, and the 
Nadwat al-‘Ulama in Lucknow. It was also this time period that saw the emergence 
of the Ahl-i Hadith movement and Ahmad Riza Khan’s Barelwi movement. Within 
this context, Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya proceeded to introduce one more interpretation of 
Islam to a growing list of revivalist ideologies. Ghulam Ahmad’s exception to the 
developing trend was that his mission was far more dependent on divine charisma 
than the majority of reform movements of that time. From a theological perspective, 
Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya more closely resembled a pre-modern Sufi order than its 
modernist counterparts. However, the Jama'at’s concerted emphasis on external and 
internal reform from its earliest stages was indicative of its modernist disposition. 
And though the internal reform remained centred around purification of the heart and 
soul in classical Sufi fashion, the notion of external reform presented an opportune 
reaction to the ongoing political challenges of the day. It was no coincidence that 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya consistently aligned itself with its Imperial British rulers while 
setting out to spread the ‘True’ teachings of Islam all over the world.
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani began his spiritual notoriety by claiming to be 
a renewer (mujaddid) of Islam as well as the two apocalyptic figures known as the
12
mahdi (guided one) and the mcisTh (messiah), Ghulam Ahmad used messianic claims 
to infer that his spiritual status had arrived at some level of prophethood. His 
prophethood was subservient to Muhammad, yet nonetheless commissioned by God 
Himself for the benefit of mankind. As one might expect, Ghulam Ahmad’s spiritual 
claims led to voluminous justifications, which took the form of sectarian polemics 
against his numerous religious rivals. At first, Ghulam Ahmad’s publications were 
primarily intended to sway the sentiment of Indian Muslims against the rising threat 
of Hindu revivalist groups like the Arya and Brahmo Samaj. However, there was an 
additional threat from Christian missionaries who were intent on offering colonized 
Indians salvation through Christ. Ghulam Ahmad’s first major works were attempts 
at establishing Islam’s superiority as a religion through the use o f rationalized 
justifications, logic, and argumentation. During this brief period before he began 
advancing his spiritual claims in 1891, many Muslims rallied around Ghulam Ahmad 
and supported his literary efforts against the non-Muslim evangelists. In 1891 
however, three years after the formation of Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya, Ghulam Ahmad 
began to announce his true spiritual status to the general public. The inferences of 
prophethood that were derived from his claims of being the mahdi and the promised 
messiah were not being warmly received by the Muslim mainstream, which gradually 
led to the deterioration of his reputation. Over the next 15 years, Ghulam Ahmad 
devoted his attention to expounding the extraordinary nature of his spiritual status and 
disclosing his spiritual heights to the Muslim mainstream.
Testimonials of exceptional spiritual heights and unforeseen insights 
corresponding to extravagant unveilings of hidden realities are not as uncommon in
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the history of Islam as one may initially think. The utterances of many Sufis have 
been termed ecstatic or described as intoxication in an attempt to reconcile heterodox 
ideas with the mainstream. Abu Yazid Bistami, the one most often credited as the 
founder of intoxicated Sufism,2 may not be the Sufi who is most commonly known 
for his extravagant claims, though his legendary presence with the Divine is still 
widely celebrated within intellectual circles. Others like al-Hallaj are better known 
amongst non-scholars for making ecstatic claims, such as the one for which he was 
famously executed, T am the Truth (ana al-Haqq),’ because it affirmed his identity 
with the Divine.3 Classical memoirs like Attar’s Tadhkirat al-AM>liya are full of 
astonishing tales of Muslim mystics and saints who had achieved fantastic heights 
through the highest levels of divine realization.4
As the Sufis expanded their ideas and ecstatic experiences became an 
acceptable part of the path, different terms were developed to describe the spiritual 
stages of the mystic traveller. The awliyd (saints) laid out the perils o f the path in a 
didactic tradition which was passed down from teacher to student. The higher levels 
of wilaya (sainthood) were often associated with terms like qntb (pole/axis), ghawth 
(help), abdai (substitutes), and many more. Although it was certainly not the norm, it 
was also not unusual for many mystics to claim to be the mahdi himself.5 An elitist 
tradition developed in which the highest levels of sainthood at times began to blur
2 See H. Ritter, ‘Abu YazTd (BayazTd) Tayfur b. ‘Isa b . Surushan al- Bistam i' E ncyclopaedia o f  Islam, 
P. Bearman (ed.), Brill, 2008. Brill Online.
3 See Louis M assignon, The Passion o f  al-H allaj: M ystic an d  M artyr o f  Islam  (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1994).
4 See Farid al-Din Attar, Tadhkirat al-Awliyd, translated by A. .1. Arberry as M uslim Saints an d  
M ystics: E pisodes fro m  the Tadhkirat a l-A u liya ' ('M em orial o f  the Saints j  by F arid  a l-D in  A ttar  
(London: Arkana Penguin Books, 1966).
5 Annemarie Schim m el, M ystical Dim ensions o f  Islam  (Chapel Hill: The University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1975), p. 200.
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with prophethood. The inner secrets of veiled realities were only understood by the 
mystical elite who had experienced them. Even though treatises were written in early 
Islamic history to define the boundaries of wildya (sainthood) and to safeguard those 
susceptible to religious deviance,6 alternative understandings still appeared.
There are several precedents for questionable claims that have been shunned 
by orthodox Muslims. Ruzbihan Baqli, similar to Ghulam Ahmad, characterized his 
unveilings with the term wahy, the type of revelation that is reserved for the 
prophets.7 Ruzbihan Baqli went on to obscure the distinction between the prophets 
and the saints in a way that even most Sufis would reject, following visions in which 
he was told that he himself was a prophet.8 The most prominent thinker to expand 
these ideas was Muhyiddin Ibn al-‘Arabi, who described the path o f the saints as 
being ‘on the footsteps of the prophets { ‘aid aqdam al-anbiya) .’ Michel 
Chodkiewicz’s work, Seal o f  the Saints, offered western scholars some insight into 
just how intricate these ideas may be,9 even though Ibn al-‘Arabi may not represent 
the best paradigm for Ghulam Ahmad’s thought. A more appropriate comparison 
would be Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, who shared the South Asian context and 
proclaimed his own status as Mnjaddid Alf-i ThanT (the Renewer for the second 
millennium) in addition to being the khdtam al-awliya (the Seal of the Saints).10 It is 
not surprising that Ghulam Ahmad also took on the title khdtam al-awliya and
6 See Bernd Radtke and John O ’Kane, The Concept o f  Sainthood in E arly Islam ic M ysticism : Two 
w orks by A!-HakTm Al-Tirm idhi (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1996).
7 Carl W. Ernst, Ruzbihan Baqli: M ysticism  and  the Rhetoric o f  Sainthood in Persian Sufism  (Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 1996), p. 51.
8 Ibid., pp. 24-26.
9 M ichel Chodkiewicz, S eal o f  the Saints: P rophethood an d  Sainthood in the D octrine o f  Ibn 'Arabi 
(Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1993).
10 See Yohanan Friedmann, Shaykh A hm ad Sirhindi: An Outline o f  H is Thought a n d  a S tudy o f  H is 
Im age in the Eyes o f  P osterity  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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frequently referenced the works o f Ibn aI-‘Arabi and Ahmad Sirhindi as justifications 
for his claims that were intended to give his ideas religious credibility. However, 
when it comes to the community which he founded, the case o f Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
is less intellectual and more political than the followers of either of these two 
predecessors.
This combination of political interests with messianic claims bears some 
resemblance to the early Isma'ili or Safavid dynasties, but there are clear limitations 
to both of these comparisons. There is a closer resemblance to the Sufi orders o f the 
late medieval period like the Nurbakhshiyya whose founder, Muhammad Nurbakhsh, 
advanced the claim of being the mahdi, which he based on his own messianic 
visions.11 The closest comparison to Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya in recent times is the 
Bahai community whose origins in messianic Islam eventually led to the formation of 
a new religious movement based on seemingly universal ideals.12 Unlike Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya, the Bahai formalized their break with Islam, which put an end to the 
questions about their orthodoxy. Both of these groups used mystical revelations 
within a messianic framework to found a theology that emphasized the universality of 
all faiths. When first encountering Ahmadi theology, it is tempting to categorize the 
Ahmadis as religious pluralists, because of Ghulam Ahmad’s claim to be the 
promised messiah for all faiths, but this does not reflect the patronizing attitude of 
Ahmadi Islam towards other religious outlooks. It would be interesting to see this 
comparison o f the Ahmadis and the Bahai explored further in the future, especially if 
Ahmadis formalize their break with traditional Islam in a similar way. Perhaps the
11 See Shahzad Bashir, M essianic H opes an d  M ystical Visions: The Nurbakhshiya Between M edieval 
an d  M odern Islam  (Columbia: University o f  South Carolina Press, 2003).
12 Oliver Scharbrodt, Islam an d  the B aha'i Faith  (London: Routledge, 2008).
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key difference between Ahmadi Islam and its various other sectarian counterparts is 
the community’s response to the messianic claims of their founder. Whereas most 
Muslim communities with messianic origins have suppressed the heterodox views of 
their founders or at least adopted figurative understandings of their founder’s 
questionable claims, Jama£at-i Ahmadiyya celebrates Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood 
and affirms a strictly literal interpretation of his spiritual worldview and prophetic 
status.
The majority of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s works have been published in 23 
volumes known as Ruham Khaza'in (spiritual treasures) with an additional three 
volumes of Majmu'a-i Ishtiharat (collected pamphlets) and ten volumes of Malfuzat 
(collected sayings). Although these works tend to be organized chronologically, they 
do not reflect a thematic progression through Ghulam Ahmad’s career. Ghulam 
Ahmad’s writing style involved a multilingual delivery in which he would frequently 
switch from Urdu prose, to Persian poetry, to an Arabic revelation or Qur’anic 
commentary, all within the span of a few pages. Additionally, Ghulam Ahmad would 
occasionally receive revelations in English or Punjabi. However, aside from the 
multiple languages in which many of his works were written, Ghulam Ahmad’s 
longwinded discourses contain abstruse ideas that are difficult to penetrate. Most of 
his works seem to have been written in a stream of consciousness and reflect his 
confessional style o f writing. Many o f his works could easily be mistaken for secret 
diaries, private notebooks, or unfinished drafts that elaborated forthcoming 
manuscripts which may not yet have been ready for publication. This unedited mass 
of loosely structured religious argumentation was published by Jama£at-i Ahmadiyya
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posthumously as an anthology of the promised messiah’s work and included several 
texts that appeared in print for the first time. Some of the longer works incorporate a 
number o f discussions on unrelated themes that appear as unusually long footnotes 
which extend through the body of the text. Some of these footnotes have later been 
published by the Jama'at independently as monographs on religious issues that were 
more neatly focused on limited theological questions. In the originals however, the 
writing may simply appear as footnotes, with footnotes to the footnotes, and 
sometimes even footnotes to the footnotes of the footnotes, compressed onto a single 
page with each note telling a different story through an entire body of work.
Many of the smaller works have been translated into English, but some of the 
more important works surprisingly remain untranslated. Unfortunately, most of the 
English translations are difficult to read and frequently misconstrue Ghulam Ahmad’s 
allusions by divorcing them from their mystical context. In this way, the translations 
of his works are often disconnected from the subtle inferences that connect his ideas 
to the perennial themes that permeate the broader Islamic tradition. In their original 
form however, the works clearly display Ghulam Ahmad’s literary mastery which 
appealed sentimentally to familiar motifs interwoven with his intense charismatic 
convictions. In this sense, the translated selections of Ghulam Ahmad’s works tend 
to lose the bombastic tone of his writing style and edit away the frantic urgency with 
which he was trying to deliver his mixed messages. The reverence that accompanied 
the mythical mystique surrounding Ghulam Ahmad’s uncanny approach has led to the 
development of a relationship between his works and Jama‘at~i Ahmadiyya that is 
arguably comparable to scripture. Although it is difficult to regard his works as such
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right now, there remains no other source that illuminates the Ahmadi enterprise with 
such authoritative esteem as the works o f Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.
The earliest sources, aside from Ghulam Ahmad’s own works, are the 
hagiographies produced by the movement itself. Although these sources are essential 
in understanding the self image of the early Ahmadi community, they do not provide 
a critical analysis of their beliefs or doctrines. We have already described above how 
much of Ghulam Ahmad’s writing took on an argumentative tone, as is the case with 
many sectarian movements. The majority o f insider Ahmadi sources were not 
intended to critically analyze any o f the movement’s positions within the broader 
religious context, but were to provide repeated accounts of Ahmadi ideology restated 
in different ways and in different languages. Similarly, the bulk of outsider literature 
on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya has often been characterized by passionate polemics directed 
at Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his followers. Few academics have taken up research 
011 Ahmadi Islam, but we may now briefly examine the most important studies.
One of the first and most frequently referenced academic perspectives on 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was a supplementary chapter in Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s 
Modern Islam in India, which was first published in 1943 just prior to the partition.13 
Cantwell Smith rightly placed Ahmadiyyat within the context of Islamic revivalist 
movements attempting to come to terms with modernity. Although he did not 
provide much commentary 011 Ahmadi theology, he noted that the reaction to Ahmadi 
Islam was having a greater impact on ordinary Indian Muslims than Ahmadi Islam 
itself. This reaction to Ahmadi Islam and the corresponding persecution of Ahmadis
lj See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, M odern Islam  in India: A Socia l Analysis (N ew  Delhi: Usha 
Publications, 1985), pp. 367-372, under the heading, ‘A Note on the AhmadTyah M ovem ent’.
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was only the beginning of its process of politicization. Cantwell Smith commented 
that the exclusivist nature o f Ahmadis and their ‘social aloofness rather than their 
theology (which is no more heretical than the respected Aga Khan)...occasioned the 
bitter antagonism between the Muslims.’14 He noted the growing influence of 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya on indigenous religious communities in the diaspora and listed 
the United States, Europe, and Africa as examples.
Most of Cantwell Smith’s observations were sociological, as the subtitle of the 
book suggests, but they were nonetheless relevant to understanding the Ahmadi 
identity. For example, Cantwell Smith noted that the voluminous supply o f literature 
published by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, which spanned Urdu, Arabic and Persian, was 
intended to address a highly literate audience. As a result, Ahmadi Muslims were 
known to boast astonishing literacy rates for pre-partition India.15 This comment in 
particular, along with Cantwell Smith’s subsequent discussion on Qadian’s privately 
funded schools and its organizational infrastructure, such as its permanent langar 
khana (free kitchen) to provide relief from unemployment, were often misquoted by 
later scholars studying Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. There is no question that the early 
Ahmadi community in Qadian was made up of followers from privileged and 
educated backgrounds, but the population of the community at this time was 
significantly smaller than it is today. It is still possible to find lingering references to 
the highly educated Ahmadi elite that quote Cantwell Smith’s early study, even 
though these observations are no longer representative of the Jama‘at today. Exceipts 
from Cantwell Smith’s commentary on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya served as the basis for
14 Ibid., pp. 371-372.
15 Ibid., p. 370.
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the main Encyclopaedia o f  Islam entry on the movement until the recent third edition 
appeared with an updated article in 2007.16
The next major study on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was Humphrey J. Fisher’s 
Ahmadi)ryah: A Study in Contemporary Islam on the West African Coast, which did 
not appear until 1963 and specifically looked at the West African context.17 Fisher’s 
study was an interesting contribution because it looked at the circumstances particular 
to African Islam and largely ignored the Indian context. There were occasional 
reminders of the subcontinent, such as where Fisher mentioned how racial tensions 
arose between indigenous members who disapproved of black Africans following an 
Indian Imam in prayer,18 but the study mainly focused on the African experience. His 
analysis of the Ahmadi communities in countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, 
and Gambia would be useful in understanding the surging population of Ahmadi 
diaspora communities in Africa today.
Fisher did devote Part II  of his book to ‘Ahmadiyyah Doctrine’ which was 
one o f the first looks at key aspects of Ahmadi theology, especially in relation to 
Jesus.19 This was particularly interesting in conjunction with Fisher’s observations 
regarding tabligh (missionary activity), which is a major component of Ahmadi 
ideology. For example, Fisher observed that the Ahmadi presentations of the life and
16 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Ahmadiyya’' E ncyclopaedia o f  Islam , (second edition), P. Bearman (ed.), 
Brill, 2008. Brill Online; see also Y. Friedmann, “Ahmadiyya” E ncyclopaedia o f  Islam , (third edition), 
Gudrun Kramer (ed.), Brill, 2008. Brill Online.
17 Humphrey J. Fisher, Ahm adiyyah: A Study in Contem porary Islam  on the West African Coast 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
18 Ibid., p. 111.
19 Ibid., pp. 35-88. There is one book on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya which predates the studies done by 
Fisher and Cantwell Smith and devotes considerable attention to the relation between Ahmadi Islam  
and Christianity. However, the book is not as balanced as Fisher’s study and includes a number o f  
errors and misunderstandings, even though it may prove useful for other reasons. See H. A. Walter, 
The A hm adiya M ovement (London: Oxford University Press, 1918).
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death of Jesus varied and that the arguments were carefully chosen depending on the 
religious orientation of the audience. Arguments challenging the divinity o f Jesus 
were reserved for a Christian audience, whereas arguments that highlighted the 
natural death of Jesus without the ascension were stressed to Muslims. His account 
showed the varying emphasis of Ahmadi doctrine in the face of Muslim and non- 
Muslim identities outside of South Asia. Fisher even spent some time explaining 
Jesus’ survival from the crucifixion and subsequent journey to Kashmir, but 
implicitly dismissed the shrine identified by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the tomb of 
Jesus as a gimmick.20
There are certain distinctive features that cannot be found in other sources 
which are unique to Fisher’s study and are useful in gaining a better understanding of 
the Ahmadi identity. Although many works have discussed the issues relating to the 
separation and isolation of the Ahmadi community, typically from other Muslim 
communities, only Fisher addressed these issues in a non-Muslim context. The 
insistence on an Ahmadi identity posed a problem for coastal West Africans who 
customarily had identified themselves according to their tribal affiliations. The 
expectation of African converts was that their new Ahmadi identity would supersede 
their former tribal identity.21 In one case, known as the Okepopo split, a legal battle 
ensued over whether an Ahmadi or non-Ahmadi should be the rightful Imam of the 
Okepopo mosque in the Gold C oast22 The leaders of the local Ahmadi community 
had felt that the Imam must have a formal allegiance {bay ‘at) to their caliph, despite
20 Humphrey J. Fisher, Ahm adiyyah: A Study in C ontem porary Islam on the West African C oast, pp. 
70-71.
21 Ibid., p. 186.
22 Ibid., pp. 100-102.
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the fact that the mosque had been frequented by all members o f the Okepopo 
community regardless of tribal or sectarian loyalties. The Okepopo split established 
that simple participation in Ahmadi prayer services at an Ahmadi mosque was not 
enough to consider oneself an Ahmadi in West Africa.
In other cases, conflicts with local Tijani Muslims played an important role in 
defining the boundaries of Ahmadi fiqh  (jurisprudence). According to Fisher, the 
most apparent difference between the Ahmadis and their non-Ahmadi Muslim 
counterparts in West Africa was the folding of the arms in prayer. Ahmadis folded 
their arms in prayer, in accordance with the Flanafi School, on which many of their 
rulings are based, whereas the Tijanis allowed their arms to fall straight along their 
sides, in accordance with the Maliki rulings.23 Both methods are considered valid and 
accepted by the jurists o f the Sunni mainstream, but the rigid adherence o f Ahmadis 
to this specific trait created further tensions for the West African Ahmadiyya 
community. Fisher noted how Ahmadi missionaries would never commit to one 
specific school o f thought, but instead would swear allegiance to the khalifat aUmasih 
and the promised messiah,24
The next major contribution was Spencer La van’s The Ahmadiyah Movement, 
the first comprehensive survey of early Ahmadi history.25 Lavan based his study 
primarily on an early unfinished biography of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad called Life o f  
Ahmad, which was written by a prominent Ahmadi missionary in English 26 Lavan 
completed his survey with references to newspaper articles, government reports, and
23 Ibid., pp. 133-137.
24 Ibid., p. 20.
25 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement: A H istory and  Perspective  (Delhi: Manohar Book  
Service, 1974).
26 A. R. Dard, Life o f  A hm ad  (Lahore: Tabshir, 1948).
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later Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi publications. In many ways, this was the first critical 
analysis o f Ahmadi history that offered a balanced look at the conventional 
presentation of Ghulam Ahmad’s life and mission within the scope of the broader 
South Asian context.
Lavan considered how the religious affiliations of the three primary tutors of 
Ghulam Ahmad’s youth may have affected his religious outlook and influenced the 
way in which he later interpreted his mission. This was a meaningful observation 
considering that one tutor was Hanafi, one was from the Ahl-i Hadith movement, and 
one was Shi'a.27 All of these ideologies can been seen in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya today. 
Lavan also commented on the use of Sufi metaphors and terminology to explain 
Ahmadi theology, noting that ‘[Ghulam] Ahmad came close to what might be 
considered a sufi conception of his own role.’28 There is a 20 year gap in Ghulam 
Ahmad’s biography which begins at the time he finished studying with his final tutor 
and ends at the time he was preparing for his mission. Lavan questioned whether 
Ghulam Ahmad may have entered into a Sufi order or received some other 
specialized training.29 An overt affiliation with a specific Sufi order, in addition to 
the above tutors, certainly would have made tracing the influences on Ahmadi 
theology easier.
Lavan’s most significant contribution was his elaboration of the events that 
occurred after Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s death. He provided a fair account of the split 
in the movement between the Qadianis and the Lahoris and devoted considerable 
attention to dealing with the political controversy that emerged with the Ahrar in the
27 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement, p. 28.
28 Ibid., p. 47.
29 Ibid., p. 29.
24
early 1930s. Both of these events are crucial to understanding the development of the 
Jama‘at and the development of the Ahmadi identity. Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s 
political involvement during the crisis in Kashmir in 1931 led to a major sectarian 
conflict with one of India’s most outspoken demagogues, ‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari. 
This type of political involvement, along with their unwavering support for the 
British, remained a steady feature of Jama;at-i Ahmadiyya through the partition of 
India in 1947, which ultimately led to some unexpected outcomes. We will look at 
how the publicity of these events and the increasing notoriety of the Jama1 at led to the 
politicization of the Ahmadi identity.
The official history of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya is an ongoing project which is 
currently being compiled by Dost Muhammad Shahid as a part of his Tartkh-i 
Ahmadiyya in Urdu.30 As a senior missionary commissioned for the work, Dost 
Muhammad Shahid has devoted his life to chronicling the history of the Jama1 at. 
Although the first volume of Tankh-i Ahmadiyya appeared in 1958, Lavan only 
referenced the Urdu Tarikh occasionally despite listing the first nine volumes in his 
bibliography. I had the good fortune of meeting with Dost Muhammad Shahid at his 
office during a visit to Rabwah in 2006, which was an experience worth mentioning. 
After a quick security screening from his secretary, we sat in his office in the Khilafat 
Library complex surrounded by books and old photographs of Ghulam Ahmad’s 
various khalifas, where I listened to him explain the historical development of the 
Jama1 at. There was a peg on the wall where he hung his turban, immaculately 
wrapped, and one for his achkan (overcoat) which dangled by the door. The
30 D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1-19 (ongoing work in progress), (Rabwah?, 
1983).
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combination of his advanced age and moderate celebrity status amongst the locals 
demanded a fulltime staff of four or five teenage boys who would fetch whichever 
books he needed from the adjoining library. He answered my questions by showing 
me the exact passage in an actual book, rather than simply providing me with the 
references. In the end, we discussed his forthcoming volumes of the Tarikh, and he 
boldly insisted that he had told me things about Ahmadi history that no one (Ahmadi 
or non-Ahmadi) knew. Though the voluminous work is certainly the most 
comprehensive source of Ahmadi history available, it was not intended to serve as a 
critical analysis. Regardless, any subsequent commentary on Ahmadi history must 
take into consideration the authoritative accounts presented in Dost Muhammad 
Shahid’s Tankh-i Ahmadiyya.
The next major study on Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya was perhaps the most relevant 
to this analysis. Yohanan Friedmann’s Prophecy Continuous appeared in 1989 and 
was the first to look at how closely Ahmadi theology was rooted in the medieval 
Islamic tradition.31 Friedmann outlined the arguments that Ghulam Ahmad had used 
to substantiate his prophethood and began to trace their Sufi heritage. He provided a 
detailed discussion of Ghulam Ahmad’s interpretation of the Qur’anic verse 
proclaiming Muhammad to be the khatam al-nabiyyin (seal of the prophets),32 which 
traditionally has been used to justify the finality of prophethood in Islam. However, 
Ghulam Ahmad interpreted the designation of khatam al-nabiyyin (seal of the 
prophets) to signify that Muhammad was ‘the best of the prophets’ rather than ‘the
31 Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: A spects o f  A hm adi Religious Thought an d  Its M edieval 
Background {Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1989).
32 See verse (33:40) which Friedmann translated in Prophecy Continuous, p. 53, as: ‘Muhammad was 
not the father any man am ong you, but the M essenger o f  Allah and khatam  [or khatim) al-nabiyyin.'
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last of the prophets4. He maintained that it was possible for new prophets, who 
abided by the established shan 'a , to appear in the Islamic tradition after the death of 
Muhammad and welcomed such appearances as manifestations of divine mercy and a 
demonstration of the blessings upon mankind. Ghulam Ahmad had based his 
understanding of prophethood largely on the ideas found in the works of Ibn al-‘Arabi 
and Shaykli Ahmad Sirhindi, which Friedmann duly analyzed alongside Ghulam 
Ahmad’s interpretations. Friedmann explained Ibn al-‘Arabi’s concept of legislative
— 33prophets (anbiya tashrV) and non-legislative prophets (anbiya la tashri'a lahum). 
Legislative prophets were those who brought some type of scripture or legal code to 
mankind, whereas non-legislative prophets simply reinforced the previous scriptures 
that had already been revealed. Although Ghulam Ahmad did claim to be a non­
legislative prophet, he acknowledged that no other legislative prophet could come 
after Muhammad and that the Qur’an was the last scripture. Friedmann showed how 
Ghulam Ahmad believed that non-legislative prophets would continue to come in the 
Islamic tradition, albeit in a capacity that was subservient or spiritually inferior to 
Muhammad who was khatam al-nabiyyin (seal of the prophets). Friedmann’s work 
highlighted Ghulam Ahmad’s dependence on atypical interpretations of Sufis like Ibn 
al-‘Arabi and Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi and demonstrated how these interpretations 
were used to validate his own prophethood. This has allowed scholars to place some 
of the more controversial tenets of Ahmadi doctrine within a different, yet more 
appropriate, intellectual context.
The final and most recent group of literature on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya deals 
mostly with issues related to their persecution. Although previous sources dealing
33 Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, pp. 73-75.
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with the Jama'at mention the exclusivity, isolation, and persecution o f the community 
in some way, theses sources specifically deal with the more recent political actions 
taken against Jama1 at-i Ahmadiyya primarily in Pakistan. Antonio Gualtieri 
summarized the recent developments in his Conscience and Coercion, which was 
published in 1989.34 Aside from the agitations with the Ahrar during the Kashmir 
crisis of the early 1930s, there have been three major waves of anti-Ahmadi protests 
in Pakistan. The first was the wide scale anti-Ahmadi rioting that occurred in 1953 
shortly after the partition. These uprisings involved Maulana Mawdudi and his 
Jama'at-i Islami amongst others and resulted in the declaration o f martial law 
throughout the Punjab. The second wave of protests took place in 1973 and resulted 
in a special session of the National Assembly of Pakistan declaring that Ahmadis 
were part of the country’s non-Muslim minority. The third wave o f disturbances 
occurred in 1984 and resulted in further changes to Pakistan’s constitution regarding 
the self-identity and individual freedoms of Ahmadis.35 Gualtieri’s book focused on 
the most recent disturbances.
The theme was carried over into Gualtieri’s subsequent book called The 
Ahmadis, which followed up Conscience and Coercion and was published in 2004.36 
In Part III of the book, Gualtieri included some insightful interviews with the then 
Minister of Religion and Minority Affairs of Pakistan, Lutfulla Mufti, and the then 
Canadian High Commissioner in Islamabad, Marie-Andree Beauchemin.37 Gualtieri
34 Antonio R. Gualtieri, Conscience and Coercion: Ahm adi M uslims and Orthodoxy in Pakistan  
(Montreal: Guernica Editions, 1989).
35 See The Constitution o f  the Islam ic R epublic o f  Pakistan , (Ordinance X X  o f  April 26, 1984).
36 Antonio Gualtieri, The Ahm adis: Community, Gender, an d  P olitics in a Muslim Society  (London: 
M cG ill-Q ueen’s University Press, 2004).
37 Ibid., pp. 145-153.
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lampooned the diplomats and argued that Pakistan was in violation of basic human 
rights by enforcing the blasphemy laws which held Ahmadis accountable for the 
criminal charges associated with ‘posing as a Muslim’. Although Gualtieri 
thoroughly explained his firm conviction that all human beings had a basic right of 
self-identification, he did not explain the counterargument or address the theological 
reasons why such seemingly foolish allegations would be introduced, accepted, or 
upheld by the Pakistani government. Unfortunately, the interviews themselves did 
not provide the answer. Gualtieri pressed the diplomats by asking why there had 
been such consistent persecution o f the Ahmadis and why such intense animosity was 
prevalent amongst the general public. Both diplomats suggested, rather disturbingly, 
that the overall rigidity maintained by the Ahmadiyya movement regarding their faith 
and some of their tendencies towards Islam instigated such harsh persecution. They 
dismissed the persecution and effectively vindicated the past episodes of vigilante 
violence by affirming that ‘the Ahmadis brought it on themselves.’38 Discouraged by 
their responses and unable to establish a meaningful dialogue, Gualtieri ended both 
books with his contempt for religious intolerance and a sense o f despair.
Outside the context of Ahmadi persecution, the beliefs and rituals of the 
Ahmadi community are still undergoing a process of formalization. The development 
of Ahmadi theology and an Ahmadi identity is worthy of further study, which may 
allow scholars to appreciate the Islamic context from which it emerged and better 
understand the direction in which it appears to be heading. In describing this 
religious context of the movement, Ghulam Ahmad’s second successor and son, 
Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, once said that:
38 Ibid., p. 148.
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The Ahmadiyya Movement, therefore, occupies, with respect to the 
other sects of Islam, the same position which Christianity occupied 
with respect to the other sects of Judaism.
This sentiment suggests that a thrust to establish a distinct Ahmadi identity has been 
present within the leadership of the movement for some time. Although it is not yet 
clear how the Ahmadis will choose to assert themselves in the future, there is the 
potential that they may one day choose to form a new religion.
Members of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya have struggled to establish their identity 
from the very beginning, and the current literature on the movement reflects how 
insiders and outsiders of the community chose to define and redefine Ahmadi Islam. 
However, the literature does not reflect a comprehensive assessment of the 
progression of the Ahamdi identity from a blossoming brotherhood with a charismatic 
leader to the institutionalized religious construct of today, which exists in opposition 
to the Islamic tradition. Most of the studies on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya that engage with 
Ahmadi theology tend to isolate one aspect of Ahmadi thought, which is often 
detached from its historical context. This study goes beyond singular aspects of 
Ahmadi thought and shows how Ahmadi Islam developed on the whole from the 
mystical mindset of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to a globalized religious movement with 
one supreme khalifa residing in central London. This study shows how the pre­
eminence of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad over his disciples, the esoteric ambiguity of his 
spiritual claims, the emphasis that he placed on internal and external reform, and the 
exclusivity of his early followers are all indicative of a medieval Sufi order. Then we
39 Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Ahm adiyyat or the True Islam  (Rabwah: Ahmadiyya M uslim  
Foreign M issions O ffice Tahrik-i-Jadid Anjuman Ahmadiyya Pakistan, 1924), p. 18.
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look at the historical context in which Ahmadi Islam developed and show how 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya came to adopt a strictly literalist interpretation of Ghulam 
Ahmad’s prophetic claims and establish a fixed religious hierarchy that has come to 
define its new identity. This study will trace the development o f the Ahmadi identity 
from its Sufi style beginnings to a consciousness that revolves around a highly 
structured establishment and has the potential of shedding its Islamic origins 
altogether. As this process progresses, Ahmadiyyat is developing into a unique 
religious movement with a unique religious identity that is slowly distinguishing itself 
from Islam.
We begin with a look at Ghulam Ahmad’s family background, education, and 
early spiritual training before his controversial claims. Ghulam Ahmad’s privileged 
upbringing was the result of ancestral connections with the Mughal rulers of 16th 
century India who placed his family in charge of a budding settlement that later 
developed into his native Qadian. As the power dynamics in the subcontinent 
changed, Ghulam Ahmad’s family established a lasting relationship with the British 
government, which later proved to be veiy beneficial. Following the Sikh conquests 
in the middle o f the 19th century, the family rekindled their ties with the British in an 
attempt to restore their former prestige. Ghulam Ahmad was bom in an uncertain 
climate which marked the beginning of the end of an old world of pomp and glory 
enjoyed by the previous generations in his family. He received a private education 
from personal tutors who taught him the languages necessary to pursue an Islamic 
education. As a young adult, Ghulam Ahmad moved to Sialkot to become a court 
reader where he came into contact with a number of evangelical Christian
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missionaries who were eager to expand their mission. The experience gave Ghulam 
Ahmad his First interaction with people who aggressively challenged his religious 
beliefs and allowed him to develop a taste for religious argumentation. Ghulam 
Ahmad began debating Christians and Hindus on religious issues and started to write 
short articles defending Islam. The exposure gave him limited recognition amongst 
local Muslims and allowed him to found a small fellowship, which he called Jama'at- 
i Ahmadiyya. This process initiated a broader campaign which gradually led Ghulam 
Ahmad to making the controversial claims that disclosed his messianic aspirations.
It is necessary to take a careful look at Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic claims in 
order to understand the full scope of his mission in the appropriate Islamic context. 
In the second chapter, we look at Ghulam Ahmad’s justifications for his prophetic 
status and the dependency of his mission 011 the rejection of Jesus’ death by 
crucifixion. By claiming that Jesus was not alive in heaven, Ghulam Ahmad could 
assert that he himself was the second coming of the messiah. Ghulam Ahmad went to 
great lengths to show that Jesus had died a natural death in Kashmir and argued that 
he himself was the promised messiah who was sent to fulfil divine prophecy. He 
used Sufi ideas to justify a mysterious spiritual connection between himself and the 
Prophet Muhammad. He claimed that his profound love for the Prophet and his strict 
obedience to the Qur’an and sunna had led him to receive prophetic insights, which 
he described using the terminology of revelation. This eventually led many Ahmadis 
to affirm Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic status and to distance themselves from what 
they believed to be the antiquated interpretations of a stagnant Islamic tradition.
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The subsequent presentation of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood became the 
subject of a heated debate within the early Ahmadi community as members looked to 
the Jama*at leadership for answers following Ghulam Ahmad’s death. In chapter 
three we look at how the question of prophethood raised questions of authority and 
led to the splitting of the movement into two camps, the Lahoris and the Qadianis. 
The Lahori-Qadiani split enabled the early community to formalize their positions on 
Ghulam Ahmad’s role in the Islamic tradition and allowed the Qadiani leadership to 
initiate a process o f institutionalization that transformed Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya into a 
hierarchical religious organization that is mediated by a khalifat al-masih, Ghulam 
Ahmad’s spiritual successor.
We next turn our attention in chapter four to Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s political 
involvement in pre-partition India under the leadership of Ghulam Ahmad’s son and 
second successor, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad. Communal tensions in the 
1920s and the Kashmir crisis in the 1930s provided Mirza Mahmud Ahmad with an 
international stage to demonstrate how his Jama‘at could provide all Muslims with 
the solidarity and leadership that they lacked. Although Mahmud Ahmad’s attempt 
was reasonably successful in the very beginning, he was not willing to accommodate 
the diversity of religious and political opinions that were being expressed by other 
Muslims, and similarly many Muslims were not willing to accommodate Mahmud 
Ahmad’s political ambitions or his monochromatic vision of Islam. Bitter rivalries 
developed between Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya and other political organizations like the 
Majlis-i Ahrar who used a number of persistent socio-economic issues to fuse their 
religious ideals into a political platform. This political history leading up to India’s
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partition had a direct influence on the development of the Ahmadi identity. As the 
Pakistan movement gained popularity amongst the Muslim mainstream, Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya was forced to reassess its role in a divided subcontinent. Although 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya slowly tried to withdraw from the political forefront, it was too 
deeply associated with the political controversies of the time. The influential 
members of the Jama‘at, along with their affiliates, who were actively participating in 
the politics of South Asia became the subject of open criticism and even persecution.
In this context of the ongoing political tensions o f the time, we turn our 
attention in the final chapter to the role that persecution had on the Ahmadi identity. 
Ahmadi persecution began with a few isolated cases at the turn o f the century and 
escalated into widespread rioting by 1953. As the political involvement of Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya increased, the Ahmadi identity became increasingly politicized. The 
prospects of partition forced many Muslims to put their sectarian differences aside 
and unite under a nationalist banner, which resulted in the creation of an independent 
Pakistan. Once the partition was complete, the religious rivalries resumed and 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya became the object of public condemnation that was allegedly 
based on Ghulam Ahmad’s claim of prophethood. In 1974, the National Assembly of 
Pakistan moved to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims for the purposes of 
constitutional law. In 1984, further changes to Pakistan’s constitution forced Ghulam 
Ahmad’s fourth successor to leave Pakistan in exile and re-establish the headquarters 
of the movement in central London.
The combination of the political struggles with the persecution o f the Jama‘at 
led to significant changes in the Ahmadi identity. The current Ahmadi identity is not
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wholly based on Ghulam Ahmad’s messianic claims, but is also in part the result of 
the socio-political context of the South Asian environment from which it emerged. 
British rule in India had initiated a reassessment of Muslim institutions and an 
evaluation of Muslim political autonomy leading up to the partition. Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya’s involvement in major political crises like the conflict in Kashmir, the 
partition of India itself, and the Punjab disturbances of 1953 gradually led to the 
politicization o f Ahmadi Islam. As the notion of Ahmadiyyat became increasingly 
politicized, the formation of the Ahmadi identity evolved, and the dichotomy between 
Ahmadiyyat and Islam widened. The current Ahmadi identity is not the necessary 
outcome of Ghulam Ahmad’s messianic claims, but rather the result of complex 
influences over time, which occasionally were independent of religious factors.
Significant changes needed to take place which allowed the community to 
develop from a small group of Ghulam Ahmad’s loyalists into the heavily politicized 
and persecuted international community that exists today. Although a history of the 
Ahmadiyya movement exists, a history of Ahmadi thought is missing from the 
existing studies on the Jama‘at. This study aims to trace the development of Ahmadi 
thought through its process of formalization and up to its current form. These subtle 
variations in the way that Ahmadi doctrine has been emphasized over the past century 
correlate with the different stages of development of the Ahmadi identity. By 
mapping these changes in Ahmadi doctrine and placing them in their appropriate 
religio-political and historical context, we can gain a better understanding o f Jama‘at- 
i Ahmadiyya and observe how the movement has progressed over the past century. 
The external and internal influences on Ahmadi Islam have been diverse and complex
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involving a number of religious and political reactions and innovations. Nonetheless, 
we have a fascinating opportunity to witness the transformation o f this identity, which 
still has the potential of severing its ties with its Islamic heritage and forming an 
altogether new religious identity.
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Chapter 1 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani before his Prophethood
In this chapter we will begin with a look at Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s family 
background and its significance in the development of his subsequent mission. We 
will explore the historical background of his education and spiritual training, his 
family’s involvement with the British government, and how his personal experiences 
with Christian missionaries may have influenced his thought and prepared him for his 
contentious religious career. As Ghulam Ahmad developed his skills in religious 
argumentation, he began writing books and argumentative articles that gave him 
limited recognition amongst the Muslim elite and enabled him to found a small 
community, which he called Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. This process allowed Ghulam 
Ahmad to expand his views on other religions and to initiate his divine mission, 
which he based on messianic claims.
1.1 -  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s Family Background
The vast majority of the Ahmadi biographical literature relating the life of 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad begins with an extensive account of the Mirza’i family’s 16th 
century migration from Persian Central Asia to India.1 Ghulam Ahmad’s emphasis 
on his lineage played an important role in establishing the religious and social
1 The ch ief source o f  biographical information on Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is his own autobiographical 
account, which takes up a considerable portion o f  the footnotes o f  his book K iiab  al-Baviyya. See 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, K itab al-B ariyya, in R uh am K haza  'in, Vol. 13, pp. 162-313.
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legitimacy for his Jama‘at. Recounting Ghulam Ahmad’s heritage will allow us to
develop a more complete picture of his mission and give us a better understanding of 
the Indo-colonial environment from which Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya emerged. The very 
fact that this lineage has been categorically presented in Ahmadi sources as a 
precondition for understanding the life and claims of the founder should give us a 
greater appreciation for the values of the early community and the Indian society 
from which it came.
The first recorded ancestor of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was Mirza Hadi Beg, an 
alleged member of the Mughal Barlas tribe, which was comprised o f the ancestral 
descendents of Haji Barlas and originally lived in Kish, south of Samarqand.3 When 
the tribal leadership passed to Timur, members of the tribe moved west to Khurasan, 
where they remained until the early part of the 16th century. Mirza Hadi Beg
2 Ghulam Ahmad presented a genealogical tree that clearly details his descent from Mirza Hadi Beg, 
who was the first family member to migrate to India. However, there are som e discrepancies in 
Ghulam Ahmad’s ancestry before Mirza Hadi Beg, which we will discuss below. See Mirza Ghulam  
Ahmad, K itab a l-B ariyya, in R u h a n iK h a za ’in, Vol. 13, p. 172, in the footnote to the footnote.
3 Haji B eg Barlas was the head o f  the Barlas tribe prior to Timur (Tamerlane). This aspect o f  Ghulam  
Ahm ad’s genealogy is problematic, because the Barlas tribe o f  Central Asia was o f  Turkic origin with 
a m ixed M ongolian ancestty. Ghulam Ahm ad’s claim to have a Persian ancestry played a crucial role 
in providing supporting evidence for his broader spiritual m ission. He emphasized the Persian lineage 
because it coincided with a hadith, which he interpreted to mean that the m ahdi would be o f  Persian 
descent. This clearly went against the accepted view  that the Barlas tribe was o f  Turko-Mongolian 
origin. Ghulam Ahmad acknowledged the contradiction but affirmed that his original ancestors were 
Persian, which he based purely on divine revelation. Similarly, many M uslim s believed that the m ahdi 
would be o f  Arab descent, which they based on a different hadith that suggested the m ahdi's lineage 
would emanate from the tribe o f  the Prophet, Ghulam Ahmad was able to resolve the conflict when it 
was revealed to him that his paternal grandmothers descended from an Arab ancestry which stemmed 
from the Prophet Muhammad him self. For more information on the ethnography and politics o f  the 
Barlas tribe, see Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Rise an d  Rtde o f  Tamerlane  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). For classical view s regarding the ancestry o f  the mahdi, see Ibn Khaldun, 
Franz Rosenthal (trans.), and N . J. Dawood (ed.), The Mnqaddimah: An Introduction to H istory  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 257-258. For Ghulam Ahm ad’s revelations 
regarding his own lineage, see H aqiqat al-W ahy, in Ruhani K haza 'in, Vol. 22, pp. 81-82, in the 
footnotes, which include the strong assertion that his lineage is Persian, and not Mughal, as well as the 
revelation informing him that he had descended from M uhammad’s daughter Fatima through his 
paternal grandmothers who were sayyids. Similar revelations appear in: Tiryaq al-Q idub, in Ruhani 
Khaza 'in, Vol. 15, pp. 272-273, in the footnote; Tohfa Golrcnviyya, in Riihdm K haza 'in, Vol. 17, p.
117, in the footnote; and Ek G h alad  kd Izdla, in Ruhani Khaza ’in, Vol. 18, p. 212, in the footnote.
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migrated to India in 1530 with roughly 200 family members and attendants who 
founded a village called Islampur, approximately 10 miles west of the Beas River and 
70 miles northeast of Lahore. Islampur was part of a large tract of land (jagir) that 
was given to Mirza Hadi Beg by the Imperial Court of the Mughal Emperor Babar.4 
Mirza Hadi Beg was given some legal jurisdiction over the area as the local qadi 
(Islamic magistrate), and thus the village came to be known as Islampur Qadi. Over 
time, the name of the village evolved into various forms until eventually the 
‘Islampur’ prefix was dropped altogether, and the name of the village became 
Qadian.5 It appears that the original area o f the jagir  encompassed at least 70 
neighbouring villages, which was a sizeable domain. As such, the jag ir  more closely 
resembled a semi-independent territory in Imperial India than one family’s oversized 
estate. Likewise, the head of the family, as the jagirdar, more closely resembled an 
Indian feudal ruler, rather than a mere landlord, and exercised a reasonable amount of 
sovereignty over the jagir. Consequently, the old city of Qadian was a walled 
settlement, as were many cities in India during that time. The fortress styled wall 
stood 22 feet high by 18 feet wide with four towers surrounding the homes of a 
standing militia. By the time that Ghulam Ahmad’s great-grandfather, Mirza Gul 
Muhammad (d. 1800), inherited the jag ir , a significantly reduced force remained at 
hand, which included a cavalry and three large guns. In addition to the military 
presence, Gul Muhammad’s Qadian is often portrayed as a place that fostered the
4 Sir Lepel H. Griffin and Charles Francis M assy, The Panjab Chiefs (Lahore: Civil and Military 
Gazette Press, 1890), p. 49; see also Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, K itab al-Bariyya, in Ruhani Khaza'in , 
Vol. 13, pp. 162-163.
5 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, K itab al-B ariyya , in Ruhani K h a za ’in, Vol. 13, pp. 163-164.
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growth of Islamic thought through generous endowments for Muslim intellectuals at a 
time of external hostilities.6
As the stronghold of the Mughals faded away, so did the glory days of the 
\oya\ist jagir dars. When Mirza Gul Muhammad passed away, the jag ir  was inherited 
by his son and Ghulam Ahmad’s grandfather, Mirza ‘Ata Muhammad. By this point, 
the Sikh insurgency was gaining strength throughout the Punjab, and ‘Ata 
Muhammad watched as the Sikhs captured the villages of his./agz>’ until only Qadian 
itself remained under the family’s control. Jassa Singh (d. 1803) and the Sikhs of the 
Ramgarhia misal seized Qadian in 1802.7 The hostility involved in the takeover of 
Qadian resulted in the burning of the library, which had been well endowed with 
Islamic texts and Qur’anic manuscripts through the previous generations. The main 
mosque of Qadian was converted into a Sikh temple, which still functions as such to 
this day. The remaining members of the family were expelled from Qadian and 
forced to take refuge in a nearby village, where they lived in exile for the next 16 
years. This difficult time period for the family culminated in the murder of Mirza 
‘Ata Muhammad who was poisoned in 1814.
In the following years, Ranjit Singh consolidated his rule of the Punjab, which 
enabled the family to find relief from their predicament by negotiating a deal with the 
Sikhs.8 In 1818 Ghulam Ahmad’s father, Mirza Ghulam Murtaza, and his brothers 
were permitted to return to Qadian with their families on the condition that they
6 Ibid., pp. 166-174; see also Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Ahm adiyyat: The Renaissance o f  Islam  
(Tabshir Publications, 1978), pp. 1-2.
7 Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Ahm adiyyat: The Renaissance o f  Islam, p. 2.
8 Khushwant Singh, A H istory o f  the Sikhs: Volume I: 1469-1839  (Oxford: Oxford University' Press, 
1999), pp. 188-191; see also G. S. Chhabra, A dvanced  H istory o f  the Punjab, V ol. II, (Ludhiana: 
Parkash Brothers, 1973), pp. 37-39.
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enlisted in Ranjit Singh’s army. Accordingly, Ahmadis often stress how Mirza 
Ghulam Murtaza and his brothers performed favourably in the campaigns in Kashmir, 
Peshawar, and Multan; however, the Ahmadi portrayals often overlook that these 
campaigns were fought against other Muslims.9 By the 1830s, Ghulam Murtaza’s 
loyalty and services were rewarded with the return of four villages from the ancestral 
estate including Qadian. Between the brothers, they received pensions of Rs. 700 per 
annum and managed to recover a total of seven villages from their ancestral estate.10 
With the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839, the British were soon able to extend their rule 
over the rest of India in a relatively short amount of time, following the First Sikh 
War.
It was in this atmosphere, during the family’s political and economic decline 
that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was born in Qadian to a father who had witnessed the 
withering away of the fruits of several preceding generations. Although the affects of 
this decline played a key role in Ghulam Ahmad’s portrayal of his childhood and 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s grieving perception of the period pertaining to their founder’s
9 Although Ahmadis are proud o f  this history, virtually no Ahmadi account discusses the fact that these 
campaigns were fought against fellow  M uslims who were rebelling against the Sikhs as mujahidin. 
Griffin noted that Ghulam Murtaza ‘was continually em ployed on active service’ under ‘N ao Nahal 
Singh, Sher Singh, and the Darbar.’ It was Sher Singh’s forces who stopped Sayyid Ahmad o f  Rai 
Bareilly (more com m only known as Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi or Sayyid Ahmad Shahid) and Shah 
Muhammad Isma'il (the grandson o f  Shah W aliullah Dehlawi) at Balakot where both were martyred in 
1831 on their way to Kashmir from Peshawar, Although Ghulam Murtaza’s particular role in these  
battles is unclear, it is likely that he fought against other M uslims during this time. See Sir Lepel H. 
Griffin and Charles Francis M assy, The Panjab Chiefs, p. 50; see also Khushwant Singh, A H istory  o f  
the Sikhs: Volume I: 1469-1839, pp. 262-265; see also Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Sirat 
M asih-i Maw 'ud (Rabwah: M ajlis Khuddam al-Ahmadiyya Pakistan, 1979), pp. 4-5.
10 Sir Lepel H. Griffin and Charles Francis Massy, The Panjab Chiefs, p. 50; see also Yohanan 
Friedmann Prophecy Continuous: A spects o f  Ahm adi Religious Thought an d  Its M edieval Background  
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1989), p. 2, in footnote 1. Friedmann suggests that the 
family history was based on the accounts given in Griffin’s book, but it seems more likely that Griffin 
based his account on the fam ily’s own oral records, despite the fact that the fam ily now  quotes from 
Griffin to establish a greater sense o f  historic credibility'. It is likely that this is all circular information 
which was originally based on the fam ily’s own accounts.
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birth, the tragedy is no greater than the deterioration of many other aristocratic 
families following the advent of modernity throughout the period of colonial 
expansion. The successful campaigns of the Sikhs and later the British resulted in a 
steady decline o f the Muslim aristocracy through the 17th and 18th centuries. One can 
appreciate the sense of apathy and resentment that the family had towards their 
waning influence in the 19th century through the descriptions that are found in the 
numerous passages in which Ghulam Ahmad lamented his family’s losses.11
1.2 -  Education and Spiritual Training
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was born in Qadian on Friday, 13 February 183 5,12 
along with a twin sister named Jannat, who was born before him but died a few days 
later.13 He received private tutoring, which was the type of education that was 
standard amongst the aristocratic children of rural Punjab. This process began at age
11 Ghulam Ahmad clearly placed a high value on his aristocratic background. There is evidence o f  this 
in the way that he occasionally signed his publications: Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Chieftain (ra is) o f  
Qadian. Even later publications appeared with this signature, but with less frequency. H owever, this 
is surprising because it implies that his status as a ra  'is, a socio-political title, took precedence over his 
spiritual claims, for exam ple, m asih-i m a w 'iid (the promised messiah). His failure to consistently drop 
the worldly title ra ’is in favour o f  his divine appointment demonstrates the importance that he placed 
on it.
12 The accuracy o f  this date is questionable, even though it is the accepted date that presently appears 
on all Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya publications. Estimates regarding Ghulam Ahm ad’s birth date have varied 
considerably from 1831 to 1840. In his own account, Ghulam Ahinad said that he was born in either
1839 or 1840. See Kitab al-B ariyya, in Ruham Khaza ’in. Vol. 13, p. 177, in the first footnote. For 
several years during the reign o f  Ghulam Ahm ad’s second successor, the accepted date o f  birth was 
listed as 1836 until it was changed to the 1835 date given above. Once again, the primary motivation 
for adjusting the birth date revolved around issues relating to the fulfilm ent o f  prophecies concerning 
the com ing o f  the m ahdi and the messiah. Interestingly, the 1835 date was settled by com bining the 
indirect implications o f  Ghulam Ahm ad’s statements regarding the phase o f  the moon during his 
divinely ordained birth along with the spiritual necessity o f  his birth taking place on a Friday, which is 
w idely regarded as the holiest day in Islam. The m ost comprehensive account o f  the details involving  
these variations can be found in D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tarikh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, (Rabwah,
1983), pp. 48-50.
13 A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad  (Lahore: Tabshir, 1948), p. 27.
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seven with a Hanafi tutor named Fazl Ilahi, who was a local resident of Qadian who 
taught Ghulam Ahmad the Qur’an and some elementary Persian. Around age ten, 
Ghulam Ahmad began studying with Fazl Ahmad, who was a member o f the Ahl-i 
Hadith movement from Ferozwala, District Gujranwala who would travel to Qadian 
to teach Ghulam Ahmad intermediate Arabic grammar.14 These lessons were 
followed by a small break in his education around age 16, when Ghulam Ahmad 
married his maternal uncle’s daughter named Hurmat Bibi. When Ghulam Ahmad 
resumed his studies shortly thereafter, he had a Shi‘i tutor from Batala named Gul 
‘Ali Shah who taught him advanced Arabic grammar and logic. Initially, Gul ‘Ali 
Shah would come to Qadian to teach Ghulam Ahmad, but then later Ghulam Ahmad 
began travelling to Batala for short periods of time to continue his studies. At the 
time, Gul ‘Ali Shah was also teaching Muhammad Husayn Batalwi, who developed 
and maintained a close friendship with Ghulam Ahmad well into their adult lives, 
even though the two became bitter rivals after Ghulam Ahmad proclaimed his 
messianic mission.15
The instruction from these three tutors represents the entirety of Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad’s formal education and training according to the Ahmadi historians, 
who often emphasize its modesty in comparison to the curriculum for traditional 
‘idamci in Islam. Ghulam Ahmad’s formal education was based almost entirely on 
language acquisition, which was only the basis for traditional Islamic scholarship. It 
would be useful to know the details of the other subjects (if any) that Ghulam Ahmad
M It may be o f  interest to note that Fazl Ahm ad’s son, Mubarak ‘A ll o f  Sialkol, later became an 
Ahmadi, which im plies that the two maintained a good relationship despite Ghulam Ahm ad’s 
subsequent conflicts with the Ahl-i Hadith, which w e w ill discuss below.
15 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement: A H istory an d  P erspective  (Delhi: Manohar Book  
Service, 1974), p. 28.
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studied during this period. One cannot presume that Fazl Ilahi taught Ghulam Ahmad 
fiqh-i hanafiyya (legal theory) simply because he was Hanafi, or that Fazl Ahmad 
taught Ghulam Ahmad hadith criticism simply because he was a member of the Ahl-i 
Hadith movement, or finally that Gul ‘Ali Shah taught Ghulam Ahmad the 
theological subtleties of the coming of the mahdi simply because he was Shi‘a. This 
view of Ghulam Ahmad’s Islamic education, or perhaps lack of education, is 
precisely the image that Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya maintains with firm resolve. When 1 
questioned Sayyid Mir Mahmud Ahmad Nasir, the prominent Ahmadi scholar and 
longtime principal of the Ahmadi seminary in Rabwah, about the inconsistencies in 
Ghulam Ahmad’s Islamic education, he made it abundantly clear that this is the point 
that clearly demonstrates that Ghulam Ahmad was ammi (unlettered) in the same way 
as the Prophet Muhammad. He further elaborated that this was because all prophets 
of God, including Ghulam Ahmad, received their knowledge from Allah, who has 
knowledge of all things.16
It is worth noting that Ghulam Ahmad was not linked to any religious 
institutions for his education, unlike the majority of scholars in the Muslim world 
who typically underwent some period of formal study of the traditional Islamic 
sciences. In many ways, Ghulam Ahmad was not a traditional Islamic scholar, which 
may account for some of the irregularities in his methodology that developed later on
16 This view  was expressed to me in a conversation with Sayyid Mir Mahmud Ahmad Nasir at the 
Ahmadi seminary, Rabwah, Pakistan (1 April 2006). Ghulam Ahmad did express similar sentiments 
regarding the expectations o f  the promised messiah in which he said that the com ing m essiah would  
not be taught by anyone other than Allah. In addition, Ghulam Ahmad claimed that he was not taught 
by any human being but rather Allah taught him the Qur’an and hadith. See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, 
A yyam -i Sitlh, in Ruhani Khaza 'in, V ol. 14, p. 394.
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in his career. In comparison, even his first successor, Maulvi Hakim Nur al-Din, 
had spent a number of years formally studying Islam with traditional scholars while 
travelling through the Middle East.18 It is important to recall that the advent of 
modernity is often associated with the decline of the traditional ‘ulama in the Muslim 
world and to recognize that many notable figures in 19th century South Asian Islam 
did not follow traditional courses of study and would not be considered traditional 
‘ulama}9 However, even though Ghulam Ahmad’s fragmented scholastic 
background was consistent with a prevalent strand that was present within this 
historical context, it is unlikely that his language tutors provided the entirety of his 
religious education and training.20
The years between Ghulam Ahmad’s tutorials as an adolescent to the 
beginning of his mission are the most mysterious in his life. That Ghulam Ahmad 
had no links to a program of formal study with a specialist teacher makes it more 
difficult to trace his patterns of thought. Without a religious education, Ghulam
171 have used ‘M aulvi’ and ‘Maulana’ instead o f ‘M aw lw i’ and ‘M awlana’ because o f  their common  
use.
18 Prior to his bay 'at (allegiance) with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Hakim Nur al-Din had taken bay ‘a t with 
Shah * Abd al-Ghani while studying in M ecca and Medina. He had also studied with M aulvi Nazir 
Husayn Dehlawi and a disciple o f  Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi. See ‘Abd al-Qadir, H ayydt-i N ur (Qadian: 
NizaratNashar-o-Isha‘at, 2003), pp. 54-56; for a less detailed account in English, see  also Muhammad 
Zafrulla Khan, H azrat M aulvi Nooruddeen KhalifatuI M asib 1 (London: London M osque, 1983?), pp. 
12-13, 24-25.
19 For a more detailed discussion on the tension between traditional Islamic learning, classical strands 
o f  rationalism, and modernist reform, see Fazlur Rahman, Islam and  M odernity: Transform ation o f  an 
Intellectual Tradition  (London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1982).
20 Although our primary concern is Ghulam Ahm ad’s religious education, it is interesting to note that 
he was also taught som e m edicine by his father w ho was a notable hakim  (herbal and natural medicine  
doctor). This tradition o f  herbal and alternative m edicine has continued to evolve as an intellectual 
subculture within Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya and is tied in to their holistic view  o f  physical and spiritual 
healing. If this strand were more dominant, one could argue that these aspects o f  Ahmadi ideology  
bordered on the N ew  Age. A t present, the majority o f  Ahmadi m osques include a homeopathic 
dispensary with facilities for personal consultations. For more information regarding the Ahmadi 
view s on m edicine, including specific prescriptions for various ailments, see the book by Ghulam  
Ahm ad’s fourth successor, Mirza Tahir Ahmad, H om eopathy  (Tilford: Islam International 
Publications, 2005).
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Ahmad appears to jump from being a grammar intensive recluse to the spiritual 
reformer {miijciddid) of the age. There is a gap of nearly twenty years that is largely 
unaccounted for in the Ahmadi biographies, which mention little more than Ghulam 
Ahmad’s solemn practice of reading and re-reading the Qur’an in isolation. These 
discrepancies in conjunction with his educational deficiencies led Spencer Lavan to 
question ‘whether or not Ghulam Ahmad ever entered a sufi order or received any 
specialized spiritual training common to almost all Muslim religious teachers o f the 
times.’21 However, this question presupposes that Ghulam Ahmad’s religious 
education was incomplete at the time he finished his instructional sessions with Gul 
‘Ali Shah. One could better gauge Ghulam Ahmad’s mastery of the Islamic sciences 
by comparing his level o f proficiency to the progress of the other students with whom 
he had studied. For example, if Muhammad Husayn Batalwi had also completed his 
education at the same time as Ghulam Ahmad, then one could conclude that Gul ‘Ali 
Shah’s lessons were quite comprehensive since Batalwi was known to be a prominent 
scholar of the Ahl-i Hadith. This would imply that Gul ‘Ali Shah’s tutorials were 
sufficient to prepare Muhammad Husayn Batalwi for his subsequent religious career 
with the foundational Islamic knowledge that was necessary for a scholar of his 
calibre and arguably sufficient for Ghulam Ahmad to have advanced his claims of 
being the ‘Imam of the age’.22 It is well known, however, that Muhammad Husayn 
Batalwi’s studies did not end with Gul ‘Ali Shah and that Batalwi travelled to Delhi 
where he remained for a number of years completing his education before returning
21 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement, pp. 28-29.
22 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Zarurat ai-lm dm , in Riihdm Khaza ’in, Vol. 13.
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to Batala as a recognized Islamic scholar (;maulvi).23 This comparison with Batalwi5s 
progression implies that Ghulam Ahmad may only have studied languages as the 
Ahmadi sources suggest, and it confirms the Ahmadi position that his Islamic 
education at this point in his life was neither extensive nor complete.
Ghulam Ahmad continued his religious studies on his own after the period of 
formal instruction had finished, but the exact date of when these sessions ended is 
unknown. What is known in connection to this period is that during the Mutiny of 
1857, Ghulam Ahmad’s older brother, Mirza Ghulam Qadir, along with many other 
residents of Qadian, was urged by their father, Mirza Ghulam Murtaza, to enlist in 
military service. As a result, the Qadiani group, headed by Mirza Ghulam Qadir, 
joined General Nicholson’s 46th Native Infantry.24 The military service earned the
* * • 25family financial remuneration as well as the lasting appreciation of the British. We 
can presume that Ghulam Ahmad must have been too young in 1857 to have been 
pressured into military service by his father, and instead he was directed towards the 
civil service shortly thereafter.26 Around 1864 Ghulam Ahmad was sent to Sialkot to 
take a job as a court reader under the Deputy Commissioner, who had a connection to 
his father. Sialkot was a much larger city than Qadian and had become a centre for
23 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, p. 111.
24 Sir Lepel H. Griffin and Charles Francis M assy, The Panjab Chiefs, p. 50.
25 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Kitab al-B ariyya, in Ruhani Khaza 'in, Vol. 13, pp. 4-7. The letter on p. 
6, is fi'om the Commissioner o f  Lahore, Robert Cust, (20 September 1858) and details the offer o f  a 
khil'at (land grant) made to Mirza Ghulam Murtaza worth Rs. 200 in return for the 50 cavalry units 
that he provided during the Mutiny. M ultiple letters, including these ones, are also available in Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad, K a sh f al-Ghita, in Ruhani K h a za ’in. Vol. 14, pp. 181-185, and also in M ajm u‘a-i 
Ishtiharat, Vol. 2, pp. 459-462.
26 Ghulam Ahmad said that he was sixteen or seventeen years old during the Mutiny o f  1857 and that 
his facial hair had not yet begun to grow. See K itab al-B ariyya, in Ruhani Khaza 'in, V ol. 13, p. 177, 
in footnote.
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evangelical Christian missionary activity in Punjab during the 19th century.27 This 
period in Sialkot was when Ghulam Ahmad first came into contact with evangelical 
Christian missionaries, who appear to have had a considerable impact on his religious 
outlook. Though Ghulam Ahmad disliked the job, he stayed in Sialkot for a few 
years as a reader in the British-Indian court of Sialkot, despite having 110 previous 
knowledge of English.
Apparently, Ghulam Ahmad made an effort to learn English during his time in 
Sialkot, where English language courses were offered to government employees as a 
means of professional development. In one account, Ghulam Ahmad is said to have 
completed the first two levels o f an English course before he withdrew.28 The results 
of this language instruction may have carried over into the latter part of his mission, 
when Ghulam Ahmad began receiving some revelations in English, which he would 
write down in Urdu script.29 Although these revelations were far less frequent than 
the revelations that Ghulam Ahmad received in other languages including Urdu, 
Arabic, and Persian, they appeared miraculous to devoted followers, like Maulana 
Muhammad ‘Ali, who adamantly maintained that Ghulam Ahmad ‘did not know a
27 See Avril A. Pow ell, ‘Contested Gods and Prophets: Discourse among M inorities in Late
Nineleenth-Century-Pun jab,' Renaissance and M odern Studies, No. 38, (1995), p. 41; see also John 
McManners (ed.) The Oxford History o f  Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.
511-526; see also E. M. Wherry, The M uslim C ontroversy  (London: The Christian Literature Society, 
1905); see also H. A. Walter, The Ahm adiya M ovement (London: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 
14.
28 Dard emphasizes that the sum total o f  Ghulam Ahm ad’s English instruction was only enough for 
him to have the ability to read the alphabet and a few sim ple words. He also insists that Ghulam  
Ahmad soon forgot what he was taught after he discontinued his studies; A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, p.
39.
29 For exam ples, see Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Bardhin-i Ahm adiyya , Part IV, in RuhdnTKhaza'in, Vol.
1, p. 563, in footnote, and pp. 571-572 in the bottom footnote; see also al-Hakam  V ol. 10, N o. 4, (31 
January 1906), p. 3, which is available in Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Tadhldra  (Tilford, Islam  
International Publications, 2004), pp. 338-339; see also al-Hakam  Vol. 11, N o. 12, (10 April 1907), p.
2, in Tadhkira, p. 393.
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word of English.’30 However, there is something suspicious about the English 
revelations that is difficult for native speakers to ignore. The English revelations 
were typically only a few words in length and often included phrases with 
questionable grammar. For example, one English revelation warned, ‘God is coming 
by His army. He is with you to kill enemy.’31 Other English revelations followed: ‘I 
love you. I am with you. I shall help you. I can what I will do. We can what we will 
do.’32 Ghulam Ahmad’s English revelations were often supplemented with eloquent 
Urdu translations so that he himself could understand their meaning, while on other 
occasions, he would simply ask English speakers what the revelations meant. 
Although the above examples are not intended to mock Mirza Ghulam Ahmad or to 
discredit what Ahmadis may associate with divine revelation, they provide 
considerable insight into what Ghulam Ahmad’s understanding of ‘revelation’ 
actually entailed.
Although he spent much of his personal time pursuing religious devotions, the 
Christian missionaries in Sialkot provided new prospects for a religious dialogue with 
which Ghulam Ahmad was unfamiliar in Qadian. The exposure to such discussions 
must have opened up new avenues and new modes of thought for Ghulam Ahmad in 
his youth. He would debate the missionaries on points of eschatology and salvation, 
and ultimately endeavour to prove the superiority of Islam as a religion to his 
Christian counterparts/3 These exchanges provided Ghulam Ahmad with the
30 Muhammad ‘Ali, The F ounder o f  the Ahm adiyya M ovem ent (Newark, CA: Ahm adiyya Anjuman 
Isha'at Islam Lahore, 1984), p. 37.
31 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Bavahin-i Ahm adiyya, Part IV, in R uhdriiKhaza'in, Vol. 1, pp. 571-572 in 
the bottom footnote.
32 Ibid., pp. 571-572 in the bottom footnote; a very similar revelation appears in English in H aqlqat al- 
Wahy, in Ruhdni K h a za ’in, Vol. 22, pp. 316-317.
33 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, p. 92.
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opportunity to improve and finesse his logical argumentation and to express his 
religious outlook in writing for the first time.34 The discussions and debates in 
Sialkot were beneficial, because Ghulam Ahmad was still a young amateur theologian 
at the time, whereas his religious rivals were higher educated Christian missionaries. 
His encounters with the missionaries facilitated a second period o f intellectual and 
spiritual growth for Ghulam Ahmad, even though he had a fulltime career as a court 
reader and was still not receiving any formal religious training. There is no doubt that 
these debates influenced and shaped the Ahmadi polemic against Christianity, which 
later came to define much of Ghulam Ahmad’s career.
Ghulam Ahmad’s increased religious exposure in Sialkot was not limited to 
Christianity, but also included encounters with Muslim intellectuals like Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan who had recently published his commentary on the Qur’an. Ironically, 
Ghulam Ahmad’s main criticism of the commentary regarded Sir Sayyid’s assertion 
that Jesus had died and was not alive in heaven, which is a belief that eventually 
defined the greater part o f Ghulam Ahmad’s mission.35 He also objected to Sir 
Sayyid’s naturalism, which he felt diminished the belief in miracles and replaced it 
with the determinism of modernist science.36 Eventually, Ghulam Ahmad wrote a 
full response to Sir Sayyid in his Barakat al-Du ‘a (The Blessings of Prayer) on the 
effects of prayer,37 along with some other articles that were published separately.38
3‘’ A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, p. 39.
35 Ghulam Ahmad surprisingly maintained the orthodox view  that Jesus was alive in heaven until 
relatively late in his career. Remnants o f  this position can be found as late as Barahin-i A hm adiyya , 
Part IV, in Ruhdni K h a za ’in, Vol. 1, p. 593, which was published in 1884.
36 A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, p. 40.
j7 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Barakat al-Du  'a, in Ruhdm K haza 'in, Vol. 6.
38 There is an interesting critique o f  Sir Sayyid’s concept o f  revelation in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Izdla- 
i A wham , in Ruhdm Khaza 'in, Vol. 3, pp. 596-602. See also ‘Sir Sayyad Ahmad o f  Aligarh and Hazrat
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Ghulam Ahmad’s disputes with the Aligarh scholars continued throughout the rest of 
his life, despite his subsequent adoption of Sir Sayyid’s position on Jesus’ physical 
ascension to heaven.
The biographies relate that Ghulam Ahmad developed a close relationship 
with a prominent Shaykh of the Naqshbandi order named Maulana Mahbub ‘Alam 
while living in Sialkot, however, many of these accounts often conceal Maulana 
Mahbub ‘Alam’s Sufi affiliations.39 The Ahmadi sources suggest that the two 
developed a close ‘friendship’, which is doubtful even though the nature of their 
relationship is unclear, considering Mahbub ‘Alam’s stature as a prominent Sufi 
Shaykh.40 The sources depict a lighthearted camaraderie between casual 
acquaintances, which is improbable considering Ghulam Ahmad’s youth and 
incomplete religious training. Given the cultural context and the customary practices 
of the time, it is unlikely that an established Shaykh of the Naqshbandi order,41 like 
Maulana Mahbub ‘Alam, would have exchanged pleasantries or had casual 
conversations with a young court clerk about their shared passion for Islam, even if 
their exchanges were rather engaging. In accordance with the proper social etiquettes 
associated with an esteemed pir, the only meaningful relationship that Ghulam 
Ahmad was capable of establishing with a Sufi Shaykh at that stage in his life was
Ahmad o f  Qadian Compared and Contrasted’, R eview  o f  R eligions (June 1933) Vol. 32, No. 6, pp. 
292-297.
39 Basharal Ahmad, M ujaddid-i 'Azam (Lahore?: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at Islam Lahore, 1939), p. 
60. When Maulana Mahbub ‘A lam ’s credentials and his affiliations with the Naqshbandi order are 
mentioned in Ahmadi sources they tend to be underrated.
40 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, p. 132; and also A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, p.
40.
41 Arthur Buehler’s study on theNaqshbandis in India mentioned Mahbub ‘Alam in relation to his 
position on reciting the H izb al-Bahr o f  Abu Hasan al-Shadhili without permission, for which Buehler 
referenced, Mahbub ‘Alam , D hikr-i Kathir: Mahbub al-Suluk (Lahore: M illi Printers, 1913). See 
Arthur F. Buehler, Sufi H eirs o f  the Prophet: The Indian Naqshbandiyya an d  the Rise o f  the M ediating  
Sufi Shaykh (Columbia: University o f  South Carolina Press, 2008), p. 85.
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one of student and teacher. It is more plausible that Ghulam Ahmad was going to 
Mahbub ‘Alam as a student, although the formality and subject matter of his study is 
debatable and it is not known whether he was initiated into the Naqshbandi order. 
However, Maulana Mahbub ‘Alam may still have served as a potential spiritual guide 
for Ghulam Ahmad, since it is possible for him to have developed a close relationship 
with the Shaykh without formally taking his bay‘at (allegiance). Ghulam Ahmad’s 
bay ‘at with the Shaykh is in many ways superfluous, because even though he may 
never have been formally initiated into the Sufi order, it appears as though he was 
going to Mahbub ‘Alam to learn Sufism.
In 1867, Ghulam Ahmad returned to Qadian upon receiving word of his 
mother’s poor health. Although he left Sialkot immediately, his mother, Chiragh 
Bibi, had passed away by the time he reached home. Rather than returning to Sialkot, 
Ghulam Ahmad remained in Qadian to help his father with the ongoing legal battles 
pertaining to the recovery of the family’s lost estates. The new career required 
frequent travel to remote locations, which often lasted for extended periods of time. 
The seclusion provided Ghulam Ahmad with more opportunities to continue his 
Islamic studies on his own. Although his legal success varied from case to case, the 
family was never able to re-establish its previous influence in the region. Ghulam 
Ahmad’s disinterest in worldly pursuits and financial stability apparently created 
some tension between him and his father. His father persuaded him to study for the 
qualifying examination that would have enabled him to practice law, but he failed the 
exam and soon lost interest.42
42 A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 40-41.
52
Ghulam Ahmad’s biographers mention that he visited the nearby saintly 
people (ahl allah) while living in Qadian, but again, few details are present in their 
accounts. Dost Muhammad Shahid mentioned a Sufi Shaykh named Mian Sharaf al- 
Din, whose residence and instructional facility in Sum Sharif near Talibpur, District 
Gurdaspur, was frequented by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad before he initiated his spiritual 
mission. On one occasion when Ghulam Ahmad had gone to Sum Sharif to visit 
Mian Sharaf al-Din, he met a Sufi called Makka Shah who was a resident of Layl, 
near Dhariwal. Dost Muhammad Shahid states that Makka Shah soon began making 
the journey to Qadian to visit Ghulam Ahmad.43 This was not unusual for Ghulam 
Ahmad who enjoyed a number of visitors in Qadian, especially during his tenure as 
messiah. It is unusual, however, that Dost Muhammad Shahid mentioned Makka 
Shah in his section on the ahl allah in the same context as Mian Sharaf al-Din, which 
implies a strong connection between the two regarding their Sufi affiliations. Ghulam 
Ahmad came into contact with several prominent scholars in his life, most of whom 
are given due recognition in his biographies, including the ones who viewed Jama ‘at- 
i Ahmadiyya unfavourably. These interactions between Ghulam Ahmad and his rivals 
have been well documented by the Ahmadi historians, but the history that pertains to 
Ghulam Ahmad’s spiritual mentors has repeatedly been obscured. Ahmadi sources 
consistently suppressed the names and affiliations of scholars capable of influencing 
Ghulam Ahmad’s mission or thought in any way that would seem other than 
supernatural. It is worth noting that in Dost Muhammad Shahid’s account, Ghulam
431 had great difficulty finding more information on these shrines, especially from external sources, 
which made it difficult to assess their significance, religious affiliations, or influence on Ghulam 
Ahmad. H owever, D ost Muhammad Shahid described them as big Sufi shrines that were frequented 
by the locals. Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tarlkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, p. 132.
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Ahmad travelled to Sum Sharif to visit Mian Sharaf al-Din, whereas Makka Shah was 
travelling to Qadian to visit Ghulam Ahmad. Perhaps his emphasis on this point was 
intended to infer Makka Shah’s relative seniority in the Islamic world in relation to 
Ghulam Ahmad whose religious status at that time was nominal.
There is one final scholar who is mentioned by the Ahmadi biographers in 
connection to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s pre-messianic biography named Maulana 
‘Abdullah Ghaznavi. Although Ghaznavi receives the most attention from the 
sources, his role is underrated.44 However, this may have less to do with ‘Abdullah 
Ghaznavi himself, who passed away before Ghulam Ahmad could announce his 
claims, and more to do with the other scholars who were affiliated with Ghaznavi and 
later opposed Ghulam Ahmad’s mission. ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi was himself exiled 
from Afghanistan when the local ‘ulama declared him a kafir (nonbeliever) and 
prompted his sudden migration to India. Ghaznavi’s biographical accounts state that 
he spent some time studying hadith in Delhi before settling in Amritsar.43 During his 
stay in Delhi, ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi studied hadith under the leading Ahl-i Hadith
44 Dard’s account makes a point to state that Ghulam Ahmad only visited ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi tw ice in 
his life, although he is said to have brought Ghaznavi gifts, see Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 50-51. This image 
seems inconsistent with a description o f  their m eeting given by Ghulam Ahmad h im self in H aqlqat a!- 
Wahy, in Ruhdm K haza ’in, V ol. 22, pp. 250-251, as well as the account given in D ost Muhammad 
Shahid, Tarlkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, pp. 132-134.
45 The biographical information on ‘Abdullah al-Ghaznavi is available in various sources, including 
som e books which have been published by his descendents’ children and grandchildren. Considering 
the closeness o f  his relationship with Ghulam Ahmad, it would be particularly useful to exam ine the 
fan vds  o f  kafr which led to his exile from Afghanistan, Although the sources mention that th c fa iw d s  
were som ehow related to ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi’s rejection o f taq lld  or strict adherence to the four 
schools o f  thought (m adhhabs), it would be interesting to see i f  Ghaznavi’s numerous revelations and 
esoteric insights described by Ghulam Ahmad influenced their decision. Dost Muhammad Shahid’s 
account states that the fa n vas  o f  kufr were linked to his interpretation o f  Bukhari and his rigid 
adherence to the sunna, which almost entirely avoids the question. See Tdrlkh-i A hm adiyya, Vol. 1, p. 
132. Dost Muhammad Shahid references Maulana ‘Abd al-Majld, Slrat al-Sana 1 (Amritsar, 1952), p. 
369, which apparently discusses the migration from Afghanistan, but was not available to me; see also 
Muhammad D a’ud Ghaznavi, M aqdlat M aulana D d ’ud  G haznavi (Lahore: Maktaba Nazira, 1979), pp. 
19-22; see also Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i Ahrar, Vol. 1, (Lahore: Maktaba-i Tabassira, 1975), pp. 142- 
143.
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scholar, Maulvi Nazir Husayn, who was a major proponent of the movement in India. 
Maulvi Nazir Husayn Dehlawi took the title Shaykh al-Kul (the scholar of all), which 
implied that he was not only a scholar of every subject but also everyone, Arab and 
non-Arab.46 Shaykh al-Kul, Maulvi Nazir Husayn Dehlawi, taught ‘Abdullah 
Ghaznavi and his sons the science of hadith. He also taught Sana’ullah Amritsari and 
Maulvi Muhammad Husayn Batalwi, who was Ghulam Ahmad’s old friend and 
classmate under Gul ‘Ali Shah,47 all of whom challenged Ghulam Ahmad’s mission 
in later years.48 In fact, it was this group o f Ahl-i Hadith scholars, headed by Maulvi 
Nazir Husayn Dehlawi, who issued the first fatw a  of kufr (infidelity) against Ghulam 
Ahmad in 1891,49 following his publication of Tawzih-i Maram (Clarification of 
Objectives).50 In many ways, this fatwa  represents a milestone in Ghulam Ahmad’s 
career, in that it marked the beginning of his estrangement from orthodox Islam.
In this light, ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi’s connection to Ghulam Ahmad was pivotal 
to his development and is worthy of further attention. Ghulam Ahmad had asked 
Maulana Ghaznavi for prayers concerning an undisclosed personal matter on a visit to 
his village of Khayrdi, in Amritsar, after which Ghaznavi immediately went home 
and began praying for Ghulam Ahmad. In the coming days after he had returned to
46 See Claudia Preckel, ‘Ahl-i Hadith’, E ncyclopaedia o f  Islam, (third edition). Brill Online.
47 Barbara D aly M etcalf, Islam ic R evival in Brilish India: Deoband, 1860-1900  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), p. 292.
48 In contrast, Maulvi Nazir Husayn Dehlawi had also taught Ghulam Ahm ad’s first successor, Nur al- 
Din. See footnote 18 above.
49 The fatw a  against Ghulam Ahmad states that he is a k a fr  (nonbeliever) and the dajja l (antichrist). 
Ghulam Ahm ad’s response to the fa tw a  is particularly relevant to this discussion because he 
inadvertently acknowledged the stature o f  Maulvi Nazir Husayn amongst the 'ufama o f  Delhi in his 
reply. See A sm am  Faysala, in Ruhdm K haza ’in, Vol. 4; also available in translation as The H eaven ly  
D ecree  (London: Islam International Publications, 2006).
50 Ghulam Ahmad wrote three companion volum es Fath-i Islam , Tawzih-i M aram , and Izala-i Awhain, 
in 1891. Tawzih-i M aram  and Izala-i Awham  expounded som e o f  his more controversial view s 
regarding the death o f  Jesus, nam ely that Jesus Christ was not alive in heaven and would not return to 
the world in the same flesh as the orthodox believe.
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Qadian, Ghulam Ahmad received a letter from Ghaznavi, which explained that he had 
received the following revelation in a dream concerning the matter:51 ‘You are our 
Protector, so help us against the disbelievers {anta mawlana fa  ’nsiirna ‘aid ’l-qawm 
al-kafinn).’52 ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi interpreted his revelation to mean that Allah 
would help Ghulam Ahmad in his matter, similar to the way in which Allah helped 
the companions of the Prophet Muhammad.53 On a separate occasion, Ghaznavi saw 
a vision in which he described a light {nur) descending upon Qadian from which his 
children were being deprived.34 This particular revelation played a major role in 
Ghulam Ahmad’s proclamation of success following a mubdhala (prayer duel) in 
1893 against ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi’s son, ‘Abd al-Haq Ghaznavi.55 The mubdhala 
ended when two supporters of ‘Abd al-Haq Ghaznavi publicly attested to hearing this 
revelation from his father.56 After ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi had passed away, Ghulam 
Ahmad saw a vision {kashf) in which Ghaznavi was carrying a large sword for killing 
the kuffar (infidels). In the vision, ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi disclosed Ghulam Ahmad’s
51 Again, the various accounts o f  this encounter have slight variations. For Ghulam Ahm ad’s account, 
see HaqTqat al-W ahy, in Riiham Khaza 'in, Vol. 22, p, 251.
52 ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi’s revelation was identical to the last verse o f  Sura al-Baqara (2:286). See 
M .A.S. Abdel Haleem (trans.), The Our'an  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 33. It may 
seem surprising that an overwhelm ing number o f  Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations were identical to 
Qur’anic verses, similar to this revelation o f ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi. It would be interesting to see if  
other alleged recipients o f  revelation also repeated portions o f  the Qur’an and claimed it as their own. 
H owever, i f  this format for receiving revelation is unique, then perhaps it was som ething that Ghulam 
Ahmad first observed in the revelations o f ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi.
53 A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 50-51.
54 D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tarlkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, p. 133.
55 A  m ubdhala  is a lengthy prayer contest in which two religious rivals curse each other and invoke the 
wrath o f  God upon each other, seeking a divine resolution to their unresolved debate. The m ubdhala  
was often used between opposing claimants o f  divine revelation and is believed to bring about the 
humiliating death o f  the liar or false claimant. The textual foundations for the m ubdhala  can be found 
in the Qur’an (3:54). For more information on the classical background, see Yohanan Friedmann, 
P rophecy Continuous, pp. 6-7, in footnote 20, where Friedmann provides a number or additional 
sources about mubdhala.
56 A . R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 276-279; see also Ghulam Ahm ad’s book Tohfa Ghaznawiyya, 
which was a byproduct o f  the mubdhala  and is available in Riiham K h a za ’in, V ol. 15.
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true spiritual rank (;maqam) and said that God would make much use out of him later 
on in his life.57
Maulana ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi was a critical figure in Ghulam Ahmad’s 
biography and there are constant reminders of him throughout Ghulam Ahmad’s 
career, including the first fatwa  of kufr issued by Maulvi Nazir Husayn Dehlawi and 
some of the last mubdhala challenges at the end of his life. Consequently, many of 
Ghulam Ahmad’s publications dealt directly or indirectly with scholars connected to 
‘Abdullah Ghaznavi,58 which may be used as an indicator of the closeness of their 
association. It is unlikely that Ghaznavi’s relations would have taken such offense to 
Ghulam Ahmad’s messianic claims if nothing personal had been vested in their 
relationship. Since the close relationship between Ghulam Ahmad and ‘Abdullah 
Ghaznavi was well known amongst Ghaznavi’s students, it became imperative for the 
relevant scholars who were associated with him to denounce Ghulam Ahmad’s 
mission in an attempt to maintain their religious credibility and to salvage their 
reputations after Ghulam Ahmad’s views had begun to diverge from orthodox Islam. 
Had it otherwise been known that Ghulam Ahmad was an insignificant or occasional 
correspondent with ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi, perhaps the relevant scholars in question 
would have been willing to dismiss his prophetic claims as trivial nonsense rather 
than inflating them with a false sense o f credence.59 However, it was the fierce 
reaction o f the followers of ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi that demonstrates the fondness that
57 Basharat Ahmad, M ujaddid-i 'Azam, p. 63.
58 Some exam ples o f  these include: A sm am  F aysala  (1891), Zarurat al-Imam  (1898), Tahfa 
G haznawiyya  (1902), Thyaq al-Qulub  (1902).
59 The negative response to Jama‘at~i Ahmadiyya appears to be tightly focused around a very specific  
group o f  South Asian scholars, whereas Ahmadi Islam appears to have been largely ignored in most 
other parts o f  the M uslim  world. See section 5.7 below , called ‘Unconventional Explanations: The 
Case o f  the Common Lineage’.
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must have been present between Maulana Ghaznavi and Ghulam Ahmad. On one 
occasion, Ghulam Ahmad attempted to exploit his relation with ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi 
by claiming that Ghaznavi would surely have been an Ahmadi had he been alive. The 
audacity of this claim in 1899 initiated a lengthy dispute with ‘Abd al-Jabbar 
Ghaznavi and Munshi Ilahi Bakhsh, who was one of ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi’s followers. 
Ghulam Ahmad’s comments led to years of quarrelling and several threats of 
mubdhala from both parties, but most of the threats went unanswered.60 Munshi Ilahi 
Bakhsh eventually published ‘Asa-i Musa (The Staff of Moses) in 1900, which 
contained his own revelations against Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.
1.3 -  Transition from Scholar to Prophet
The death o f Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s father marked a turning point in 
Ahmadi history and was a major blow to Ghulam Ahmad, who no longer had a means 
of supporting his sequestered lifestyle. By the time of his father’s death in 1876, 
Ghulam Ahmad had begun writing articles for local journals and newspapers from 
Qadian. His contributions were too irregular to consider him a journalist, and they 
often included a number of Persian poems that were republished after his death in 
1908.61 His publications did not provide a sufficient source of income, but he 
continued to write polemics against the Hindu Arya and Brahmo Samaj movements, 
and also against the Christians.
60 A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, pp. 578-584.
61 Ibid., p. 48.
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The Arya Samaj was a Hindu revivalist movement founded by Swami 
Dayanand in 1875. Dayanand had gained acceptance following the publication of his 
book Satyarth Prakash, in which he expounded the Vedas in a manner that was 
purportedly rational and consistent with modernist science.62 Ghulam Ahmad viewed 
the accomplishment as an attack on Islam and criticized theological issues, which 
were related to the creation of the soul and the existence of God. He also disapproved 
of the moral implications of the doctrine of Niyoga, in which a couple experiencing 
difficulties conceiving sons invited another man into their relationship until the 
desired number of sons had been produced.63 Although the Arya Samaj did not 
formally establish a branch in Qadian until 1887,64 their confrontations with Ghulam 
Ahmad continued as a result of tensions that had been mounting for some time. In 
1877, a ‘vagabond Sadhif came to Qadian to display his physical strength and natural 
abilities. He gained much notoriety amongst the local Hindus in the village who had 
begun to believe that he was an avatar of Shiva. When Ghulam Ahmad became 
aware of the situation, he promptly had the ‘vagabond Sadhif expelled from 
Qadian.65
Similar incidents continued with the Aryas and the Christians, whose 
missionary activities were having a profound affect on the religious landscape o f the
62 See Swami Saraswati Dayananda, Satyarth Prakash  (1875), which is also available in English as, 
Durga Prasad, Satyarthaprakasa: An English translation o f  the Satyarth Prakash  (Lahore: Virjanand 
Press, 1908).
63 H. A. Walter, The A hm adiya M ovem ent, pp. 103-104. Dard suggests that Ghulam Ahm ad’s 
argumentation led to Dayanand’s rewriting o f  the Satyarth Prakash  in which he omitted the doctrine o f  
N iyoga , but I could not confirm the discrepancy between the original and the revised editions.
64 Swami Dayanand had personally established Arya Samaj branches in Amritsar and Lahore by 1877, 
which are reasonably close to Qadian. See Kenneth W. Jones, The A rya Sam aj in the Punjab: A Study 
o f  Socia l Reform an d  Religious Revivalism, 1877-1902  (Ann Arbor: University M icrofilm s, 1966), pp. 
67, 69.
65 A. R, Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, p. 59. Dard provides a full account o f  the story.
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Punjab. Multiple factors were contributing to the general disenchantment of the 
Muslim mainstream, as increasing numbers o f disillusioned Muslims were turning to 
Christianity as a source of salvation. The decline of Muslim rule and the 
deterioration of the Muslim aristocracy at the hands of the Sikhs and then later the 
British, along with the sheer magnitude of Christian missionaries overwhelming the 
Punjab, had led many Muslims to renounce their faith and embrace what appeared to 
be a socially, economically, and theologically superior religion. The struggle for 
religious domination was not new to India, but the manner in which religious 
movements were competing with each other was changing.66
The advent of modernity had introduced a renewed emphasis on rationalism 
that had coloured the religious arena. Rationality and logical argumentation was 
increasingly being perceived as a more credible approach to religion amongst the 
mainstream, even though the themes in question often remained irrational 
themselves.67 Although many religious arguments still relied on miracles or an 
element of faith, it had now become necessary to present them in the style of a 
scientific discourse, which was becoming the preferred convention for evaluating 
truth values. Theological arguments that were based on the popular Orientalist belief 
that Islam had originated as a Christian heresy went unanswered by the Muslim 
mainstream. Islam’s confirmation of the Christian belief regarding Jesus’ ascension 
to heaven and the anticipation of his return had created a serious dilemma for many 
Indian Muslims. If Muhammad was indeed the superior prophet, then why was it
66 See Avril A. Powell, M uslims a n d  M issionaries in Pre-m utiny India  (Richmond: Routledge Press, 
1993).
67 See Steve Bruce (ed.), Religion an d  M odernization  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
especially chapter 2, Roy W allis and Steve Bruce, ‘Secularization: The Orthodox M odel’, pp. 8-30,
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Jesus whose arrival the Muslims were awaiting? For Muslim lay intellectuals this 
question presupposed an even greater problem: if Muhammad was indeed the 
superior prophet, then why was it Jesus who was alive in heaven while their prophet 
lay buried in Medina?
Many Muslims were at a loss, and it was in reaction to these embarrassments 
that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad composed his first and most celebrated work, Barahm-i 
Ahmadiyya (The Proofs o f Islam).68 The publication of Bardhin was made possible 
by the donations of a number of affluent Muslims in India.69 The work was originally 
intended to be a series o f 50 books, which comprehensively addressed rationalist 
arguments in favour o f Islam. Parts one and two were published in 1880, part three 
was published two years later in 1882, and part four soon followed in 1884, but the 
fifth and final part did not appear until 1905. Part five was essentially a new book 
altogether, despite sharing the title with the earlier unfinished series. In the 
introduction, Ghulam Ahmad explained that his inability to produce the remaining 45 
books as promised was as negligible as the zero that differentiates five from fifty.70 
Barahm-i Ahmadiyya carried the same polemic tone found in Ghulam Ahmad’s later 
works, but without the controversial claims that have come to define his legacy. The
68 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Barahm -i A hm adiyya, Pari 1 and Part II, (Amritsar: SafTr Hind Press, 1880).
69 The introductory acknowledgm ents list the Indian patrons whose donations and financial 
contributions made the publication possible. Interestingly, the Begum o f  Bhopal, Nawab Shah Jahan 
Begum, was a major benefactor for the publication o f  the text. She also funded the construction o f  the 
W oking mosque, which was built in 1889 and eventually served as the first Ahmadi m ission in the 
United Kingdom  before the Lahori-Qadiani split. See Barahm -i A hm adiyya , Part I, in Ruhdni 
Khaza ’in, V ol. 1, p. 3.
70 Ghulam Ahmad actually said that the difference was just a dot, since the numeral for zero in Urdu is 
written as a dot. He said that the only difference between A and  ^* was just a dot. Perhaps it would be 
better explained as the difference between 5 and 50 is nothing (i.e. zero) and therefore Ghulam Ahmad 
said that his five volum es equalled fifty, hence his promise was complete. There was som e subtle 
humour in this explanation which alluded to a tradition in which the Prophet was permitted to reduce 
the 50 daily prayers to five daily prayers during the night journey (isrd  and m i'raj). In B ukhaif s 
version, the five daily prayers have the reward o f  50. See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Barahin-i 
A hm adiyya , Part V, in R uhdni K h a za ’in, Vol. 21, p. 9.
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series focused on the broader scope of the Islamic tradition in light of the religious 
tensions that were specific to 19th century India. This theme was often overshadowed 
in later works by statements that emphasized and expounded the theology 
surrounding the profound implications of his spiritual claims.
Ghulam Ahmad’s first revelation regarding his status as the mujaddid 
(religious renewer) of the 14th century was included in part three of Barahm-i 
Ahmadiyya.71 Advancing a claim of this magnitude may seem premature considering 
that Ghulam Ahmad had hardly published any substantial works before proclaiming 
his divine advent, which in comparison was succeeded by his voluminous output 
afterwards. Historically, Ghulam Ahmad’s announcement of his spiritual status 
marked the beginning of his religious career rather than the evaluation of a lifetime’s 
achievement. Intuitively, one would expect a prospective mujaddid to have already 
made strides in the way of Islamic reform worthy of such a bold claim, but for 
Ghulam Ahmad, the vast majority of his public efforts in the way of Islamic reform 
came after the publication of Barahm-i Ahmadiyya. The impact of Barahm  was 
noticeable in small intellectual circles of the Punjab, but the book remained largely 
unknown and unread throughout the rest of the Muslim world. Nonetheless, Ghulam 
Ahmad as a defender of Islam had gained notoriety as a rising expert in formulating 
anti-Christian and anti-Hindu polemics.
71 Deducing Ghulam Ahm ad’s divine appointment as a reformer is not self-evident from the revelation 
in question, non eth eless, the first revelation used to establish his status as a reformer was: ‘Say, “I 
have been com m issioned and I am the first o f  the believers” (gul inm innirtu w a  ana am va lu  7- 
m u'm inin)! B arahm -i Ahm adiyya, Part III, in Ruhdni Khaza ’in, Vol. 1, p. 265, in the bottom footnote. 
It was not until much later that Ghulam Ahmad announced his interpretation o f  this revelation as being 
linked explicitly to his claim o f  being the m ujaddid  (renewer o f  the faith). Interestingly, even Ghulam 
Ahm ad’s Urdu explanation for his Arabic revelation only im plicitly addressed his claim, despite being 
written much later (1892) after he had proclaimed the scope o f  his m ission. See Iza la-i Awham , in 
Ruhdm K h a za ’in, Vol. 3, p. 193.
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Ghulam Ahmad began staging debates with leading members of the Arya 
Samaj, many of which failed to materialize. He wrote to Swami Dayanand in 1883 
and challenged him to a debate, but within a few months, Dayanand had fallen ill, 
after being poisoned and shortly before his unexpected death. Munshi Indarman 
Muradabadi accepted Ghulam Ahmad’s challenge in Dayanand’s stead, but the
72debate never took place due to a failure of communication between both parties. In 
March 1886 Ghulam Ahmad’s first major debate took place in Hoshiarpur with the 
Arya Samajist, Lala Murli-Dhar.73 This was immediately after Ghulam Ahmad’s 40 
days of spiritual retreat (chilla) and seclusion in the same city.74 Murli-Dhar attacked 
the miraculous nature of the moon splitting event (shaqq al-qamar), which is 
described in the Qur’an,75 while Ghulam Ahmad challenged Dayanand’s explanations 
of the Hindu theological issues related to the creation of souls.76 The two agreed to 
continue the debate in writing, in which both parties could have their responses read 
aloud, but even this attempt ended abruptly.
By the end of 1888, Ghulam Ahmad was making arrangements to formalize 
his spiritual authority over his followers by accepting their bay ‘a1 (allegiance). For
72 A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 82-84.
73 There is a brief account o f  this in A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, pp. 111-114.
74 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tarlkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, pp. 274-276.
75 Ghulam Ahmad published his own lengthy account o f  the situation as well as the written exchange 
o f  arguments from the debate in his book Surma-i Chashm-i A rya  (Antimony for Clearing the 
Obscured Vision o f  the Arya), in Ruhdm K haza 'in, Vol. 2.
76 M any o f  the classical commentaries o f  the Qur’an refer to the introductory verses o f  Sura 54 (al- 
Oam ar) as a description o f  a miraculous event, which was witnessed by the com panions o f  the 
Prophet, in which the moon was split in two. Recent commentators like Muhammad Asad in The 
M essage o f  the Our ’an  suggests that it only appeared to be split, whereas Abdel Haleem  in The Our 'an 
says that it refers to one o f  the signs o f  the Day o f  Judgment. N eedless to say, the supernatural and 
miraculous nature o f  every religion came under fire with the scientific revolution and the advent o f  
modernity. One should note that Ghulam Ahmad defended the miracle, even though the Jama1 at 
position seems to have changed by the time o f  his fourth successor’s reign. For an exam ple, see the 
discussion on evolution in Mirza Tahir Ahmad, Revelation, Rationality, Know ledge, a n d  Truth 
(Tilford: Islam International Publications, 1998).
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some reason, although Ghulam Ahmad had first claimed to be a mujaddid in 1882, he 
waited until 1888 to begin making the necessary preparations for laying the 
foundations for his community by taking bay ‘at. Ahmadis note that Hakim Nur al- 
Din, amongst others, had requested Ghulam Ahmad to accept his bay ‘at as early as 
1883, but there is no clear explanation why Ghulam Ahmad waited so long to accept 
bay ‘at after already having claimed to be a mujaddid seven years earlier. It appears 
as though the delay in the formalization of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was linked to the 
birth of his son, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, which had been foretold in a 
prophecy that we will discuss below. Spencer Lavan suggested that Ghulam Ahmad 
was waiting for the birth of his son to take bay ‘at, because it ensured the fulfilment of
• 77his prophecy and gave him confidence that an heir would lead his Jama‘at.
In anticipation of his progeny, Ghulam Ahmad had begun receiving 
revelations as early as 1881,78 even though he kept many of them private until much 
later in his life. Ghulam Ahmad had married his second wife,79 Nusrat Jahan Begum 
(commonly known as amma jcm) in 1884, who was approximately 30 years younger 
than him.80 In February 1886, he published a divine prophecy, which promised him 
that he would soon father a blessed and illustrious son whose name would be
77 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovem ent, pp. 36-37.
78 Iain Adamson, A h m a d -  The G uided One (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 1999), p. 84.
79 The details o f  the relationship between Ghulam Ahmad and his first w ife have been inadequately 
documented by the Ahmadi historians. However, it is clear that the first marriage did not last very 
long. Despite the apparent tension between the couple, it appears that Ghulam Ahmad continued to 
support his first fam ily w hile they lived in a separated state. The eldest son, Mirza Sultan Ahmad, was 
raised (and possibly even adopted) by Ghulam Ahmad's elder brother Mirza Ghulam Qadir. The 
friction continued between Ghulam Ahmad and his son well beyond his death in 1908. It was shortly 
before Mirza Sultan Ahm ad's own death in the 1930s that he finally became an Ahmadi, after which  
m ost Ahmadi sources overlook their turbulent past.
80 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad travelled to Delhi for the wedding, where the ceremony was performed by the 
same Maulvi Nazir Husayn Dehlawi (Shaykh al-Kul) referenced above for issuing the first/a /im  o f  
kufr against Ghulam Ahmad in 1891.
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Bashir.81 When later that same year, Ghulam Ahmad’s wife gave birth to a daughter
named Ismat who died in infancy soon thereafter, his opponents took full advantage
of the opportunity to ridicule the mujaddid. The reaction of Pandit Lekh Ram, Swami
82Dayanand’s successor and leader of the Arya Samaj, was particularly offensive. 
The situation was made worse when many of Ghulam Ahmad’s disciples lost their 
faith in him following the death of his next child, a boy named Bashir, who passed 
away in early November 1888.83 By December 1888, Ghulam Ahmad issued an 
apologetic pamphlet that explained away the deaths of his children in an attempt to 
dispel the anxiety that was building amongst his supporters.84 However, Ghulam 
Ahmad was far from being deterred and had good reason to be optimistic since his 
wife was pregnant once again. The third child, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, 
was born on 12 January 1889, and the first bay'at followed soon after in March.
Devoted Ahmadis treated the multiple deaths of Ghulam Ahmad’s children as 
divinely designed tests, rather than a breach in his prophecy. Ahmadis believe that 
these trials and tribulations distinguished the true believers from the weak-minded 
followers who had deficiencies in their faith and substandard convictions that were
81 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, H aqqam  T aqnr bar Waqi 'a~i Wqfdt-i Bashir, in Riiham K haza ’in, Vol. 2, 
(listed on the cover as Sabz Ishtihar) pp. 447-470; although there are other publications around the 
same period concerning this specific prophecy as w ell, this is the most detailed and m ost frequently 
quoted by Ahmadi sources.
82 Kenneth W. Jones, A rya Dharm: H indu C onsciousness in 19,h Century Punjab (London: University 
o f  California Press, 1976), pp. 148-151 as well as the footnotes. Jones provides som e interesting 
information on the tensions between Ghulam Ahmad and Lekh Ram which is not often mentioned in 
the Ahmadi sources. See also A . R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 143-144. Dard reproduces som e 
excerpts o f  Lekh Ram’s jeering remarks towards Ghulam Ahmad. Although Lekh Ram ’s original 
publication was not available to me, see also the collected works o f  Pandit Lekh Ram, K ulliyat A rya  
M usafir (Lahore: 1897), which is often quoted by secondary sources.
83 This tim e Ghulam Ahmad had already issued a pamphlet in August 1887 stating that his earlier 
prophecy had been fulfilled, which made Bashir’s death particularly humiliating. See the pamphlet 
called Khush KhabrT (7 August 1887) in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M ajm u’a-iIsh tih drd t, Vol. 1, pp. 141 - 
142.
84 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad H aqqam  T aqnr bar W aqi'a-i Wafdt-i Bashir, in Ruhdni K h a za ’in. Vol.
2, (listed on the cover as Sabz Ishtihar), pp. 447-470.
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unbefitting the members of the early Ahmadi community. Only a reduced number of 
select followers were privileged with membership to Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya by taking 
the very first bay‘at at Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's hand. Although the childbirth 
prophecy may seem like a blunder in retrospect, we can say with certainty that the 
remaining followers that came together to form the early Ahmadi community had a 
profound belief in the fulfilment of their spiritual expectations through the person of 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.85
The timeline for the bay'at was as follows: Ghulam Ahmad had issued a small 
pamphlet called Tabllgh (announcement) in early December of 1888 containing a 
divine revelation commanding him to take the bay ‘at from his supporters. The strong 
wording of the revelation clearly indicated that ‘those who pledge allegiance to you 
[Ahmad] pledge allegiance to God. God’s hand is over their hands (alladhma 
yubdVunaka nmama yubal'una ’Uah; yada Hah fawqa aycllhim). ’86 Ghulam Ahmad 
had expressed his intention to accept disciples in this leaflet, Tabllgh, but the
85 This is a very controversial issue and polem ics continue to be written on this subject at present. 
Following the deaths o f  Ismat and Bashir 1, the eldest surviving boy from Ghulam Ahm ad’s second 
marriage was Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, who had poor health throughout his childhood. 
Ghulam Ahm ad’s next child was a girl named Shawkat (1891-1892?), who was follow ed by another 
boy in 1893. Apparently, Ghulam Ahmad was unsure whether Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad was 
healthy enough to be the fulfilm ent o f  his prophecy by the time that his next son w as born, because he 
named the newborn child Mirza Bashir Ahmad (1893-1963). Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad remained 
a ‘sickly child’ with poor eyesight throughout most o f  his adolescence, which undoubtedly contributed 
towards his underachieving performance in school and eventual failure to pass the matriculation 
examination, That three o f  the first five children were boys named Bashir, two o f  whom  survived 
beyond childhood and only one who reasonably fulfilled Ghulam Ahm ad’s prophecy, w ill never satisfy 
Ahmadi critics. However, Ahmadis celebrate the challenges that Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad faced 
in his youth as proof o f  the D ivine helping him to overcom e insurmountable odds. Considering the 
lifelong accomplishments o f  Mahmud Ahmad during his khilafat in conjunction with the fact that he 
arguably had a greater influence on Jama‘at-i Ahm adiyya than even his father, it is understandable why 
Ahmadis annually commemorate his birth as the fulfilm ent o f  divine prophecy. See A . R. Dard, Life o f  
Ahm ad , p. 148, where Dard briefly mentions the challenges in Mahmud Ahm ad’s childhood.
86 See the notice called, Tabllgh  (1 December 1888) in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M ajm u'a-i Ishtiharal, 
Vol. 1, p. 188; it is also worthwhile to look at Yohanan Friedmann’s discussion on the prophecy in 
Prophecy Continuous, p. 5, especially footnote 12, which details the com posite Qur’anic verses that 
make up the revelation. The portion quoted here is from (48:10). See also Dost Muhammad Shahid, 
Tarlkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, p. 335.
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specifics of the ceremony had yet to be arranged. Rumours had been spreading about 
the bay‘at for some time, and the ambiguity o f the pamphlet only made things worse. 
It was not until 12 January 1889, which coincided with the birth date of his son, that
87Ghulam Ahmad issued a second pamphlet disclosing his ten conditions for bay 'at. 
Ghulam Ahmad issued a third pamphlet from Ludhiana on 4 March 1889 announcing 
that he would be accepting the bay ‘at from there and informing those interested in 
participating to begin making their travel arrangements.88 Accordingly, it was in 
Ludhiana on 23 March 1889 when Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sat alone in a secluded 
room at the private estate of Munshi Ahmad Jan and summoned his companions one 
by one to take the bay‘at at his hand. Nur al-Din, Ghulam Ahmad’s closest
* 89companion and first successor (,khalifat al-masih), was the first to be called. The 
second person to take Ghulam Ahmad’s bay‘at was Mir ‘Abbas ‘Ali, but his name is 
rarely mentioned since he later abandoned the movement. A total of 40 disciples 
followed shortly thereafter.90
87 See the notice called, Takmil-i Tabllgh  (12 January 1889) in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M ajm u'a-i 
Ish tihdrd i,N o\. l ,p p . 189-192.
88 See the notice called, G uzarish-i Zururl (4 March 1889) in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M ajm u 'a-'i 
Ishtiharal, Vol. 1, pp. 193-198; see also A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 151-153.
89 The term khalifat al-m asih  literally means ‘successor to the m essiah’ and is used in conjunction with 
Mirza Ghulam Ahm ad’s successors as the official title o f  the Ahmadi caliphs.
90 There is some discrepancy within the sources regarding the date o f  the first b ay'a t as w ell as the 
number o f  participants. Ghulam Ahmad’s own handwritten account o f  the initiation, whose first page 
was m ysteriously destroyed, begins with the ninth disciple on 21 March 1889. See Dost Muhammad 
Shahid, Tarlkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, p. 344, for a reproduction o f  the surviving list. The remainder o f  
the original handwritten register is still available in the Khilafat Library in Rabwah, Pakistan. The 
three to four day variation in the date does not seem  to have much affect on the Jama‘a f  s subsequent 
presentation o f  the ceremony, but it is interesting to note that the number o f  disciples that were 
initiated into the community' on the first day varies tremendously. Dard's account gives no exact 
number but implies that it was small. See A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 153-156. The surviving  
pages o f  the original register lists 46 names who took bay'at on 21 March but com pletely excludes the 
names o f  the wom en who took the bay ‘at on that day. I f w e assume that the m issing page began with 
the first eight names on 21 March as the remaining register suggests, then significantly more than 40  
people, both men and wom en, took the bay 'at on the first day. However, i f  it began on the 20 March 
or before, then significantly fewer than 40 people took bay 'at on the first day. Ahm adis have been 
asserting that precisely 40 people took bay 'at on the first day ever since the second khalifa  deemed it
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Iii the following weeks Ghulam Ahmad left Ludhiana for Aligarh, where he 
was scheduled to meet with important scholars regarding the scope o f his mission. 
The trip ended in disappointment after Ghulam Ahmad received divine instructions 
forbidding him to speak on account of his poor health. Despite the fact that he was 
repeatedly invited to partake in some type of dialogue or debate during his stay, 
Ghulam Ahmad consistently refused. Had Ghulam Ahmad spoken, it would have 
been the first time that he addressed an audience of Muslim intellectuals of this 
calibre at an internationally recognized institution. The tenacity of his silence 
resulted in the aversion and general scorn from the Aligarh scholars, but Ghulam 
Ahmad would not disobey his divine instructions.91 The bitterness that lingered after 
Ghulam Ahmad’s departure developed into a grudge with one mullah in particular 
named Muhammad Isma‘il, whose disillusioning encounter with Ghulam Ahmad lead 
to a jaded series of letters.92 The consequences of the anticlimactic journey from 
Qadian to Aligarh were more apparent in the missed encounter with Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan himself. Ghulam Ahmad’s withdrawal at Aligarh made him the target 
of Sir Sayyid’s jeering remarks, which made a mockery of the financial stipulations 
that often accompanied Ghulam Ahmad’s promises to show divine miracles to his 
sceptics.93 Although the two never entered into a meaningful exchange face to face, 
the potential for such a forum did present itself during his visit to Aligarh. Ghulam
so. See also Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, cil-FazI (18 February 1959). For further discussion  
on the discrepancy in the date but not in the number o f  disciples, see Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh- 
i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 1, pp. 362-374.
91 A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, pp. 160-161.
92 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, F ath-i Islam , in Ruhdni Khaza'in , Vol. 3, pp. 17-26, in footnote.
93 Dard wrote that Sir Sayyid suggested that they travel to Hyderabad together where he ‘would go 
round singing his [Ghulam Ahm ad’s] praises’ as a disciple while Ghulam Ahmad showed som e false 
miracles, and they could then split whatever m oney they coerced from the unsuspecting m asses 
accordingly; see A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, p. 161, in footnote.
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Ahmad’s resolve to remain silent and his refusal to make any public appearances 
permitted the opportunity to pass before he eventually made his way back to Qadian,
It is clear that the Aligarh scholars equated Ghulam Ahmad’s withdrawal with 
his inadequacy to perform appropriately before the congregation of ‘ulama. At first 
glance, it does appear like Ghulam Ahmad was intimidated by his audience, although 
this may not necessarily be the case. Ghulam Ahmad repeatedly demonstrated 
throughout his religious career an overwhelming ability to sustain massive amounts 
of criticism and abuse. His unwavering conviction in his message never allowed him 
to shy away from proclaiming his mission, yet at Aligarh, he failed to utilize the 
opportunity to talk about his interpretation of Islam on an exceptionally grand stage. 
Similar to Aligarh, there were several other cases where Ghulam Ahmad either
94avoided entirely or significantly delayed potential debates with his opponents. In 
this manner, his behaviour was inconsistent. At times, he hurled himself into 
religious confrontations by challenging anyone who denounced him to a m ubahala^  
while at other times he shied away without stating a reason. He also tended to have a 
strong preference for a format that enabled him to write his responses before having
94 Some other exam ples o f  major debates that never took place include the challenge directed towards 
Swami Dayanad, which was taken up by Munshi Indarman Muradabadi after Dayanand’s death and is 
discussed above. On a separate occasion in 1885, Lekh Ram went so far as to actually make the 
journey to Qadian, solely for a debate with Ghulam Ahmad. Once again, a meaningful discourse never 
materialized, because the two could not agree on the logistics o f  the purse that was to be awarded to 
the winner o f  the contest; see A . R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, pp. 84-85. A similar occurrence happened in 
1900 with Pir Mehr Ali Shah Golrawi. Pir Sahib responded to Ghulam Ahm ad’s challenge and went 
from Rawalpindi to Lahore for a debate upon Ghulam Ahmad’s request, but Ghulam Ahmad never 
showed up. See section 5.7 called ‘Unconventional Explanations: The Case o f  the Common Lineage’ 
in chapter 5 below.
95 At times, Ghulam Ahmad challenged virtually all o f  his opponents to mubahala. See M irzaGhulam  
Ahmad, Majmu ‘a-i Ishtiharal, V ol. 2, pp. 300-303; see also Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Anjam -i Atham , in 
Ruhdni Kha:a 'in, Vol. 11, pp. 69-72, where Ghulam Ahmad issued mubdhala  challenges to over 100 
scholars and p irs  by name. At other times, Ghulam Ahmad was not as harsh. On 15 July 1897 
Ghulam Ahmad issued a pamphlet requesting every opposing scholar in India to seek divine guidance 
regarding his m ission before dism issing his claims, and he challenged them to receive their own 
inspirations. See M ajm u'a-i Ishtiharal, V ol. 2, pp. 443-451, especially from p. 449.
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them read out by a reader, as opposed to a more improvisational format that required 
him to respond to objections verbally as they arose. His meticulous choice of 
opponents and his final decision at Aligarh are inexplicable.96 Perhaps Ghulam 
Ahmad felt that the Aligarh environment was better suited for a modernist scholar 
than a mujaddid, or perhaps he was simply obeying his revelations as he claimed. It 
does seem odd for a claimant of divine revelation and a future prophet of God to be 
engaging in lectures at universities. Perhaps in anticipation of his future claims, 
Ghulam Ahmad wanted to dissociate himself from this particular genre o f scholars in 
favour of something more spiritual. Nonetheless, all that remains of the encounter is 
an account of Ghulam Ahmad’s poor health at Aligarh and his mention of a divine 
command that forbade him to speak.
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had chronically suffered from a number of prolonged 
illnesses throughout his religious career. In 1890, the following year, Ghulam Ahmad 
suffered from a very serious illness and rumours began to circulate that he had died.97 
When he recovered from the illness, he began to write his next series o f controversial 
works, Fath-i Islam  (Victory of Islam), Tawzih-i Maram (Elucidation o f Objectives), 
and Izala-i Awham  (Removal of Suspicions). The trilogy was published in 1891 as 
companion treatises and was the first time that Ghulam Ahmad had attempted to 
expound the implications of his revelations.98 This also marked the beginning of a 
new era o f Ahmadi history and the beginning of Ghulam Ahmad’s messianic career.
96 In M ay 1892, Muhammad Husayn Batalwi said that he would bring a Sufi scholar to Qadian to 
debate Ghulam Ahmad, but since he would not disclose the scholar’s name the debate never took 
place; see A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 239-240. Dard states that the original correspondence was 
published in the Punjab Gazette, Sialkot, (14 May 1892) however, I was unable to verify this source.
97 A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahmad, pp. 161-162.
98 A ll three books comprise the third volume o f  Ruhdm Khaza ’in.
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He explained that he was a muhaddath, which meant that God was speaking to him 
through revelation. He also claimed to be the promised messiah (masih) and mahdi 
sent in the spirit of Jesus son of Mary. Foreseeing the natural objection that orthodox 
Muslims would make to his position, he clarified that the corporeal body of Jesus was 
not alive in the heavens as the majority of Muslims believe. He spent the next 
seventeen years up to his death engaged in a bitter controversy with the Muslims who 
rejected his claims.
Although Ghulam Ahmad continued to attack the misguided members of all 
other religious traditions, Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya eventually settled into a sectarian 
debate with other Muslims. A great deal of the Ahmadi understanding of Islam is 
based on the messianic claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, which make up a crucial 
part of the Ahmadi identity. At this point, we will turn our attention towards gaining 
a better understanding of Ghulam Ahmad’s messianic claims and the finer points of 
Ahmadi theology.
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Chapter 2 
The Prophetic Claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
In this chapter we will look at the messianic claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, 
the justifications for his prophetic status after the Prophet Muhammad, and the 
dependency of his mission on the prophets who came before him. We will see how 
he established himself as the second coming of the messiah by rejecting Jesus’ death 
on the cross. We will see how Ghulam Ahmad used elitist Sufi terminology to 
describe his revelations, his status, and his role in the broader Islamic tradition, to the 
general public and the Muslim mainstream. We will also look at how his theological 
worldview poses intellectual problems and produces interesting questions of authority 
for the members of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya as they attempt to reconcile his spiritual 
claims and begin their process of theological formalization.
2.1 -  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s Primary and Secondary Claims
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s education and spiritual training shaped the way in 
which he understood and explained his religious experiences. His spiritual claims 
were complex and developed subtle nuances over the course of his life, but the 
controversy surrounding his claims was in many ways what made Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad’s mission most interesting. Any analysis of Ghulam Ahmad’s claims must 
allow for the changes in the understanding and interpretation of his claims that have 
taken place over time. The development of these spiritual claims did not end with his
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death, but rather continued through the successive generations of Ahmadis who 
interpreted and explained these claims differently. The ambiguous and sometimes 
paradoxical nature of his Sufi style of metaphysics has led to divergent opinions 
about Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. His views on theologically charged subject matter were 
often presented analytically in terms of argumentative value judgements with very 
specific consequences. In actuality, the more controversial aspects of Ahmadi Islam 
resulted less from Ghulam Ahmad’s primary spiritual claims and more from the 
consequential inferences or secondary implications of what his primary claims 
entailed. The best example of this was Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood itself, which 
surprisingly was not one of his primary spiritual claims. Similarly, Ghulam Ahmad’s 
rejection of violent jihad and his insistence on Jesus’ survival from crucifixion were 
not primary claims, but resulted from the underlying claim that Ghulam Ahmad was 
the promised messiah. To better understand Ghulam Ahmad’s mission and how he 
became a prophet of God one must look at the context and connotations of his 
primary spiritual claims.
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s claims were intended to identify his role in the world 
and to delineate his spiritual rank. He claimed to be a muhaddath, someone to whom 
God speaks; a mujaddid, a renewer of Islam; the mahdl, the guided one who will 
return in the last days; and finally the masTh-i maw 'ud or the promised messiah and 
second coming of Jesus son of Mary. His status as the mahdi and messiah in 
conjunction led to the most recognizable and controversial aspects of his mission, 
which had theological implications that have since defined his role in Islamic history. 
It is clear that he understood and expressed these roles in terms of the long awaited
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fulfilment of divine prophecy, which served as the basis for the broader scope of his 
mission of spiritual purification and Islamic revival. However, the process that 
enabled the members of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya to acknowledge, accept, and adhere to 
Ghulam Ahmad's claims within a familiar Islamic framework was something that 
needed to be developed and further elaborated much later. This subsequent 
elaboration has laid the theological foundations for the current Ahmadi identity, and 
so we may first look at the spiritual claims as they were presented in their original 
form.
2.2 -  Jesus as the Promised Messiah
In the western Christian context, there is nothing more provocative about 
Ahmadi Islam than Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s explanation for Jesus’ survival from the 
crucifixion. By arguing that Jesus Christ survived the crucifixion, Ahmadis conclude 
that Jesus could not have been resurrected nor could he have subsequently ascended 
to the heavens. The argument was intended to invalidate the very basis for the 
Christian claim that Jesus died for the sins of mankind. If Jesus did not die for the 
sins of mankind and is not alive in the heavens, then according to Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad, there is no viable reason for anyone to remain Christian. Ghulam Ahmad 
believed that if he could prove that Jesus survived the crucifixion, then he could 
prove Islam’s superiority over Christianity as a religion. It is important to appreciate 
this rationale within the context of the rivalry between Islam and Christianity in 19th
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century India.1 This rivalry between the two religions was a serious concern for 
Indian Muslims who felt threatened by the advances of Christian missionaries, 
particularly in the Punjab. The socio-political context provided the appropriate 
environment for Ghulam Ahmad to fulfil his role as the mcihdj. and metaphorically 
‘break the cross’. The advent of modernity had aroused interest in rationality, which 
undoubtedly shaped the delivery of Ghulam Ahmad’s ideas and message. Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad believed that he could rationally prove that Christianity was a 
baseless religion and convince people of Islam’s truth, purely through rational 
argumentation and proofs. However, it is important to recall that Christianity was not 
his only target. Ghulam Ahmad had devoted considerable attention throughout his 
career to debunking Hinduism as well and had been using this method of logical 
argumentation since his first major work, Barahm-i Ahmadiyya (The Proofs of 
Islam), the first part of which was published in 1880, nine years before his Jama‘at 
was founded.
Aside from the general dismantling of the fundamental doctrine of 
Christianity, Ghulam Ahmad needed to prove that the first messiah, Jesus, was not 
alive in heaven awaiting his final return in the latter days. The reasoning for this was 
that Ghulam Ahmad could not claim to be the second messiah if the first messiah was 
still alive and well in heaven. The argument was equally important to the majority of 
Muslims who maintained that Jesus will descend from the heavens in the latter days 
to fight evil alongside the mahdi. With this in mind, Ghulam Ahmad’s claim of being 
the second coming of Jesus was clearly dependent on there being no other messiah
1 See Avril A. Pow ell, M uslims and M issionaries in Pre-mutiny India (Richmond: Curzon Press,
1993).
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alive in heaven who was waiting to return. These ideas were first expounded by 
Ghulam Ahmad in 1891 with the publication of the trilogy Fcith-i Islam  (Victory of 
Islam), Tawzih-i Maram (Elucidation of Objectives), and Izala-i Awham  (Removal of 
Suspicions).2 At first, the details of Jesus’ survival from crucifixion were presented 
as purely intellectual arguments based largely on textual interpretations of the Qur’an, 
Hadith, and Bible. However, a substantial breakthrough in his argument for the death 
of Jesus came when Ghulam Ahmad identified a burial tomb in Srinagar, Kashmir as 
the final resting place of Jesus. In providing an actual tomb for Jesus, Ghulam 
Ahmad could conclusively show that Jesus had died a natural death and would never 
return in the flesh as the promised messiah of the latter days. This extraordinary 
journey of Jesus after surviving his own crucifixion was the basis for Ghulam 
Ahmad’s book Masih Hindustan Men (Jesus in India),3 which was not actually 
published until 1908 despite having been written in the late 1890s.
The book was heavily influenced by the work of a Russian traveller, Nicolas 
Notovitch, who had spent some time studying Buddhist texts in Tibetan monasteries 
from which he concluded that Jesus had travelled through Afghanistan and India and 
then on to Tibet prior to his crucifixion.4 The timeline for the journey according to 
Notovitch’s theory was rejected by Ghulam Ahmad and restructured around the idea 
that Jesus had indeed travelled to India, but only after his crucifixion, and then on to 
Kashmir where he died at the age o f 120. Over the past century, these arguments 
have been considerably expanded and are best outlined in a more recent work by
2 These three works constitute the third volum e o f  Ruham K haza ’in.
3 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M asih Hindustan M en , in Ruham K haza 'in, Vol. 15; see  also the 
translation, Jesus in India  (Tilford: Islam International Publication, 2003).
4 See N icolas N otovitch, The Unknown Life o f  Jesus  (Sanger: Quill Driver Books/W ord Dancer Press, 
2004).
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Ghulam Ahmad’s fourth successor and grandson, Mirza Tahir Ahmad, called 
Christianity: A Journey From Facts to Fiction. This restatement of Ghulam Ahmad’s 
original premise relies more heavily on contemporary medical evidence than obscure 
interpretations of scriptures or ancient religious texts.
A broad synopsis of the current Ahmadi position begins with a firm 
affirmation of the impossibility for any human being to physically ascend to the 
heavens.5 To explain the whereabouts of Jesus, Ahmadis argue that even though 
Jesus was hung on the cross and crucified, he did not die from the crucifixion. The 
problem with this position is that it requires an explanation for what many Muslims 
consider to be a direct contradiction of the Qur’an. This can be illustrated quite well 
by comparing different translations of the Qur’anic account of the crucifixion. Abdel 
Haleem translated the crucifixion verse as:
They did not kill him [Jesus], nor did they crucify him, though it was 
made to appear like that to them. Those that disagreed about him are 
full of doubt, with no knowledge to follow, only supposition: they 
certainly did not kill him .. ,6
Ahmadis favour a more creative rendition o f the crucifixion verse, which is most 
apparent in the interpretive translation by Malik Ghulam Farid:
And fo r  their saying, ‘We did slay the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, the 
Messenger o f Allah;’ whereas they slew him not, nor did they bring 
about his death upon the cross, but he was made to appear to them like 
one crucified; and those who differ therein are certainly in a state o f
5 The follow ing account o f  the Ahmadi be lie f regarding Jesus is taken from Mirza Tahir Ahmad, 
Christianity: A Journey F rom  F acts to Fiction  (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 1994). It 
may also be worth noting here that Ahmadis also reject the physical ascent o f  the Prophet Muhammad 
to heaven during the night journey.
6 See verse (4:157) in M .A.S. Abdel Haleem (trans.), The Our'an  (Oxford: Oxford University' Press, 
2004), p. 65.
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doubt about it; they have no certain knowledge thereof, but only 
pursue a conjecture; and they did not arrive at a certainty concerning 
it.7
In the Ahmadi interpretation, Jesus did not hang 011 the cross long enough to
die from crucifixion. Ahmadis argue that death by crucifixion is a long and painful
process, which is precisely why it was used as a method of torture and intimidation.
Death by crucifixion was a process that could easily be drawn out for several days if
not longer. A person may continue to hang on the cross for an indefinite period until
the innards ultimately collapse and bring about an excruciating death. Ahmadis
believe that Jesus was crucified on a Friday afternoon and therefore could not have
died by crucifixion, since it was the Jewish custom to remove all o f the crucified
bodies before the Sabbath, which began at sunset. Consequently, Jesus could only
have hung on the cross for a few hours at most. This was not enough time to bring
• • 8about his death on the cross, which makes it less likely that he died from crucifixion. 
Likewise, Ghulam Ahmad explained that the other two men who were crucified 
alongside Jesus did not die either, which is why their legs needed to be broken 
according to the Biblical account in John (19:31-34).9 In contrast, Jesus5 legs were 
not broken because he was believed to be dead. Here, Ahmadis argue that Jesus was 
still alive in an unconscious state.
The Biblical account describes a solider who pierced Jesus5 side from which 
blood and water gushed out. According to Ghulam Ahmad, this description proved
7 See verse (4:158) in M alik Ghulam Farid (ed,), The H oly Our 'an: A rabic Text w ith English  
Translation an d  Short Com m entary  (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 2002), p. 225. All 
italics exist in the original text itself.
8 Mirza Tahir Ahmad, Christianity: A Journey From Facts to F iction , p. 74.
9 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M asih Hindustan Men, in RdhanT Khaza 'in, Vol. 15, p. 27; see also Jesus in 
India, p. 30.
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that Jesus was still alive after the crucifixion, because a dead body whose heart has 
stopped beating does not bleed profusely when stabbed. Instead, the blood inside a 
dead body begins to congeal and cannot rush forth in the same way when stabbed, 
especially following a traumatic crucifixion in which large nails through the hands 
and feet allowed the blood to drain from the limbs on its own. Ghulam Ahmad was 
convinced that the way in which the Bible described Jesus’ bleeding after being 
stabbed substantiated the fact that he was still alive and that his heart was still 
beating, even though he was unconscious and appeared to be dead.
The Ahmadi translation of the next verse describing Jesus’ ascension to 
heaven following the crucifixion is also worth comparing to non-Ahmadi translations. 
Abdel Haleem translated the verse: ‘God raised him [Jesus] up to Himself (rafa'ahu 
’Hahn Hay h i).'10 The Ahmadi translation of the verse reads: ‘On the contrary, Allah 
exalted him [Jesus] to Himself.’11 The traditional interpretation, as seen in the two 
contrasting translations, is that Jesus was physically raised to the heavens, which is 
consistent with the Christian account of Jesus’ ascension. The Ahmadi rendition 
reinterprets the verse to show that Jesus was only raised in spiritual status and not 
raised physically to the heavens. In his commentary on the verse, Malik Ghulam 
Farid says:
The Jews exultingly claimed to have killed Jesus on the cross and thus 
to have proved that his claim to be a Divine Prophet was not true. The 
verse along with the preceding one contains a strong refutation o f the 
charge and clears him of the insinuated blemish and speaks of his 
spiritual elevation and of his having been honoured in the presence of 
God. There is absolutely no reference in the verse to his physical 
ascension to [the] heavens. It only says that God exalted him towards
10 See verse (4:158) in M .A.S. Abdel Haleem (trans.), The Q u r’an , p. 65.
11 See verse (4:159) in M alik Ghulam Farid (ed.), The H oly O u r’an, p. 226.
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Himself which clearly signifies a spiritual exaltation, because 110 fixed 
abode can be assigned to God.12
The commentary on the verse reinforces the Ahmadi position that Jesus died a natural 
death unrelated to the crucifixion. Interestingly, some non-Ahmadis have also 
interpreted this verse similarly and concluded that Jesus was not physically raised to 
the heavens. For example, Muhammad Asad strongly stated in his commentary that:
The verb rafa‘ahn (lit., “He raised him” or “elevated him”) has 
always, whenever the act of r a f  (“elevating”) of a human being is 
attributed to God, the meaning of “honouring” 01* “exalting”. 
Nowhere in the Qur’an is there any warrant for the popular belief that 
God has “taken up” Jesus bodily, in his lifetime, into heaven. The 
expression of “God exalted him unto Him self’ in the above verse 
denoted the elevation of Jesus to the realm of God’s special grace — a 
blessing in which all prophets partake, as is evident from 19:57, where 
the verb rafa'nahit (“We exalted him”) is used with regard to the 
Prophet Idris.13
Asad went 011 to reference Muhammad Abduh who held similar views denying Jesus’ 
bodily ascension. Other commentators have also denied Jesus’ bodily ascension, 
although most of them, including Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, tend to be modernists with 
an aversion to miraculous explanations.
Next, Ghulam Ahmad introduced the existence of a special medicinal 
ointment known as the Marham-i ‘Isa (ointment of Jesus). Supposedly, when Jesus 
was taken down from the cross and enshrouded before burial, a medicinal ointment, 
the Marham-i ‘Isa> was applied to his wounds. Intuitively, Ghulam Ahmad asked 
why anyone would apply a medicinal ointment to the wounds of a dead body.
12 Ibid., pp. 226-227 in footnote 700.
13 Muhammad Asad, The M essage o f  THE OUR 'AN (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), pp. 134-135 in 
footnote 172.
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Ghulam Ahmad was convinced that the application of the Marham-i ‘Isa to Jesus’ 
wounds conclusively showed that a few of the disciples must have known that Jesus 
was still alive after the crucifixion. Ghulam Ahmad cited over thirty books that 
mentioned the Marham-i Isa , the formula for the mixture with its ingredients, and its 
intended uses.14 He also claimed that the medicine can still be used to treat boils, 
ulcers, and the plague.15 Although the idea of dressing the wounds of a dead person 
is certainly counterintuitive, the historical authenticity of the Marham-i Isa is 
difficult to verify. I was unable to find further discussions on the Marham-i Isa  in 
more appropriate sources, such as the potential analyses of the scholars of early 
Christianity, regarding the origins and intended uses of the Marham-i Isa in relation 
to the crucifixion of Jesus.16 Even though the name of the ointment suggests some 
fink to Jesus, the original Marham-i Isa  may or may not have been used to dress the 
wounds of Jesus following the crucifixion. It is not unreasonable or unlikely to 
presume that many products, including miracle ointments, have been falsely 
attributed to great religious figures like Jesus in the past. Until there is evidence to 
suggest otherwise, there is nothing conclusive to substantiate the origins o f the 
Marham-i Isa  and Ghulam Ahmad’s claim.
Ghulam Ahmad used numerous textual sources to construct his argument and 
to demonstrate that Jesus did not die on the cross, but his final piece o f evidence was
14 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M asih H industan Men, in Ruham K haza ’in, Vol. 15, pp. 58-59; see also 
Jesus in India, pp. 66-68.
15 See the notice called, D aw a 'e Ta 'un (23 July 1898) in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M ajm u 'a-i Ishtiharat, 
Vol. 3, pp. 52-54. There is a rare translation o f  this which is listed as A R evea led  Cure f o r  the Bubonic 
Plague  (Lahore: Victoria Press, 1898) and is available in the British Library Oriental Collections, 
Shelfmark 14105. e. 1.(2.).
16 Humphrey Fisher did criticize the ointment, its sources, and the ‘swoon theory’ regarding Jesus’ 
survival from crucifixion in his study o f  Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, although he did not explicitly say how  
he arrived at his conclusions. See Humphrey J. Fisher, Ahtnadiyyah; A Study in C ontem porary Islam  
on the West African C oast (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 69-71.
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by far the most fascinating. Ghulam Ahmad believed that Jesus journeyed east after 
the crucifixion to escape further persecution and to reunite the lost tribes of Israel. 
Jesus continued travelling east through present day Afghanistan and on to India, until 
he finally settled in Kashmir. Ghulam Ahmad identified the shrine of an old saint in 
Khaniyar, Srinagar as the actual tomb of Jesus. Apparently, local legend attributes 
the tomb to an ancient ‘Hebrew prophet’ who came to Kashmir from some distant 
land around the same time as the crucifixion.17 The prophet buried in the tomb was 
named name Yus Asaf, which Ghulam Ahmad said was a corrupted Hebrew variant 
of Jesus ‘the gatherer o f people (jam a‘at ko ikattha karne walay in reference to a 
biblical account of him bringing people together.18 Evidently the locals of Srinagar 
have believed that the tomb belonged to Jesus for quite some time prior to Ghulam 
Ahmad’s discovery, which neatly fits into his crucifixion survival theory. By 
producing an actual tomb, Ahmadis believe that they have tangible archaeological 
evidence in support of their dead messiah. Once again, it would be difficult to argue 
that Jesus is alive in heaven when his corpse is enshrined in Kashmir. Likewise, 
proving that Jesus died a natural death is absolutely essential to Ahmadi Islam. To 
maintain the belief that Jesus physically ascended to the heavens is completely 
incompatible with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s messianic claim. Ghulam Ahmad only 
becomes the second messiah when the first messiah is dead, regardless of the 
authenticity of this specific tomb in Kashmir.
17 See chapter 13 in J.D. Shams, Where d id  Jesus die?  (Tilford: Islam International Publications,
1989), pp. 109-117.
18 See chapter 4, section 2 o f  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Masih Hindustan Men, in Ruham  Khaza 'in, Vol. 
15, especially p. 82; see also Jesus in India, p. 94. Ghulam Ahm ad’s reference in the original text is 
mistakenly given as G enesis 3:10 though later Ahmadi publications either cite Genesis 49:10 or 1 
Chronicles 16:4-7 as the correction.
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2.3 -  In the Footsteps of the Prophets
In claiming to be the second coming of Jesus, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had 
made an intrinsic claim to prophethood. It followed that since Jesus was a prophet in 
his first appearance, he would not suddenly be demoted or stripped o f his prophetic 
status in his second appearance. Ghulam Ahmad’s claim of being the mahdi did not 
carry the same implications, even though he had claimed that the mahdi and the 
masih were the same person,19 This implicit claim to prophethood was expounded at 
length throughout his career, but it had always been present in some form since at 
least the early 1890s. His previous claims of receiving revelation from God were not 
as controversial and did not elicit the same backlash from Muslim critics as his being 
the promised messiah.
Revelation exists in many forms in the Islamic tradition. The language used 
to describe revelation varies from different types of divine inspiration to true dreams, 
none of which are considered sufficient for prophethood. Ghulam Ahmad’s 
awareness of these subtleties made the reconciliation of his claims even more difficult 
for his contemporaries because he never openly claimed prophethood in the way that 
one would expect a prophet of God to do. Instead of making a forthright claim, his 
claims of prophethood were either qualified with elaborate explanations or placed 
within a certain religious context that did not denote prophethood in Islam, which
19 Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad presented a detailed explanation o f  this v iew  in his Invitation  
to A hm adiyyat (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 30-32; however, this is not a position  
that is unique to Ahmadi Islam. Several other M uslim scholars have maintained that the m ahdi and the 
masih  are indeed the same person. For an exam ple o f  classical view s regarding this position, see Ibn 
Khaldun, Franz Rosenthal (trans.), and N. J. Daw ood (ed.). The M nqaddimah: An Introduction to 
H istory  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 257-259.
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only added to the confusion. Making sense of the totality of these claims throughout 
Ghulam Ahmad’s career is even more confusing due to the numerous contradictions, 
ambiguities, and the general ambivalence with which Ghulam Ahmad evasively 
expressed his ideas. The linguistic fa9 ade created by the intermittent jumps from 
Urdu to Arabic to Persian added yet another layer of complications, which for our 
purposes makes English translations that adequately express these subtleties rather 
difficult. This is even more problematic since each language has its own terminology 
and connotations for prophecy and revelation. However, one must recognize and 
appreciate that this linguistic complexity was as much of a sign of Muslim writing in 
19th century South Asia as it was a display o f Ghulam Ahmad’s literary mastery.
In English, a prophet may be defined merely as someone who prophesizes the 
future, but this is not the case in an Islamic context where the terminology designated 
for the revelation of the prophets may denote a certain qualitative distinction in 
spiritual rank. An average Muslim may receive divinely inspired revelations that 
correctly prophesize the future, but this type of revelation does not entail prophethood 
in the traditional sense even though one may describe it as such in English. 
Understanding the context and navigating through these religious undertones is 
perhaps the greatest challenge to making sense of Ghulam Ahmad’s theology. 
Typically, this type of technical jargon was only used with great care and with an 
appreciation for the sensitive distinctions in the religious symbolism, but Ghulam 
Ahmad’s writing style tended to mix the different terms together and augment their 
traditional usages. Perhaps this was a technique used to add literary value to his 
writing, but it makes the analysis of his ideas less precise. We will look at some
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examples of how Ghulam Ahmad made the figurative imagery in religious 
terminology and symbolism overlap below.
In Fath-i Islam (Victory of Islam), Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be a 
mujaddid-i din (renewer of the faith) similar to the other mnjaddids (renewers) from 
previous centuries. In his explanation of tajdld-i din (religious renewal), he stated 
that a mujaddid becomes the deputy (;na ’ib) and successor (khalifa) of the Prophet 
Muhammad; the inheritor of all of the blessings of the messengers and prophets; and 
the one whose heart is illuminated with revelation (ilham) from God and guidance 
from the Holy Spirit (ruh al-quds).20 Each one of these characteristics is a bold claim 
for any saintly Muslim, including a mujaddid, but they appear even more ostentatious 
when presented consecutively in this fashion. Each quality has its own specific 
connotation which normally never would appear together in this combination. 
Ghulam Ahmad’s understanding of the status o f a mujaddid is excessive, yet it is 
presented as unquestionable fact. One could treat this as hyperbole though it is not 
very compelling to argue that it was intended as such. Ghulam Ahmad went on in the 
text to distinguish himself from his predecessors and show why his rank was even 
higher than that of the previous mujaddids. Ultimately, he proclaimed his own advent 
as the second messiah in the same image of the first, referring to Jesus son of Mary,21
In these regards, the second coming of Jesus is something that the Muslim 
umma has been anticipating for centuries. Ghulam Ahmad used this discourse on the 
mujaddids and the second coming of Jesus to introduce his claim as the promised 
messiah who was modelled on the first messiah Jesus. However, he confusingly
20 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Fath-i Islam , in Ruham Khaza 'in, Vol. 3, pp. 7-8 and the footnote; see also 
Victory o f  Islam  (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 2002), pp. 5-6 and note 1.
21 Ibid., pp, 8-9 and in the footnote; see also Victory o f  Islam , pp. 7-9 and note 2.
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phrased his statements in a way that spoke of the second messiah, himself, in the third 
person until he finally acknowledged his own claim. Maintaining these contradictory 
ambiguities was part o f Ghulam Ahmad’s writing style. Within the same footnote 
where he claimed prophethood, Ghulam Ahmad rebutted his own claim and denied 
his prophetic status. Moreover, he would often claim to be a prophet in a context that 
was contrary to prophethood by advancing ideas with conflicting connotations or by 
presenting his ideas through contradictory claims. In one example, he claimed to be 
both a muhaddath (one spoken to by God), which is a non-prophet, and the khalifat- 
ullah (representative of God on Earth), which is a term repeatedly used in the Qur’an 
to describe prophets, if not all of humanity.22 Typically, a muhaddath would never be 
connected to the khallfat-ullah, because the two ideas are radically different and have 
little to do with each other in the traditional sense. Within a few pages of this early 
treatise, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad made a number of very different and often conflicting 
spiritual claims that are difficult to comprehend.
Although it is tempting to dismiss Ghulam Ahmad’s claims as ignorance of 
the tradition or an inability to distinguish between independent ideas, it is not 
appropriate to do so. Most scholars have tended towards treating each claim 
individually with the presumption that Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be either a 
muhaddath, or a mujaddid, or the mahdi, or the messiah, or a prophet, similar to the 
way in which they were first presented above. However, despite his contradictions, 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was not ignorant o f the traditional usages of these terms. The
22 There are several exam ples o f  similar usages in the Qur’an. In (2:30) Adam is called a khalifa. In 
(38:26) David is called a khalifa. In som e cases, such as (27:62) the term may refer to all o f  humanity. 
Additionally, the Prophet M uhammad’s third successor, ‘Uthman, took the title khalifa!-ullah. See 
Mahinoud M. Ayoub, The C risis o f  Muslim H istoiy: Religion and P olitics in E arly  Islam  (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2006), p. 50.
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unprecedented combination of divinely bestowed honours truly reflects Ghulam 
Ahmad’s extraordinary self-image. He unreservedly continued to propagate his 
mission and teachings in this august fashion with no regard for their potential 
inconsistencies. He saw his own status as exceptional and utterly unique from those 
who came before him. He was the fulfilment of all previous divine prophecies about 
the latter days and the culmination of every true religious tradition. Nevertheless, the 
condemnation o f Ghulam Ahmad’s claim to prophethood by the Indian ‘idama did 
not go unnoticed. Perhaps the unfavourable reaction to Ghulam Ahmad’s 
presentation o f his own spiritual status and divine commission may have persuaded 
him to soften the exposition of his self-image. As the opposition mounted, Ghulam 
Ahmad apparently felt obliged to further elaborate his position, and in his following 
book, Tawzih-i Maram (Elucidation of Objectives), he was withdrawing into a more 
apologetic tone. A complete reversal following such extravagant claims was highly 
problematic and would have damaged Ghulam Ahmad’s credibility as a scholar. 
Similarly, continuing to defend such unconventional claims was not an effective way 
of increasing his followers, even if he believed them to be true. Likewise, if Ghulam 
Ahmad did not believe his claims to be true in the fullest sense, he had a 
responsibility to acknowledge his eccentricity and clarify the confusion as the title of 
his book suggests.
Ghulam Ahmad’s awareness of the unsettled situation resulted in a detailed 
discussion on the prophetic rank of the second messiah. Once again, since Jesus was 
a prophet of God during his first appearance in the world, it follows that he ought to 
be a prophet during his second appearance. Interestingly in TawzTh-i Maram , Ghulam
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Ahmad treated this rationale as an objection to his being the second manifestation of 
Jesus, which implies that he acknowledged that he was not really a prophet. He 
began his replies to this objection by mentioning that the Prophet Muhammad never
• 23explicitly made prophethood a requisite condition for Jesus in his second coming. 
Ghulam Ahmad recognized that if there were some hadith or verses from the Qur’an 
which referenced the prophethood of Jesus in his second coming, he would not have 
been able to make such a claim. He went on to say that there was no doubt that God 
had designated the second coming of Jesus as a muhaddath for the umma, ‘and a 
muhaddath in one sense is actually a prophet (awr muhaddath bin ek ma ‘m  se nabi hi 
hota hay).’24 He explained that this type of prophethood was not complete but was 
partial (juzwT) prophethood, since a muhaddath is spoken to by God and given 
insights about the unseen. He added that a muhaddath has revelations (\vahy) that are 
free from satanic corruptions, similar to the revelations (wahy) of the prophets and 
messengers. A muhaddath is appointed by God, knows the essence of the shan 'a , 
and must publicly proclaim his mission. Furthermore, Ghulam Ahmad warned that a 
divine punishment was predestined for anyone who rejected a muhaddath25 In his 
conclusion to the discussion, Ghulam Ahmad proclaimed that he was that messianic 
muhaddath who had been sent by God in the image of Jesus.26
As one can see, this was an elaborate way of divulging one’s divine 
appointment and proclaiming one’s prophethood. Ghulam Ahmad’s reluctance to 
claim prophethood straightforwardly may have been a result of his awareness of the
2j Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Tawzih-i M aram , in Ruham K haza ’in, Vol. 3, p. 59; see also E lucidation o f  
O bjectives  (Tifford: Islam International Publications, 2004), pp. 15-16.
24 Ibid., p. 60; see also Elucidation o f  O bjectives, p. 16.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 61; see also Elucidation o f  O bjectives, p. 19.
incompatibility of such a claim with orthodox Islam, even though the basic claim of 
being a muhaddath is in itself acceptable. The existence of a muhaddath after the 
death of the Prophet Muhammad is not incompatible with Islamic orthodoxy, but 
Ghulam Ahmad's expansion of the qualities o f a muhaddath were coloured with the 
perfections of prophethood in such a way that they inappropriately overlapped. It is 
not surprising that many people were still confused about Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s 
mission and spiritual status by 1891 only two years after he began taking bay'at 
(allegiance) and accepting disciples. However, what is surprising is that his Ahmadi 
disciples themselves were still unclear about his spiritual status in regards to his 
prophethood more than a decade after the formation of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. In 
1901 the confusion of some Ahmadis about the spiritual status of their leader 
prompted Ghulam Ahmad to write Ek Ghalati kd Izala (The Correction of an Error), 
in which he attempted once again to clarify his spiritual claims to his followers. At 
present, the Qadiani branch of the Jama‘at meat this short booklet as the definitive 
tract affirming Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood, whereas in contrast, the Lahori branch 
uses Ek Ghalati kd Izala to show that Ghulam Ahmad denied being a prophet. 
Ironically, both branches use the same booklet to draw opposite conclusions. The 
only reason that this is possible is because Ghulam Ahmad’s presentation of his 
prophetic status remained muddled with contradictions where clear statements 
affirmed his prophetic status and clear statements denied it.
The booklet opened with Ghulam Ahmad reprimanding one of his disciples 
who was confused about the claims of his mentor. When the disciple was faced with 
an opponent’s objections to Ghulam Ahmad’s claim of being a prophet (nabi) and a
89
messenger (,rasul), the disciple denied the claim without hesitation. Ghulam Ahmad
* 27warned that simply denying {mahz inkdr) his prophetic status outright was wrong. 
He explained his position by stating that his revelations contained words like nabl, 
rasiil, mursal, and nazir, which referred to prophets, messengers and warners, and 
thereby affirmed his status as a prophet of God. Ghulam Ahmad went on to address 
the Qur’anic designation of the Prophet Muhammad as khatam al-nabiyym (the seal 
of the prophets),28 which even in the context in which Ghulam Ahmad was using it, 
implied that Muhammad was the last prophet.29 But if this was true and Muhammad 
was the last prophet, then how were these types of prophetic revelations possible and 
how could Ghulam Ahmad claim to be a prophet? Ghulam Ahmad’s response was:
The answer to this is that without a doubt in this way no prophet, new 
or old, can come (is kd jawab yahi hay ke beshak is tarah to ko 7 nabi 
naya ho yapurana nahih d-saktd).30
After a brief rejection of the popular belief regarding Jesus returning from the 
heavens, Ghulam Ahmad supported the orthodox position by citing the famous hadith 
declaring that ‘there is no prophet after me (la nabiyya b a ‘di),'> in reference to 
Muhammad being the last prophet. He explained that all the doors of prophethood 
were closed except for one, which was fana f t  1-rasul or the annihilation of one’s
27 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Ek Ghalati kd Izala  in Ruham K h a za ‘in, Vol. 18, p. 206; see also the English 
translation, A M isconception R em oved  (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 2007).
28 See verse (33:40) which states: ‘Muhammad is not the father o f  any one o f  you men; he is G od’s 
M essenger and the seal o f  the prophets (ma kana mnhammadun abd ahadin min rijdlikam  w a lakin 
rasul-allahi w a khatam a l-n ab iyy in )\ translated by M .A.S. Abdel Haleem (trans.), The Our 'an, p. 269. 
The phrase khatam al-nabiyyin  (seal o f  the prophets) is interpreted by the M uslim mainstream to mean 
that Muhammad is the last prophet.
29 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Ek Ghalati kd Izala, in Rfihdm K haza 'in, Vol. 18, pp. 206-207.
30 Ibid., p. 207.
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being through total obedience to the Prophet Muhammad.31 The concept of fana  
(annihilation of the self) has long since been associated with Sufism but is rarely 
associated with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.32 This raises the question of whether Ghulam 
Ahmad’s experience offcma influenced the formulation of his controversial claims in 
ways other than how he suggested. If this were the case, then his claims of 
prophethood may have been no more than ecstatic statements based on euphoric 
mystical experiences that need not be taken literally. There is certainly a precedent 
for this in the statements of countless intoxicated Sufis who preceded Ghulam Ahmad 
and notoriously claimed similar mystical experiences of the divine. In these regards, 
it is not surprising that Ghulam Ahmad justified his position most often by almost 
exclusively referencing the Sufi scholars before him. Most notably, Ghulam Ahmad 
heavily relied on the ideas developed by the Sufi masters Ibn al-‘Arabi and Shaykh 
Ahmad Sirhindi to defend his position that prophethood following the death of 
Muhammad was acceptable in Islam.3j
Ghulam Ahmad proceeded to describe his prophethood as zilli (shadowy) or 
biiruzi (manifestational), in the sense that it was dependent on the prophethood of 
Muhammad. Ghulam Ahmad believed that it was only through his fana f i  'l-rasul, 
which resulted from his complete submission to the Prophet Muhammad, that his
3' I b i d -
32 Fazlur Rahman provided a clear overview  o ffa n a  in relation to Sufis like D hu’1-Nun al-M isrl and 
Abu Yazld al-Bistam l in his book, Islam  (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1979), p. 135. The 
E ncyclopaedia o f  Islam, (second edition), entry under ‘Baka’ wa-Fana”  is also useful.
33 For an excellent and thorough analysis o f  the finality o f  prophethood in relation to Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad’s use o f  Sufi variations o f  prophethood stemming from medieval thought, see Yohanan 
Friedmann, P rophecy Continuous: A spects o f  Ahm adi Religious Thought an d  Its M edieval B ackground  
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1989), especially chapters 2-3; see also Yohanan Friedmann, 
Shaykh Ahm ad Sirhindi: An Outline o f  H is Thought an d  a Study o f  H is Im age in the E yes o f  P osterity  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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prophethood had any meaning.34 In other words, by imitating Muhammad so closely, 
Ghulam Ahmad identified with the Prophet’s very being and thereby acquired his 
own prophetic status. With this identification, and in virtue o f his receiving 
disclosures o f the unseen (,ghayb), one may ‘call’ Ghulam Ahmad a prophet. In this 
sense, Ghulam Ahmad is only ‘called’ a prophet since he reflected the perfections, 
virtues, and high moral character of the Prophet Muhammad so closely. He was the 
khalifat-idlah, Allah’s representative on Earth.35 However, in the sense that Ghulam 
Ahmad had no new scripture to disseminate or new law to supplement 01* supersede 
the shan'a, he was not a prophet.36 Ghulam Ahmad was only ascribed prophethood 
through his pure and perfect spiritual imitation (bitriiz) of Muhammad. Ghulam 
Ahmad paid considerable attention in his booklet to the khatm al-mtbm>wa verse in 
order to explain how the seal on prophethood had not been broken. This undue 
attention affirming the soundness of the verse implies that he understood that no 
prophet could appear after Muhammad. As he had already explained, no prophet 
could exist in the world after Muhammad including Jesus, because if Jesus were to 
return to the world in the way that most Muslims expect, the seal of prophethood 
would be broken.37 The summary of his thoughts at the end of the tract helps to 
clarify his final position.
This entire treatise is intended to show that my ignorant opponents 
accuse me of claiming to be a prophet or a messenger, whereas I make 
no such claim. In these regards, I am neither a prophet nor a 
messenger in the way that they think. However, in one sense, I am a 
prophet and a messenger in the context in which I have just explained.
34 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Ek G halati ka Izala , in Ruham Khaza 'in, Vol. 18, p. 208.
35 Ibid., p. 210.
36 Ibid., p. 211.
37 Ibid., pp. 214-215.
92
So whoever maliciously accuses me of claiming prophethood or 
messengership is following false and fdthy persuasions. It is my 
manifest spiritual imitation (buruz) [of the Prophet Muhammad] that 
has made me a prophet and a messenger, and it is on this basis that 
God has repeatedly called me a prophet of God and a messenger of 
God, but in manifestational {buruzt) form.
(cib is tamam tahrir se matlab mera ye hay ke jah il mukhdlif men  
nisbat ilzam I agate hayh ke ye shakhs nabi yd rasul hone kd da ‘wa 
kartd hay mnjhe aysd ko 'I da ‘wa. nahTh — mayh is tawr se jo  wo khayal 
karte hayh na nabi huh na rasul huh — hah mayh is tawr se nabi awr 
rasul huh jis  tawr se abhi mayh ne bay an kiya hay -  pas jo  shakhs 
mere par shararat se ye ilzam lagdta hay jo  da ‘wa nubuwwat awr 
risdlat kd karte hayh wo jhutd awr nd pdk  khayal hay -  mujhe buruzt 
surat ne nabi awr rasul bandya hay awr isT bind par khuda ne bar bar 
mera nam nabi all ah awr rasul allah rakha magar buruzt surat
38men).
The reality of this explanation is that Ghulam Ahmad’s conception of his own 
prophetic status was complicated. Aside from the apparently contradictory 
statements which he made throughout his career, Ghulam Ahmad went to great 
lengths to qualify his conception of prophethood and to show how he fitted in to the 
prophetic tradition. But once again, the greatest challenge for contemporary scholars 
is working out the semantics of the prophetic terminology within the context of 
Ghulam Ahmad’s unique self-image. We must look at the language that Ghulam 
Ahmad chose to express his ideas to get a fuller picture of his spiritual self-image. 
We will examine below some of the complications surrounding Ghulam Ahmad’s 
claims as well as the complications surrounding the presentation of his claims.
38 Ibid., p. 216.
93
2.4 -  The Terminology of Prophethood and Revelation
The words that are commonly associated with revelation and the prophetic 
tradition in Islam may be derived from Arabic roots, but they take on different 
meanings when used in the relevant languages o f scholarship despite their shared 
religious context. In the case of Ahmadi literature, assigning a fixed meaning to a 
word for analytic purposes, which is based on previous usages in the religious 
tradition, is often inappropriate because of Ghulam Ahmad’s intermittent jumps 
between Urdu, Arabic, and Persian. To further complicate things, Ghulam Ahmad 
would frequently switch his writing style between poetry and prose within the context 
of the same discussion, often switching languages as well. It appears that he may 
have used the same word differently, depending on his writing style, poetry or prose, 
and also on the language in which he was writing, be it Urdu, Arabic, Persian, or even 
at times Punjabi. Ghulam Ahmad blurred together the connotations of the prophetic 
terminology and ignored the religious precedence set by the tradition. In addition, he 
placed an unusual emphasis on uncommon terms like biiriiz (manifestation) and zill 
(shadow), which have negligible usage outside of a rare and exceptional genre of 
highly elitist Sufi literature. These terms were virtually never used in a prophetic 
context outside of the ecstatic claims of a minimal group of highly controversial 
figures.
Within a relatively short period of time, Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s insistence on 
maintaining an intense proselytization campaign demanded the abandonment of their 
elitist terminology in favour of the more common and less sophisticated explanations
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that were easily comprehensible by the mainstream. In trying to define irregular ideas 
with regular terminology, many Ahmadis reduced Ghulam Ahmad’s claim simply to 
that of being a prophet without the additional qualifiers that routinely accompanied 
his own explanations. Since the vast majority of the Muslim mainstream did not 
understand Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic qualifiers (buriiz, zill, ‘partial’, ‘dependent’, 
or ‘non-1 awbearing’) that prefixed and limited his prophethood, the standardized 
terminology for prophets and revelation quickly took hold. It is important to 
emphasize that even within the prophetic context, Ghulam Ahmad’s self-image was 
extraordinarily unique. Although his prophethood was a secondary and consequential 
outcome of his being a buruz (manifest spiritual imitation) of Muhammad, he was 
still the mahdi and the promised messiah of the latter days who received regular 
revelations from God.
Classifying these revelations appropriately poses other problems as well. 
Similar to the jargon associated with prophethood, several words have been used to 
describe revelatory or inspirational experiences in the Islamic tradition; for example, 
wahy, ilham, kashf, ru 'yd, futuhat, mubashshirai and so forth. Ghulam Ahmad also 
added Perso-Urdu words to the list like pesh go I  and khwab, which he used in a 
similar context when referring to his mystical experiences. It is interesting that he 
used all of these words interchangeably as revelation and ignored their theological 
connotations or implications. Even in the case of the revelations of the Prophet 
Muhammad himself, Muslims acknowledged that subtle distinctions in his wahy 
distinguished between Qur’an and hadith qudsl, though both are unquestionably
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accepted as divine revelation.39 Unlike the English connotations, one cannot acquire 
prophethood through prophecy in an Islamic context, which is related in part to the 
idea that revelations and divine inspirations have qualitative distinctions. If Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad did acquire a shadowy (zillt) or contingent prophetic status as he 
claimed, then how should one treat his shadowy revelations?40
Fortunately, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad did attempt to qualify his own revelations 
in one o f his more metaphysical works called Haqiqat a]-Wahy (The Reality of 
Revelation). Alongside the philosophical subject matter, the book presents a thought 
provoking insight into the intended significance of Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations in 
relation to his conspicuous self-image. As one of his last major works, Haqiqat al- 
Wahy was published in May 1907 only one year before his death. In this sense, it 
represents his final thoughts on his revelations and his prophetic status after a full yet 
bitterly contested career. Ghulam Ahmad organized the book into four chapters, each 
detailing one type of revelation. The first chapter categorizes people who have some 
true dreams or receive some true inspirations but have no spiritual connection to 
Allah. The second chapter describes people who periodically had some true dreams 
or some true revelations but maintained some connection with God, even though their 
connection was not a strong one in the sense that they are not representative o f the 
spiritually elite. The third chapter details people who had a very strong connection 
with Allah and with great frequency received pure revelations, which were lucid, 
unambiguous, and illuminating. These people were consumed by the love of God and
39 See W illiam A. Graham, Divine W ord an d  Prophetic  W ord in Early Islam  (Paris: Mouton, 1977).
40 Humphrey Fisher recognized this problem and raised a similar question in his study, but he did not 
attempt to answer or expound on what this question entailed for Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, which has been 
done below. See Humphrey J. Fisher, Ahm adiyyah: A Study in Contem porary Islam on the West 
African C oast, p. 44.
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included God’s chosen prophets and messengers. The fourth and final chapter is 
devoted to showing the position of Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations within this context 
and essentially gives him a unique status as the promised messiah.41
It is clear that Ghulam Ahmad’s concept of prophethood was intimately 
connected to his concept of revelation. Throughout his career, Ghulam Ahmad was 
consistent in asserting that by receiving revelation, he received access to the unseen, 
which thereby granted him access to prophethood. But in terms o f the act of 
revelation itself, Ghulam Ahmad never mentioned an intermediary that liaised 
between himself and God,42 which represents a peculiarity in Ghulam Ahmad’s 
revelations when considering that a median is a necessary part o f prophetic revelation 
in Islam. One must conclude, therefore, that Ghulam Ahmad’s type of revelation was 
significantly inferior to the wahy of prophets like Muhammad who are believed to 
have received the word o f God through the angel Gabriel.43 1 was unable to find any 
indication that Ghulam Ahmad received his revelations from the angel Gabriel or 
through any other median, which begs the question of why he insisted on calling his
41 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, H aqiqat al-W ahy, in Riihdm K haza 'in, Vol. 22.
42 There was a noteworthy attempt at scientifically justifying the act o f  revelation by Ghulam Ahm ad’s 
fourth successor and grandson, Mirza Tahir Ahmad. Although his book was written and published 
nearly one hundred years after Ghulam Ahmad’s death, it demonstrates an interesting exam ple o f  the 
tendency for Ahmadis to reject miracles. Mirza Tahir Ahmad went to great lengths to show that 
revelation was a naturally occurring phenomenon in the universe that could be used to explain a range 
o f  experiences from physic clairvoyance to prophecy. Ironically, his rationalized explanation o f  the 
mystical experience still ultimately depends on divine intervention. See Mirza Tahir Ahmad, 
Revelation , Rationality>, Know ledge, an d  Truth (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 1998), pp. 
239-254, and especially the section on Psychic Experiences other than Hallucinations.
43 There are only two instances in the Islamic tradition where prophets received the word o f  God 
without the use o f  som e type o f  median. The first was M oses during his interlude on Mount Sinai, and 
the second took place when Muhammad ascended through the heavens during his night journey. 
Interestingly, Ghulam Ahmad often took the name kalim-ullah, which was originally given to M oses in 
reference to his being spoken to by God in this direct manner. For an example o f  this, see Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad, Fath-i Islam , in Ruham K haza ’in. Vol. 3, p. 8.
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revelations ‘revelation (wahy)\44 The ability for non-prophets to tell the future is not 
celebrated in traditional Islam, which may be seen in the negative attitude towards 
soothsayers and oracles in the Qur’an.45 Ghulam Ahmad explained:
And then there is this one other objection which is raised in order to 
provoke the ignorant, they say that I have claimed prophethood, 
whereas this accusation is completely false. In actuality, I have made 
no such claim to the type of prophethood that is well known to be 
forbidden by the Holy Qur’an. I only claim that on one side I am 
ummati (a devout follower of the example of the Prophet Muhammad) 
and on the other side I am a prophet, purely because of the bounties of 
the prophethood of the Holy Prophet, may the peace and blessings of 
Allah be upon him. And by prophet, I only mean to the extent that I 
receive an abundance of God’s speech and conversation.
{awr phir ek awr nadani ye hay ke jah il logon ko bharkane ke llye 
kahte hayh ke is shakhs ne mibinvwat ka da ‘wa kiyd hay haldhke ye  
unka sar-a-sar iftird hay -  balke j is  mibuwwat ka da 'wa karnd qnr ’an 
sharif ke ru se mana ‘ ma ‘lum hotd hay aysa ko 7 da ‘wa nahih kiyd 
gaya s ir f ye da ‘wa hay ke ek pahlii se mayh ummati huh awr ekpahlii 
se mayh dh-hazrat sall-alldhu ‘alayhi M>a sallam ke fayz-i nubuwwat Id 
wajah se nabT huh awr nabl se murdd s ir f is qadr hay ke khudd ta 'alia 
se ba-kasrat sharaf-i mukdlama o mukhdtabapata huh...)46
Although Ghulam Ahmad’s position does not represent the traditional 
understanding of prophethood or revelation, it explains his self-image rather well. 
Receiving numerous communications from the Divine does not make one a prophet in 
Islam. One may ask why Ghulam Ahmad insisted on using this terminology with 
mainstream Muslims when he knew that he intended something far more complex. It 
is even more interesting that Ghulam Ahmad attempted to justify his concept of 
prophethood by referring to Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, the Naqshbandi master who also
44 Ghulam Ahmad certainly had claimed to have seen and communicated with angels, but in general he 
never claimed to receive his revelations from them in the traditional sense. In som e o f  these instances 
or dreams, Ghulam Ahmad did describe angels who disclosed certain hidden truths, but they were 
never described to have played a significant role in his day to day revelations.
45 For som e exam ples o f  this, see (52:29), (69:42), (37:36).
46 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, H aqiqai al-W aliy , in R u h an lK h aza’in, Vol. 22, p. 406.
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faced intense criticism for similar unorthodox claims 47 The glaring difference 
between the two figures is that Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi’s contribution to the Islamic 
tradition is firmly placed within a Sufi context, whereas Ghulam Ahmad has been 
distanced from both ecstatic Sufism and orthodox Islam. Receiving divine inspiration 
and claiming extraordinary spiritual heights is a typical feature in the writings of the 
intoxicated Sufis, but for various reasons that we will explore in later chapters, 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya has long since lost touch with this context. With the advent of 
modernity, the increase of technology, and the sharp decline of the traditional ‘ulama 
in the subcontinent, Ghulam Ahmad’s claims were disseminated through the masses 
as popular religion. To this day, many of Jamacat-i Ahmadiyya’s members fail to 
appreciate why taking such a claim literally is problematic within orthodox Islam. As 
we saw above, Ghulam Ahmad himself acknowledged that even nonbelievers are 
capable o f receiving communication from the Divine, which implies that revelation in 
itself does not entail prophethood regardless of how frequent or how vivid it may be. 
Yet, the persistent commitment of Ahmadis to affirming the authenticity of Ghulam 
Ahmad’s revelation and prophethood has developed into a definitive feature of 
Ahmadi Islam. We will see below how the question of Ghulam Ahmad’s revelation 
and prophethood later evolved into a question of authority.
It is easy to see how differences o f opinion regarding Ghulam Ahmad’s 
prophethood reappeared after his death and eventually contributed to the Lahori- 
Qadiani split. For the Qadianis, at least in terms of their theological interpretation, 
any type of prophethood was still prophethood regardless of its deficiencies. The 
Qadiani branch treats Ek Ghalati ka Izala as the definitive tract that establishes
47 Ibid.
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Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic status and has the tendency to overlook the later works 
like Haqiqcit al-Wahy, which also qualify Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood in a way 
similar to the earlier books. In reference to Ek GhalatT ka Izala, the Qadianis 
maintain that ‘for the previous ten years Ahmad had been assuring the world that he 
did not lay any claim to prophethood and now in this leaflet [Ek GhalaH ka Izala] he 
definitely declared that he was a prophet of God.’48 This understanding of Ghulam 
Ahmad’s claim of being a prophet is inconsistent with his later writings. There was 
no sharp break in the presentation of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic status after 1901. In 
fact, he continued to make similar statements about his prophethood very late in his 
life as we have seen in Haqiqat al-Wahy.
2.5 -  Reconciling the Revelations of the Promised Messiah
In terms of analysis, acknowledging that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad received 
revelations from God was only the first part of the problem, while determining how to 
treat those revelations in the context of the broader Islamic tradition was a far greater 
issue. There has always been a general consensus in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya that Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad did not bring any new law or sharl'a. The Qadiani branch 
emphasizes this point by asserting that he was a non-Iawbearing prophet, as is often 
stated in Ghulam Ahmad’s own writings. The problem with acknowledging that 
Ghulam Ahmad was a non-lawbearing prophet is that it admits that he himself must 
abide by the pre-existing sh a n ‘a. In theory, this entails that no one can act on any of
48 A. R. Dard, Life o f  A hm ad  (Lahore: Tabshir, 1948), p. 607.
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Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations; and likewise, if any of his revelations happen to be 
inconsistent with the shari'a , they ought to be abandoned. These questions of 
authority have yet to be addressed by the Jama1 at, but the standard Ahmadi claim that 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a non-lawbearing prophet entails that he himself was 
bound by the sharVa. In one sense, maintaining this belief essentially renders 
Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations meaningless, since no one has the right to act on them 
without appealing to valid forms of legal justification. The very act of using Ghulam 
Ahmad’s revelations to clarify, amend, or newly create any rulings whatsoever would 
assign a greater value to his revelations than he himself intended, regardless of 
whether or not they are consistent with the shari‘a. This means that Ahmadi rulings 
should be subject to the same legal discretion under the same legal methodology of 
the classical Islamic tradition and subject to the same scrutiny from dissenting 
scholars who disagree with their rulings.
In actuality, this is not the way in which Ghulam Ahmad’s opinions are 
treated within the Jama1 at. His opinions and revelations have already acquired a 
unique precedence over all other legal rulings in Islamic shari'a, even though this 
precedence has yet to be formalized into a rigorous legal methodology. The problem 
has been compounded in recent years as Ghulam Ahmad’s khalifas have acquired a 
status that is comparable to the familiar Shi'i notion o f the infallible imam, in the 
sense that the Ahmadi khalifa gives divinely inspired legal injunctions that cannot be 
breached.49 The frequent assertion that the Ahmadi khalifa is chosen by God is
49 It may also be useful to compare the role o f  the Ahmadi khalifa to that o f  the Aga Khan in the 
Ism a‘ili tradition. Antonio Gualtieri commented on his experiences with the Ahmadi community and 
made som e interesting observations on the essential role o f  the Ahmadi khalifa ‘in bridging the divine- 
human gulf.’ See Antonio Gualtieri, The Ahmdais: Community, Gender, and P olitics in a M uslim
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steadily becoming indoctrinated,50 which poses other problems when the opinions of 
two or more khalifas clash or when the khalifa’s opinion clashes with the opinion of 
Ghulam Ahmad himself. There is no doubt that Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya will one day 
have to grapple with the problem of defining a formal legal methodology of 8fiqh-i 
Ahmadiyya’ that clearly defines a framework to rank the classical sources like the 
Qur’an and hadith against Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations, writings, and sayings in 
conjunction with the opinions o f the presiding khalifa.51 At present, it appears rather 
informally that the opinion of the presiding khalifa takes precedence over all of the 
above, but once again this has yet to be formalized into doctrine.52 Comparatively, 
the process of formalization took centuries to develop in Sunni and Shi‘a Islam after a 
clear khalifa or imam had ceased to exist, which drew attention to the need for a more 
rigorous legal methodology.
Society  (London: M cG ill-Q ueen’s University Press, 2004), pp. 38-44. The quotation is taken from p. 
38.
50 This sentiment appears to have been present in som e fonn follow ing the elections o f  virtually every 
Ahmadi khalifa , but it appears to have first been emphasized in this way follow ing the Lahori-Qadiani 
split in 1914. It resurfaced several tim es since then, including during Mirza Mahmud Ahm ad’s lengthy 
final illness, and has once again becom e a prominent theme in Ahmadi Islam today. See R eview  o f  
Religions (July 1956) V ol. 50, N o. 7, pp. 503-505, 521-524; see also Review  o f  R eligions (October 
2007) Vol. 102, N o. 10, pp. 48-51.
51 Ahmadis claim to base their legal m ethodology primarily on the Hanafi madhhab, but they clearly 
reject strict adherence to any particular school o f  thought, which is most likely a direct result o f  
Ghulam Ahm ad’s Ahl-i H adith  influence. In practice, Ahmadis clearly prefer to obey the rulings o f  the 
presiding khalifa  under the presumption that his living awareness, and potentially his divine 
connection, makes him better equipped to address contemporary issues more appropriately as they 
arise. There are, however, two short volum es o f  Ahmadi legal rulings which were recently published 
by a committee o f  missionaries as a guideline for basic family issues and prayer in Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya. See Fiqh-i A hm adiyya  2 vols. (Rabwah: Zia Islam Press, 1983?).
52 Humphrey Fisher presented an account o f  how the folding o f  the arms in prayer had becom e an issue 
amongst the W est African diaspora community o f  Ahmadis and the predominantly M aliki locals. This 
difference o f  opinion does not pose a problem between two conflicting schools o f  fiqh, which  
acknowledge the validity o f  both positions. H owever, the folding o f  the arms posed a serious problem  
for Ahmadi missionaries in the 1950s who had trouble committing to a particular school o f  thought, 
but instead would assert their allegiance to the khalifat al-m asih  and the Promised M essiah. See 
Humphrey J. Fisher, A hm adiyyah , p. 20.
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It is clear that this process of formalization for Jamacat-i Ahmadiyya will 
require an official position on the nature of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood and 
the authority of his revelations in relation to the inspiration of his spiritual successors. 
This is not to suggest that Ghulam Ahmad never explicitly addressed the issue of his 
own legal authority. There is certainly the potential for a precedence in one instance 
where Ghulam Ahmad openly stated that the revelations (ilham and kash f received 
by the people of revelation (ahl-i kashf) are on the same level as hadith in terms of 
their legal authority. In this sense, he claimed to have complete autonomy in his legal 
discretion to make legal rulings as a mnjtahid, however he saw fit.53 Although this is 
a clear contradiction of classical legal theory and iisiil al-fiqh, it is sufficient for our 
purposes to recognize that the potential for grounding this legal methodology has yet 
to be formalized.54
If one could determine exactly what Ghulam Ahmad intended regarding his 
spiritual status it would make addressing the question of authority much easier. 
Although the most imperative question in relation to Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood 
may revolve around the question of authority, there are a number of other questions 
that must be considered first. Many of these issues revolve around a clarification of 
his path to prophethood. There is nothing that explicitly details how Ghulam Ahmad
53 For the full discussion regarding the authority o f  Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations in relation to hadith, 
see Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Izdla-i A wham, in Ruham Khaza 'in, Vol. 3, pp. 175-177. For a more 
general commentary that broadly outlines Ghulam Ahmad’s position on hadith, see the two books 
entitled, al-H aqq, in Riihdm Khaza 'in, Vol. 4.
54 There is one instance where Ghulam Ahmad provided a bibliographic breakdown o f  classical 
sources in terms o f  their relation to the traditional Islamic sciences. Although the books essentially 
represent a cataloguing o f  the first khalifa  Nut' a l-D in’s personal library, they are a potential starting 
place for future Ahmadis who w ish  to formalize their religious m ethodology. The list o f  approved 
sources are organized in terms their respective disciplines including hadith, tqfsir, grammar, history, 
fiq h , usul al-fiqh, kalam , logic, Sufism , m edicine, and many more. It is interesting to note that Ghulam 
Ahmad chose to list books o f  hadith before books o f  lafsir, which may or m ay not be a reflection o f  his 
A hl-i H adith  background. See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, al-Balagh, in Ruham K haza 'in, Vol. 13, pp. 
458-469.
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acquired prophethood or what type of prophethood it is possible for one to acquire. 
We saw above that Ghulam Ahmad added a number of qualifiers to his prophetic 
status by using various prefixed terms to limit his prophethood. It is unclear whether 
these qualifiers were intended to create a qualitative 01* a quantitative distinction in his 
prophetic status. When Ghulam Ahmad referred to himself as being a partial (Jnzwt) 
prophet, he made a quantitative distinction about his prophecy, which he often 
justified by referring to the famous hadith about true dreams being 1/46 of 
prophecy.55 In this sense, Ghulam Ahmad considered his portion of prophecy 
authentic but numerically incomplete. What is often overlooked when relying on this 
hadith is that it admits that Ghulam Ahmad’s prophecy was incomplete by 45/46 parts 
or 97.8 percent. However, the importance for Ahmadis is that his prophecy was 
genuine and authentic. In other places where Ghulam Ahmad described his prophecy 
with terms like biiriizi or zillT, he appeared to be making a qualitative distinction 
about his prophethood. In this sense, he was not the same type o f prophet as those 
who came before him, but qualitatively a rather different one. That Ghulam Ahmad 
drew both qualitative and quantitative distinctions about his prophethood is 
paradoxical, but it was this contradictory and ambiguous usage o f the terminology of 
prophethood that allowed (Ghulam Ahmad and) Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya to infer 
whatever they liked about his status. Sustaining these ambiguities indefinitely has
55 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Tawzih-i M ar dm, in Rithani K h a za ’in, Vol. 3, pp. 60-61; see also Elucidation  
o f  Objectives, pp. 17-18. In the original Arabic text, Ghulam Ahmad said that this type o f  prophetic 
revelation was given to the elite saints (khawass al-a\vliya), which is an interesting statement because 
the aw liya  (saints) are not prophets. It often seem s like Ghulam Ahmad’s conception o f  nubitwwa 
(prophethood) was much closer to a traditional notion o f  w ilaya  (sainthood) rather than anything else. 
At times in Ghulam Ahm ad’s writings, the two appear to be indistinguishable.
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allowed for some indeterminate connection to prophethood to be invariably present in 
Ahmadi Islam.
One more question regarding the acquisition of Ghulam Ahmad’s 
prophethood relates to the grammatical objects of the terms buruz and zill. As we 
have seen above, in some accounts, Ghulam Ahmad had based his claims of 
prophethood largely on the death of Jesus. Since Jesus had died a natural death and 
would not return from the heavens, Ghulam Ahmad had been raised by God in the 
image of Jesus. Given that Ghulam Ahmad was the second coming of Jesus, he 
became the second messiah and acquired a prophetic status in the likeness of the first 
prophet Jesus. In other accounts, Ghulam Ahmad described his absolute and 
complete devotion to the Prophet Muhammad by employing the Sufi concept offana  
f t  'l-rasul in an unusually literal sense. Since Ghulam Ahmad had adhered to the 
sunna so closely and devoted his life to mimicking every virtue of the Prophet 
Muhammad, he became Muhammad’s buriiz (manifestation). His being itself was 
destroyed in his intense love for the Prophet and he acquired the being of his master, 
Muhammad. In this explanation, Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood was a. zill (shadow) 
of the prophethood of Muhammad. This justification may also explain why many, if 
not most, of Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations were simply verses of the Qur’an, which 
he claimed were re-revealed to him by G odf6
These two scenarios are problematic for the simple reason that in the first 
case, Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood results from him being a copy of Jesus, whereas 
in the second case, his prophethood results from him being a copy of Muhammad.
56 See Yohanan Friedmann, P rophecy Continuous, pp. 136-137, in which Friedmann detailed the 
relation between Ghulam Ahm ad’s Arabic revelations and the Qur’an, hadith, and other classical 
sources.
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When taken together, it is not clear who Ghulam Ahmad imitated to acquire his 
prophethood. The two conflicting accounts inconsistently detailed his ascent to 
prophethood. Perhaps one explanation could be that his messiahship resulted from 
copying Jesus whereas his prophethood resulted from copying Muhammad. Another 
explanation may be that the chronology o f his particular advent, perhaps in some 
metaphysical way, allowed for the culmination of prophecy through his particular 
prophethood which represented all of the previous prophets universally. There are 
passages in Ghulam Ahmad’s works, which suggest that he was indeed a 
manifestation of all of the prophets. In one place, when discussing the magnitude of 
his divine mission, he specifically listed the names of Adam, Seth, Noah, Abraham, 
Isaac, Ishmael, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, David, Jesus, Muhammad, and Ahmad as being 
prophets who were all manifest within him.57 This explanation was far less common, 
but it still contributed to the problem of acquisition. In any case, Ghulam Ahmad’s 
prophethood was vicarious in nature and contingent on at least one unrestricted and 
independent prophet who came before him. Since Jesus cannot return, Ghulam 
Ahmad appears in the place of Jesus; or since his being became absorbed in the being 
of Muhammad, he may now function on the Prophet’s behalf. It will be interesting to 
see if Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya further develops the idea of vicarious prophethood in the 
future, either through Ghulam Ahmad’s successors or through any other potential 
Ahmadi claimants to prophethood. It will be even more interesting if Ghulam 
Ahmad’s contingent prophethood serves as the basis for the prophethood of other
57 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, HaqTqat al-W ahy , in Ruham Khaza 'in, Vol. 22, p. 76 in the footnote. 
Ghulam Ahmad said that his being Muhammad was his most perfect manifestation (m azhar-i atam m ), 
which he further explained as being the z ill (shadow) o f  Muhammad.
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potential claimants within the newly developing Ahmadi tradition.58 It would be
rather disappointing, considering the sophistication of Ahmadi prophetology, if one 
day Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya concluded that prophecy ended with Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad. This could potentially give way to several iterations of surrogate prophets 
who vicariously absorb a little less prophethood than their respective predecessors.59
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya had two ways of addressing these questions of 
authority, which eventually manifested themselves in the Lahori-Qadiani split 
following the deaths of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his first successor. On one hand, 
authority was left with Ghulam Ahmad and with the individual’s interpretation of 
Ghulam Ahmad. And on the other hand, authority was consigned to a formalized 
institution of kliilafat-i Ahmadiyya. To see how the Jama'at interpreted these claims
58 The idea o f  regulating subsequent Ahmadi prophets is not speculation, as there have already been 
several exam ples o f  inspired figures in Ahmadi Islam. In the footnote o f  the polem ic tract H is 
H oliness , the author wrote: ‘One Chiragh Din claimed to be a prophet during Ghulam Ahm ad’s 
lifetime and was excommunicated by the M essiah. Abdullah Timapuri, Ahmad Nur Kabuli, and Yar 
Muhammad Qadiani have also advanced similar claims. Zaheer-ud-Din Aroopi is now an Emeritufs]- 
prophet. Ghulam Muhammad o f  Lahore styles h im self “the promised son.”’ See Phoenix, H is 
H oliness (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1970), p. 151. It is worth noting here that Ahmad Nur 
Kabuli may not be an appropriate example. In his defence, Ahmadi Nur Kabuli suffered from a 
traumatic experience in Afghanistan as a disciple o f  Sahibzada ‘Abd al-Latif, when he was punished 
severely for being Ahmadi. Am ongst other methods o f  torture and abuse, Ahmad Nur Kabuli was 
permanently disfigured by having his nose cut off. Some Ahmadi elders, who met him in Qadian 
before his passing, believe that his maltreatment in Afghanistan may have compromised his sanity, see 
also chapter 5, ‘The Role o f  Persecution’, below. Howard Walter also wrote o f  som e o f  these 
claimants including, ‘MaulvT Abdulla o f  Timapur (a suburb o f  Shorapur, in the Deccan) [who] had 
been successively Sunnite M uslim, Wahhabi [sic], and Ahmadi, before he created his own sect, 
declaring, “I am the man from God: You must all follow  me. 1 am the real Khalifa o f  Qadian.” He has 
about three hundred disciples at present [in 1918], and is much more friendly to Christians than to 
M uslim s.’ Walter also mentioned that Chiragh Din o f  Jammu, another claimant, died in accordance to 
Ghulam Ahm ad’s prophecy. See H. A. Waiter, The Ahm adiya M ovement (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1918), pp. 45-46. There has been a recent claimant named Munir Ahmad A zim  who claimed to 
be the promised reformer (nntslih m aw 'ud), the sam e title taken by Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud 
Ahmad. He described the challenges that he has faced with the two m ost recent Ahmadi khalifas in an 
interview, which is available on the website: http://www.alghulam .com /ahm adiyyanews/Al- 
Mouslemeen-Interview.html (October 2008).
59 There are numerous passages in Ghulam Ahm ad’s writing that are capable o f  justifying future 
prophets within an Ahmadi framework. In one example, Ghulam Ahmad said that 30 antichrists
(d a jja l) would appear in Islam, who demanded 30 m essiahs to stop them, which in the original passage 
implied that Ghulam Ahmad was only one o f  these messiahs. See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Izala-i 
Awham, in Ruham Khaza. 'in, V ol. 3, p. 197.
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of prophethood and responded to Ghulam Ahmad’s divine mission, it is necessary to 
look more closely at the chaotic period that followed his death. We will see how the 
process o f institutionalization began to formalize the ecstatic claims of the promised 
messiah and shifted Ahmadi theology away from the metaphysics o f Sufi elitism 
towards the literalist conformity of mass market religion. This was facilitated by the 
abandonment of the Sufi context of Ghulam Ahmad’s claims, which allowed for a 
more literal interpretation of his Sufi style metaphysics. Whereas in the beginning, 
there were only individual disciples struggling to understand the ecstatic experiences 
of their master, the formation of an organizational hierarchy introduced the type of 
consistent theological interpretations that accompany institutionalized religion. We 
will now turn our attention to how this process affected the Ahmadi identity and 
moulded the community in a way that more closely resembles the Jama‘at of today.
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Chapter 3 
Authority, Khilafat, and the Lahori-Qadiani Split
Interpreting the messianic claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad presented a 
challenge for the early Ahmadi community following its founder’s death. In this 
chapter we will look at how unanswered questions surrounding Ghulam Ahmad’s 
prophethood and the future leadership of the community resulted in the splitting of 
the movement into the Lahori and the Qadiani branches. We will look at how both 
groups used the same textual sources to justify their respective positions. As each 
faction began to formalize their interpretations of Ghulam Ahmad’s spiritual claims, 
subtle changes in the Ahmadi belief system began to take place, which yielded 
changes in Ahmadi ritual practices. The Qadiani leadership institutionalized Ghulam 
Ahmad’s charisma by forming a hierarchical organizational structure that was capable 
of embodying divine authority. We will see how these changes developed well 
beyond the split and influenced further changes in the Ahmadi identity.
3.1 -  The Setting for the Split and its Circumstantial Context
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad passed away in the early morning hours of 26 May 
1908 while visiting Lahore. His body was transported back to Qadian where his 
disciple and close companion Maulvi Hakim Nur al-Din led the funeral prayer after 
unanimously being chosen as his successor by those in attendance. Although the 
process may have taken some time, the decision was uncontested by the nearly 1200
members present who offered Nur al-Din their allegiance.1 Nur al-Din had been the 
first one to take Ghulam Ahmad’s bay'at in Ludhiana in 1889 and had always been 
regarded as one of his closest friends. During his reign as khalifa, Nur al-Din did 
very little to assert his authority over the Jama‘at. His mild mannered personality and 
strict adherence to Ghulam Ahmad had left little room for objections. It was not until 
his death six years later that the underlying differences in the Jama‘at began to 
emerge. Tension had been mounting for some time when Nur al-Din passed away on 
13 March 1914.2 The primary source of these tensions were conflicting views of the 
future leadership of the Jam a‘at, which were based on different interpretations of 
Ghulam Ahmad’s mission and claim. An underlying power struggle may have 
influenced the way in which these differences of opinion manifested themselves 
following Nur al-Din’s death. We will first look at the objections from each camp 
and then explore some other possibilities that may have contributed to the split in 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya.
Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, the eldest son from Ghulam Ahmad’s 
second marriage, had been the favoured candidate to take over the khildfat upon Nur 
al-Din’s demise. Whereas Nur al-Din had become the khalifa without any disputes, 
Mahmud Ahmad’s election was far more controversial. Although cultural mores 
placed an extraordinary value on Mirza Mahmud Ahmad being the eldest son of 
Ghulam Ahmad, he was only 25 when he was elected khalifat al-maslh II on 14 
March 1914 the day after Nur al-Din’s passing. A minority group of roughly 50
1 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 3, (Rabwah, 1983), pp. 187-189; Muhammad 
Zafrulla Khan, H azvat M aulvi N ooruddeen Khalifa la l M asih 1 (London: The London M osque, 1983?), 
pp. 103-108.
2 Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, H azvat M aulvi Nooruddeen Khalifalul M asih 1, pp. 200-201.
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members led by Maulana Muhammad 4All, another close companion of Ghulam 
Ahmad, refused to give Mahmud Ahmad allegiance or accept his authority as their 
next khalifa. Muhammad ‘Ali and his supporters soon decided to leave Qadian and 
set up their own organization in Lahore, from which their name ‘Lahoris’ is derived. 
The majority of members who stayed in Qadian retained the name ‘Qadianis’ from 
the context of this split.3 Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali had almost immediately 
published a few tracts detailing some of the group’s objections. However, the first 
publication to provide a comprehensive account of the grievances of the opposition 
party appeared in January 1918 in English under the heading The Ahmadiyya 
Movement IV  -  The Split. Since then, the book has undergone various revisions for 
subsequent editions, which have appeared under similar titles.
3.2 -  Causes of the Split
Muhammad ‘Ali outlined three major objections to Mahmud Ahmad’s 
khildfat in his book, The Split. The first objection was in regards to Mahmud 
Ahmad’s interpretations of a Qur’anic verse from Sura al-Sqff which describes how 
Jesus had prophesised the coming of the next prophet:
3 The term ‘Qadiani’ has developed a negative connotation and is often used in the pejorative in a 
derogatory tone to insult members o f  Jama‘al-i Ahmadiyya. The followers o f  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
refer to them selves as ‘Ahm adis’. In this context, the term ‘Qadiani’ is only being used to distinguish  
the followers o f  Mirza Mahmud Ahmad who remained in Qadian from the follow ers o f  Muhammad 
‘A li who migrated to Lahore and called them selves ‘Lahoris’.
I l l
Jesus, son of Mary, said, ‘Children of Israel, 1 am sent to you by God, 
confirming the Torah that came before me and bringing good news of 
a messenger to follow me whose name will be Ahmad.’
The verse is clear. Jesus addressed the Children of Israel and explained his 
mission as a fulfilment of the prophecies of the Torah and gave them the glad tidings 
of the forthcoming messenger, ‘whose name will be Ahmad.’ Some verses in the 
Gospel of John express similar sentiments to the Qur’an and are often referenced by 
Muslims as Jesus’ prophecy for the coming of Muhammad.5 Muslims also use this 
Qur’anic verse as a confirmation o f the Biblical prophecies by suggesting that Jesus 
informed his people of the coming of Muhammad, despite the fact that Jesus clearly 
stated that the messenger’s name will be ‘Ahmad’ instead of ‘Muhammad’.6 
Traditionally, the overwhelming opinion of Muslim commentators has been that both 
names referred to the Prophet. The name Muhammad has a similar meaning to 
Ahmad and both were used synonymously by Muslims in reference to the Prophet. 
However, it is easy to see why some Ahmadi commentators were eager to establish a 
connection with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, considering that the verse explicitly 
mentioned the name ‘Ahmad’. Such an explicit reference in the Qur’an to a 
forthcoming messenger named Ahmad would certainly bolster the Ahmadi 
presentation of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood.
A See (61:6) in M .A.S. Abdel Haieem (trans.), The Our 'an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 
370.
5 See John 12:13, 14:16-17, 15:26, and 16:7.
6 Muhammad Asad noted in his commentary on the verse that the word used in the B iblical accounts is 
the G reekparakletos, which is often translated as ‘the Comforter’. He believed this to be a corruption 
o f  the word p erik ly tos , ‘the much praised’, which was more appropriate as an exact translation o f  the 
original Aramaic mcnvhamana. Asad thought that the Aramaic mawhamana  clearly resem bles the two  
Arabic words, M uham m ad  and Ahmad, both o f  which are derived from the same root ham ida  meaning 
‘to praise’. See Muhammad Asad, The M essage o f  the Our 'an (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), p. 
861.
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Muhammad ‘Ali accused Mahmud Ahmad of exploiting the verse to claim 
that Jesus was speaking exclusively of his father. Conversely, Muhammad ‘Ali 
attempted to refute Mahmud Ahmad by suggesting that the verse referred exclusively 
to the Prophet Muhammad.7 Although the debate itself was straightforward, the 
implications of the debate were not simple. In refuting Mahmud Ahmad, Muhammad 
‘Ali attempted to show that any Ahmadi who believed that the Qur’anic reference to 
Ahmad was referring to the Prophet Muhammad was directly contradicting Mahmud 
Ahmad’s exegesis and henceforth discharged of their loyalties to him as their khalifa. 
Muhammad ‘Ali was attempting to discredit Mahmud Ahmad’s religious authority, 
his capabilities as a Qur’anic interpreter, and his competence as a khalifa. 
Undermining Mahmud Ahmad’s authority would benefit the Lahori cause, if it 
convinced some members to abandon Mahmud Ahmad and the Qadianis. The 
underlying presumption in Muhammad ‘Ali’s argument was that adhering to Mahmud 
Ahmad’s interpretations of the Qur’an was a necessary part of the Qadiani belief 
system. Establishing his position was problematic because even though Mahmud 
Ahmad later admitted to maintaining the belief that the verse prophesised the coming 
of his father, he acknowledged that it could be interpreted both ways, since the 
Qur’an could be interpreted in many ways. Mahmud Ahmad said that he did not 
consider it wrong or sinful for someone to disagree with him on the matter of 
Qur’anic interpretation.8 The disagreement did not touch on any o f the core beliefs of
7 Maulana Muhammad ‘A li, The Split in the A hm adiyya M ovement, (Columbus: Ahm adiyya Anjuman 
Isha‘at Islam Lahore, 1994), pp. 19-20.
8 See Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, A ’ina-yi sadaqa t (Lahore: 1921) in A nw ar a h  'Ulum, Vol. 
6, (Tilford: Islam International Publications, n.d.), which is also available in translation as, Truth about 
the Split (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 2007), pp. 56-61, under the section ‘A lleged  
Innovations’.
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Islam or of Ahmadiyyat, and so Mahmud Ahmad dismissed the issue as a difference 
o f opinion rather than serious theological contradiction.
Muhammad ‘Ali’s following two objections were far more serious. It Is well 
known that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood has always been a problem for the 
Sunni mainstream, but it is often overlooked that Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood was 
also a serious problem within Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. Ghulam Ahmad’s claims of 
being the mahdi (guided one) and the masih (messiah) were the most problematic 
because they implied that his spiritual status contained some underlying strand of 
prophethood. Muhammad ‘Ali consistently argued that Ghulam Ahmad had never 
claimed to be a ‘real’ or ‘perfect’ prophet in the way that Muhammad was a ‘real’ and 
‘perfect’ prophet who administered the shari'a. The wording used by Ghulam 
Ahmad indicated that he claimed to be a zilli (shadowy) or a baruzi (manifestational) 
prophet by mimicking the perfections of Muhammad in a manner that achieved God’s 
pleasure and eventually earned him a status equivalent to the ranks of the prophets. 
Ghulam Ahmad never claimed to establish any new religious law, but rather 
reinterpreted and re-administered the original law in its intended form. Muhammad 
‘Ali believed that Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood was imperfect and that Mahmud 
Ahmad was dangerously approaching kufr (infidelity) by exaggerating his father’s 
claims.9 Mahmud Ahmad responded by saying that pinpointing the specific rank of 
his father overlooked the fact that he was chosen by God for his mission. The details 
o f his prophetic rank were superfluous, because only God could control the rank of 
the prophets and designate their elevated spiritual status. He argued that it did not 
matter whether Ghulam Ahmad was more of a shadowy prophet or a manifestational
9 See Maulana Muhammad ‘A li, The Split in the Ahm adiyya M ovem ent, pp. 50-78.
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prophet, since the important part was recognizing that his father’s privileged status 
had been assigned by God Himself. Ultimately, Mahmud Ahmad concluded that 
Ghulam Ahmad was still a prophet of God regardless of the specific variety of his 
prophecy, since his status had been predicated on a type of prophethood that was 
assigned by Allah.10
For the Qadiani supporters of Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, Muhammad ‘Ali’s 
concerns were inconsequential. Ghulam Ahmad, in a manner o f speaking, earned his 
prophethood through his strict adherence to the Prophet Muhammad. Since Ghulam 
Ahmad copied Muhammad’s perfections so closely, he literally acquired the 
Prophet’s perfections through identification with him. Qadiani supporters argued that 
it was pointless to say that one perfection was better than another, especially since 
they were referring to the same perfections that had been manifested in two different 
people. Mahmud Ahmad believed that Ghulam Ahmad’s perfections were 
qualitatively identical to the perfections of the Prophet Muhammad. In mirroring 
Muhammad’s actions so precisely, Ghulam Ahmad claimed the Prophet’s perfections 
for himself through fana f i  ‘l-rctsul, which further enabled him to acquire a prophetic 
identity.11 The Lahori position was closer to the orthodox view in that copying the 
Prophet’s good actions does not make one a prophet. However, since the Qadianis 
were utterly convinced that they had found in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad the example of 
an individual who somehow managed to capture and exhibit all of the spiritual 
perfections of the Prophet Muhammad, they chose to call him a prophet. From the
10 For Mahmud Ahm ad’s elaboration on this issue, see Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, H aqlqal 
a l-m ib u m va , in A nw ar al-'U liim , Vol. 2, §10, pp. 345-613.
11 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Ek GhalatT ka Izala  in Ruham Khaza 'if7, Vol. 18, p 207; see also chapter 2 
above, ‘The Prophetic Claims o f  Mirza Ghulam Ahm ad’.
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Qadiani perspective, it was meaningless to say that Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood 
was imperfect, because imperfect prophethood did not exist as an attribute in itself, 
but rather was contingent on the negation of the positive attribute of perfect 
prophethood. From an analytical perspective, everyone and everything that is ‘non- 
prophet’ displays characteristics of imperfect prophethood. To suggest that there is 
some essential quality that is capable of making ‘imperfect’ prophethood is vacuous.
The framework of the Lahori-Qadiani debates revealed important details 
about the nature of Ahmadi beliefs. Given the circumstances and the rationalized 
manner of debating, it is difficult to avoid comparisons of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya to the 
early Mu‘tazila.12 In these regards, Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s internal debate on 
Ghulam Ahmad’s perfections and prophethood is far more characteristic of literalist 
strands of Islam or speculative philosophy than Sufism. It is likely that the finer 
points of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood did not matter to those members of the 
Jama‘at who were more attracted to his esoteric insights or his attacks on other 
religions. In this sense, Mahmud Ahmad’s explanation of Ghulam Ahmad’s 
prophethood was far more satisfying to the non-intellectuals of the Jama‘at who 
simply wanted to hear a yes or no. The breakdown necessary for pinpointing Ghulam 
Ahmad’s spiritual standing amongst the countless number of known and unknown 
prophets in the greater Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition was simply irrelevant to the 
lay Muslims who had recently been joining the Jama‘at from the rural areas of the 
Punjab shortly following Ghulam Ahmad’s death. Presumably many of these people, 
as is the case with many religious movements, were not looking for an intellectual
12 See Fazlur Rahman, Islam  (London: University o f  Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 85-99, which is the 
chapter on the development o f  Dialectical Theology; see also W. Montgomery Watt, The Form ative  
P erio d  o f  Islam ic Thought (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006).
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debate, but rather a familiar type of spiritual satisfaction that corresponded with their 
folk Sufi, Sunni, Punjabi backgrounds.
Muhammad ‘Aliks final objection in The Split was related to the status of non- 
Ahmadis. Mahmud Ahmad was accused of declaring anyone who did not enter into 
the bayTat of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad a kafir (nonbeliever).13 In declaring that all non- 
Ahmadis were guilty of kufr (infidelity), Mahmud Ahmad was excluding his Jama‘at 
from the rest of the Muslim umma. Although there were several examples in Ghulam 
Ahmad’s life where religious rivals had declared him a kafir, his response to these 
allegations was inconsistent. Ghulam Ahmad had initially hesitated in retaliating and 
was reluctant to react with his own declarations of kufr. He had refused his first 
mubahala (prayer duel) challenges by saying that it was not proper for one to enter 
into such contests with other Muslims.14 Muhammad ‘Ali used this point to insist 
that Ghulam Ahmad would never issue an unsolicited declaration of kttfi' against 
everyone who did not enter into his bay‘at, even though he later did accept the 
mubahala challenges from his Muslim opponents.15 Muhammad ‘Ali viewed these 
instances as special cases that were directed at a specific group o f people who were 
giving Ghulam Ahmad difficulty with his mission. He did not think that they were 
intended generally for all Muslims, since the idea of declaring the entire Muslim 
umma to be kafirs was absurd. However, this was precisely the position that 
Muhammad ‘AH attributed to Mahmud Ahmad by stating that ‘all those who have not
13 Maulana Muhammad ‘A li, The Split in the A hm adiyya M ovement, p. 79.
14 A. R. Dard, Life o f  A hm ad  (Lahore: Tabshir, 1948), pp. 178, 374.
15 Maulana Muhammad ‘A li, The Split in the Ahm adiyya M ovement, pp. 81-83.
117
entered into the bai'at of the Promised Messiah are outside the circle o f Islam, i.e. 
non-Muslims.’16
Ghulam Ahmad did acknowledge that anyone who affirmed the kalima or 
basic creed of Islam was a Muslim, unless they called him a kafir in which case the 
kufr would revert back to them.17 In this case, Ghulam Ahmad elaborated that even
the followers of the people who had declared him a kafir were kdfirs by default,
► • * 18 especially if they continued to follow their scholars without protest. For everyone
else, he said that denying his mission would only lead towards sin, since it was
deviating from the straight path, but importantly, it was not kufr. Ghulam Ahmad
defended his position by asserting that he had brought no new shari'a  and was not a
law-bearing prophet. He said that only those people became kafir who denied the
legislative prophets.19 Contrary to this view, in other books Ghulam Ahmad did
claim that denying his mission was equivalent to denying Allah, and thus anyone who
rejected him was a kafir?0 He elaborated by asserting his status as the promised
messiah and the culmination of the prophetic tradition. His being and his teachings
were identical to those of Muhammad, so by rejecting Ghulam Ahmad and his
teachings, one was rejecting Muhammad. He maintained that he had been shown
divine signs in support of his mission and that these signs were a direct manifestation
16 Ibid., p. 79.
17 The kalim a  is the statement, ‘there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his m essenger {la  ildha 
ilia 'llah m uhamm ad rasul a llah ).’
18 This is taken from an interview with Ghulam Ahmad during his final visit to Lahore in the weeks 
before his death. The original reference was cited as being from the periodical B adr  on (24 May 
1908), which is difficult to find, but it is easily available elsewhere in, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, 
M alfuzdr V ol. 10, (Rabwah: 1967), pp. 376-377. To legitim ize his position, Ghulam Ahmad cited a 
hadith from Sahlh B tikhan, K itab  al-Adab, which affirmed that anyone who wrongfully called a 
believer a kafir was a kafir himself.
19 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Tiryaq at-Quliib, (1902), in Ruham K haza ’in. Vol. 15, pp. 258-259.
20 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Barahtn-i Ahm adiyya, Voi. 5 (1905), in Ruham K h a za ’in, Vol. 21, p. 82.
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of God’s power. With this rationale, Ghulam Ahmad claimed that by rejecting his 
mission, one was rejecting the divine signs that had been shown in his favour, and 
therefore one was rejecting God Himself.21
In actuality, this problem of takfir (calling someone a nonbeliever) was a 
subset of the previous problem of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood. If one could 
pinpoint Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic status with some degree of certainty, then 
perhaps one could gauge the status o f those who rejected his message. The case of 
legislative prophets was much easier for Ahmadis to evaluate. By definition, 
legislative prophets brought a message that was legally binding in terms of religious 
law. If  Ghulam Ahmad’s message was binding, then anyone who rejected him, or 
perhaps did not enter into his bay‘at, could be considered a kafir. However, since 
Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be a non-legislative prophet, rejecting his mission should 
not result in kufr. According to Muhammad ‘Ali, there was a distinction between 
active rejection and passive rejection of Ghulam Ahmad’s mission. Actively 
rejecting Ghulam Ahmad entailed being familiar with his writings, his mission, and 
his claims before consciously refusing to enter into his bay'at and denying his 
mission. Passive rejection of Ghulam Ahmad referred to someone who was unaware 
of his mission and unaware of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. Muhammad ‘Ali had accused 
Mahmud Ahmad of not distinguishing between the two and deeming both active 
rejection and passive rejection of his father’s mission to be kufr?2
According to Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, although Ghulam Ahmad did not 
introduce any new religious laws, the laws that he was preaching were still binding,
21 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, H aqiqal al-W ahy , in Ruham K haza'in , Vol. 22, pp. 120, 163-165, 178.
22 Maulana Muhammad ‘A li, The Split in the Ahm adiyya M ovement, pp. 79-80.
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just as they had always been, since they were first revealed to Muhammad. With this 
rationale, Mahmud Ahmad maintained that rejecting Ghulam Ahmad was equivalent 
to rejecting the prophecies made by Muhammad, which is the same position that was 
already expressed above.23 In later years, Mahmud Ahmad eventually revised his 
position by attempting to redefine the word ‘kafir'. He claimed that linguistically it 
was not necessary for a kafir to refer to a non-Muslim, but that the word ‘kafir' had 
more general usages that included other connotations of denial. He said that when he 
used the word 4kafir’ in reference to anyone who did not enter into the bay'at of his 
father, it only meant that they had denied the promised messiah and the mahcK, which 
was still kufr but not kufr of Islam. Mahmud Ahmad argued that these kafirs were not 
considered non-Muslims, but that they were only considered non-Ahmad is.24 In 
many ways, Mahmud Ahmad's reasoning resulted in a trivial position that was 
redundant. Of course anyone who did not enter into bay ‘at with Ghulam Ahmad was 
a non-Ahmadi. The argument was circular, and affirming this type of kufr is a 
tautology. Nevertheless, Mahmud Ahmad's interpretation stuck and was soon 
adopted as the official Jama‘at position on non-Ahmadis. At present, Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya maintains that non-Ahmadis are kafirs insomuch that they reject the 
Imam of the age, which calls into question the sincerity of their faith.
It is clear that the debates that emerged during the Lahori-Qadiani split had an 
impact on the identity of average Ahmadis. The Jama‘a fs  preoccupation with 
speculative theology, which had surrounded Ghulam Ahmad's claims of
2j See Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Truth about the Split, pp. 134-179, particularly the 
sections in relation to his article on ‘K ufr-o-lslam ’.
24 See Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahm ad’s article under Hazrat Khalifatul M asih II, ‘Are non- 
Ahmadis Kafirs?’, R eview  o f  R eligions (July 1935) Vol. 34, N o. 7, pp. 241-256.
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prophethood, was surprisingly not limited to a small group of intellectuals. However, 
it is likely that participation in these debates isolated large portions of the early 
Ahmadi population. Realistically, the majority of Ahmadis had minimal influence on 
the actions or the outcome of the Lahori dissenters and the Qadiani leadership. 
Ultimately, the Lahori perspective adopted a softer position that was more consistent 
with Sunni orthodoxy,25 while the Qadianis emphasized the controversial aspects of 
Ghulam Ahmad’s inner religious experiences and prophethood, and they formulated 
religious doctrine that was based on it.
In many ways, the problem of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood and his position 
on takfir was a problem of semantics. It was a problem of distinguishing the 
correlations between the ranks associated with a muhaddath (one to whom God 
speaks), a mujaddid (renewer of the faith), a buruzi nabi (manifestational prophet), a 
zilli nabi (shadowy prophet), a jazw i nabi (partial prophet), a tashrV nabi (law- 
bearing prophet), a la. tashri‘ nabi (non law-bearing prophet), a rasul (messenger), a 
mahdi (guided one), a masih (messiah), and so forth. Correspondingly, it was equally 
impossible to determine the exact degree o f a kafir's kufr. The theological dispute 
was largely dependent on the semantics of the terminology, which had virtually no 
precedent in the Qur’an, sunna, or the greater Islamic tradition in the context of this 
debate. Given the impossibility in determining the spiritual rank of any person, much 
of the Lahori-Qadiani debate developed a political dimension,
Muhammad ‘Ali had initially blamed the unorthodox interpretations of 
Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic status on Mahmud Ahmad’s youth, inexperience, and
25 In many ways the Lahoris have dissolved back into Sunni Islam although they still maintain their 
reverence for Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. They do not have sharply distinctive features in the same way as 
the Qadianis and largely define them selves in reaction to the Qadianis at present.
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excessive admiration for his father. In the earliest explanations, Muhammad ‘Ali, as
a faithful disciple of Ghulam Ahmad, had also included an apologetic excuse for
Mahmud Ahmad, perhaps to avoid maligning his reputation. He blamed the
exaggerations on a rogue Ahmadi innovator named Muhammad Zahir al-Din who had
allegedly corrupted Mahmud Ahmad’s understanding of his father’s rank. Zahir al-
Din had written two tracts in which he attributed perfect prophethood to Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad.26 The first tract, Nabi Allah ka Zahur (The Appearance of the
Prophet of God), was published in April 1911 and was supposedly the first time that
Ghulam Ahmad’s name was explicitly used in a way that inferred perfect
prophethood. Muhammad ‘Ali said that Zahir al-Din was the first member of
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya to entertain the heterodox view that Muhammad was not the
final prophet. By July 1912, the controversy had reached Hakim Nur al-Din, who
was then khalifat al-masih I, and Zahir al-Din was excommunicated from the Jama1 at
011 charges o f blasphemy 27 Within a month, the conflict had subsided and Nur al-Din
28permitted Zahir al-Din to re-enter the Jama‘at in accordance with his repentance. In 
April 1913, Zahir al-Din published a second tract called Ahmad Rasul Allah ka Zahur 
(The Appearance of Ahmad the Messenger o f God), which apparently displayed a 
reworded kalima on the title page that said, da ilaha ilia 'lldh ahmad rasiil alldh 
(there is no god but Allah; and Ahmad is the messenger of Allah)’, instead of, 
‘Muhammad is the messenger of Allah’.29 As one would suspect, Zahir al-Din was
26 Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali, The Split in the A hm adiyya M ovem ent, p. 10.
27 Maulana Muhammad ‘A li cited the original letter o f  expulsion as appearing in B adt\ (11 July 1912). 
He provides an exceip t o f  the original in. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
28 Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali cited the follow-up letter as originally appearing in B adi\ (1 August 1912) 
in, Ibid., p. 11.
29 Ibid., p. 11.
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excommunicated from the Jama‘at for a second time. Interestingly, Muhammad ‘Ali 
said that the official reason for Zahir al-Din’s second expulsion from the Jama‘at was 
related to his unsuccessful attempt to claim the khilafat for himself.30 It is difficult to 
determine what influence Zahir al-Din had on Mahmud Ahmad, who was still in his 
early twenties at the time. Mahmud Ahmad denied the allegations in his response to 
Muhammad ‘Ali and renounced any close affiliation with Zahir al-Din, despite his 
continued belief that Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet.31
Although the issue of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood is crucial to reconciling 
the conflict between Ahmadiyyat and orthodox Islam, Muhammad ‘Ali’s criticisms of 
the Qadianis were often presented in a way that emphasized character flaws in 
Mahmud Ahmad rather than the issues at hand. Muhammad ‘Ali’s attacks on 
Mahmud Ahmad were often expressed in terms of his disapproval of the direction of 
leadership for the Jama‘at, rather than his theological inconsistencies. Given the 
commonalities between the Lahoris and the Qadianis, it seems odd that the two camps 
could not resolve their subtle differences regarding the semantics of Ghulam 
Ahmad’s prophetic status. Muhammad ‘Ali’s repeated references to Mahmud 
Ahmad’s immaturity and incompetence as a leader suggest a different motive 
underlying the split, which may revolve around a hidden desire for the khilafat. 
Although this is the most common explanation for the split given by the Qadianis in 
casual conversation, the idea itself may not be unfounded. Muhammad ‘Ali clearly 
had more appropriate qualifications for being the khalifa than Mahmud Ahmad,
30 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
31 The full response is available in Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Truth about the Split, pp. 96- 
120, in the section on ‘Factors Relating to Zahiruddin’s expulsion’, and also pp. 121-123, under 
‘Zahiruddin’s Second Expulsion’.
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whose only relevant qualification was his lineage. Muhammad ‘Ali’s knowledge of 
Ahmadi Islam is apparent from his numerous publications on the Jama‘at, both before 
and after the split. He was a close companion of Ghulam Ahmad, the first editor of 
the Review o f  Religions, a translator of the Qur’an, an accomplished attorney, and a 
professor of English, but yet he never openly solicited the position. ~ It is unlikely 
that the split in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was based solely on personal problems, but it 
does seem reasonable to suggest that many of the early disputes regarding the 
terminology of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood could have been resolved had they 
taken place between two different people. In the end, the differences proved to be 
impossible to resolve when Muhammad ‘Ali and his supporters left Qadian for good, 
nearly six weeks after Nur al-Din’s demise. On 2 May 1914, Muhammad ‘Ali and 
Khwaja Kamal al-Din, another early missionary and companion of Ghulam Ahmad, 
formed the Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i Isha‘at-i Islam in Lahore.
Mahmud Ahmad went on to become the most influential khalifa in Ahmadi 
history and eventually took the title nnislih maw ‘ud  (the promised reformer). The 
Qadianis have always regarded his youth and inexperience, which characterized his 
early khilafat, as divine proof of the legitimacy of his authority. The issue o f khilafat 
eventually overshadowed the Lahori-Qadiani split and displaced the deeper problems 
related to Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood which we discussed above. The split 
allowed the Jama‘at to establish formal positions 011 Ghulam Ahmad’s messianic 
claims and initiated a process o f institutionalization that formally defined an overt 
authority for the community. The institution of khilafat provided a means for this
32 For the biography o f  Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali, see Mumtaz Ahmad Faruqui, M uham m ad Ali: The 
Great M issionary o f  Islam  (Lahore: Ahmadiyya Anjuinan Isha‘at-i Islam, 1966).
3j Maulana Muhammad ‘A li, The Split in the Ahm adiyya M ovem ent, p. 2.
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process to take place by centralizing authority for average Ahmadis. Once the split 
had taken place, justifications for the newly established doctrine of khilafat ~i 
Ahmadiyya needed to be retroactively rooted in Ghulam Ahmad’s thought in order to 
give legitimacy to Mahmud Ahmad’s authority. We will now turn our attention to the 
doctrinal justifications for khilafat-i Ahmadiyya and see how the creation on an 
institutionalized khilafat enabled Ghulam Ahmad’s charismatic authority to be 
persevered.
3.3 -Al-W asiyyat (The Will)
Although Ahmadis draw parallels between their caliphate and the first Islamic 
caliphate that followed the death of Muhammad, Ghulam Ahmad’s succession 
developed rather differently. On 20 December 1905, Ghulam Ahmad wrote a short 
tract known as al-Wasiyyat (The Will) in anticipation of his death in 1908. The 
purpose of the tract was to announce Ghulam Ahmad’s intentions and instructions for 
the community after his demise. Ironically, the book was unsuccessful in avoiding 
the later disputes between the Lahoris and the Qadianis when different interpretations 
of the text led to different conceptions of the organizational structure of the Jama‘at. 
The Qadianis prioritized khilafat whereas the Lahoris preferred spreading the 
community’s authority into an administrative body or anjuman. Much of al- 
Wasiyyat, in addition to Ghulam Ahmad’s own will, presented his inheritance 
guidelines for the creation of an endowment that would be subsidized by the assets 
bequeathed by Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s religious elite.
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Ghulam Ahmad’s impetus for the scheme was based on a vision of an angel 
who appeared to him and warned him of his imminent death. Ghulam Ahmad was 
shown a special plot o f land on which the angel was measuring out his future 
gravesite. The dirt surrounding the gravesite was described by Ghulam Ahmad to be 
shining brighter than silver. He was shown a place called bahishti maqbara 
(heavenly graveyard) where the heaven bound members of his Jama‘at ultimately 
would be laid to rest.34 The enigmatic experience inspired Ghulam Ahmad to find a 
plot of land that could serve as this bahishti maqbara and fulfil his divine vision. 
Ghulam Ahmad proposed that his own plot of land, which was adjacent to the family 
orchard in Qadian, be used to construct the bahishti maqbara. He specified that only 
those members who were pure of heart (pak dil) and who gave precedence to the true 
faith (haqiqat din) over worldliness would be given the privilege of participating in 
this divinely ordained scheme. He compared these exceptional members of his 
Jama'at to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad in their authenticity (sidq) and 
their detachment from the world.35 To demonstrate this detachment, Ghulam Ahmad 
required potential candidates to donate at least one tenth of their inheritable wealth 
and assets to the Jama‘at, in order to fund the propagation of Islam and to carry out 
the teachings of the Qur’an.36 Along with some logistical details about the collection 
and the allocation of these endowments, Ghulam Ahmad concluded his scheme after 
giving Ahmadi hopefuls the opportunity of being buried in the bahishti maqbara 
alongside their master, the promised messiah.
34 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, al-W asiyyaty in Ruham K haza'in , Vol. 20, pp. 315-317.
35 Ibid., p. 316.
36 Ibid., p. 319.
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The al-Wasiyyat scheme represented Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s first ever 
donation system and established a benchmark for financial sacrifice in the Jama4at. 
Prior to the al-Wasiyyat scheme, Ahmadis only paid the zakat in accordance with the 
rest of the Muslim umma. If a situation arose in which funding was required for a 
specific project, Ghulam Ahmad made a special appeal to his disciples, but there were 
no other financial obligations that were exclusive to the Jama‘at. The al-Wasiyyat 
scheme offered individual Ahmadis the means to participate in a divinely ordained 
venture whose end result provided them with reasonable confidence in this world that 
they would enter paradise in the next w orld /7 Even though it was never intended for 
every Ahmadi to partake in al-Wasiyyat, the exclusivity of the scheme contributed to 
the notion of a separate Ahmadi identity. This was the first step towards giving 
Jama4 at-i Ahmadiyya the consistent and continuous funding that is necessary for 
financial independence, self-sufficiency, and a lasting autonomy from non-Ahmadi 
sources.
Ghulam Ahmad founded an anjuman (committee), which soon came to be 
known as the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya (Executive Ahmadiyya Committee), to 
handle the collection and distribution of the revenues generated from the al-Wasiyyat 
scheme.38 He placed an extraordinary amount of authority in the hands of one 
singular body by combining the responsibilities for the collection and distribution of 
funds. He personally presided over the Sadr Anjuman until his death, even though
37 There is a com mon m isconception amongst Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis that burial in bahishti 
m aqbara  guarantees one entrance into paradise, even though Ghulam Ahmad explicitly rejected this 
view  in al-W asiyyat. Contrary to popular belief, Ghulam Ahmad made it clear that there was no 
inherent quality in the land that automatically grants one entrance into paradise. He said that no one 
would enter paradise sim ply by being buried in the graveyard, but rather only those who were already 
bound for heaven would be permitted to be buried in the bahishti m aqbara. See the footnote in, Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad, al-W asiyyat, in Ruham K haza in , Vol. 20, p. 321.
38 Ibid., p. 318.
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Nur al-Din officially occupied the most senior office of president.39 The roles of the 
office bearers are vague, but they were definitely subservient to Ghulam Ahmad. 
Designating a hierarchy only posed a problem after Ghulam Ahmad’s death when the 
community, on its own accord, decided to elect a separate khalifa. It is not surprising 
that Nur al-Din served as the first president of the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya before 
becoming khalifa. Similary, Nur al-Din appointed Mahmud Ahmad to head the Sadr 
Anjuman after becoming Ghulam Ahmad’s first successor.40
Ghulam Ahmad wrote an appendix to al-Wasiyyat about two weeks later on 6 
January 1906 in which he elaborated the logistical details for the scheme and 
stipulated the necessary qualifications for being a member of the Sadr Anjuman 
Ahmadiyya. Section 16 of the appendix stated that at least two members of the Sadr 
Anjuman needed to be proficient in the Qur’an, hadith, and Arabic, as well as being 
versed in Ahmadi literature 41 Considering that the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya as an 
organized body had the potential to succeed Ghulam Ahmad religiously and 
politically following his death, the minimum quota of two scholars seems rather low 
to establish significant religious authority. Perhaps this could be used to infer that 
Ghulam Ahmad never intended the Sadr Anjuman to have considerable religious 
authority, which may demand something like a khilafat. Even though the size of the 
Sadr Anjuman was never predefined, the first committee only had six members 
excluding Ghulam Ahmad himself, which may suggest that it was intended to fulfil a
39 Ibid., p. 330.
40 There appears to be a trend developing in Ahmadi succession, because four o f  the five Ahmadis who  
became khalifat al-m asih  were serving as president o f  the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya at the time o f  
their predecessor’s death.
41 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, al-W asiyyat, in Ruham Khaza 'in, Vol. 20, p. 326.
128
purely administrative role.42 However, in some passages like section 13, Ghulam 
Ahmad said that the Sadr Anjuman would serve as his representative after his death.
Because the anjuman is the representative of God’s appointed 
vicegerent, for this reason the anjuman will have to be completely free 
from all traces of worldliness and all its affairs should be extremely 
pure and founded on justice.
(chuhke anjuman khuda ke muqarvav karda khalifa Id. ja-nishin hay is 
liye anjuman ko dunya dan ke rangdii se bi-kulll pdk rahnd hoga awr 
us ke tamdm mu'dm Hat nihdyat sa f awr insdf par mubni hone 
chdhiyeh).43
This was the only passage where Ghulam Ahmad used the word ‘khallfaj and it was 
in reference to himself and his being represented by the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya 
after his death. Ahmadis inferred the establishment of khildfat-i Ahmadiyya from a 
different passage, where Ghulam Ahmad made provisions for the members of his 
community to accept bay ‘at on his behalf after his death.
Such persons will be selected according to the opinion of the believers.
So whomever forty believers agree upon as competent to accept the 
bay 'at from people in my name will be authorized to accept the bay ‘at.
And he ought to make himself into an example for others. God has 
informed me that ‘I will raise a person for your community (jama 'at) 
from your progeny, and I will distinguish him through his nearness [to 
God] and his revelations, and he will be a means to advance truth, and 
many people will accept truth’.
{ayse logdh kd intakhab mominoh ke r d ’e par hoga - p a s  jis  shakhs Id 
nisbai chads momin ittifaq karehge ke wo is bat ke la ’iq hay ke mere 
nam par Idgdh se bay'at le wo bay‘at lene kd majdz hoga -  cnvr 
chdhi’e ke wo apne ta l’h dusroh ke liye namuna banawe — khuda ne 
mujhe khabar dl hay ke mayh ten jam a 'at ke liye terl-hl zurrlyat se ek 
shakhs ko qd 'im karuhga awr us ko apne qurb awr M>ahy se makhsus
42 The minutes and attendance o f  the first m eeting (29 January 1906) o f  the M ajlis-i Mu ‘tam idin-i Sadr 
Anjuman A hm adiyya  (Organization o f  the Trustees o f  the Executive Ahmadiyya Committee) is 
available in, Ibid., pp. 330-332.
4j Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, al-W asiyyat, in RuhdnT Khaza ’in, Vol. 20, p. 325.
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karuhga awr us ke zari'e se haq taraqql karegd cnvr bahut se log 
sacha 7 ko qabul karehge)44
This passage presents a challenge to the standard Qadiani interpretation in 
which it is impossible for there to be multiple khalifas who are authorized to accept 
the bay 'at at the same time. The passage shows that Ghulam Ahmad did not limit the 
number of people who were permitted to accept the bay‘at, which means that the 
authority in question was not necessarily exclusive to one person. Any individual 
who acquired the confidence of forty believers had the potential to accept the bay 'at 
in Ghulam Ahmad’s name. Interestingly, Ghulam Ahmad did not allow for anyone to 
accept the bay ‘at in their own name. Although he prophesised that a member of his 
progeny would bring people towards truth (haq), he did not suggest that this confined 
the acceptance of the bay ‘at to the members of his progeny. The person from his 
progeny in question could have been one out of many people who were authorized to 
accept the bay'at in Ghulam Ahmad’s name.
Taking bay'at is a standard feature in Sufi orders, where the authorized 
individual is often known as the khalifa. It was common for the leader of the order to 
authorize several khalifas to carry out his teachings before his death, although in 
many cases the khilafat was hereditary.43 With the exception of Nur al-Din, Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya adopted this practice, as did numerous Sufi orders in India, even though 
the Jama4at only acknowledged the authority of one khalifa at a time. The reduction 
o f the institution o f khildfat-i Ahmadiyya to one individual consolidated the domain of 
religious authority significantly. It seems odd that a prolific writer such as Mirza
44 Ibid., p. 306, in footnote.
45 Annemarie Schimmel, M ystical D im ensions o f  Islam  (Chapel Hill: The University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1975), p. 236.
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Ghulam Ahmad would reduce his exposition of one of his Jama‘at’s most important 
institutions, khilafat-i Ahmadiyya, to a mere footnote in one of his shorter texts. 
However, the institution of khilafat became the primary seat of authority while the 
Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya took on a more supplementary role within this framework. 
According to the text, the Sadr Anjuman’s authority was centralized in a headquarters 
which was to remain situated in Qadian 45 In contrast, there were no geographical 
restrictions placed on the khalifa whose authority could have arguably been shared 
between rival candidates. According to Ghulam Ahmad, the primary function of the 
Sadr Anjuman was to collect and distribute funds to support the propagation o f Islam, 
whereas the individuals authorized to accept the bay‘at were responsible for 
promoting spiritual guidance and gathering people to one faith.47 At present, many 
Qadianis would differentiate between the spiritual authority of the khalifa and the 
administrative authority of the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya, even though the authority 
of the khalifa remains supreme.
As a final instruction, Ghulam Ahmad ordered his community to wait for a 
second manifestation of God’s power (qudrat-i ihdni or dusri qitdraf) and told them 
clearly that he himself was the first: T am an embodiment of God’s power (mayh 
khuda Id ek mujassam qudrat huh).A% He said that God always displayed two 
manifestations of power to dispel the two false joys (do jhiiti khushiafi) of the 
opponents 49 He said that the second manifestation would descend from the heavens 
at an unknown time but that it was worth waiting for, ‘because it is everlasting, and
46 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, al-W asiyyat, in RuhanT Khaza 'in, Vol. 20, p. 326, in section 15 and also in 
the footnote.
47 Ibid., pp. 306-307, 318-319.
48 Ibid., p. 306.
49 Ibid., p. 305.
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its continuity will not be broken until the day o f judgment (kyoh-ke wo d a ’imi hay j is  
kd silsila qiydmat tak munqata ' nahih hoga).’50 Although the second manifestation 
was eternal and therefore preferable to first, it could not come until Ghulam Ahmad 
had passed away.51 Ahmadis now interpret the prophecies for the second 
manifestation to be implicit references to the institution o f khilafat-i Ahmadiyya. By 
combining Ghulam Ahmad's instructions for the anjuman, his stipulations for 
members of the community to accept bay ‘at, his prophecies for his blessed progeny, 
and the anticipation o f God’s second display of manifest power {qudrat-i than!), the 
members of the Jama4at (both Lahoris and Qadianis) formed the institution of 
khilafat-i Ahmadiyya. These instructions from al-Wasiyyat laid the foundations for 
Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya’s two authoritative bodies, the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya and 
khilafat-i Ahmadiyya. Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya remained united within this framework 
of khilafat throughout Nur al-Din’s reign. It was not until Nur al-Din’s death that 
tangential concerns stemming from the Lahori-Qadiani dispute led to a debate on the 
legitimacy of an authoritative institution of khilafat. The Qadianis chose to give 
precedence to Mahmud Ahmad’s khilafat whereas the Lahoris rejected it in favour of 
their newly formed anjuman, the Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i Isha4at-i Islam Lahore.
In the years of Nur al-Din’s khilafat from 1908 to 1914, there was a consensus 
on the established framework for Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya’s leadership, which allowed 
divergent views to exist within a singular community. Questions about leadership, 
the authority of the khalifa's religious interpretations, and the administrative structure 
for managing the community’s affairs eventually led to irreconcilable differences
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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between the two camps. Although Muhammad ‘Ali did become the head of the 
Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i Isha‘at-i Islam Lahore, he never took the title ‘khalifa\  
Perhaps the authoritarian connotations associated with the khilafat were simply too 
much for him, and so he took the title ‘amir’ instead. In this role as the amir, 
Muhammad ‘Ali maintained political authority over his community without imposing 
his religious rulings on his supporters in the same way that Mahmud Ahmad had 
done. The primary function of the khalifat al-masih under the reign o f Nur al-Din 
still entailed presiding over the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya, even though the Sadr 
Anjuman retained its appointed president. The divergent views the community’s 
leadership and the institutional responsibilities that they entailed, gradually developed 
as both groups continually pointed to the passages in al-Wasiyyat to validate their 
positions.
3.4 -  Changes in the Ahmadi Belief System: From Theory to Practice
The split in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya left two sovereign factions with two 
divergent interpretations of Ghulam Ahmad’s message. The changes in ideology led 
to changes in the administrative structure and eventually led to changes in identity, 
even though both factions shared a common history through their founder and his first 
khalifa. The problem of takfir (calling someone a nonbeliever) began to have a 
sociological impact on members o f the Qadiani Jama‘at who began separating 
themselves from non-Ahmadi Muslims during the prayer. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad 
forbade his disciples from praying behind non-Ahmadi Imams and from participating
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in the funeral prayers of non-Ahmadi Muslims.52 The Lahori Jama‘at expressed their 
outrage and accused Mahmud Ahmad of distorting Ghulam Ahmad’s teachings and 
attempting to form his own religion.53 The physical separation in congregational 
prayer made an undeniable statement to both insiders and outsiders and objectified 
what had previously been a theoretical debate. Internal differences in religious belief 
were manifesting themselves in external differences in religious practice.
Mahmud Ahmad soon placed restrictions on marriages with non-Ahmadis. 
Although the prohibition was more strictly enforced amongst Ahmadi women who 
desired to marry non-Ahmadi Muslim men, the ruling was applied to both genders.54 
This represented a critical change in the social structure for several families in the 
Jama*at who were now displaying their new Ahmadi identity through their social 
practices. Children born to Ahmadi parents were now being considered Ahmadis by 
birth, even though they were too young to take bay‘at. This was a significant 
departure from most Sufi orders in the subcontinent whose members were still 
involved in every social aspect of Muslim civil society. A bay ‘at was typically a non- 
transferable allegiance between muvid and murshid (student and teacher), but the 
Ahmadi allegiance was now allowing Ahmadiyyat to be passed down from 
generation to generation as if it was a new religion.
52 Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, A nw dr-i Khilafat (Qadian: 1915), pp. 91-93; see also Spencer 
Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement: A H istory an d  Perspective  (Delhi: Manohar B ook Service, 1974), 
p. 114.
53 See Zahid A ziz, The O adiani Violation o f  A hm adiyya Teachings (Columbus: Ahm adiyya Anjuman 
Isha‘at Islam Lahore, 1995).
34 Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, Barakdt-i Khilafat (Qadian: 1914) in A nw ar a l- 'Ulum, Vol. 2, 
p. 220, where he says, ‘Presently, the needs o f  our community dictate that members neither give their 
wom en to non-Ahmadis nor accept other wom en in marriage (dj ham an zarurlydt chdhti hayh ke 
ja m a  ‘at is ta jw izp a r  'atnal kare ke ghayr ahm adiyon ko na larkz de aw r na an Id larfd l e) f  See also 
Al-Fazl, (23 M ay 1914), p. 8. Although the original A l-F azl article was not available to me, excerpts 
are often quoted by Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis regarding Mahmud Ahm ad’s verdict on marriage in 
various other sources.
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The (often self-imposed) isolation of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya gave way to new 
Ahmadi rituals and practices that began to take precedence over conventional Islamic 
practices. Mahmud Ahmad developed an elaborate donation system to provide 
continual revenues for his Jama‘at. Although Ghulam Ahmad’s al-Wasiyyat scheme 
was firmly in place, it only provided the Jama‘at with income upon the death of the 
members who had chosen to participate in it. In addition to the numerous other 
subscription fees introduced by Mahmud Ahmad during the course of his khilafat, 
which we will examine below, the al-Wasiyyat scheme was revised to include annual 
donations and create a more consistent source of income for Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. 
Ahmadis were expected to contribute finances to these schemes in addition to the 
zakat, which was slowly superseded by the other mandatory donations. Similarly, the 
Jalsa Sdlana (annual gathering) introduced by Ghulam Ahmad developed into a 
yearly convention that some believe has superseded the pilgrimage for hajj. Spencer 
Lavan commented on Ghulam Ahmad’s failure to perform the hajj and suggested that 
the Jalsa itself now served as an Ahmadi pilgrimage.55
This particular issue of the hajj in Ahmadi Islam is worth mentioning in some 
detail as Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s failure to perform the mandatory pilgrimage to 
Mecca has become a contentious issue. In actuality, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad never left 
India. However, Lavan’s view on the Jalsa displacing the pilgrimage to Mecca may 
have been inappropriate considering the current political climate, which prohibits 
Ahmadis from performing the hajj as ‘Ahmadis’. Consequently, many more 
Ahmadis attend their respective country’s Jalsa each year than go for the pilgrimage
55 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovem ent, p. 92. Lavan did mention how Ghulam Ahmad was 
prone to chronic illness in reference to the hajj on p. 42, in footnote 48. However, his com ments on the 
role o f  the Jalsa  were independent o f  this discussion.
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to Mecca. The number of Ahmadis that travel internationally to attend the main Jalsa 
each year in London is exceedingly high in comparison to those who appear to make 
an effort to perform the hajj. When Ghulam Ahmad was questioned regarding his 
failure to perform the hajj, he said that his primary obligation, as someone appointed 
by Allah, was spreading his mission (tabUgh).56 On another occasion, when Ghulam 
Ahmad was asked the same question, he said that his priority was killing the swine 
and breaking the cross, in reference to the popularly conceived duties of the mahdf. 
He further said that although he had already killed many swine, several stubborn 
souls remained.57 Nonetheless, Ahmadis place extraordinary emphasis on attending 
the yearly festivals like the Jalsa gatherings. At present, to assert that the Jalsa 
Sdlana has become a substitute for the pilgrimage to Mecca would be premature, but 
these new rituals and practices have added a unique dimension to Ahmadi life and 
contributed to the emergence of a distinctive Ahmadi identity.
As the Qadiani interpretations of traditional Islam were beginning to 
distinguish themselves, the Lahoris were desperately trying to reaffirm their Sunni 
identity.58 The subtle discrepancies in Ghulam Ahmad’s claims to prophethood were 
eventually abandoned altogether by both sides. Current Lahori publications most 
often emphasize Ghulam Ahmad’s status as a mujaddid (renewer of faith) and avoid 
any type of prophetic distinction whatsoever. Similarly, many recent publications by 
the Lahoris focus their objections on the Qadiani interpretation of khilafat, in which
56 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M alftbat, Vol. 5, p. 388.
57 Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 372. This specific question and answer was dated 26 August 1902.
58 Sayyid Mir Mahmud Ahmad Nasir, ‘Positions Taken by the Ahmadiyyah Anujm an-e-Isha‘al-e- 
Islam after March 13, 1914 on Nubuwwat and Khilafat in the Ahmadiyyah Muslim .lama1 at’, in 
Munawar Ahmed Sa‘eed (trans.), Nubuwwat & Khlilafat: P rophethood an d  its Successorship  (Tilford: 
Islam International Publications, 2006), pp. 51-59.
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khilafat-i Ahmadiyya is presented as something completely contrary to Ghulam 
Ahmad’s desires, and Mahmud Ahmad is treated as the usurper o f his father’s 
authority.59 There is very little difference between the authority of the Ahmadiyya 
Anjuman-i Isha‘at-i Islam Lahore and the authority of the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya 
over their respective communities. Neither Anjuman has ever had the ability to 
impose a substantial amount of religious authority over their respective Jama‘ats. 
The primary difference between the leadership of the two communities has always 
been determined by the role of khilafat.
3.5 -  The Institutionalization of the Jama‘at
The Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya remains the primary administrative authority 
in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya under the khalifat al-masih, despite having gone through a 
number of changes and considerable expansion over the past 100 years.60 The 
structural changes in the Jama‘at are easier to observe than the changes in Ahmadi 
beliefs, although they both had an affect 011 the emerging Ahmadi identity. In order 
for Mirza Mahmud Ahmad to streamline his power and allow his Jama‘at to function 
more smoothly on a global platform, he needed a way to exert his authority over the 
localized Ahmadi congregations that he was determined to establish throughout the 
world. A transfer of power needed to take place between the divinely guided
59 See Zahid Aziz, The O adiani Violation o f  A hm adiyya Teachings. The section called ‘M. Mahmud 
Ahmad usurps Anjuman *s authority’, which begins on p. 37, is particularly interesting.
60 1 am greatly indebted to Abdul Mannan Tahir, who was then a missionary at the Fazl M osque, 
London for his detailed explanation o f  the inner structure o f  Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. He w as kind 
enough meet with me at his office on 1 April 2005 as well as a number o f  tim es thereafter. The 
knowledge that he provided was the primary source o f  information for the follow ing section.
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leadership of the promised messiah and the institution of khilafat that had been 
established for his successors. Within the first month of Mahmud Ahmad’s election, 
he set up an advisory council (majlis-i shura), which became a permanent part of the 
Jama‘at’s infrastructure in 1922. The majlis-i shura still plays a major role in 
advising the khalifa on Jama'at policy, by developing proposals which are sent to the 
khalifa each year from each local Ahniadi chapter.
The divisions in the Jama‘at’s hierarchy are based 011 geographic boundaries, 
with local, regional, and national regions. Each stratum in the hierarchy has 
executive representatives that are responsible for the administrative or spiritual 
spheres, both of which are embodied by the khalifat al-maslh. The spiritual 
leadership of the Jama‘at is the responsibility of Ahmadi missionaries, who are 
responsible for the daily affairs of worship, spiritual guidance, and the propagation of 
Islam. An Ahmadi missionary (muballigh) must attend a seven year training course 
at an Ahmadi seminary before being assigned to a local chapter, which is usually 
situated in a major city. The missionaries are under the direction of the national amir, 
who serves as a liaison between the khalifa's administration and each local chapter. 
The missionaries focus on religious interests, and typically avoid political 
involvement, whereas the amirs may be heavily involved in local politics and 
typically have no formal religious education or training. The missionaries are 
encouraged to remain neutral and resolve the disputes that may arise between 
members. Each local chapter also has a president,61 who serves as the administrative 
leader and is elected at regular intervals by the financially contributing members of
61 The English word ‘president’ {s used for this office.
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the community.62 Whereas the missionary often conveys the national or international 
interests of the Jama‘at to local members, the president voices the concerns of local 
members to the amir or the khalifa, In local chapters without a missionary, the 
president is often responsible for religious guidance, even though the president, like 
the amii\ rarely has any formal religious education or training.
Mahmud Ahmad split his Jama'at into auxiliary organizations for men and 
women with the intention of giving women more of a voice in administrative affairs. 
The Lajna Im a ’illah (council for the handmaidens of Allah) was founded in 
December 1922 for Ahmadi women above the age of 15. Nasirat al-Ahmadiyya 
(female helpers of Ahmadiyya) was formed in December 1938 for girls under the age 
of 15. Each auxiliary organization for women meets at the local level and elects a 
local president. The local president reports to the country’s national president (Sadr 
Lajna Im a ’illah) who directly reports to the khalifat al-masih, Ahmadi women 
appear to have some sense of administrative autonomy in terms of their ability to 
handle their own affairs.
The men were split into three groups, which are also based on age. The 
Majlis Khuddam al-Ahmadiyya (organization for the servants of Ahmadiyya) was 
founded in December 1938 and comprised o f young Ahmadi men from ages 15 to 40. 
Members of the Khuddam are often responsible for issues that require physical labour 
and are usually the first to carry out new initiatives. Like the Lajna, each local 
Khuddam chapter elects its local leader (qa ’id) and its national president (Sadr Majlis 
Khuddam al-Ahmadiyya) who also reports directly to the khalifat al-masih. In July
62 Members who do not or cannot contribute financially are barred from participating in the elections, 
unless they attain special permission from the khalifa.
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1940 the Majlis Atfdl al-Ahmadiyya (Ahmadiyya children’s organization) was created 
for boys aged 7 to 15. It primarily functions as a subset of the Khuddam , which 
means that the boys fall under the responsibility of the local q a ’id. The third and 
final auxiliary called Majlis Ansarulldh (organization of the helpers o f Allah) was 
also founded in 1940 for men above the age of 40. As the Ansar comprise the elders 
of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, they are often a major source of intellectual and spiritual 
guidance for local members. The Majlis Ansarulldh has a local leader (zalm) along 
with a national leader (Sadr Majlis Ansarulldh) who is answerable to the khalifat al- 
masih.
The Kashmir crisis during the early 1930s increased tension with the Majlis-i 
Ahrar and demanded a significant increase in funding, beyond what had been 
available from the al-Wasiyyat scheme.63 In November 1934, Mahmud Ahmad 
created the Tahrik-i Jadid (new movement), which was a fund established for the 
expansion and propagation o f Ahmadi Islam in foreign lands.64 A committee called 
the Tahrik-i Jadid Anjuman Ahmadiyya was set up as a subsidiary o f the Sadr 
Anjuman Ahmadiyya to manage the new funds. Ahmadis contribute to the Tahrik-i 
Jadid scheme in addition to their other financial obligations. Although the tensions 
with the Ahrar subsided, the Tahrik-i Jadid scheme remained in place as a permanent 
charity for contributions through a regular subscription each year. Mahmud Ahmad 
repeatedly solicited Ahmadis to donate their time and money to the Tahrik-i Jadid 
project for the propagation o f Ahmadi Islam. Apparently, he even urged Ahmadis to 
limit their meals to one per day in order for them to save money and donate their
5j See chapter 4 below , ‘The Political Involvement o f  the Ahmadiyya M ovem ent under Mirza Bashir 
al-Din Mahmud Ahmad'.
64 Review' o f  Religions (February 2002) Vol. 97, N o. 2, p. 19.
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savings to Tahrik-i Jadid. To increase the number of Ahmadi missionaries, he 
encouraged members to offer their lives to the Jama'at as endowments (waqf) and to 
work essentially as volunteers in return for minimal remuneration. He also asked 
members to encourage their children to dedicate their lives to the Jama'at and to enrol 
in the Ahmadi seminaries for missionary training.65 Everyone was encouraged to 
participate by leading simple lives and donating time, money, and property to fulfil 
the mission of the promised messiah. Influential and educated Ahmadis were asked 
to give lectures or to publish works on behalf of the Jama'at. Students were advised 
to seek the khalifa's council before pursing higher education, so that they could 
maximize their usefulness to the Jama'at.
In 1958, Mahmud Ahmad launched the Waqf-i Jadid (new endowment) 
scheme, which was established to generate the revenues required to propagate 
Ahmadi Islam in rural Pakistan.66 In 1986, the fourth khalifat al-masih, Mirza Tahir 
Ahmad, expanded the regional limitations to include remote and developing areas 
around the world, although the majority of funds are still spent primarily on the 
subcontinent. Accordingly, another subsidiary organization was established to 
oversee the collection and distribution of the Waqf-i Jadid funds, completing the three 
main administrative branches o f Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya that exist today: Sadr Anjuman
65 On 3 April 1987 the fourth khalifa , Mirza Tahir Ahmad, launched the Waqf-i d a w  (new  endowment) 
schem e, in which parents were asked to endow their children’s lives for Jama‘at service. Although the 
children’s future occupations were not limited to missionary work, parents could enlist their children 
even before birth. As the first generation o f  this group has only recently com e o f  age, it appears to 
have provided Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya with an unending labour force at virtually no expense. See 
R eview  o f  Religions (April 2003) Vol. 98, No. 4, p. 22,
66 R eview  o f  R eligions (February 2002) Vol. 97, N o. 2, p. 19.
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Ahmadiyya, Tahrik-i Jadid and Waqf-i Jadid.67 It is important to recall however that 
all three of these branches come under the domain of the khalifat al-masih.
In tracing the development of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s infrastructure, one can 
trace the process by which the Jama‘at was institutionalized. The institutionalized 
structure of the Jama‘at created an administrative hierarchy with formalized 
procedures and boundaries for individual Ahmadis. It externalized authority by 
creating a social system that was applied to every local chapter throughout the world. 
Now every local chapter could progress through the appropriate chain of command 
from their local president, to their national amir, and finally the khalifa, who was 
representing God’s chosen messiah and therefore God Himself. Individuals in 
isolated areas could apprehend their personal role within the greater community. 
Furthermore, there was an implicit internal hierarchy at a local level that 
distinguished office bearers from non-office bearers.
In this sense, Ghulam Ahmad’s Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was significantly 
different from the Jama‘at o f today. Although he had complete control over his 
community, his authority was charismatic and derived purely from God. When Mirza 
Mahmud Ahmad took control of the Jama4at, he needed a way of drawing on his 
father charisma to substantiate his authority and to justify his creation o f the 
institution of khilafat, so he redefined the role of the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya. He 
did this by persistently publicizing his father’s prophecies in al-Wasiyyat that referred 
to someone from Ghulam Ahmad’s progeny who would someday lead people to 
truth.68 In addition, Mahmud Ahmad referred to other prophecies pertaining to
67 Ibid., pp. 7-23.
68 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, al-W asiyyat, in Ruham K haza 'in, Vol. 20, p. 306, in footnote.
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Ghulam Ahmad’s progeny to reinforce his right to khilafat.69 Accepting the khalifa in 
itself was no longer enough. Ahmadis also needed to accept the khalifa’s divine 
appointment, which became a central theme in the Ahmadi identity and has been 
maintained by all of Mahmud Ahmad’s successors to this day.70
The Qadiani branch perceived Mahmud Ahmad’s changes in the Jama‘at as 
the fulfilment of divine prophecy. Before a gathering in Hoshiarpur on 20 February 
1944, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad formally announced that he was indeed
71the mitslih-i m aw ‘ud (promised reformer) that Ghulam Ahmad had prophesised. 
The date marked the 58th anniversary of Ghulam Ahmad’s first publication of his 
prophecy regarding his blessed son. Claiming to be the fulfilment o f divine prophecy 
put an exceptional burden on Lahori opponents who had difficulty explaining away 
Mahmud Ahmad’s lineage and charisma, even though his charisma was still 
dependent on his father. Although Mahmud Ahmad was the khalifa, it was his 
creation of the institution of khilafat that embodied his father’s charismatic authority, 
which was spread throughout the new structure of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. Each 
individual office bearer participated in this transfer of charisma and now shared in the 
fulfilment of divine prophecy. Whereas the spiritual experiences, divine prophecies, 
and charismatic authority were all part of Ghulam Ahmad’s esoteric wonders, they 
were now transferred into exoteric offices under Mahmud Ahmad. The
69 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Sabz Ishtihar in Ruhdm K h a za ’in, Vol. 2, pp. 447-470; see also Mirza 
Ghulam Ahm ad’s pamphlet from (20 February 1886), p. 21 in the footnote; see also Muhammad 
Zafrulla Khan, Tadhkira (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 2004), pp. 85-86.
70 Maulana Sheikh Mubarak Ahmad, ‘Khilafat-e-Ahmadiyyah and the Pledge o f  A llegiance to 
Khilafat’, in Munawar Ahmed Sa‘eed (trans.), Nubuwwat & Khlilafat, pp. 27-45; see also Review  o f  
R eligions (October 1956) Vol. 50, N o. 10, pp. 503-505, 510-511, 519-524; see also R eview  o f  
R eligions (October 2007) Vol. 102, N o. 10, pp. 49-51, 58, 59.
71 See Mirza Bashir al Din Mahmud Ahm ad’s speech entitled D a 'wd Mitslih M aw  ‘u d k e  M ula 'alliq 
Pur-shawkat E 'lan  (20 February 1944) which was delivered in Hoshiarpur and is available in Anwar 
a l - ’Ulum, Vol. 17, pp. 138-170.
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bureaucratization of charisma meant that spiritual experience could itself be derived 
from the structure of the Jama‘at. Ahmadis derive spiritual experience from 
participation in or obedience to the structural hierarchy or nizam of the Jama‘at, 
which is viewed as a manifestation of God’s favour.
Understanding the strata of authority in khilafat-i Ahmadiyya is an exercise in 
institutionalized representation. Ghulam Ahmad as the mahdi and the messiah 
represents God’s law and message, the khalifa represents the promised messiah, the 
amir represents the khalifa, and the president represents the amir, all o f whom claim 
that their posts are authorized by divine will. In practice, it is interesting to note that 
virtually none o f these representatives have any formal religious education or training 
but derive their legitimacy purely from Ghulam Ahmad’s institutionalized charisma. 
Each individual Ahmadi is linked on a personal level to some vague sense of 
charisma through the institution of khilafat, even though he/she may have little to no 
contact with the khalifa himself. Paradoxically, the khalifat al-masih is the keystone 
that binds the Jama‘at together, even though he too is bound by institutionalized 
charisma in the same manner.
3.6 -  Beyond the Split: The Early Years 1914-1925
The series o f events beginning with the death of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
followed by the death of his closest companion and first successor, Maulvi Hakim 
Nur al-Din, and finally culminating with the split of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya into two 
factions, placed extraordinary strains 011 both the members o f the Jama‘at and their
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leadership. The years that immediately followed Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud 
Ahmad’s caliphal election are regarded as some of the most difficult in Ahmadi 
history. The uncertainty and overall confusion in the movement left many Ahmadis 
disoriented and looking for a sense of stability from their leadership. However, it was 
the instability itself that allowed Mahmud Ahmad the necessary flexibility to change 
the direction of the movement without an adverse reaction from his followers. The 
split in the movement was final, and the time for dissent had long passed. Those who 
had chosen to remain with Mahmud Ahmad were obliged to adhere to his 
discretionary decisions with a renewed sense of fidelity. The continual changing of 
the leadership had raised new questions regarding the developing identity of the 
Jama‘at, which had prevented the community from normalizing the fluctuations in 
their evolving distinguishing features. It was not until the mid 1920s that the young 
khalifa, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, gained the confidence and foresight necessary to 
define for his members what he thought the future of Ahmadiyyat ought to be. For 
this reason, throughout the formative period of Ahmadi Islam, much of the Jama‘a f  s 
efforts were exerted on coming to terms with the multiple changes in leadership, 
reconciling the ensuing fallout from the split, and resettling into an equilibrium that 
was consistent with Mahmud Ahmad’s vision.
This period represented a time of inner exploration for the Ahmadi 
community. The turmoil that resulted from these multiple changes had forced 
individual Ahmadis to confront the broader questions of Ahmadi identity more 
directly than they had done in the past. The most obvious question had become the 
most difficult to answer: what exactly does it mean to be an ‘Ahmadi’? For the
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earliest followers the obvious answer was the most appropriate: taking the bay ‘at of 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, which meant that simply being a follower of Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad was sufficient to designate one as an Ahmadi. Accordingly, as the leadership 
of the community ventured through its different manifestations, the response to this 
question demanded further clarification. In this manner, through these early stages of 
the Jam a'at’s development, the variations in the leadership had a correlation with the 
variations in sentiment being expressed by the members of the community regarding 
their own Ahmadi identity. Initially in 1889 when Ghulam Ahmad invited people to 
join him by taking his bay‘at in Ludhiana, he had published a list of conditions for 
those who aspired to become his followers. The bay'at was clearly intended to be a 
privilege for both the existing spiritual elite themselves and for those who desired to 
join their ranks. At the time, being an Ahmadi was largely contingent on an 
individual’s successful efforts to adhere to these conditions. These requisite 
conditions defined the Ahmadi identity by explicitly laying bare Ghulam Ahmad’s 
expectations of his followers. The very notion that the bay ‘at was conditional implies 
that it had the potential of being revoked at any time. The ten requisite conditions of 
primary concern around which Mirza Ghulam Ahmad chose to pivot his movement 
may be abbreviated as follows:72
1) Abstaining from shirk
2) Abstaining from dishonesty, adultery, and lustful transgressions
3) Strict observance of the five daily prayers with a special emphasis 
on voluntarily offering the supererogatory tahajjud (late 
night/predawn) prayer, seeking forgiveness, and prayers in praise 
of the Prophet
72 The original pamphlet containing the ten conditions o f  bay'at was published as Taknnl-i Tabligh  (12  
Jan 1889). See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M ajm u'a-i Ishtiharat, Vol. 1, pp. 189-192.
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4) Abstaining from verbally or physically abusing anyone or anything 
while maintaining a general sense of compassion towards 
everyone, especially other Muslims
5) Maintaining ultimate trust and dependence on God through both 
good times and bad times
6) Abstaining from un-Islamic behaviour by using the Qur’an and the 
sunna as a model for one’s life
7) Abstaining from pride and arrogance, and adopting a general sense 
of humility
8) Giving precedence to Islam over everything, including one’s 
wealth, honour, and loved ones
9) Maintaining a sincere commitment to the service of all of God’s 
creation, including service to humanity
10) Remaining faithful and obedient to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in an 
exemplary manner that transcends ordinary relationships
O f the above conditions, the only one that resembles anything inherently 
‘Ahmadi’ is number ten. The first nine are all standard Islamic principles, to which 
any pious Muslim would presumably be willing to comply. Similarly, the final 
condition was a reasonable stipulation, which essentially prioritized Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad’s religious discretion, as the murshid of his disciples, over any alternative 
teacher. Although this provision is distinctly Ahmadi, it is not unreasonable for one 
to impose such conditions on one’s spiritual disciples or miirlds. For example, if we 
were to substitute the name of any other Sufi pTr, murshid, or shaykh in the Islamic 
tradition for Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s name in condition ten, it would lose its Ahmadi 
identity. In this sense, these ten conditions could easily have been the requisite 
conditions for initiation into any Sufi order throughout Islamic history. There is 
nothing extraordinary about Ghulam Ahmad’s conditions for joining the Ahmadi 
community, in the sense that there is nothing that poses a challenge to Islamic 
orthodoxy. The extraordinary part of the ten conditions o f hay ‘at however, is not in
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what was said, but rather in what was not said.73 The absence of what we presently
would consider to be the distinctive features of Ahmadi Islam is far more interesting 
than Ghulam Ahmad’s ten articles of accelerated moral conduct. It is surprising that 
there is no mention of any of Ghulam Ahmad’s controversial claims or the contested 
issues which were later asserted by his successors. There is no reference to Ghulam 
Ahmad being a mujaddid, muhaddath, mahdi, or the masih Jesus son of Mary. There 
are no references to the notorious consequences of these claims, particularly his 
prophethood or elevated spiritual status. There are 110 references to his interpretation 
of the Qur’anic verse declaring Muhammad to be khatam al-nabiyyin (seal of the 
prophets) that could be used to indicate that he was anything other than the last of the 
prophets.74 Likewise, there are no references to his categorical condemnation of 
violent jihad amongst his Indian contemporaries. And finally, there are no references 
to Jesus’ survival from the crucifixion and his subsequent journey to his final resting 
place in Srinagar, Kashmir. Everything that we have come to associate with the 
distinctive features of Ahmadi Islam is astonishingly absent from Ghulam Ahmad’s
73 Spencer Lavan appears to be the first to comment on the sim plicity o f  the ten conditions o f  ba)>'al, 
but his discussion is limited to Ghulam Ahm ad’s lack o f  emphasis on the zakat and hajj. Lavan noted 
that Ghulam Ahmad never made the pilgrimage to M ecca due to a life o f  chronic illness. Lavan’s 
discussion is more interesting i f  one treats Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya as a new religious m ovem ent with a 
new religious identity, otherwise, i f  w e accept that Jama;at-i Ahmadiyya belongs within the fold o f  
Islam, then being a M uslim is clearly a necessary precondition to the ten listed above. There is no 
evidence to suggest that one could be an Ahmadi without first being a Muslim, since being Ahmadi 
presupposed that one was already a M uslim. In addition, the basic tenets o f  Islam, such as the five 
pillars, are im plicitly included in the sixth condition’s emphasis on the Qur’an and sunna as well as the 
eighth condition’s emphasis on giving precedence to ‘Islam ’ in one’s life. For som e unknown reason, 
Ghulam Ahmad specifically emphasized the observance o f  prayer in his second condition, but perhaps 
this was done in order to facilitate his additional requirement o f  imposing the supererogatory tahajjad  
prayer upon his followers. For Lavan’s comments, see Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiycih M ovem ent, p. 
37, especially his com ments in footnote 48.
74 See verse (33:40) which states: ‘Muhammad is not the father o f  any one o f  you men; he is G od’s 
M essenger and the seal o f  the prophets: (tna kana nmhaimnadun aba ahadin min rijaliknm  w a Idkin 
rasul-allahi w a  khatam a!-n ab iyym )\ translated by M .A.S. Abdel Haleein (trails.), The Qitr 'an 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 269. Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood w as based largely on 
his reinterpretation o f  the phrase khatam al-nabiyyin  (seal o f  the prophets), w hich mainstream M uslims 
understand as meaning that Muhammad was the last prophet.
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conditions for becoming an Ahmadi in his 1889 treatise. Although one may argue 
that Ghulam Ahmad did not fully explicate the details of his religious claims until 
much later, the fact remains that he never revised the conditions on which he accepted 
bay ‘at. These ten conditions of bay 'at accurately demonstrate the values that Ghulam 
Ahmad prioritized to his earliest followers. However, it is inconceivable to delineate 
a set o f criteria that establishes an ‘Ahmadi’ identity at present and neglects the three 
most controversial issues: khatm al-mtbitwwa, the survival of Jesus from death on the 
cross, and the strict adherence to non-violent Jihad.75 We will further examine why 
this gap occurs below.
Until his death in 1908, what it meant to be an Ahmadi hinged exclusively on 
Ghulam Ahmad’s willingness to accept a candidate’s bay‘at. If  Ghulam Ahmad 
decided to refuse, reject, or revoke a disciple’s bay‘at, then considering that person an 
Ahmadi was absurd.76 After Ghulam Ahmad’s death the situation grew more 
complex. The unresolved theological issues that instigated the Lahori-Qadiani split, 
along with the actual splitting of the movement itself into two geographically separate
75 These three issues are presumed by m ost scholars, both Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi, to be the 
distinguishing features o f  Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya with no recourse to how or why they came to be. As a 
result, these idiosyncrasies are the standardized principles o f  Ahmadi Islam, w hich are echoed in most 
o f  the recent characterizations o f  Jamalat-i Ahmadiyya, for one example, see Francis Robinson, Islam, 
South Asia, an d  the West (N ew  Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 69.
76 Som e important counterexamples are worth m entioning here. Considering the current trends in 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, m ost people presume that a child bom to Ahmadi parents is automatically 
Ahmadi, which more closely  resembles a new religion or an exclusivist religious m ovem ent rather than 
a traditional Sufi order. A  traditional Sufi order would typically require each member to take b a y ‘at 
individually upon reaching the age o f  maturity. However, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad was 
not formally initiated at his father’s hand until 10 March 1898. See A. R. Dard, Life o f  Ahm ad, p. 148. 
Surprisingly, Ghulam Ahm ad’s second w ife, Nusrat Jahan Begum (amnia ja n ), never took her 
husband’s b a y ‘at, which implies that the b a y ‘at may not have been necessary in exceptional cases.
Dost Muhammad Shahid said that it was not necessary for her to take her husband’s bay'a t since her 
allegiance to him was already implicit, which is a reasonable and convincing argument. H owever, this 
particular case is interesting in comparison to Mahmud Ahmad’s harsh view s on marrying non- 
Ahmadi wom en. See D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya , V ol. 1, p. 342. See also section 
3.4 above called ‘Changes in the Ahmadi B e lie f  System: From Theory to Practice’ for more on 
Mahmud Ahm ad’s view s regarding marriages with non-Ahmadi women.
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camps, led to more elaborate responses to the same question: what does it mean to be 
an ‘Ahmadi’?
Although the original ten conditions of bay‘at nonetheless remain unchanged 
to this day, they 110 longer represent the exclusive conditions for an individuaPs 
induction into Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. The same ten conditions are indeed still 
necessary for one’s initiation into the Ahmadi community, but they alone are no 
longer sufficient to join. The initiation process now includes an official Ahmadi 
‘declaration form’ for induction, which ameliorates the ten conditions with 
amendments for asserting one’s belief in khatm aJ-nubmvwa, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s 
status as the imam mahdf and promised messiah, and a vow of loyalty and obedience 
to not only the khalifat al-masih, but also the institution of khilafat-i Ahmadiyya 
itself.77 The new additions are far more consistent with one’s intuitive expectations 
for joining Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, even though they do not demonstrate the emphasis 
placed by the Jama‘at on these newly added declarations.
The amended clarifications that stress Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic status have 
grossly overshadowed the original ten conditions of bay‘at. and have become 
associated with popular conceptions about Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. A new Ahmadi 
identity emerged around these three corrected beliefs: khatm al-mibinvwa, Jesus’ 
survival from the cross, and khilafat-i Ahmadiyya, which still excludes an explicit 
reference to non-violent jihad.78 None of the Ahmadis with whom I had contact had
77 The ‘declaration form’ is available in the appendix at the end as well as online in both Urdu and 
English at the official Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya website  
http://www.alislam.org/introduction/initiation.htmI (February 2007).
78 W e will examine conflicting interpretations o f  Ahmadi jihad below and see how the second and third 
khalifas rejected Ghulam Ahm ad’s categorical denial o f  non-violent jihad and led military campaigns 
in Kashmir. Ahmadis are bound to the opinions o f  the presiding khalifa whenever his opinions conflict 
with the opinions o f  the previous caliphs or even Ghulam Ahmad himself.
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committed the ten conditions o f bay ‘at to memory, which gave an impression of their 
relative importance to the Ahmadi identity. These Ahmadis were certainly familiar 
with the ten conditions of bay 'at, but memorizing them or strictly adhering to them in 
daily practice was not a major factor in their Ahmadi self-identification. There 
appears to be minimal emphasis on memorizing or (perhaps more importantly) 
implementing these conditions in daily life. In this sense, there is a discrepancy 
between the theory presented in Ahmadi texts and the religious practice of the 
members of the community, even when considering the amendments to the ten 
conditions like the ‘declaration form’. For example, the ‘declaration form’ is 
invariably accompanied by another form, which is used to determine a new initiate’s 
mandatory financial contributions to the Jama‘at’s elaborate system of charitable 
donations ([chanda);79 Although contributing financially to the movement is not 
formally stipulated in writing, it is an essential part of remaining within the Jama'at in 
good standing, with few exceptions that are determined case by case. May it suffice
79 In addition to the numerous mandatory and recommended contributions that finance Jama‘at-i 
Ahm adiyya’s worldwide activities, the Ahmadi khalifas have developed the tendency o f  demanding 
financial ‘g ifts’ from their spiritual disciples, which is an issue worth exploring. In preparation for the 
100th anniversary o f  Khilafat-i Ahm adiyya, the fifth khalifa , Mirza Masroor Ahmad, approved a 
schem e to solicit and collect ‘no less than one m illion sterling pounds’ which were to be gifted to the 
khalifa ‘as a token o f  [Jama‘at-i Ahm adiyya’s] thanks to A llah.’ This pattern was repeated throughout 
the world, so that m illions o f  dollars were raised in each o f  the western congregations o f  the United 
States, Canada, and Britain. The m oney was supposedly presented to the khalifa during the Khilafat 
Jubilee, which took place in London in May 2008, although there is no public record o f  the exact 
amount that was raised. The precedent was first set by Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad who 
accepted a ‘g ift’ o f  Rs, 300,000 in 1939 during his 25 year anniversary as the khalifa. See R eview  o f  
Religions (February 2006) Vol. 101, No. 2, pp. 62-63. Similarly, the third khalifa , Mirza Nasir 
Ahmad, was anticipating a ‘g ift’ o f  Rs. 25 m illion whose collections were already on target to reach 
Rs. 90 m illion in 1974. See Review  o f  R eligions (March 1974) Vol. 68, N o. 3, pp. 77-79. It is 
arguable from an outsider’s perspective that this pattern may be representative o f  deeply rooted 
corruption within the Ahmadi hierarchy. That the khalifas have shown an affinity towards accepting 
large sums o f  m oney may or may not be surprising, but the chronic demands to solicit these funds from 
their largely underprivileged spiritual disciples may potentially be extorting and exploiting countless 
members o f  the Jama‘at under the guise o f  attaining divine pleasure.
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to say that a detailed anthropological study of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s beliefs and 
practices would be a welcome contribution to this study.80
The bcry'at in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya has become far removed from its sacred 
ceremonial origins in Sufi initiation. The procedure more closely resembles the banal 
process of filling out an application form as opposed to a hallowed Sufi ceremony of 
allegiance to one’s spiritual mentor. The annual Ahmadi convention (Jalsa Salana) is 
the exception where remnants of the Sufi ceremonial bay ‘at still linger today. Each 
year in London, thousands of Ahmadis gather to renew their bay ‘at at the hand of the 
khalifat al-masih. In a moving display, the khalifa stretches his hand as each member 
does the same to join him. Those outside the immediate inner circle place their hand 
on the shoulder of the person in front of them creating an unbroken chain that leads to 
the khalifa al-masih. Aside from this annual exception, the Ahmadi bay ‘at ceremony 
has become wholly divorced from the deep expression of initiation rooted in the rich 
heritage of Sufi Islam. The community has largely abandoned the familiar procedure 
of the physical joining of hands as a demonstration o f the spiritual connection 
between two individuals, murshid and mitrid, and instead replaced it by the signing of 
a piece of paper.
This shift in character o f the Ahmadi identity was a gradual process that has 
quietly evolved over successive generations through the first century following 
Ghulam Ahmad’s death. The movement needed to refashion itself into a mould that 
was more conducive to the intense demands of proselytization, which have always
80 For the beginnings o f  such a study see Antonio Gualtieri, The Ahmadis: Community, Gender, and  
P olitics in a M uslim Society  (London: M cG ill-Q ueen’s University Press, 2004). Gualtieri makes 
interesting observations about the variations in Ahmadi religious practices in different parts o f  the 
world. His discussion on gender and the different veiling practices o f  Ahmadi w om en in rural Pakistan 
and those in urban Canada is particularly insightful.
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been an important part of Ahmadi ideology. The original organizational structure of 
the Jama‘at was intended for the elitist membership of the earliest community that 
had either direct contact with Ghulam Ahmad or the educational background to read 
and comprehend his complex works. The organization was not suitable to 
accommodate the Jama‘at of the future when mass membership was destined to come 
from the sections of rural Punjab’s population that are associated with lower class 
mediocrity. Mahmud Ahmad was clearly aware of the logistics of mass conversions 
and had immediately taken steps to adapt the structure of the Jama‘at appropriately. 
With a stabilization period following the split and the changes in leadership settling 
down, the foundations for subsequent changes in ideology and structure were well 
established by the 1920s. Nevertheless, the changes in communal identity following 
Mahmud Ahmad’s succession to the caliphate and the split in the Ahmadiyya 
movement were not inevitable. The split only acted as a catalyst for further changes 
by bringing the question of Ahmadi identity to the forefront, while Mahmud Ahmad’s 
vision and intentions for his movement only allowed these changes to take place more 
smoothly and largely unopposed, following the purge of the Jama‘at’s Lahori 
members. In fact, it was the circumstances surrounding a number o f events which 
little by little honed the identity of the movement with gradual change. We will now 
turn our attention to key events that punctuate Ahmadi history and offer some 
suggestions as to why the Ahmadi identity eventually changed.
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Chapter 4 
The Political Involvement of the Ahmadiyya Movement under Mirza 
Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad
In this chapter we will look at Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s involvement in South 
Asian politics under its second and most influential khalifat al-masih, Mirza Bashir 
al-Din Mahmud Ahmad. Communal tensions springing from the RangTla Rasul 
incident in the 1920s and the Kashmir riots in the early 1930s provided Mirza 
Mahmud Ahmad with the opportunity to display his Jama4at’s abilities to deal with an 
international crisis and lead the Muslim mainstream towards their collective goals. 
Mahmud Ahmad’s relations with influential Muslim community leaders enabled him 
to further his political objectives. We will see how Mahmud Ahmad’s opinions 
regarding the military offensive in Kashmir following the partition conflicted with his 
father’s ban on violent jihad, which led to the creation and deployment of the first 
Ahmadi militia. Many portions of this chapter deal with obscure aspects of political 
history, which are only intended to further demonstrate the added political dimension 
of the Ahmadi identity' and not to serve as a balanced account of these events beyond 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. Interestingly, many of these events are irrelevant to the 
development of Islamic theology even though they have significantly influenced the 
political development o f the subcontinent and the development o f the Ahmadi 
identity. Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s continued involvement in political activism led to a 
number of unexpected conclusions including an increased emphasis on publicizing 
their activities and the politicization of Ahmadi Islam.
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4.1 -  The ‘RangTla Rasul’ Incident: The ‘Playboy’ Prophet
By 1925, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad had missionaries diligently 
setting up Ahmadi centres all over the world. Ahmadi Islam had touched virtually 
every continent by establishing local chapters throughout Western Europe, America, 
both East and West Africa, Mauritius, Syria, and Palestine, but the communal 
tensions back home in India were creating the greatest stir. Hindu-Muslim tensions 
had steadily been building for some time before they came to a head in the late 1920s. 
Polemic pamphlets blaspheming the other religion had been gaining popularity 
amongst intolerant zealots and bigots on both sides when a spirited Arya Samajist 
published the Rangila Rasul booklet in 1924, which attributed a number of sexual 
immoralities to the Prophet Muhammad and successfully captured the attention of 
Muslim India.1 The Arya polemicist responsible, Rajpal, was initially convicted for 
the publication under section 153A of the Indian Penal Code in an attempt to keep 
communal tensions under control. The sentence would have entailed 18 months in 
prison with a Rs. 1000 fine, but the Punjab High Court overturned the decision in 
June 1927 and acquitted Rajpal of the crime. Furthermore, the deteriorating morale 
of the Punjabi Muslim community was exacerbated when the High Court’s Hindu 
justice, Dalip Singh, imprisoned the editor of Lahore’s Muslim Outlook for 
expressing his outrage following Rajpal’s acquittal. Consequently, the defence of the
1 The title 1 R angila Rasul' itse lf has a wide variety o f  offensive connotations. Although it literally 
translates as the Colourful Prophet, it more appropriately connotes the Queer or G ay P rophet. In 
addition to the Rangila R asul pamphlet, Ahmadi responses to the attacks on the Prophet Muhammad 
often referred to another popular blasphemous article known as the R isala Vartanian, which was 
published by an Amritsar based monthly periodical.
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Prophet and the preservation of the nmma quickly became the primary focus of 
Muslims throughout India.
Historically, few things have united Muslims, despite their sectarian 
differences, as the defamation of the Prophet Muhammad. Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
under Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad was quick to respond to the attack, and 
Punjabi Muslims were willing to follow their lead.2 Mahmud Ahmad printed a poster 
with a picture of Ghulam Ahmad and a substantial retort to the inflammatory anti- 
Islamic remarks.3 The poster had circulated the khalifa's impassioned words and 
effectively roused Muslim support while sharply defining the boundaries of Muslim 
tolerance, until the Deputy Commissioner ordered the poster to be torn down. It is 
possible that the cumulative Ahmadi response to the attacks on the Prophet, which 
resulted from the pre-existing communal tensions, materialized at the cost of a more 
subdued path towards reconciliation with the Hindus. Spencer Lavan argued that 
Ahmadi reactions, such as the polemic poster, further contributed to ‘creating the 
hostile climate of opinion’ that prevailed throughout the Rangila Rasul incident.4 
Nevertheless, the direction and the leadership of the Ahmadi khalifa enabled the 
Muslim mainstream to find its voice during this brief period o f communal discord. 
Perturbed Punjabi Muslims reaped the benefits of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s institutional 
hierarchy and framework, which was already in place and ready to deploy a global 
network of obedient missionaries at their khalifa 's command.
2 See Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, K itdb  “Rangila Rasul" ka Jaw ab  (1 July 1927) in 
Khutbat-i M ahm ud  (Islamabad, Surrey: Islam International Publications, n.d.), Vol. 11, pp. 168-178.
3 Excerpts from the response are available in D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, V ol. 4, pp. 
596-598.
Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah Movement: A H istory an d  P erspective  (Delhi: Manohar Book  
Service, 1974), p. 136, and also footnote 44 for the government’s concern regarding the poster.
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The heightened communal tension and the High Court’s failure to administer 
legal retribution had provoked an increase of anti-British sentiment throughout India, 
beyond the Punjab. Many Muslims now refocused their blame on the government for 
its weak response to one Hindu’s degradation of their Prophet. Mahmud Ahmad 
ordered the London mission to solicit the British Secretary of State o f India in protest 
of the injustices abroad, which also included the imprisonment of the editor of the 
Muslim Outlook. The Ahmadi missionary in London who was responsible for 
fulfilling the khalifa's orders was ‘Abd al-Rahim Dard, one of the biographers of 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Dard wrote a series of letters publicizing the event and 
informed the British government that ‘Muslim leaders like the Head of the 
Ahmadiyya Community, Qadian, Sir Abdul Qadir and Sir Mohammad Iqbal [were] 
doing their best to keep the [Indian] masses under control.’5 The messages were 
clear, and they adequately conveyed that the Ahmadiyya community would continue 
with their loyalty to the British Raj during the strife. The Ahmadi mission in London 
followed up the correspondence with a petition that secured over 500 signatures that 
included several notable figures such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and other highly 
qualified individuals,6 The social stature o f the dignitaries on the petition captured 
the attention of the British Parliament, who now felt compelled to respond to the 
worsening situation abroad.7 The impact of the distinguished persons supporting the 
petition became clear when the names of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Sir William
5 The letter is dated (5 July 1927) and is published in R eview  o f  R eligions (October 1927) Vol. 26, N o.
10, p. 22.
6 R eview  o f  R eligions (October 1927) Vol. 26, N o. 10, pp. 22-27.
7 The Rangila Rasul incident was brought to the attention o f  The Under-Secretary o f  State for India, 
Earl Winterton, also called Edward Tumour, on two occasions in the House o f  Com m ons. Captain 
Foxcroft raised the question on 27 July 1927 and Sir Frank Sanderson raised the issue again on 29 July 
1927. See Parliam entary D ebates House o f  Commons Official Report, Fifth S eries , Vol. 209, 
(Hansard), for (27 July 1927), pp. 1258-1259, and also (29 July 1927), p. 1651.
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Simpson were echoed back in the official response to Dard’s letter as a justification to 
take action.8 The Ahmadiyya network had successfully raised awareness about the 
dysfunctional communal relations in India and prompted external action by Britain 
due to its systematic organizational structure, resolute missionaries, and excellent 
contacts with influential members of society.
Similar efforts were being made locally in the Punjab by Mahmud Ahmad 
who was at the helm of a major Pan-Islamic campaign that was no longer limited to 
his Ahmadi disciples in Qadian. His charismatic authority' now reached beyond its 
conventional domain of faithful followers and extended over India’s Muslim 
mainstream with surprisingly little opposition. Although a number of other eminent 
Muslim leaders were involved, the attacks on the Prophet had yielded widespread 
support from the usually uninfluential Muslim masses. The protest on the Punjabi 
front was a grassroots movement that included significant numbers of India’s Muslim 
population. On one of the few occasions that India’s Muslims were willing to unite 
under a single banner of Islam, sectarian differences were (perhaps grudgingly) 
ignored just long enough to retaliate against the attacks on the Prophet.
With the Ahmadis under Bashiruddin Mahmud taking a lead in 
propagating the way of life, and the work and character of the Prophet, 
there was 110 immediate danger of Muslims collectively turning upon 
enemies within. Individual Sunni Muslims might resent Ahmadis 
spearheading the veneration of the Prophet, but with one of Punjab’s 
most indefatigable public speakers, Ataullah Shah Bukhari [co-founder 
of Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam], temporarily in jail for creating a breach of 
the peace, there was for the moment no ^prospect of a concerted 
popular campaign against the Qadian faction.
8 R eview  o f  Religions (October 1927) Vol. 26, N o. 10, p. 27.
9 Ayesha Jalal, S e lf  an d  Sovereignty: Individual an d  Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850 
(London: Routledge, 2001), p. 296.
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Mahmud Ahmad and his Jam a‘at had momentarily canvassed their way to the 
forefront of Muslim India’s inner circle of political activists, and this was not the last 
time that Mahmud Ahmad would allow religio-political activism to dominate his 
agenda. Given the historical context of the situation, it was an understandable 
response shared by the majority of Muslims at the time. The Rangila Rasul incident 
had come to represent the state of Hindu-Muslim relations at a difficult time in 
India’s modern history. However, it served as a distraction from the internal sectarian 
debates that had come to dominate the Indo-Islamic scene by enabling Muslims to 
band together as defenders of the Prophet. The Ahmadiyya community had a 
significant role in the intensification as well as the resolution of the event. The 
second khalifa, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, may not have single-handedly prevented the 
situation from ‘degenerating into violence’ in the way that many Ahmadis fondly 
remember,10 but his role in the agitations cannot be ignored. The Rangila Rasul 
incident marked a major turning point in Ahmadi history. The perceived success 
resulting from the Rangila Rasul incident provided Mahmud Ahmad with the 
encouragement he needed to continue his political activism when other opportunities 
would soon present themselves in Kashmir.
4.2 -  Panic in the Streets of Srinagar: The Kashmir Riots
Muslim rule in Jammu and Kashmir extends back from before the Mughal 
period, and accordingly, a Muslim majority population has dominated the Kashmir
10 R eview  o f  R eligions (October 1927) Vol. 26, N o. 10, p. 21.
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valley for several centuries underneath various forms of government. There was a 
brief interlude of Sikh rule during the Ranjit Singh era, which lasted nearly three 
decades and ended soon after his death in 1839. At this point, the British 
consolidation of India led to successive treaties in 1846 signed first in Lahore and 
then in Amritsar, which resulted in the transfer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to 
the loyalist Dogra chieftain, Gulab Singh, in exchange for a relatively nominal sum. 
This enabled the British to avoid the logistical formalities of rule while maintaining 
an active influence in the region through a reduced role of ‘firm supervision’.11 Since 
the new Dogra Maharaja and his successive heirs were Hindu, Kashmiri Muslims 
developed the tendency, as political tensions occasionally swelled, of looking to their 
co-religionists on the other side o f the border for support from the Punjab. Likewise, 
Punjabi Muslims had an increased interest in assessing the state of affairs of Kashmiri 
Muslims, especially in contrast to their own state of affairs under the British. 
Compounded by the growing popularity of the independence movement, in 1911 
Punjabi Muslims founded the All-India Muslim Kashmir Conference in Lahore.12 In 
actuality, it was more of a symbolic gesture than a radical call to action, and it took 
close to twenty years of nearly complete dormancy before the committee was revived 
with wide recognition and mass public it}'.
By the early 1930s the Dogra Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, 
had developed a reputation for highhanded treatment of his Muslim majority subjects. 
Moreover, the growth of political dissent in Muslim areas coincided with a severe
11 Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, M uslim  Subjects: Islam, Rights and  the H istory o f  K ashm ir  (London:
Hurst & Company, 2004), p. 26.
12 The name also appears as the M uslim Kashmiri Conference. For example, see Ayesha Jalal, S e lf  
a n d  Sovereignty, p. 352.
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international economic depression whose effects Kashmir could not escape. Heavy 
taxation resulting from the government’s mistaken assessment of agricultural 
production had left many families in hardship. Additionally, within the urban areas 
many qualified Kashmiris were increasingly finding themselves without suitable 
work, which was only adding to the popular perception of Muslim victimization. 
Opportunities for Kashmiri Muslims were diminishing on many different social levels 
and half-hearted attempts to remedy the situation were failing miserably. Only 
recently in 1927, a state sponsored scholarship committee consisting entirely of 
Hindu members had selected eleven out of twelve possible awards to be given to 
Hindu students, leaving only one scholarship for a Muslim candidate. The selection, 
which the government defended as a decision based entirely on ‘merit’, fuelled the 
prevalent sense of injustice and inequality that led many to believe that the 
government was committed to truncating opportunities for Muslims before they ever 
entered the workforce.13 Still, Kashmiri Muslims bore their socio-economic plight 
with ‘remarkably little organized resistance’ until the summer of 1931 when things 
began to change.14
The underlying tensions, which had been building steadily for decades, 
reached their boiling point on 5 June 1931 when a Hindu head constable of police had 
reportedly ordered a subordinate Muslim constable to stop reading the Qur’an. After 
calling the recitation nonsense (bakwds), the head constable proceeded to snatch the 
Qur’an from the hands of the subordinate officer and throw it away in the trash.15
lj IOR R /l/1 /2 1 5 4  in the R eport o f  the Srinagar Riot Enquiry Com mittee  (24 September 1931), p. 17.
14 Ayeslia Jalal, S e lf  an d  Sovereignty, p. 354.
15 IOR R /l/1 /2 0 6 4  in the Fortnightly R eport f o r  the f ir s t  h a lf  o f  June 1931 fro m  the Resident o f  
Kashm ir (19 June 1931). The Riot Enquiry Committee later found that the M uslim constable had in
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This was all that the Punjabi press needed to hear, and soon newspapers were full of 
colourful versions of the story with each trying to outdo the other. The socio-political 
climate made it seem as if each Kashmiri Muslim had his or her own story o f unequal 
treatment and Hindu favouritism to tell and retell, and soon articles began to appear 
that depicted Muslims as the ‘downtrodden slaves’ of Dogra rule.16 India’s Muslim 
population was livid, and a barrage of Punjabi protesters continued streaming across 
the border until the organized demonstrations began.
Towards the end of June 1931 a ‘European’s cook’ named ‘Abd al-Qadlr was
— —1 7 *arrested for making a seditious speech at Srinagar’s khanaqah mu'alia. His 
radicalized intonation and violent objectives involved inciting listeners ‘to kill Hindus 
and burn their temples.’18 The government tried to control the hype surrounding the 
trial by conducting the proceedings in secret within the Srinagar jail where ‘Abd al- 
Qadir was being detained. The Darbar believed that the privacy of a swift closed 
trial would prevent excessive public excitement and counter precisely what India’s 
newspapers had been provoking for the past few weeks. However, when whisperings 
of a ‘secret trial’ mysteriously leaked out the night before the arraignment, imminent 
disaster was unavoidable. Thousands of demonstrators arrived at the Srinagar jail on
fact exaggerated the event. Officially, the M uslim constable was reprimanded for failing to put his 
bedding away in the early morning hours, which was beyond the permissible time, and not for his 
recitation o f  the Qur’an. Nevertheless, the head constable’s reaction was to grab the wad o f  bedding 
and crassly throw it away. Wrapped up in the bedding was a copy o f  the p a n j surah , the first five 
sections o f  the Qur’an. Interestingly, the outcome o f  the incident resulted in the retirement o f  the head 
constable and the dismissal o f  his subordinate Muslim officer. For the official report, see IOR 
R /l/1 /2 1 5 4  in the R eport o f  the Srinagar R iot Enquiry Com m ittee  (24 September 1931), p. 20.
16 IOR R /l/1 /2154 , see Telegram R. No. 2017-S from  the Viceroy (Foreign an d  P o litica l Departm ent) 
Sim la to the Secretary o f  State fo r  India, London  (13 August 1931).
17 The date recorded in the R eport o f  the Srinagar Riot E nquiiy Com mittee  for the speech is 21 June 
1931, whereas the Fortnightly R eport f o r  the f ir s t  h a lf o f  July 1931 from  the Resident o f  K ashm ir  states 
that the arrest w as made on 1 July 1931.
18 IOR R /l/1 /2 0 6 4  Fortnightly R eport f o r  the first h a lf  o f  July 1931 fi'om  the R esiden t o f  K ashm ir (17 
July 1931).
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13 July 1931 to protest the proceedings inside. In retrospect, it is understandable why 
so many people believed that the secrecy o f the trial was simply another Dogra 
conspiracy to continue oppressing Muslims. Though the police had been summoned 
in the early morning hours, their failure to appreciate the magnitude of the situation 
and their overall lackadaisical attitude prevented them from arriving at the jail until 
the afternoon, when they came ill prepared.19 As the protest intensified, the audacity 
of the crowd turned into belligerence. Irascible protestors began hurling stones and 
bricks at the guards as they surrounded the prison and proceeded to shake the 
telephone lines furiously until the lines were finally cut off. The guards intermittently 
fired warning shots with ephemeral effects, but the crowd became more hostile and 
tried to set fire to the prison. The guards opened fire killing ten protesters almost 
immediately and successfully dispersed the crowd away from the prison. The mob 
carried the bodies back to the city, shouting slogans and waving banners soaked in the 
blood of the dead, where rioters devastated the Maharaj-ganj bazaar, which was 
located in the Hindu quarters of Srinagar, and looted a number of shops.20
19 Although this account was taken largely from government documents and reports, it differs from 
Spencer Lavan's independent reading o f  the same reports. Lavan said that ‘the [Riots Enquiry] 
Com m ission upheld the actions o f  the Maharajah and commended his prompt dispatching o f  troops to 
prevent further troubles.' See Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovem ent, p. 161, in footnote 8. 
However, the report o f  the Enquiry Com m ission also criticized the attitude o f  the police and their 
implementation o f  these orders. See IOR R /l/1 /2 1 5 4  in the R eport o f  the Srinagar R iot E nqniiy  
Com m ittee  (24 September 1931), pp. 4-5.
20 See IOR R /l/1 /2 1 54 in the R eport o f  the Srinagar R iot Enquiry Com mittee  (24 September 1931) for 
the official report on the riots. Additionally, it is worth noting that D ost Muhammad Shahid’s Tarikh-i 
Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, contains som e rare photographs which are located in an insert between pp. 406- 
407, depicting som e very disturbing scenes o f  the victim s, including children, amidst the bereaved at 
the Jam4i Masjid, Srinagar where the bodies were taken follow ing the riots. He has also included 
photographs o f  large crowds o f  wom en protestors demonstrating and o f  the Maharaja's troops when 
they surrounded the m osque in the w eeks follow ing the riots. It is also worth noting that m ost Muslim  
accounts indicate substantially higher death tolls, including Shahid’s own account, which numbers 
those injured to be in the low  hundreds.
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The riots marked the beginning of three long years of strife, disturbances, and 
political unrest throughout the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The communal tensions 
had taken decades to build up and took equally as long to simmer down. In the weeks 
that followed, Muslim shopkeepers declared a hartal (strike) by refusing to open for 
business, which brought much of Srinagar’s daily commerce to a standstill. Muslims 
continued their acts of noncompliance by refusing to take part in the official Riot 
Enquiry Committee, despite repeated offers from the Darbar. On 23 September 1931 
a crowd of 15,000 dissidents armed with staffs and axes amassed at the house of Sa‘d 
al-Din, one of the local Muslims who had become a celebrity in the past few weeks 
for refusing to take part in the Riot Enquiry Committee. This time the local Hindu 
population was fortunate because the rioters apparently had ‘no quarrel with Hindus, 
but [rather] ha[d] declared Jehad against His Highness’ government.’21
The following evening an ordinance was passed that gave ordinary members
of the military and police extraordinary powers to control ‘turbulent persons’ by
22making arrests and taking possession of their property without any warrant. The 
ordinance even incorporated a clause, which made ‘dissuading’ others from military 
enlistment a prosecutable offence that was punishable by one year in prison, flogging, 
or both.23 Reactionary responses and retaliation came from both sides. On 25 
September following the Friday prayers in the town of Shopian (south of Srinagar), a 
mob of Muslims attacked a sub-inspector and eight constables who had been 
‘watching the prayers’ and killed one head constable. Military reinforcements soon
21 IOR R /l /1 /2 155(1) in Telegram No. 60-6  (24 September 1931) from the Resident o f  Kashmir.
22 Ibid., which contains a booklet o f  the ordinance entitled Notification o f  No. 19-L o f  1988.
23 Ibid.
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arrived opening fire, which killed another and wounded at least seven more.24 
Meanwhile, with the threat of the new ordinance looming, the British Resident of 
Kashmir was led to believe that a ‘rapid improvement’ of troop morale was taking 
place. His mistaken assessment only lasted until he began receiving reports from 
‘Europeans’ who were complaining that Hindus were abusing their newly acquired 
powers. Some Hindu officers had interpreted the ordinance to justify thrashing any 
Muslim who failed to say, ‘Maharaja sahib Id jay\ [victory to the Maharaja]’ 
whenever passing a member o f military or police. Indeed this unacceptable 
behaviour was corrected as soon as possible, but a few Muslims in Srinagar had
25already been ‘severely’ beaten.
From 1931 to 1934 demonstrations and communal disturbances were 
displacing diplomacy as preferred methods for expressing political dissent in 
Kashmir.26 The pressures, which arose in these extreme circumstances, allowed a 
new Muslim leadership to emerge out of the broader movement for independence. 
Each leader saw manifest in Kashmir the exemplification of the Indo-Islamic cause, 
and therefore Kashmir became the paradigm for Indo-Muslim independence. The 
overall perception of the Kashmir crisis was a paradigmatic case for both the 
tyrannical subjugation of Muslims, as well as an idealized spiritual resistance that
24 IOR R /l/1 /2 0 6 4  Fortnightly R eport fo r  the secon d  h a lf o f  Septem ber 1931 fro m  the Resident o f  
Kashmir, F .9-C /30  (3 October 1931); See also, IOR R /l /l /2 1 5 5 ( l)
25 See Ibid., for the full account including the above quotations.
26 The above accounts are intended to present an idea o f  the critical situation in Kashmir from the 
perspective o f  the disenfranchised M uslim  population. A  comprehensive historical presentation is 
beyond the scope o f  this study, which is only intended to show how these circumstances later 
contributed to the evolution o f  Ahmadi theology and identity. For more com prehensive historical 
accounts, see Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, M uslim  Subjects (2004); Ayesha Jalal, S e lf  an d  Sovereignty  
(2001); Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adtyah M ovem ent (1974); Ian Copland, ‘Islam and Political 
M obilization in Kashmir, 1931-1934/ Pacific  Affairs (1981); and David Gilmartin, Em pire and Islam  
(1988).
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bordered on outright jihad. The new political parties emerging from the centre were 
eager to make the most out of this example, which had the potential to reinforce their 
own political visions in the event of a favourable outcome. In this sense, the 
idealized perception of the crisis in Kashmir provided an opportune moment for 
emerging Muslim leaders to demonstrate to the world exactly how their party’s Islam 
was capable of transforming society in precisely the way in which they had claimed. 
In addition, the historical context of the Kashmir crisis corresponded with a time that 
was sufficiently removed from the failures of the IChilafat Movement, which allowed 
India’s aspiring leaders to substantiate their claims once again through a seemingly 
new course of action.
4.3 -  Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad’s Response and 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s Political Involvement in the Kashmir Crisis
Kashmir has always played a significant role in Ahmadi explanations of 
Jesus’ survival from the crucifixion.27 Ghulam Ahmad himself wrote a tract which 
argued that both Jesus and Mary had travelled to Kashmir following the crucifixion to 
escape further persecution.28 Subsequently, Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya has produced an 
extensive amount o f literature pertaining to Jesus’ journey to Kashmir and his burial 
in a particular Sufi shrine in Srinagar, which Ghulam Ahmad identified as the actual
27 See chapter 2, section 2.2 above, ‘Jesus as the Promised M essiah’.
2S See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, MasTh H industan Men, in Riihdm Khaza 'in, Vol. 15.
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tomb of Jesus Christ.29 In addition, Maulvi Hakim Nur al-Din, khalifat al-masih I, 
had served as the chief royal physician (shalii tabib) to the Maharaja of Jammu and 
Kashmir for fifteen years, under Hari Singh’s two predecessors.30 Due to its 
importance to the community, Mahmud Ahmad had visited Kashmir on a number of 
occasions before and after his ascension to the khilafat. Given this context, there is 
no coincidence that Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was pursuing an aggressive missionary 
campaign in Jammu and Kashmir prior to the outbreak of the riots.
Soon after the riots on 25 July 1931, the Lahore based All-India Muslim 
Kashmir Conference held a meeting in Shimla to determine their course of action. 
Many notable dignitaries were present, including Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Sir Mian 
Fazl-i Husain, (the Nawab of Malerkotla) Sir Muhammad Zulfiqar ‘Ali Khan,31 
(Shams a l-‘Ulama) Khwaja Hasan Nizami of Delhi, Khan Bahadur Shaykh Rahim 
Bakhsh, and several other Nawabs, a Deobandi professor, and high ranking 
administrators from both the Siyasat and Muslim Outlook newspapers. On Iqbal’s 
nomination, the members unanimously agreed that Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud
29 See Mirza Tahir Ahmad, Christianity: A Journey From  Facts to Fiction  (Tilford: Islam International 
Publications, 1994); see also J. D. Shams, Where d id  Jesus die?  (Tilford: Islam International 
Publications, 1989).
30 Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, H azrat M aulvi Nooruddeen Khalifatul M asih 1 (London: The London 
M osque, 1983?), p. 39. Presumably, Nur al-D in’s status as the royal physician earned him the title
‘hakim' which typically prefixes his name. Although Nur al-Din served as the royal physician for 
fifteen years (1877-1893) under Ranbir Singh and Pratap Singh, Dost Muhammad Shahid’s account 
indicated that Nur al-Din was asked to leave Kashmir under seem ingly unfavorable circumstances, see 
Tarikh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, p. 369.
31 Nawab Sir Zulfiqar ‘Ali Khan had a particularly impressive profile that may appear to be 
overshadowed by the other eminent figures like Iqbal and Mian Fazl-i Husain. A m ong other things, he 
was the C hief Minister o f  Patiala (1910-1913), a participant for the Simon Com m ission (1928-1929), 
and an Indian delegate to the League o f  Nations (1930). Interestingly, his brother, Naw ab Muhammad 
‘Ali Khan, married Mirza Ghulam Ahm ad’s daughter, Nawab Mubaraka Begum , which made both o f  
the Nawabs the brothers-in-law o f  Mirza Mahmud Ahmad khalifat al-m asih  II. In addition, Ghulam  
Ahmad’s other daughter, Am lul Hafiz Begum , married Nawab Muhammad ‘Ali Khan’s son, Nawab  
‘Abdullah Khan.
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Ahmad should become president, with ‘Abd al-Rahim Dard as his secretary, of what 
they called the All-India Kashmir Committee (AIKC).32
This inaugural meeting at Shimla was important for several reasons. The 
motivating circumstances throughout the All-India Muslim Kashmir Conference’s 
former period of impotence had not really changed by 1931. The All-India Kashmir 
Committee still had no clear grounds for agency in the sense that there was no official 
sponsorship from any o f the three governments (Kashmir, India, and Britain) 
involved, no definitive goals or reasons for its existence, and no Kashmiri lobby 
officially asking for its help. For all intents and purposes, the AIKC was no different 
than it had always been during its quieter years throughout the earlier part of the 20th 
century. Prior to the meeting at Shimla, the committee was an unorganized group of 
influential and wealthy Muslims, predominantly from the Punjab, who were 
understandably upset about the conditions of their co-religionists in Kashmir. 
Nonetheless, their shared sentiment did not translate into practical power on the other 
side of the border in Kashmir. Shimla marked the beginning o f several significant 
changes that altered the role o f the committee and the struggle for Muslim 
independence in Kashmir. In virtue of the fact that the meeting took place in Shimla, 
instead of somewhere more convenient like the committee’s previous headquarters in 
Lahore, the AIKC had already taken on a more national appearance that extended 
beyond the Punjab.'33 The new members who were present at Shimla, and those who
j2 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, pp. 415-416, has his account o f  the 
com m ittee’s formation and pp. 419-421, has the full list o f  members.
33 Shimla traditionally belonged to the region o f  mountain states that is associated with the people o f  
the Himalayas, until the British discovered the town and eventually made it their summer capital in 
1864. Shimla continued to function as India’s summer capital until partition in 1947. In 1972 the 
Indian government redefined the state borders on more traditional lines and made Shimla the capital o f  
the new state o f  Himachal Pradesh.
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joined them soon thereafter, were truly a better representation of an ‘All-India’ 
organization that stretched from the Frontier in the west to the Bengal in the east. 
The augmented geographic boundaries were a clear step towards establishing 
credibility. Now at the very least the All-India Kashmir Committee could produce 
non-Punjabi members who held meetings in one of the nation’s capitals.
Other Muslim activists to emerge following the riots included a young 
Kashmiri named Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abdullah,34 who was an unemployed Master’s 
graduate of Aligarh that was making a name for himself by delivering impassioned 
speeches in protest. Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s continued involvement in political activism 
eventually earned him the laudatory title Sher-i Kashmir (the Lion of Kashmir) as 
well as the opportunity to serve as the state’s Chief Minister from 1975 until his death 
in 1982.35 The Kashmir crisis also marked the beginning of the recently formed 
Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam, which was an organization that was trying to establish itself in 
opposition to the Ahmadi administered All-India Kashmir Committee.36 From its 
inception, the Ahrari defence of Islam was reactionary in nature and unapologetically 
incorporated anti-Darbdr, anti-British, anti-Sikh, anti-Hindu, and anti-Ahmadi 
sentiments all on a single platform.37 This stance was reinforced through a militant 
enterprise that wielded gangs (jathas) of thousands of Punjabis who threatened to 
infiltrate the Kashmiri border at a moment’s notice.38 Sir Mian Fazl-i Husain
34 The name also appears as Sheikh Abdullah in English works.
35 For a sketchy autobiographical account, see Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, A tish -i C indr (trans.) 
Flam es o f  the Chinar (N ew  Delhi: Penguin, 1993).
36 See section 4.4 below.
37 David Gilmartin, Em pire and Islam: Punjab an d  the M aking o f  Pakistan  (London: University o f  
California Press, 1988), pp. 96-97; see also Ayesha Jalal, S e lf and  Sovereignty, p. 349, who noted that 
the appeal o f  the early Ahrar attracted ‘communitarian bigots o f  varying m easure.’
38 IOR R /l /l /2 1 5 5 ( l)  in the L etter from  C h ief Secretary to  the Governm ent o f  the Punjab  (10 October 
1931), p. 12.
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described them as the ‘riff-raffs’ amongst the Muslims.39 Even though the Ahrar’s 
tactics may have been crude in the earliest days, they nonetheless may have provided 
suitable opposition to Mahmud Ahmad who had been ‘running the local 
administration [in Qadian] on the lines of an Ahmadi mafia.’40
Mahmud Ahmad’s objectives were to find ‘Ahmadi’ solutions to a set of 
sophisticated political problems. Leading a successful lobby on behalf o f the AIKC 
in India was a challenge, but ensuring that they had a practical impact on the streets 
of Kashmir was an entirely different matter. Mahmud Ahmad knew that only 
Kashmiris could determine the fate of Kashmir. Offensively, he needed to mobilize 
Kashmiri Muslims against a stagnant Dogra government, while defensively, he 
needed to ward off the attacks and constant criticism from the Ahrari opposition. 
Neither of these were easy tasks. Had the Darbdr been willing to respond to civil 
sentiments, either through the implementation of various changes in public policy or 
perhaps by initiating an attempt to bring about these changes in the near future, it is 
likely that a great deal of social anxiety could have been avoided. Resolving the 
problem of reconciliation after the crisis had begun was not a viable option once 
mainstream members of Kashmiri society had felt it necessary to resort to rioting and 
civil disobedience en masse. Many Kashmiri Muslims were weary of the government 
and were no longer willing to entertain the idea of diplomatic negotiations. Both the 
severity of the violence and the widespread consent that the masses expressed during 
the communal disturbances made it exceedingly difficult to stop the crisis by finding 
a tempered solution. Furthermore, reconciliation needed to take place in the backdrop
jQ W aheed Ahmad (ed.), D ia ry  an d  Notes o f  M ian Fazl-i Husain  (Lahore: Research Society o f  
Pakistan, U niversity'of the Punjab, 1977), p. 141.
40 Ayesha Jalal, S e lf and Sovereignty, p. 293.
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of groups like the Ahrar, who based many of their activities on reciprocating a refined 
rhetoric of hatred back into the public ear.
Once again, Mahmud Ahmad’s methodology in resolving the conflict in 
Kashmir was to utilize the Jama‘at’s excellent contacts in the region and its superb 
organizational structure as an asset. The organizational structure itself gave Mahmud 
Ahmad a considerable advantage over his opposition, as it was drastically different 
from any other Muslim group of the time with the exception of the Isma'ilis. 
Considering that Mahmud Ahmad was personally responsible for setting up the 
Jama* at’s organizational structure in the first place, it is not surprising that he was 
quick to use the Jama‘a f  s institutionalized framework to enter into an international 
political crisis. He had always intended for his Jama*at to compete for the dominant 
leadership of the Muslim world, thereby enabling the Ahmadi khilafat (which is to 
say his own khilafat) to reign supreme over the umma. This is why Mahmud Ahmad 
never had fully supported the Khilafat Movement, because it would have undermined 
his own claim to khilafat.41
The AIKC needed authentication from the Kashmiri masses in order to have a 
lasting effect in Kashmir. Mahmud Ahmad knew that he needed to balance the 
support of the Kashmiri mainstream with the logistics of an international resistance. 
He established a Publicity Committee whose only function was to bombard the Indian 
Press with news and perspectives 011 the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir. 
They publicized pertinent issues amongst Muslims throughout the subcontinent who
41 Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: A spects o f  Ahm adi R eligious Thought an d  Its M edieval 
B ackground  (Berkeley: University' o f  California Press, 1989), pp. 35-36. There are certain subtleties in 
Mahmud Ahm ad’s argument that are expressed in detail below. W e will explore som e o f  these 
questions further in chapter 5, section 5.3 ‘The Political Dim ensions o f  Persecution’.
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were potentially unaware of the most recent internal developments in Kashmir or the 
AIKC’s response to the crisis.42 Then Mahmud Ahmad ordered the establishment of 
numerous Kashmiri Independence Offices (otherwise known as Reading Rooms) 
throughout Jammu and Kashmir, but shrewdly forbade his Ahmadi disciples from 
holding positions of leadership within them.43 This further created the impression of 
a highly organized internal resistance that was taking shape with Muslims coming 
together from within the state’s borders, which otherwise appeared to have been 
highly implausible. His strategy was devised to mislead onlookers who were trying 
to assess the threat of Kashmiri Muslims by showing them the borrowed framework 
of a well-organized institution that was already in place. Hence, government officials 
were thoroughly dismayed when they were confronted with an utterly unified 
network of Reading Rooms that were popping up throughout the state and were 
simply nonexistent in the weeks and months prior to the riots. This should have been 
impossible, and no one had predicted that the leaders of the agitations were capable of 
organizing themselves to a level of competence as rapidly as they had done in 
Kashmir. The Darbar faced an unfolding situation that gave the outward appearance 
of a disgruntled Muslim mainstream that was conflating into a collective resistance 
with unbelievable efficiency. Realistically, the underlying structure of Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya had taken nearly 40 years to establish itself in this fashion, but for the 
Dogra officials who were wondering how a similar organizational structure was 
materializing virtually overnight, it must have been terrifying. It meant that they had
42 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, p. 433.
43 Ibid., pp. 444-445.
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grossly underestimated the magnitude of the situation that was developing in their 
own state and radically misjudged the threat of Muslim resistance.
With the infrastructure beginning to take shape, Mahmud Ahmad needed to 
find an inspired Kashmiri spokesperson who he could use as a puppet for his own 
cause. He summoned roughly 15 to 20 potential candidates to Qadian for a personal 
interview, so that he could get a better idea of whom he would be working with in the 
future.44 When the meetings were complete and Mahmud Ahmad had assessed the 
situation, he asked the Kashmiri delegation if they knew of any other potential leaders 
from within Kashmir’s independence movement who had not joined them in Qadian. 
The entourage concurred that there was a Shaykh Muhammad ‘Abdullah of Srinagar 
who could not risk leaving Kashmir out o f the fear that the Darbar would not permit 
his re-entry into the state. This response was provocative enough to pique Mahmud 
Ahmad’s interest, so he made arrangements to meet Shaykh ‘Abdullah at a border 
town called Garhi Habibullah. In a true Bollywood style masquerade, ‘Abd al-Rahim 
Dard smuggled Shaykh ‘Abdullah, tucked under a blanket and hidden in the backseat 
of his carriage, across the Indian border into Garhi Habibullah to meet the AIKC’s 
new president. When the meeting with Mirza Mahmud Ahmad was over, Shaykh 
‘Abdullah was smuggled back into Kashmir in the same manner in which he 
arrived 45
44 Ibid., p. 445. Dost Muhammad Shahid did not provide the names o f  the individuals in question, but 
his account inferred that they were all reasonably young activists who were already m aking a name for 
them selves in Jammu and Kashmir.
45 Ibid., pp. 446-447. Although this story is not present in Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s autobiography, which is 
the only other source capable o f  verifying or rejecting its authenticity, it is consistent with the 
developm ent o f  the subsequent history o f  Kashmir in regards to Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s close political 
affiliations with Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya through the early part o f  his career, which w e w ill further 
discuss below.
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The scheme was a success and the agreement was simple. Shaykh 'Abdullah’s 
instructions were to set up an office in Srinagar from which he could devote his 
fulltime attention to the independence movement. Shaykh 'Abdullah’s task was to 
establish some type of newspaper or periodical to disseminate information and 
publicize the resistance internally. He founded the Islah newsletter, which introduced 
a rare Muslim mouthpiece from within the borders of Kashmir that was created 
purely for the promotion of the independence movement. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad 
was aware that it was inappropriate for him to intervene as the khalifa, because the 
majority of Muslims in Kashmir were not his Ahmadi disciples. Likewise, at this 
point the AIKC was more of a facade for Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya than anything else, 
despite the inherent potential of its influential membership. In the historical context, 
a newspaper was itself a major organ for communicating ideas throughout the 
subcontinent during this period. It was one of the few means by which major leaders 
of this era could spread their ideas beyond their immediate vicinities and beyond the 
crowds of the local mosques who emerged following the Friday prayers.46 For this 
reason, Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s easy access to the press instantly made him a major 
player in the eyes of the government observers who were studiously tracking the 
development of the situation. In fact, the impact of Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s ideas 
circulating through the Kashmiri press may have been more influential than Mahmud 
Ahmad expected, due to other historical circumstances surrounding the Kashmiri 
press. In the early years of the conflict, Kashmir’s reinvigorated press was taking 
advantage of the Dogra rulers’ recent relaxation in censorship of Muslim
46 See Francis Robinson, Islam  an d  M uslim H is to iy  in South A sia  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), especially chapter 3, 'Islam and the Impact o f  Print in South A sia’.
174
publications, which they had enforced up to 1932.47 Shaykh ‘Abdullah fulfilled his 
obligations through the early 1930s by incessantly publishing articles that made 
explicit appeals to the All-India Kashmir Committee, virtually begging for their 
intercession in the ongoing affair. This alone gave Mirza Mahmud adequate 
legitimacy for the AIKC and enough leeway to enfranchise his organization’s 
authority from neighbouring India. Now he possessed the freedom to pursue matters 
in Jammu and Kashmir as he saw fit while acting on behalf of the AIKC as their 
rightful president. In return for the internal publicity of the AIKC and the public 
appeals for their intervention, Shaykh ‘Abdullah, who did not come from an affluent 
background and lacked his own resources, received the necessary funding to run and 
sustain his independence movement office in Srinagar. The initial amount agreed 
upon at Garhi Habibullah was a base allowance of Rs. 238 per month with a potential 
for increase, which was a generous figure for the time.48
Shaykh ‘Abdullah was so convincing in aligning himself with the AIKC that 
he spent the rest of his career facing accusations of being ‘Qadiani’ from opposition 
patties, who would conveniently malign his reputation whenever the opportunity for 
political advancement arose. This was a serious problem for Darbar officials who 
were desperately trying to determine with whom they were dealing. Consequently, 
bemused local authorities now had to spend their time trying to determine if Shaykh
41 Mridu Rai, Hindu R iders, Muslim Subjects, p. 261.
48 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tarlkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, p. 447. There are also several photocopies o f  
handwritten letters from Shaykh ‘Abdullah to Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, which detail other donations 
and have been inserted at the end o f  vol. 5, between pp. 630-631; see also lan Copland, ‘Islam and 
Political M obilization in Kashmir, 1931-1934,’ P acific Affairs (1981), Vol. 54, N o . 2, (Summer, 1981), 
p. 237. Copland’s account is vague but reasonably consistent with Dost Muhammad Shahid, although 
he did not cite the sources for his information; see also Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i A hrar, Vol. 1, (Lahore: 
Maktabah-i Tabassira, 1975), p. 369, for the similar sentiment that he expressed regarding their 
financial ties.
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‘Abdullah really was a ‘Qadiani’. It took months until ‘Abd al-Rahim Dard could
personally clarify the issue for government officials on a visit to the Resident of 
Kashmir.49 Even so, the issue persisted and periodically re-emerged as a significant 
problem for unassuming Kashmiris who were caught in the fallout between political 
opportunists who were exploiting the latest scandal. There are examples of this in 
Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s memoirs:
Unfortunately, the Mirwaiz [Maulvi Yusuf Shah] became embroiled in 
their [Majlis-i Ahrar’s] intrigues. On 30 January 1932, he delivered a 
sermon at Khanqah-e-Naqshbandia in which he accused me of being a 
Qadiani. Everyone knew that I was a Sunni, of the Hanafi sect. This 
event took place in the dead of winter when most Kashmiris do not 
leave their houses without their kartgris [braziers]. During the 
altercations which followed his allegation, these kangris were freely 
used as trajectories, injuring a number of people.50
The affinity between Mirza Mahmud Ahmad and Shaykh ‘Abdullah developed 
over time as both remained true to their agreement and honoured their commitments. 
The details o f each specific project varied case by case, but the underlying premise 
was always the same. On 23 May 1932 Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, this time on behalf 
of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, established a new scholarship fund for Muslim students
4910R  R /l/1 /2  364 in Fortnightly R eport f o r  the secon d  h a lf  o f  O ctober 1931 fro m  the R esident o f  
Kashmir, F .9-C /30  (3 Novem ber 1931); see also IOR R /l/1 /2 5 3 1 in File No. 91-P olitica l (17 January 
1934), in which a warning was sent to B. J. Glancy o f  the Glancy Com m ission cautioning that Shaykh 
‘Abdullah is an Ahmadi even though he may say that he is not. The conclusion expressed in the file 
was that the authenticity o f  the source was dubious and likely to be linked to the opposition (i.e. the 
Alirar), who were threatening to publish the fraudulent letter when ‘it suits them ’, as was repeatedly 
the case throughout Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s career. It is surprising that his affiliations with Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya were persistently an issue with the D arbar  as late as 1934, even though both Ahmadi 
officials and Shaykh ‘Abdullah h im self consistently denied his religious com mitm ent to the 
community.
50 Sheikh Abdullah, Flam es o f  the Chinar, p. 39. A kdngrf is a warming device that was traditionally 
used by indigenous Kashmiris. A kangrl is a clay bowl filled with hot coals or cinder that is typically  
kept in a wooden pail throughout the winter months as a means to stay warm. The pail is small enough 
and light enough to be carried in one’s hands, usually underneath a thick Kashmiri shawl, which  
creates a portable individualized heat source for people who are walking outdoors in inclement 
weather.
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studying in Kashmir. With an additional Rs. 200 per month, Shaykh ‘Abdullah could 
establish a suitable boarding house with a fulltime cook, which enabled 20 promising 
candidates the opportunity to pursue a higher education each year.51 Although this 
may not seem like a significant number of students at first, it was considerably larger 
than the government’s offer from 1927, which had created such a stir and was 
followed by accusations of Hindu favouritism. Nevertheless, the new scholarship 
fund contained enough awards to woo Muslim favour in Kashmir and increase 
positive publicity for Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya at a reasonable price.
Pragmatically, increasing revenues was never a problem for Mirza Mahmud 
Ahmad, His foresight and ingenuity enabled him to construct somewhat of a fund 
raising industry that was beginning to perpetuate itself. There was a circular return as 
finances were being channelled back into the same system from which they emerged. 
Shyakh ‘Abdullah’s frequent public displays of approval for the AIKC’s initiatives 
had loosened the pockets of the committee’s wealthier members, which sparked an 
increase in donations as well as a broader ‘All-Indian’ membership to stretch its 
roster. Likewise, growing numbers of underprivileged Kashmiris were willing to 
support a movement that was having a visible impact on the ground and producing 
tangible results, such as stipends for the families of the deceased and medical 
provisions for those injured in the riots,32 Consequently, the increasing confidence of 
lower class Kashmiris in the AIKC was attracting even more donors from above. 
Mahmud Ahmad appropriated funds to the Kashmiri cause from every accessible 
channel that was available to him, including Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. Khalifat al-masih
51 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, p. 448.
52 Ibid., pp. 470-471.
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II established the ‘Kashmir Relief Fund’ as a mandatory charitable ‘donation’ levied 
upon every earning Ahmadi in his Jama‘at. Each Ahmadi was required to give at 
least one paV  (1/192 of a rupee),53 on every rupee that they earned, towards the 
Kashmir Relief Fund on a monthly basis, which the Jama‘at continued to collect for 
decades after the riots.54 It is likely that the vast majority of Ahmadis considered this 
a worthy cause and donated to the new Relief Fund openhandedly.
We have already mentioned above how there were significant numbers of 
Ahmadis working anonymously behind the scenes and contributing towards the 
hidden labour force underneath the independence movement’s various banners, such 
as the AIKC and the numerous Reading Rooms. However, unskilled Ahmadi 
labourers were not the only ones who were compelled to give their time and efforts to 
the Kashmiri cause. Conversely, Mahmud Ahmad instructed skilled Ahmadis to 
contribute professional services to the Kashmiri cause as well. Throughout the 
stormiest years that followed the riots, major cities like Srinagar were occasionally 
subjected to bouts of martial law. Communal tensions and revolutionary threats had 
raised concerns amongst many members of the military and the police. The 
implications of the ordinance of 24 September 1931 mentioned above reflected the 
heightened state of paranoia that some officials in Darbar experienced regarding their 
own national security. Accordingly, an inordinate number of Muslims were arrested 
and sent to prison under false or misleading pretences that were precariously 
associated with various criminal offences. With the internal situation in Kashmir
53 According to the old system  o f  currency, there were 3 p e n ’ in 1 p a ysa  and 64 p a y se  in 1 rupee.
54 D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i A hm adiyya , Vol. 5, p. 436. It is unclear when the fund actually 
ceased to exist. It is likely that this specific scheme was eventually absorbed into the broader 
initiatives o f  the Ahmadi donation system  that continue to this day under various names.
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deteriorating, there was no independent judicial system in place to determine whether 
those incarcerated were being held on charges that were exaggerated or fabricated by 
hypersensitive officers. Additionally, the Darbar had used the ordinance to provide 
legal justification for the acquisition of property from those indicted at an alarming 
rate.55 Since the ordinance permitted legal action to be taken that was based solely 011 
suspicion, when such a case went to trial it invariably reduced to one individual’s 
word against the other. The AIKC sent teams of attorneys to Kashmir and instructed 
them to assess the situation and defend any individual who had been wrongfully 
detained or whose property had been wrongfully confiscated. Although there appear 
to be several cases where wealthy Kashmiris had their properties or businesses seized 
by the Darbar, the majority of cases appear to involve lower class Kashmiris with no 
means o f finding a recourse to legal counsel.56 The lawyers went to major cities in 
Jammu and Kashmir at their own expense as volunteers of the AIKC and invested 
their own time and money. Naturally, the AIKC’s legal team included several 
prominent Ahmadis who were primarily responding to their khalifa 's instructions, 
such as Shaykh Bashir Ahmad (who later became a High Court Justice in Lahore), 
Chauhdry Muhammad Yusuf Khan, Shaykh Muhammad Ahmad Mazhar (who 
authored numerous lexicons pertaining to Ghulam Ahmad’s linguistic theory),57
55 See the ordinance booklet entitled N otification o f  No. 19-L o f  1988  in 10R  R /l / l /2 1 5 5 ( l) ,  
particularly pp. 5-7, which deal with the legalities related to the seizure o f  private property.
56 This also could suggest that their property may have been confiscated under genuine suspicion, since 
less fortunate people were less likely to own a lot o f  property.
57 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad received revelations informing him that all languages were derived from 
Arabic, which was sacred because o f  its relation to the Qur’an. See his book M inan al-Rahm an , in 
RiihanT Khaca 'in, Vol. 9, pp. 126-248. Muhammad Ahmad Mazhar expanded the thesis and wrote 
numerous lexicons that traced the words o f  various languages back to their allegedly original Arabic 
roots through an elaborate system o f  phonetic substitutions, which he devised him self. Many o f  his 
works are still available, sue Arabic: The Source o f  A ll the Languages (1963); English T raced to
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Chauhdry Asadullah Klian (the younger brother of Zafrulla Khan), and several others. 
Remarkably, Dost Muhammad Shahid has recorded the details of hundreds of such 
cases that were acquitted or overturned due to the efforts o f the AIKC’s legal team
58and counsel throughout the early 1930s.
Some of the AIKC’s internal support and services, such as the legal 
contributions, medical relief, and the scholarship funds, were unique in the sense that 
their interface with the Kashmiri public was deep rooted enough to directly impact 
the individuals who were presumably the most affected. Within the AIKC, Mahmud 
Ahmad had a number of other influential contacts with whom he was collaborating to 
support his initiatives. Iqbal’s sentimental connection to Kashmir is well known and 
often attributed to his family’s Kashmiri background. His lifelong contributions and 
poetry about the struggles of the Muslims of Kashmir and India overall have been 
well documented.59 Similarly, it is known that Mian Fazl-i Husain’s influence played 
an important role in stabilizing support for AIKC.60 As with Iqbal, Mian Fazl-i 
Husain’s contributions in the way of the broader independence movement have been 
recognized by the historians of South Asia,61 but their personal relations and social 
contacts alongside their professional affiliations are often overlooked. In the 
Ahmadi-specific context, Mian Fazl-i Husain claimed to have a ‘great regard’ for
A rabic  (1967); Yoruba Traced to A rabic  (1976); H aitsa Traced to A rabic  (1977); Sanskrit T raced to 
A rabic  (1982),
58 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, pp. 535-554. This section is further split by 
each individual attorney’s name and the details o f  their personal legal contributions.
59 Ayesha .lalal. S e lf  an d  Sovereignty, pp. 352-353.
60 Ibid., p. 356; Ian Copland, ‘Islam and Political M obilization in Kashmir, 1931-1934,’ Pacific Affairs 
(1981), Vol. 54, N o. 2, (Summer, 1981), p. 236.
61 See Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal, ‘Alternative to Partition: M uslim Politics between the W ars,’ 
M odern Asian Studies, Vol. 15, N o. 3, (1981), pp. 415-454; see also Ian Talbot, K hizr Tiwana: The 
Punjab Unionist P arty  an d  the Partition  o f  India  (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002), pp. 84-87; 
see also Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A M odern H isto iy  (London: Hurst & Company, 2005), pp. 71-73.
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Maulana Muhammad ‘AH of the Lahori branch.62 Furthermore, he had been 
mentoring a young Chauhdry Muhammad Zafrulla Khan for some time, another 
devoted member of the Jama4at who had entered the movement at the hand of Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad.
From 1930 to 1932 Zafrulla Khan participated in all three o f the Round Table 
Conferences in London. In December 1931, Zafrulla Khan was elected president of 
the All-India Muslim League. Despite the overt animosity expressed by Ahrari 
protesters,63 Zafrulla Khan continued as president of the Muslim League until June 
1932 when he resigned from the position to fulfil his next task. Mian Fazl-i Husain 
had been a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council from 1930 to 1935 but his 
declining health had forced him to take a four-month leave of absence during the 
summer of 1932. Upon his recommendation, Zafrulla Khan took Fazl-i Husain’s 
place on the Viceroy’s Executive Council throughout the summer of 1932,64 which 
was a bold move considering Zafrulla’s age, inexperience, and lack of seniority. In 
his diaiy, Mian Fazl-i Husain admitted: 4If it comes off, it will be a startling 
appointment.’65 However, Zafrulla Khan’s political aptitude and reputation were 
developing quickly. His closeness to such eminent personalities afforded him the 
opportunity to discuss the Kashmir matter personally with the Viceroy in the early
62 Waheed Ahmad (ed.), D ia iy  a n d  N otes o f  M ian F azl-i H usain , p. 36, Fazl-i Husain mentions this in 
regards to visiting Muhammad 'A li’s house in Lahore for a dinner party (27 October 1930, Monday).
63 Janbaz Mirza, K drvan-i A lva r ,  Vol. 1, p. 238.
64 Wayne W ilcox and A islie  T. Embree (interviewers), The Reminiscences o f  Sir M uham m ad Zafrulla 
Khan (Maple, Canada: Oriental Publishers with permission from Columbia University, 2004), pp. BO­
SS.
65 W aheed Ahmad (ed.), D ia iy  an d  Notes o f  M ian F azl-i Husain , p. 137, the entry is under (12 M ay 
1932, Thursday).
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1930s.66 Zafrulla Khan was an invaluable asset to Mirza Mahmud Ahmad and the 
AIKC during the Kashmir crisis, and perhaps even more so following the partition, as 
we will see below.
All of these factors came together in the Kashmir crisis in the 1930s, which 
amounted to a large network of global support with vast resources that applied 
internal and external pressure on the three relevant governments (Kashmir, India, and 
Britain) involved, in order to resolve the conflict in Kashmir. The inability to 
determine the significance and role of each key figure in the Muslim leadership must 
have been frustrating for government officials. This enabled Mahmud Ahmad to 
exercise various levels of control over the government and the Kashmiri mainstream 
by voicing similar concerns through dissimilar outlets, which thereby influenced a 
broader constituency than he normally could access through his own personal reach. 
His connections with revolutionary demagogues like Shaykh ‘Abdullah, who 
represented the Muslim sentiment o f a country, to idealized literary icons like Iqbal, 
who represent the Muslim sentiment of an era, enabled Mahmud Ahmad to impose 
his influence throughout the region. Mahmud Ahmad could now personally meet 
with the Viceroy and threaten him with various courses of action,67 such as the 
increased civil disobedience and the mass boycott of shopkeepers (,hartal) of August 
1931.68 He would intimidate government officials by threatening to resign as 
president of the AIKC and requesting its supporters to comply with the Ahrar’s 
objectives, which presumably would have resulted in a more violent conclusion to the
66 Wayne W ilcox and A islie  T. Embree (interviewers), The Reminiscences o f  S ir M uham m ad Zafrulla  
Khan, pp. 49-50.
61 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tdnkh-i A hm adiyya , Vol. 5, p. 452.
68 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement, p. 149.
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crisis.69 Mahmud Ahmad in his capacity as the president of the AIKC exerted 
whatever pressure he could on the British and Indian governments to intervene in 
Kashmir, since he was convinced that immediate British intervention was the best 
political solution for the conflict. He believed that immediate British intervention 
would displace Dogra rule and eventually give the Muslims of Kashmir the best 
chance for independence. Although this was an indirect route to Kashmiri 
independence, it may have been a reasonable plan considering the enduring violence 
and tension in Kashmir in recent years. Despite Mahmud Ahmad’s attempts, the 
British were resolved to let the Kashmiris settle their own problems while they 
intervened sparingly and only when necessary. This attitude eventually exacerbated 
the ideological conflict between Mahmud Ahmad and his opponents, including 
Shaykh ‘Abdullah, who from the beginning had insisted on the creation of an 
independent Kashmir.
4.4 -  The Beginning of Opposition: The Majlis-i Ahrar
As popular as the AIKC had become amongst the mainstream, it did not 
succeed in winning the support of every Muslim in Kashmir. The Muslim opposition
70to the AIKC was centred around the newly formed Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam. In the 
early stages of the conflict, Mahmud Ahmad attempted to appeal to Ahrari
69IOR R /I /l/2 1 5 4 , see Telegram: fro m  the presiden t o f  the All-India Kashm ir Com m ittee to His 
Excellency the Viceroy, which is underneath Telegram R. No. 2017-S from  the Viceroy (Foreign and  
P olitica l D epartm ent) Sim la to the Secretary o f  State f o r  India, London  (13 August 1931).
70 There were eight founding members o f  the M ajlis-i Ahrar: ‘Alaullah Shah Bukhari, Chaudry Afzal 
Haq, Maulana Habib al-Rahman, Mazhar ‘Ali Azhar, Zafar 4Ali Khan, Khwaja ‘Abd al-Rahman 
Ghazi, Shaykh Haysam al-Din, and Maulana DaTid Ghaznavi. See Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i A hrar,
Vol. l ,p .  82.
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sympathies by repeatedly publishing articles that called for AIKC supporters to 
cooperate with the Ahrar on Kashmir. Additionally, Mahmud Ahmad sent 
Muhammad Isma'il Ghaznavi, the nephew of Ahrari co-founder Maulana Da’ud 
Ghaznavi, as a delegate to the Ahrar leadership to offer his resignation as president if 
the Ahrar agreed to collaborate with the AIKC.71 Janbaz Mirza chronicled the 
Ahrar’s perspective on the events in an eight-volume history that illustrates their 
profound scepticism towards the offers made by Mahmud Ahmad, which appeared in 
popular newspapers like InqilabJ2 In fact, the Ahrar questioned the motivations of 
any organization other than their own. Despite the dramatic calls for Muslim unity 
emanating from both camps, neither of these two groups trusted each other enough to 
work together towards their common goals. After a slow start, the Ahrar did make 
significant contributions to the people of Kashmir on their own terms. Although the 
details of Majlis-i Ahrar’s contribution to the crisis in Kashmir are largely beyond the 
scope of this study, they are worth mentioning in brief.
The most celebrated member of the Ahrar’s leadership, ‘Ataullah Shah 
Bukhari, was a mesmerizing speaker who captivated Punjabi audiences and provoked 
political mobilization. Prior to the riots, the men who formed the Ahrar’s leadership 
had seceded from the Congress party in protest to pursue their own political 
objectives. Even after they had committed themselves to their new organization 
following the riots, it took a couple of years before the Ahrar could impact Kashmir
71 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tcirikh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, p. 432.
72 Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i Ahrar, Vol. 1, p. 190. The article in question appeared in the Inqilab  (22  
September 1931). Mahmud Ahmad expressed similar sentiments in a Siyasat article from Lahore (31 
October 1931), which is available in translation in 10R  R /l /1 /2 155(1), sw  D em i-O fficial le tter From  
C.C. Gorbett, ESO, CMG, CIE, C h ief Secretary, Governm ent Punjab No. 15267-S.B. D a ted  the 2nd/3 ni 
Nov. 1931.
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in the way that they had intended. Although initially their campaign in Kashmir was 
more of an annoyance than a serious threat to the government, it still affected the 
overall circumstances and altered the mood of the conflict. The assumptions that 
were aggressively expressed in the Ahrari stance represented the view of a significant 
number of Muslims in the subcontinent who were convinced that there was no 
peaceful way to achieve Kashmiri independence. As articulate as ‘Ataullah Shah 
Bukhari was before a swarming crowd, he did not have to convince many people of 
his argument, since similar sentiments had already penetrated rural South Asia 
beforehand. This was a great advantage for leaders like Bukhari, who did not have to 
waste time reiterating their justifications for immediate action. This no-nonsense 
approach to regime change in India and Kashmir reflected an exasperated Muslim 
population that would not continue waiting for diplomacy to take its course.
When Ahrari jathas (gangs) started crossing the Kasmiri border from Sialkot in 
the summer of 1931, local military and police officials erroneously presumed that 
they had the situation under control. Especially after the ordinance had taken effect 
in late September 1931, exonerating any number of police tactics was no longer an 
issue, since it gave police the legal authority to take harsher measures against the 
agitators. However, the Darbar did not suspect that there were large numbers of 
Muslims who were not afraid of the legal consequences for their actions. Police 
began making arrests and continued to do so until Kashmir’s prisons had reached 
their capacities. This was a misjudgement by the Dogra government, who had hastily 
passed the ordinance overnight without considering the pragmatic ramifications of 
such legislation. As defiant Ahrari insubordinates proudly filled the jails o f Kashmir,
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diplomatic negotiations were escalated to the next level rather abruptly. Fortunately 
for the government, the Ahrar had exhausted their makeshift resources and could not 
afford to support their Punjabi volunteers who had been camping on the 
mountainsides exposed to the elements. The unbearable weather forced most of the 
jatha  volunteers to return to their homes as the punishing conditions of the Kashmiri 
winter months gradually appeared.
Majlis-i Ahrar did not have the institutionalized structure, finances, or labour 
force at their disposal in the way that Mahmud Ahmad had in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, 
but this did not discourage their efforts. Although the Ahrar arranged to solicit 
regular donations (chanda) from their volunteers through a standardized induction 
form,73 the urgency of the crisis did not permit the time needed for the money to be 
collected. The complications involved in establishing an adequate infrastructure 
demanded that the majority of their funding be spent on stabilizing their new 
organization. Even Shaykh ‘Abdullah had gratuitously acknowledged the 
forbearance and physical hardships that Ahrari volunteers had endured in the 
beginning, even though he respectfully noted that he had not received a single rupee 
from the movement.74 By 1939, Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s messages had changed from 
mild irritation to telling the Ahrar to stay out of Kashmiri affairs.75 However, a 
steady source of funding was not the Ahrari leadership’s only problem in trying to 
organize a sustainable movement.
7j Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i Ahrar, Vol. I, pp. 149-150, which shows the registration form and 
membership conditions.
74 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tarlkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, pp. 445-446.
75 Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i Ahrar, V ol. 1, p. 278.
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4.5 -  The All-India Kashmir Committee after Mirza Bashir al-Din 
Mahmud Ahmad
After two years of Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s leadership and services, it was 
time for the AIKC to move on to the next stage of its development. Mahmud Ahmad 
had made considerable progress in establishing the AIKC as a viable organization and 
had acquired a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of government officials. Despite the 
fact that the AIKC was accomplishing tangible results in Kashmir, there were still a 
number of logistical issues that needed to be addressed by its members. The AIKC 
had yet to formally define their objectives, which was a necessary part of moving 
forward as an organization. Initially, the committee had been formed under strenuous 
circumstances as a reaction to the riots in Kashmir. Although the founding members 
had chosen Mahmud Ahmad as their first president, the AIKC more closely 
resembled a small group of elitist associates and their highbrowed companions who 
mutually shared a genuine concern for their fellow Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Two years later, this group was beginning to resemble a formal organization, the All- 
India Kashmir Committee, which was successfully lobbying three governments 
(Kashmir, India, and Britain) on an international scale. To sustain the AIKC beyond 
the aftermath o f the riots, the organizational fa?ade of the committee had to be 
solidified as soon as possible by clearly defining their intentions in writing. By 1933, 
the AIKC still had no formal constitution, no formal objectives, and no formal 
procedures for carrying out their presumed goals. Realistically, Mahmud Ahmad had 
complete control of the AIKC, much like in his own Jama‘at, although in this case it
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was for very different reasons. In these regards, there was a sense of validity to the 
Ahrari criticisms that were beginning to resonate throughout the region, which were 
quick to highlight the potential for an Ahmadi conspiracy. Many people were afraid 
that Mahmud Ahmad was exploiting the situation in Kashmir to expand Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya. The only reasonable course of action for the committee’s advocates was 
to consolidate the AIKC in a way that would formalize its legitimacy and give it 
longevity as a self-sufficient organization. In some respects, the familiar process and 
procedures involved in the act of institutionalization was Mahmud Ahmad’s 
specialty, as it was exactly what he had done with his own Jama'at following the 
split.
In May 1933 at Lahore’s Cecil Hotel, the AIKC decided to remedy the 
outstanding problems. Mahmud Ahmad resigned from his office of president, largely 
in response to the external pressure that was beginning to polarize the AIKC’s 
internal roster.76 Following what was described as a dignified ceremony, the 
committee selected Iqbal as an interim president to oversee the next election and to 
initiate the process of writing a constitution.77 During this interim period, Iqbal 
recommended that the members prohibit other Ahmadis from becoming president of 
the AIKC, due to the inherent conflict o f interest with their former president. Iqbal 
felt that any future Ahmadi president of the AIKC would only take orders from the 
khalifat al-masih™ which was a criticism that Mahmud Ahmad did not dispute. 
Mahmud Ahmad’s resignation was a problem for both sides of the AIKC’s
76 D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tartkh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, p. 643.
77 Ibid., pp. 644-662.
7S This was the sentiment expressed in Iqbal’s letter o f  resignation as interim President o f  the AIKC on 
20 June 1933. See Syed Abdul Vahid (ed.), Thoughts and  Reflections o f  Iqbal (Lahore: Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), pp. 301-303.
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ambivalent members. It was no secret that the majority of Ahmadis who were 
supporting the AIKC’s efforts in Kashmir were only involved out o f obedience to 
their khalifa. Had the AIKC revoked the membership of Ahmadis altogether, they 
would essentially have to recreate a new organization once again, which was 
something that they had failed to do for the twenty years prior to 1931. Categorically 
rejecting all Ahmadis from participating in the AIKC was too harsh a measure that 
was unnecessary at that time. Not only would this adversely affect the AIKC’s 
source of Ahmadi funding, but it would also diminish their international pool of 
Ahmadi labourers.
Spencer Lavan and Dost Muhammad Shahid provide differing accounts of 
Mahmud Ahmad’s resignation from the AIKC.79 Spencer Lavan focused more on the 
external pressure that influenced the resignation, whereas Dost Muhammad Shahid 
was more concerned with positively preserving Mahmud Ahmad’s legacy. It is 
unlikely that the tension within the AIKC was unbearable, since the committee never 
revoked Mahmud Ahmad’s membership or refused Ahmadis from participating in the 
organization following his resignation. However, there was certainly a growing fear 
that the khalifat al-masih was using the AIKC to further the membership of his 
Jama‘at. Perhaps the internal situation would have become worse if Mahmud Ahmad 
had continued in his role as president for a few more years, but at this point, there still 
seems to have been a cordial understanding between the members of the committee. 
Iqbal never personally attacked Mahmud Ahmad or any other Ahmadi, despite his
79 See Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i A hm adiyya, V ol. 5, pp. 641-644, in contrast to Spencer 
Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovem ent, pp. 154-156.
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public acknowledgments of their theological differences.80 The committee continued 
to function for some time with the same Ahmadi membership, which included 
Mahmud Ahmad as a regular member instead of president.
Appreciating and understanding Mahmud Ahmad’s resignation is an important 
part of establishing a context for Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s later involvement in the 
conflict in Kashmir. It may be possible to reconcile the conflicting accounts of 
Mahmud Ahmad’s resignation with a more moderate reading of the events. Mahmud 
Ahmad must have been aware that people inside and outside the AIKC had problems 
with his approach. Mahmud Ahmad never denied his high hopes for the Muslims of 
Kashmir whenever he was questioned about proselytization,81 even though he 
typically avoided the issue. Mahmud Ahmad’s explanations depicted an image of 
Kashmir’s Muslims embracing Ahmadiyyat after seeing the tremendous efforts, 
which individual Ahmadis had made in the way of Islam, but this conflicted with the 
views of the remaining non-Ahmadi supporters of AIKC. Moreover, Mahmud 
Ahmad’s acute awareness of the situation suggests that he did not want to allow a rift 
to form within the AIKC, which would damage his credibility as a leader and 
potentially taint the Jama‘at’s ongoing efforts in Kashmir. Mahmud Ahmad knew 
that his Jama‘at would follow him, regardless of outside opinion, but it was not 
prudent for him to cut all ties with the AIKC. Once again, labour and funding had 
never been a problem for Mahmud Ahmad, but he needed the recognition of his
80 Syed Abdul Vahid (ed.), Thoughts an d  Reflections o f  Iqbal, pp. 304-305. For a conflicting view  
from Ahmadis, see the article called, ‘Dr. Muhammad Iqbal’s Bitter Attack on the Ahmadiyya 
Community5 in Review  o f  Religions (June 1935) V ol. 34, No. 6, pp. 201-213.
81 See Sheikh Abdullah, Flam es o f  the Chinar, pp. 32-33, in which Shaykh ‘Abdullah described the 
instance when he confronted Mahmud Ahmad about his intentions for propagating Ahmadi Islam in 
Kashmir.
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fellow Muslims as well. Likewise, the non-Ahmadi members of the AIKC benefited 
from the Ahmadi funding and infrastructure that intrinsically accompanied Mahmud 
Ahmad’s membership. When the initial meeting of the AIKC took place in Shimla 
promptly following the riots, no one envisioned that the AIKC would eventually 
become a permanent organization. As the temporary need arising from the 
circumstances developed into an ongoing crisis in Kashmir, the AIKC needed to take 
steps towards gaining long-term access to Ahmadi resources, which was impossible 
for several reasons. Firstly, Mahmud Ahmad would never allow his disciples to serve 
another organization without his direct involvement or his express consent. Second 
and more importantly, too many members of the unskilled Ahmadi workforce were 
only participating in the AIKC because of Mahmud Ahmad’s explicit instructions for 
them to do so. Although many Ahmadis most likely had genuine concerns for 
Kashmir’s Muslim population, their deep political involvement in the crisis was 
largely the result of other influences. Mahmud Ahmad needed an active leadership 
role in the AIKC to keep his disciples motivated and to keep them interested in 
participating in the conflict, because if he left the organization altogether, most of his 
Jama‘at would leave with him.
It appears that the Ahmadi withdrawal from the AIKC (and the AIKC’s 
subsequent manifestations under similar names) took a period of several years to 
become final. Periodically, there were a few half-hearted attempts to keep both 
factions of the AIKC working together on the Kashmiri front, but eventually both 
sides followed pursuit of their own interests. Prior to his death, when Iqbal was being 
harassed by the opposition parties regarding his involvement with Jama‘at-i
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Ahmadiyya, he explained his theological objections to the movement in writing, 
Iqbal issued a number of criticisms in response to public demand, but he did not make 
baseless allegations about the Jama4at or enter into polemic slandering.82 Dost 
Muhammad Shahid suggests that Iqbal’s critique of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was an 
attempt at seeking political gain, rather than an expression of his frustrations or his 
dissatisfaction with Mahmud Ahmad’s role in the AIKC.83 However, Iqbal’s 
criticisms never vilified Mahmud Ahmad or maligned the members of Jama'at-i 
Ahmadiyya. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s resignation and his subsequent break with the 
AIKC did not prevent him from continuing his Jama'at’s involvement in Kashmir. 
We will see below how this involvement in the Kashmir crisis developed overtime.
4.6 -  Partition and Kashmir
With the presidency of the AIKC behind him, Mahmud Ahmad continued his 
campaign in Kashmir as the head of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, which was a temporary 
transformation of his image to that of a less political khalifa. Although he attempted 
to preserve some affiliation with the AIKC, the relationship proved to be impossible. 
The support from Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya itself was enough to provide Mahmud 
Ahmad with a platform to continue working towards Kashmir’s independence 
without the help of the AIKC’s more distinguished members. After various phases 
under different names, the AIKC settled back into the same role it had prior to the 
riots, as an ineffective body of well-known Muslims without any real power as an
82 Syed Abdul Vahid (ed.), Thoughts an d  R eflections o f  Iqbal, pp. 304-305.
83 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, pp. 642-644, 651-654.
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organization. By 1939 Shaykh ‘Abdullah had shifted his discourse away from the
sharp communal distinctions that highlighted religious differences, and more towards
an inclusive Kashmiri nationalist movement, which was illustrated by the name
change of his All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference to the All Jammu and
Kashmir National Conference. Shaykh ‘Abdullah's new platform incorporated
Hindus and Sikhs, in addition to Muslims, as the victims of an irresponsible Dogra
government’s negligence towards its people, which marked an entirely new approach
♦ »to Kashmiri politics and Kashmiri identity.
The political situation drastically changed when Britain announced the 
conditions for India’s partition, in which Princely States like Jammu and Kashmir 
would not necessarily fall into the boundaries of either India or Pakistan, but rather 
could remain under independent rule. Shaykh ‘Abdullah responded by launching the 
Quit Kashmir Movement {Kashmir Chhor-do), which denounced 100 years of 
unwelcome Dogra rule in Jammu and Kashmir since the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846. 
The Quit Kashmir Movement demanded that the Maharaja leave Kashmir 
immediately and allow the people to set up whichever form of government they 
desired. One year later in 1947 when the partition had been finalized, local Kashmiri 
factions began an insurgency to reclaim the state from Dogra rule. Shortly thereafter, 
Muslims from the neighbouring frontier regions and Afghanistan began pouring in to 
the state to assist with the removal of the Maharaja, The Darbar acceded to India, as 
many Muslims had feared, and asked for Indian troops to intervene and quell the 
insurrection. When India’s military encroached the Kashmiri border with armoured
84 Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, M uslim Subjects , p. 275.
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vehicles and attacked Kashmiri guerrillas, Pakistan sent its troops to counter them, 
and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 (First Kashmir War) erupted.
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was tangled in the web that accompanied partition, 
similar to the rest of the Muslim population whose homes fell on the Indian side of 
the border. Jama'at-i Ahmad iyya’s theological worldview prevented them from 
abandoning Qadian, since Ghulam Ahmad’s divine revelation had ordained it as a 
sacred land for his followers, which he described in his al-Wasiyyat,85 Mahmud 
Ahmad initially instructed the members of the Jama4 at to stay in Qadian following the 
partition while he himself went to Pakistan to make further arrangements, but when 
the conditions of the surrounding areas became too dangerous, he sent large trucks 
across the border to collect his disciples.86 Mahmud Ahmad instructed 313 Ahmadis 
to stay in India as the defenders of Qadian, which he likened to the 313 companions 
of the Prophet who participated in the Battle of Badr. He gave them the title 
Darveshan-i Qadiyan (the dervishes o f Qadian), while the remaining members o f the 
Jama‘at went to Pakistan to seek out new prospects for the future. The majority of 
Muslims from the Punjab, including Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, initially went to Lahore 
as refugees. By the summer of 1948, Mahmud Ahmad had secured a permanent 
location for his disciples on the west bank o f the Chenab River opposite the village of 
Chiniot. The Jama4at purchased the empty plot of land from the Pakistani
85 See the discussion on the significance associated with Qadian in the section 3.3, ‘al-W asiyya t’ in 
chapter 3 above. See also Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, al-Wasiyycit, in Riiham K haza 'in, V ol. 20, pp. 299- 
332.
86IOR L/PJ/7/12415 in a letter (13 Novem ber 1947).
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government and founded a new village called Rabwah, in reference to the hillside 
described in the Qur’an (23:50) where God gave Jesus and Mary refuge.87
Mahmud Ahmad’s professional network and his personal connections did not 
disappear with the formation of Pakistan in 1947. For example, Sir Zafrulla Khan 
held a senior position in the new administration as the country’s first Foreign 
Minister, and he remained in the office for seven years (1947-1954) under 
Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah’s successors. In addition, there were a few Ahmadis serving 
as highly decorated generals in the Pakistani army, who maintained regular contact 
with their khalifat al-masTh. Zafrulla Khan had been directly involved in the 
diplomatic effort, which accompanied the military conflict in Kashmir by leading 
Pakistan’s first delegation to the United Nations.
A valuable collection of interviews with Zafrulla Khan details his recollection 
of the events at the UN.88 According to Zafrulla Khan, India had taken the Kashmir 
case to the UN Security Council in early January 1948. Following the first meeting in 
New York, both India and Pakistan agreed that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir 
should be determined directly by the people through ‘a free and impartial plebiscite to 
be held under the auspices o f the United Nations.’89 The Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, Phillip Noel Baker, had personally come to New York as 
the British representative to the UN Security Council and worked diligently to find a 
swift and reasonable solution, which entailed an immediate ceasefire and a plebiscite
87 See (23:50) in M .A.S. Abdel Haleem  (trans.), The Ottr'an, p. 217, which reads, ‘W e made the son o f  
Mary and his mother a sign; We gave them shelter on a peaceful hillside with flow ing water.’ See also 
Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, p. 39.
88 See Wayne W ilcox and A islie  T. Embree (interviewers), The Rem iniscences o f  S ir M uham m ad  
Zafrulla Khan.
89 Ibid., p. 170.
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under fair and impartial conditions. Prime Minister Clement Attlee intervened from 
London by sending a ‘disastrous telegram’ that redirected British interests and 
disrupted Baker’s progress.90 Prime Minister Attlee had independently received 
threats from India that the conditions for the plebiscite in Kashmir would ‘push India 
into the arms o f the USSR.’91 This was a problem within the newly developed cold 
war context of the conflict. The Security Council resolution of 6 February 1948 had 
six sponsoring members who were about to vote on the terms when India withdrew
92from the talks for further consultation.
When the Security Council reconvened on 26 April 1948 it adopted a much 
weaker resolution. The following week, Pakistan’s Commander-in-Chief, the British 
General Sir Douglas Gracey, received intelligence reports that India was preparing to 
launch a military offensive in Kashmir, which contradicted the Security Council 
resolution. In response, Pakistan deployed its troops in early May to counter India’s 
anticipated offensive.93 Another Commission was set up to oversee the 
implementation of the first resolutions and to take action to stop the fighting. 
According to Zafrulla Khan, the Commission began working on potential solutions, 
which were never solely rejected by Pakistan, until an agreement was reached at the 
end of December 1948. A ceasefire went into effect on 1 January, even though the 
resolution was dated a few days later, on the 5 January 1949.94 The Commission 
reconvened in an attempt to determine a Truce Agreement, whose first condition
90 Ibid., p. 171.
9' Ibid-
92 Ibid., pp. 170-172, has the full discussion and breakdown o f  the first U N  Security Council 
resolution.
93 Ibid., pp. 172-174.
94 Ibid., p. 175.
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stipulated that all tribal insurgents who had come to Azad Kashmir with the intention 
to fight must leave immediately. Shortly after the ceasefire, the Commission certified 
that this condition had been met. The second condition stipulated the complete 
withdrawal of Pakistani troops and a withdrawal of the majority of Indian troops, so 
that a UN plebiscite administrator could carry out the final duties in relation to voting 
procedures. The process froze at this stage and the Truce Agreement was never 
settled. The Commission disbanded and an official representative was appointed in 
its place to carry out the remaining process of demilitarization.95
The first representative to be appointed, in April 1950, was Sir Owen Dixon, an 
Australian High Court Judge who later became Chief Justice. After multiple failed 
attempts at finding an agreement and several trips between Delhi and Karachi, Sir 
Owen Dixon offered a new suggestion in which ‘certain areas of the State contiguous 
to India which had a clear non-Muslim majority accedfed] to India and the Azad 
Kashmir territory with its solid Muslim population acced[ed] to Pakistan, leaving the 
future of the rest of the State, including the Valley, to be determined by Plebiscite.’96 
The religious demographics of the Kashmir valley indicated that 93.6 percent of the 
population were Muslim while 4 percent were Hindu.97 Although Liaquat ‘Ali Khan 
reluctantly accepted this proposal, to Dixon’s surprise, Jawaharlal Nehru rejected it. 
According to Zafrulla Khan, the proposal fell through when Dixon refused, amongst 
other things, to declare Pakistan as the aggressor in the conflict, because he claimed 
that he was not authorized to do so by the Security Council. Dixon’s successor was
95 Ibid., p. 176.
95 Ibid., p. 177.
97 See Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects, p. 37, where she provides a lucid breakdown o f  
castes and social classes in her section, ‘The Social Structure o f  Kashmir’. She takes these specific  
numbers from the Census o f  India, Jammu and Kashmir, 1941.
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the American Senator, Frank Graham, who continued to try to find an agreeable 
solution for demilitarization. Meanwhile, by 1951, India had set up a Constituent 
Assembly in Kashmir to begin the process of framing a new Kashmiri constitution as 
well as settling the problem of accession. However, the Security Council had 
previously clarified that any resolution made by Kashmir’s new Constituent 
Assembly would not absolve India of its obligations that resulted from the previous 
UN Security Council resolutions.98 India created the Constituent Assembly and 
named Shaykh ‘Abdullah the Prime Minister in exchange for cooperation on the issue 
of accession to India. Although Shaykh ‘Abdullah was prepared to acknowledge the 
current position of Kashmir’s status under the Indian dominion, he presumed that 
Kashmir would be autonomous while working towards a plebiscite that could mediate 
an option for independence.99 This agenda was unacceptable to the Indian 
government, so Shaykh ‘Abdullah was arrested in 1953 under fraudulent charges and 
spent most of the next 11 years in prison. When he was finally released in 1964, he 
remained in police custody for several years as hearings took place and his case went 
to trial. Shaykh ‘Abdullah had already developed a positive reputation long before 
the partition by habitually going to prison for the Kashmiri cause, but this extended 
period in prison solidified his reputation as the Sher-i Kashmir, Kashmir’s premier 
freedom fighter.
98 Wayne W ilcox and A islie  T. Embree (interviewers), The Reminiscences o f  Sir M uham m ad ZqfruUa 
Khan, pp. 178-179.
99 Ibid., pp. 180-181,
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4.7 -  Mirza Bashir ai-Din Mahmud Ahmad’s Continued Jihad in
Kashmir
While Sir Zafrulla Khan was assiduously attending to a diplomatic resolution of 
the conflict in Kashmir, Mahmud Ahmad was exploring alternative options. Soon 
after his arrival in Lahore in 1947 Mahmud Ahmad called a council (shura) o f his top 
advisers and informed them that the promised messiah’s era for suspending violent 
jihad (yaz'a al-harb) was coming to an end and that the members of the Jama4at 
should start preparing for a violent jihad (jihad hi'l-sayf)}m Immediately following 
the Pakistani Army’s intelligence reports o f an impending Indian offensive towards 
the end of May 1948, Mahmud Ahmad arranged for the establishment of his own 
Ahmadi militia for deployment in Kashmir. In June 1948, the Furqan Battalion (also 
known as the Furqan Force) came into being and set up a camp on the Kashmiri 
border with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner o f Sialkot. The first unit 
primarily consisted of 40 to 50 highly proficient ex-military officers under the 
command of retired Colonel Sardar Muhammad Hayat Qaysrani. They suffered 
minor losses in some scuffles and air raids from the Indian Army. Shortly thereafter, 
a more adequate force was set up under the administrative leadership o f Mahmud 
Ahmad’s son and future successor, Mirza Nasir Ahmad (khalifat al-masih III), whose
100 D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, V ol. 5, p. 699; see also IOR L/PJ/7/12415 in a  letter  
to the Under Secretary o f  State, C olonial Office (3 October 1947), which notes that there were reports 
in the press o f  large amounts o f  illegal weapons and ammunition that were being stockpiled in Qadian. 
Although the letter notes that these charges are probably baseless, it cites an article from the Hindustan  
Times (18 September 1947) as a reference.
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purpose was to offer permanent support to the Pakistani Army. Dost Muhammad 
Shahid split the members of the Furqan Battalion into four categories:101
1) Elite officers from the Pakistani Army -  either retired officers or active 
officers who were forced to take some type of temporary leave from 
military service with a reduction in pay before being eligible to serve in the 
Furqan Battalion
2) Employees of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya -  such as missionaries and students 
who were training to become missionaries, totalling approximately 125 
altogether
3) Unpaid volunteers with military or police training -  lower ranking officers 
who may have actively been involved in military or police service but 
received no financial compensation, unlike the first two groups
4) Unpaid volunteers with no military or police training -  average Ahmadis 
who volunteered with no prior commitment or obligation to the military and 
no financial dependence on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, totalling approximately 
3000
Members of the Furqan Battalion received minimal training through the 
summer of 1948 before they were armed and deployed on the Kashmiri front in 
September as a volunteer battalion ‘under Commander MALF’.102 Commander-in- 
Chief Sir Douglas Gracey wrote a glowing letter of recognition that shows his 
appreciation for the battalion’s services:
Your B[attalio]n was composed entirely of volunteers who came from 
all walks of life, young peasants, students, teachers, men in business; 
they were all embued [sic] with the spirit of service for Pakistan; you 
accepted no remuneration, and no publicity for the self sacrifice for 
which you all volunteered... In Kashmir you were allotted an 
important sector, and very soon you justified the reliance placed on 
you and you nobly acquitted yourself in battle against heavy enemy 
ground and air attacks, without losing a single inch of ground.
101 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i A hm adiyya, V ol. 5, pp. 699-703.
102 Ibid., p. 705.
103 See Ibid., in which there is a quoted reproduction o f  the letter as well as a photocopy o f  the original 
letter by General Gracey, which appears as a picture insert between pages 710 and 711. There are also 
various other pictures o f  the Furqan Battalion in the same location.
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Commander-in-Chief Sir Douglas Gracey disbanded the Furqan Battalion on 17 
June 1950 after almost exactly two years of service that extended well beyond the 
ceasefire agreement of January 1949. From the Ahmadi perspective, these soldiers 
are remembered as mujdhidun and those who died in service are believed to possess 
the highest level of martyrdom. I was fortunate to speak to a few of the ageing 
members of the Furqan Battalion who currently reside in London. They speak of 
their experiences with nobility and a sense of pride, and other Ahmadis who are 
aware of their contributions treat them with great respect at the mosques.
Aside from Mahmud Ahmad’s general political involvement in Kashmir, the 
case o f the Ahmadi militia, the Furqan Battalion, raises a number o f theological 
questions that must be addressed. Long before the partition of India, Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad had created a stir in legalist circles by conclusively condemning violent jihad 
against the British Raj.104 Although for centuries Islamic scholars have debated the 
various interpretations and specific cases for jihad, Ghulam Ahmad’s opinion was 
more contentious because he appeared to abolish violent jihad forever.105 Unlike 
some of Ghulam Ahmad’s other disputed claims, like his claim of prophethood, he 
expressed his justifications for condemning violent jihad straightforwardly in clear 
and unambiguous language. Ghulam Ahmad’s condemnation of violent jihad is a 
recurring theme in Ahmadi literature that underlies a great deal of his writing. One of 
the more concise examples of his view on jihad was a falwd, which was written as a
104 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Governm ent AngrezI A w r Jihad, in RuhdnT Khaza 'in, Vol. 17, pp. 1 -34. 
The current view  o f  Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya is consistent with the understanding that violent Jihad is no 
longer permissible in Islam.
105 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, A rba In, in Ruhani Khaza 'in, Vol. 17, p. 443, in footnote. For a full 
analysis o f  Ghulam Ahm ad’s concept o f  jihad, see also Yohanan Friedmann, P rophecy Continuous, 
pp. 165-180.
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poem called Dim jihad  Id mumdna ‘at kd fatwe masih-i maw ‘ud Id taraf se (The 
Promised Messiah’s Legal Opinions Prohibiting War in the Name of Religion). A 
few lines from the beginning and the end of the poem have been reproduced to 
illustrate Ghulam Ahmad’s rhetoric:
Now friends, leave the idea o f jihad
Wars and fighting in the name of religion are forbidden now 
(Ab chhor-do jihad  kd ay dosto khaydl 
Din ke dye haram hay ab jang  awr qitdl)
Now the Messiah has come as the leader in religion 
All religious wars are finished now 
(Ab d-gaya masth jo  din kd imam hay 
Din ke tamdm jangoh kd ab ikhtitdm hay)
Now from the heavens descends the light of God 
To sanction war and jihad is foolish now 
(Ab dsmdh se niir-i khuda kd nuzul hay 
Ab jang  awr jihad  kdfatwa fuzul hay)
Now he who performs j ihad is an enemy of God 
Only one who rejects the Prophet maintains this belief now 
(Dushman hay vo khuda kd jo  karta hay ab jihad  
Munkir nabi kd hay jo  ye rakhtd hay e ‘tiqdd)
Oh People, why do you leave the traditions of the Prophet?
Abandon as wretched, whoever abandons these...
(Kyoh chhorte ho logo nabi Id hadis ko 
Jo chhortd hay chhor-do turn us khabis ko...)
... Just tell people that the time of the Messiah is now 
Wars and Jihad are forbidden and disgusting now 
(...Logon ko ye batd 'e ke waqt-i masih hay 
Ab jang  awr jihad  haram awr qabih hay)
I have fiilfilled my mandate now, friends
And if you still do not understand, then God will make you understand 
(on the Day of Judgement)
(Ham apnd farz dosto ab kar chuke add 
Ab bin agar na samjho to samjhaega khuda)106
106 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Tohfa G olaraw iyyo, in RuhdnT K haza 'in, Vol. 17, pp. 41, 44; the entire 
poem runs from pp. 41-44.
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In contrast to the above poem expressing Ghulam Ahmad’s formal opinion that was 
written in 1900, Mahmud Ahmad expressed his opinion in a couplet of a poem in 
1946 just prior to sending the Furqan Battalion to Kashmir:
The blessed hour for Islam’s wars has come 
Commence it I may; but only God knows its end 
(Hay sa ‘at-i sa ‘d ayi islam Idjangdh Id 
Aghaz to mayh kar dun anjam khuda jdne f07
Any fatM’d, regardless of its subject matter, must adhere to certain criteria to be 
considered valid. A specific fatw a  invariably pertains to specific conditions, in which 
a particular scholar may offer a particular opinion that is dependent on the 
circumstances of the time. Ghulam Ahmad’s/afw a on jihad notoriously caused alarm 
because of the universality o f its application. It appeared to go beyond the particular 
conditions of British rule in India and categorically to abrogate violent jihad in Islam 
forever. This was further demonstrated by Mahmud Ahmad’s extra precautions and 
sensitive treatment of the yaz ‘a al-harh and jihad  bi'I-sayf issues with his advisory 
council in Lahore, which were mentioned above.108 Permanently repealing violent 
jihad in Islam is impossible without nullifying aspects of the sharl‘a. When Ghulam 
Ahmad’s problematic opinion regarding jihad is considered alongside his ambiguous 
inferences of possessing a prophetic status, two possibilities arise: either Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad was in fact abrogating violent jihad, which thereby alters the 
immutable shan 'a  and contradicts his status as a non-law-bearing prophet, or 
everyone including Mirza Mahmud Ahmad misunderstood Ghulam Ahmad’s opinion,
107 Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, K aldm -i M ahm ud  (Amritsar: Nazarat-i Nashr-o-lsha‘at 
Qadian, 2002), p. 195, poem § 120 is listed under the heading Ta 'rTfke qdbil h a y h y a  rab tere divane. 
The footnote states that the poem  originally appeared in the (2 January 1946) issue o f  ai-Fazl.
10S Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tdrikh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 5, p. 699.
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which alternatively must have been dependent on the particular circumstances that 
arose in the world during that particular point in Islamic history. Furthermore, 
Ghulam Ahmad's rejection of violent jihad is no longer applicable since these 
particular circumstances no longer exist.
Ghulam Ahmad's contemporaries clearly interpreted his fatw a  as being 
universally applicable, which is why they condemned him as someone who was 
changing Islam rather than reviving or reforming it. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s 
comments to his advisory council in Lahore also imply that he had understood 
Ghulam Ahmad's opinion to be eternally binding, while his military actions in 
Kashmir and his poetry at the time represent a departure from this view. This raises 
the question of whether Mahmud Ahmad's decision to overturn Ghulam Ahmad’s 
ruling was a special case that was only applicable at that time in Kashmir, or if it was 
a general ruling that permanently re-legalized violent jihad in Ahmadi Islam. The 
lucid and unambiguous language o f both opinions makes it difficult to reconcile their 
contradiction. To argue that either of these opinions referred to a special case would 
be unconvincing and apologetic. At present, Ahmadis maintain that violent jihad is 
an incorrect interpretation of the ‘True’ understanding of jihad in Islam, which would 
be more appropriately described in terms o f an inner spiritual struggle. In 
maintaining such inflexible and absolutist positions, Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya could be in 
danger of undervaluing the sacrifices of the Furqan Battalion by potentially negating 
their spiritual merit or undermining the religious implications of being mujahidun and 
replacing them with the secular connotations of Pakistani soldiers.
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Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s current position on the matter acknowledges that 
Ghulam Ahmad could not abrogate jihad, yet it asserts that the situation in the world 
has sufficiently changed so that the prerequisites for violent jihad no longer exist. 
Moreover, the conditions in the world will not revert to a situation that permits 
violent jihad before the Day of Judgement. With this explanation, the Jama4at argues 
that the notion of violent jihad is inconceivable (but perhaps not impossible) to justify 
in the modern world, which is consistent with Ghulam Ahmad’s claim of preserving 
the entirety of the shar'la  without adding or subtracting from it. However, this 
argument treats the Furqan Battalion as a special case and ignores the provocative 
language of the two fatwas. This is one example in Ahmadi Islam where two 
claimants of divine charisma, masih maw ‘ud (the promised messiah) and miislih 
maw'ud  (the promised reformer), advanced conflicting truth claims that were 
supposedly eternally binding. Perhaps, the Jama4 at will one day reconcile the 
contradiction by developing a response with a more convincing explanation.
In traditional Sunni Islam, dissenting views and disagreements between 
scholars are not as serious a problem as in Ahmadi Islam. Conflicting opinions of 
scholars are reconciled through a systematized legal tradition of jurisprudence {fiqh), 
which has a methodology and principles (usul al-fiqh) to establish precedence and 
authority in the sources for interpretation. Ultimately, it is acceptable for scholars to 
disagree on a ruling within a fixed margin, given that they consistently use the 
appropriate legal methodology as defined by the tradition to arrive at their 
conclusions. Disagreement itself is permissible because a scholar’s opinion is not 
binding, and perhaps more importantly, because mainstream Sunni Muslims do not
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presuppose the divine origins of their legal rulings, since a jurist does not possess 
divine charisma. This methodology enables trends to develop over time that 
distinguish strong legal opinions from anomalies, which are based on the consensus 
of scholars throughout the broader tradition. Unlike the flexibility that allows for 
legal disagreement and legal diversity in traditional Islam, the contradictory views of 
Ghulam Ahmad and Mahmud Ahmad produce an embarrassment for Ahmadi 
theology. If Ahmadi theologians attempt to reconcile differences of opinion in the 
future, they will either have to revise their understanding of Ghulam Ahmad’s legal 
authority, or revise their understanding of the institution of khildfat-i Ahmadiyya.
4.8 -  Implications of the Kashmir Crisis on the Ahmadi Identity
Until the international conflict in Kashmir unfolded, Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya had 
avoided becoming deeply involved in politics; however, this is what makes the 
political history of modem South Asia so interesting, because it was the religious 
organizations whose leadership stepped forward to influence the development o f the 
political scene. In this sense, it is inappropriate to talk about a sharp dichotomy 
between religion and politics in South Asia at that time, because the political leaders, 
like Shaykh ‘Abdullah, were influenced by religious concerns, and religious leaders, 
like Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, were preoccupied with political problems. Accordingly, 
nationalism itself and national identity was mixed with religious identity, as reflected 
in the name ‘Pak-istan' which represents a pure and holy (pak) land for Muslims.
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Considering the high value that South Asian politics has placed on religious 
issues, addressing religious concerns has become a pragmatic part of political life in 
the subcontinent. And even though these issues may not underlie the public’s 
primary concerns, they certainly have been used to provoke broader political 
discussions.109 With this in mind, we can see that Mahmud Ahmad was as much the 
leader of a new political party, Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya, as he was amTr al-m u’mimn 
(commander of the faithful) the khalifat al-masih. As such, his contemporaries 
treated him accordingly with a sense of religious reverence fused with political 
esteem. In fact, the extensive list of invitations to the All-India Muslim Conference 
in Delhi in 1928 listed Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad amongst prominent 
Muslim leaders of the Punjab, while it listed one of his most trusted missionaries, 
Mufti Muhammad Sadiq, under the different heading of ‘Leaders of Muslim Political 
Parties’ representing of the ‘Ahmadiyya Association’.110
Mahmud Ahmad was in a unique position because he had developed an 
indispensable network of highly influential contacts, which was largely based on the 
reputation of his father. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had a spiritual orientation and his 
influence was grounded in theology, but Mahmud Ahmad used his father’s religious 
reputation and the trust of his father’s companions to achieve political objectives. 
This process was facilitated by the fact that political activism in South Asia in the 19th 
and 20th centuries demanded an intimate connection with religion, such that those
109 For example, just before the outbreak o f  riots in 1931, Maharaja Hari Singh w as immersed in a 
controversy surrounding the legality cow  slaughter for meat. The politicized debate was a major 
source o f  communal tensions between Hindus and M uslim s in the days leading up to the riots. See 
IOR R /l/I /2 0 6 4  See The Jammu an d  Kashm ir Governm ent G azette  (9 July 1931); see also Ayesha 
Jalal, S e lf  and Sovereignty, pp. 302, 353, 355; see also Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, M uslim  Subjects, pp. 
278-279.
110 K. 1C. A ziz, The A ll India M uslim  Conference 1928-1935: A D ocum entary R ecord  (Karachi: 
National Publishing House, 1972), pp. 33, 35.
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who wanted to enter into politics were expected to first disclose their religious 
affiliations. All of Mahmud Ahmad’s high profile relationships had some link to his 
father. It is easy to confuse the cultural context in which Ghulam Ahmad’s Muslim 
contemporaries read his theology with the dogmatic perceptions of his mission that 
exist today. Underneath the sharp polemics of Ahmadi Islam is an unexpectedly 
ecumenical message of religious unity from a man who claimed to be the messiah for 
all faiths. At times, the universality of Ghulam Ahmad’s message was appreciated by 
his contemporaries with spiritual leanings who were sympathetic towards inclusive 
ideologies, especially those within proximity of the Punjab. Acknowledging a 
calculated degree of tolerance towards Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians by accepting the 
divine origins of their faith, albeit with an inherent favouritism towards Islam, was an 
appealing concept. It won favour with many of South Asia’s mystically inclined 
Muslims who had an affinity for political activism or a desire to bring about civil 
reforms in their communities. For this reason, the leaders of some of Muslim India’s 
most influential movements before the partition had close ties to Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad in some way. This was not because of his controversial theology, but rather 
because of the perception of his mission in which people conceived a broader 
message o f Indian unity.
Despite the controversy, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad did have tacit support from 
ample amounts o f sympathizers, and there are several examples of prominent non- 
Ahmad i Muslims who were connected to Ghulam Ahmad that illustrate this point. 
The celebrated duo of Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali and Shawkat ‘Ali, who are 
renowned for their formative contributions to the Khilafat Movement and the Muslim
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League, had a third older brother named Zulfiqar ‘Ali Khan who was a faithful 
companion of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.111 On occasion, Maulana Shawkat ‘Ali would 
visit his brother and Mahmud Ahmad in Qadian, which made it possible for Mahmud 
Ahmad to make influential contacts without leaving his home for a more 
cosmopolitan location.112 Similarly, Iqbal's father, Shaykh Nur Muhammad, and 
brother, Shaykh ‘Ata Muhammad, were members of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. Iqbal 
himself supposedly took Ghulam Ahmad's bay ‘at in the 1890s even though he clearly 
distanced himself from Ahmadi theology towards the end of his life.113 His early 
sympathies towards the Jama‘at were strong enough for him to send his eldest son, 
Aftab Iqbal, to the Ahmadi administered Ta'lim al-Islam high school in Qadian.114 
Sir Mian Fazl-i Husain also had a long-standing relationship with Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya. In 1927, the Review* o f  Religions proudly pictured him at the newly built 
Fazl mosque on a visit to London, even though he does not appear to have an overt 
familial connection to the community.115 When Mian Fazl-i Husain’s son, N a‘im, 
passed away during his studies at Cambridge, he was buried in the Muslim cemetery 
near the mosque at Woking.116 Both the Woking mosque and cemetery were 
administered by Kliwaja Kamal al-Din, the trusted companion of Ghulam Ahmad
111 D ost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i A hm adiyya , Vol. 5, p. 311. Zulfiqar ‘Ali Khan was the elder 
brother o f  Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali and Shawkat ‘A li. The brothers are more com m only known by 
their pennantes (takhallus), Zulfiqar ‘A li G aw har  and Muhammad ‘Ali Jawhar.
112 Ibid., p. 240.
113 Maulana Hafiz Sher Muhammad, Dr. S ir M uham m ad Iqbal and the Ahm adiyya M ovem ent 
(Columbus: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha‘at Islam Lahore, 1995), pp. 8-9; see also Syed Abdul Vahid 
(ed.), Thoughts a n d  Reflections o f  Iqbal  (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 297, where Iqbal 
expresses his early optim ism  towards the Ahmadiyya m ovem ent prior to 1911; see also Spencer 
Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement, p. 172. Lavan based his information on a citation o f  Dost 
Muhammad Shahid that 1 could not find in the location where he specified.
114 Maulana Hafiz Sher Muhammad, Dr. S ir M uham m ad Iqbal and the A hm adiyya M ovem ent, p. 11.
115 R eview  o f  R eligions (October 1927) Vol. 26, H o. 10, pp. 28-29, with a picture o f  Sir Mian Fazl-i 
Husain on the inside cover.
116 Waheed Ahmad (ed.), D iary  a n d  Notes o f  M ian Fazl-i H usain , pp. 59-60; the entry is under (1 May 
1931, Friday).
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who helped to establish the Lahori branch of the Jama‘at following the Lahori- 
Qadiani split.117 Mahmud Ahmad maintained an extensive network of contacts who 
neither considered his father to be a heretic nor a messiah, which he used to his 
advantage in addition to the support from his own disciples who regarded him as their 
khalifa.
Mahmud Ahmad’s role as a leader pertained more to organizing and 
managing the reality present before him, rather than creating a new reality from 
nothing. During his tenure as khalifa, Mahmud Ahmad mastered the art of 
manipulating the Punjab press. He consistently used the international network of 
disciples that he created to publicize contemporary issues around the world with great 
ingenuity. Somehow, Mahmud Ahmad ensured that the local Punjabi press refrained 
from publishing news bulletins that detailed the whereabouts of political leaders who 
would visit him in Qadian. This enabled famous leaders to come to Qadian in privacy 
and in confidence that they would not be maliciously associated with a heretical 
sect.118 In the late 1930s, to be labelled a Qadiani by the press was equivalent to 
slander. We saw above how these allegations caused Shaykh ‘Abdullah difficulty 
Kashmir, even though he clearly benefited from Ahmadi publicity on other occasions. 
The title Sher-i Kashmir (the Lion of Kashmir) itself was supposedly coined by 
Mahmud Ahmad, who would incessantly publish sensationalized articles about 
Shaykh ‘Abdullah that referred to him as the Sher-i Kashmir. As other papers 
became acquainted with the Sher-i Kashmir title, and Shaykh ‘Abdullah’s 
contributions to the Kashmiri cause were proven over time, Sher-i Kashmir
117 See chapter 3, section 3.2 above, ‘Causes o f  the Split’; see also Humayun Ansari, 'The Infidel 
Within M uslims in B ritain since 1800  (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), p. 126.
118 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i A hm adiyya , Vol. 5, p. 438.
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eventually became synonymous with Shaykh ‘Abdullah.119 Mahmud Ahmad’s 
mastery over certain aspects of the press gave him some control over his public image 
and the image of his non-Ahmadi associations, which enabled his political 
relationships to develop more smoothly. Had his contacts been stigmatized by the 
press and treated as heretics, it could have strained Mahmud Ahmad’s professional 
relations.
There is still the lingering question of why so many influential Muslims were 
willing to work with the leader of such a controversial community. Although the 
majority of Muslims at the time considered Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya to be a valid 
representation of Islam, there was still a sense of taboo surrounding the movement. It 
is ultimately unclear why Muslim leaders tolerated close relations with Mirza 
Mahmud, but one explanation might depend on the cultural context o f the time. 
Cultural etiquettes entail that the non-Ahmadi admirers o f Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
would have regarded Mirza Mahmud Ahmad with a sense o f fondness that was purely 
based on the sentiment that they had for his father. The South Asian Sufi tradition in 
particular customarily places an inherent value on family lineages, which is analogous 
to what we see in Shi‘a Islam’s reverence for the ahl al-bayt. There are many cases 
in South Asia where it has become a tradition for the descendents of the awliya 
(saints) to inherit the religious rights of their spiritual benefactors and become the 
keepers of their burial shrines. Similarly, much of the respect and religious authority 
that was attributed to Mahmud Ahmad outside of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was 
unquestionably due to this cultural context, which was almost a right of inheritance
119 See Ibid., p. 433, where he provides citations from Maulana Zafar ‘Ali Khan’s fiercely anti-Ahmadi 
newspaper, Z am inddr, which criticized Mahmud Ahmad’s schem e to promote Shaykh ‘Abdullah by 
redundantly referring to him as the Sher-i Kashmir.
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that was based on his father’s acclaim. The majority of South Asian Muslims, 
particularly in the Punjab, who were not Ahmadi but had some familiarity with 
Ghulam Ahmad, his teachings, or his followers, yet still refused to label him a kafir 
(nonbeliever), most likely would have regarded him as some type o f village wall 
(saint) instead. Even if they associated his reputation with some sense o f controversy, 
those who did not consider him a kafir would simply presume that he was the local 
bnzurg (sage) o f Qadian. The same is true of the people who knew nothing about 
Ghulam Ahmad but only saw Mahmud Ahmad as the head of a major religious 
movement. Cultural intuition in Muslim rural Punjab entailed that whoever he was, 
Mahmud Ahmad was important.
This point is essential to understanding Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s image in the 
eyes of his non-Ahmadi contemporaries. The magnitude of Ghulam Ahmad’s claims 
and their theological consequences make it implausible for non-Ahmadis to have 
been able to reconcile other positions between the two extremes, kafir or w ait Only a 
small group of scholars were willing to engage with the subtleties of Ghulam 
Ahmad’s claims or deal with the theological complexities of their repercussions. The 
presumed hypothetical distinctions between the spiritual levels o f the various 
unnamed messengers of God in comparison to the prophets Muhammad and Jesus, 
with reference to the advent of the imam mahcR, was not a pressing question in the 
early twentieth century. Mainstream Muslims in India simply did not care enough 
about speculative religious philosophy to enter into such high-level debates that were 
otherwise unessential to daily Islamic practice. Therefore, those people with minimal 
exposure to Ghulam Ahmad or his followers saw an indistinguishable difference
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between Ahmadi religious practices and the religious practices of other Muslims.
However, the aura o f controversy surrounding Ghulam Ahmad’s claims was enough
to make the justifications that he was an ordinary Muslim unrealistic. As a result,
Ghulam Ahmad’s image became polarized into two extremes, either a fraudulent
deluded kafir or a pious yet misunderstood wall. For most unassuming Muslims, this
was an easy choice to make, because it is far too dangerous to mistakenly call
someone a kafir in traditional Islam. The only alternative was to tolerate Ghulam
120Ahmad’s notoriety and accept Mahmud Ahmad as his son and legitimate heir.
Most respectable non-Ahmadi Muslims treated Mahmud Ahmad as the pious 
leader of the Ahmadiyya community in a gesture of good faith. Their initial 
inclinations were often validated by their personal contact with Mahmud Ahmad, 
which enabled them to observe his genuine Islamic behaviour, his sincere concern for 
the wellbeing of the umma, and his resolute determination to follow through with his 
charismatic convictions. It is likely that many of Mahmud Ahmad’s colleagues, like 
Shaykh ‘Abdullah, never knew the details of Ahmadi theology, even after several 
years of a political partnership. Mahmud Ahmad’s lineage made him a legitimate 
Muslim leader in the eyes of his contemporaries in spite of the controversy 
surrounding his movement.
It was the result of these underlying associations and etiquettes that justified 
his authority, rather than a rationalization of the theological arguments regarding
!2° There were also several influential M uslims, like Maulana Zafar ‘Ali Khan, w ho led virulent 
campaigns against Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya from the beginning. Aside from his editorials in the 
Zaim ndar, Zafar ‘A li Khan wrote anti-Ahmadi poetry as well. See Zafar ‘A li Khan, Bciharistan 
(Lahore: Urdu Academ y Punjab, 1937), pp. 543-578 in the section called ‘O adiyam  KhurafaC  
(Qadiani Nonsense).
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Ghulam Ahmad or his ‘illustrious son’ presented by Ahmadis today.121 This cultural 
context, and not a logical analysis o f his father’s religious claims, won Mahmud 
Ahmad favour with his non-Ahmadi admirers. Correspondingly, his appeal as the 
head o f a large Muslim Jama‘at created a favourable impression amongst an inner 
circle of political activists in pre-partition India. In some cases, this was reinforced 
by vague perceptions of an underlying theology with Islamic themes that encouraged 
religious unity. Mahmud Ahmad was still the leader of one of the Punjab’s premier 
self-sufficient religious communities that was superficially urging Muslims towards 
unity. In virtue o f his father’s reputation, Mahmud Ahmad inherently had 
extraordinary potential on the political scene in India from his birth.
There was a mutual relationship between Mahmud Ahmad and his political 
colleagues who were benefitting as much from the khalifa as he was benefiting from 
them. Both sides were trying to create the external appearance of Muslim unity in 
colonial India, even though it may have been for different reasons. Mirza Mahmud 
gained new access to a political platform with participation for his movement, which 
he used to disseminate his religious ideology and attract even more activists whose 
motivations may still have been largely political. Paradoxically, Mahmud Ahmad’s 
theological interpretations were ultimately what drove them away. Mahmud Ahmad 
was in a good position for political advancement because many of his father’s 
sympathizers had significant roles and were directly involved in key positions o f the 
Muslim leadership of the pre-partition independence movement. In addition, Ghulam 
Ahmad’s broader message of Islamic unity was perceived as a politically empowering 
idea. Ironically, Mahmud Ahmad’s interpretation of the problem of takfir (calling
I2! See chapter 1, section 1.3 above, ‘Transition from Scholar to Prophet’.
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someone a nonbeliever) and his corresponding exaggeration of his father’s 
significance in the Islamic tradition isolated him (and eventually Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya) from the sympathies of the Muslim mainstream, who had been looking
199for a message of Pan-Islamic unity rather than obstinate sectarianism.
Although Mahmud Ahmad’s attitude was far more compromising towards 
other political viewpoints and other politicians than it was towards other 
interpretations of Islam, we must recognize his role as an influential political leader 
nearing the end of British colonial India. From a political perspective, Mirza 
Mahmud Ahmad’s leadership and vision was noteworthy, considering that few people 
had the capacity or resources to follow through with such grand schemes. His 
political contributions were meaningful to Muslims even though his reputation has 
been tarnished by his questionable theology. From a religious perspective however, 
Mahmud Ahmad was not his father. There was a significant departure in Ghulam 
Ahmad’s spiritual worldview that Mahmud Ahmad not only expressed but also 
emphasized. He lacked the theological insights, the esoteric abstractions, and the 
overall creativity that was present in his father’s spiritual conceptualizations. Mirza 
Mahmud Ahmad’s narrow view of Islam and his simplistic reduction o f his father’s 
prophethood led to reckless fatwas of knfr whose implications undermined the very 
idea of Muslim unity. While in contrast, he used wide interpretations of the concept 
of revelation to reinforce his own charismatic authority'.
A conflict of interest was developing between Mahmud Ahmad and his 
political companions. Mahmud Ahmad’s colleagues did not want or need another 
visionary politician, since there was an abundance of candidates who were willing to
122 See chapter 3, section 3.2, for more on the iakftr issue in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya.
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satisfy that role. Instead, they wanted to create the external impression of Muslim 
unity by inspiring the umma to come together for the greater good of their shared 
nation. Ghulam Ahmad’s underlying message had the potential of offering this image 
under the leadership of a single mahdi who had come, as mahdis always do, to unite 
the umma against oppressive unjust rulers. India’s political elite cooperated with 
Mahmud Ahmad and his community in hope of Muslim unity until the brash 
deviations in his theological worldview were exposed, at which point they abandoned 
him by removing him from the limelight. That Mahmud Ahmad’s sectarian outlook 
sanctioned takfir and encouraged further divisions in Islam was problematic for this 
type of politics during that era, when opposing a particular party could be perceived 
as opposing Islam.
This was a difficult situation for Mahmud Ahmad because it forced 
community leaders like Iqbal and Shaykh ‘Abdullah to state their official positions in 
regards to Ahmadi Islam. Naturally, Mahmud Ahmad’s non-Ahmadi relations were 
not members o f his Jama‘at for a reason, which is not to say that they hated Ahmadis, 
because they were clearly willing to interact with them socially, politically, and 
religiously. Nonetheless, all of these associates ultimately disagreed with the Ahmadi 
interpretation of Islam on some level, which was often reduced to the problem of 
takfir that resulted from Mahmud Ahmad’s presentation of his father’s prophethood. 
Although Mahmud Ahmad’s contacts still maintained their relations with him, they 
had to publicly renounce Ahmadi Islam and denounce the Ahmadi practice of takfir. 
Interestingly, the issue of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood did not dominate criticisms 
of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya until much later, which we will discuss below. The process
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of dissociating from Mahmud Ahmad and Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was focused more on 
a public display of alienation rather than breaking private contacts with individual 
Ahmadis. Iqbal, Fazl-i Husain, Muhammad cAli, Shawkat ‘Ali, and Shaykh 
‘Abdullah undoubtedly still met with, sat with, and prayed with Mahmud Ahmad as 
Muslims who shared common interests but maintained conflicting perspectives 011 
Islam, which was different from rival groups like the Ahrar who opposed Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya from the onset.123
Mahmud Ahmad could no longer represent the face of mainstream politics 
that was associated with the independence movement in any capacity whatsoever, 
except as khalifat al-masih. Although Mahmud Ahmad continued to serve as an 
active member of the AIKC for a brief period following his resignation,124 he could 
not receive the same publicity for his Jama‘at as before. Had Mahmud Ahmad left 
the AIKC abruptly, it may have raised difficult questions concerning his previous 
efforts in Jammu and Kashmir and may have damaged his reputation. It is likely that 
Mahmud Ahmad understood the implications of his actions and willingly accepted his 
new role as a follower o f Indian politics rather than a leader, which was made easier 
by the political achievements o f his more prominent disciples. As the Ahmadi 
controversy continued to erupt with more frequency in the coming years, Ahmadis 
like Zafrulla Khan still managed to attain high-level political positions including (the 
first) Foreign Minister o f Pakistan, which was followed by a successful career in the 
United Nations as the President of the General Assembly and the President of the
123 See chapter 5, section 5.3 below.
124 In contrast, see Spencer Lavan, The A hm adiyah M ovement, p. 172. Lavan suggests that Iqbal may 
have had a personal dispute with Mahmud Ahmad that led to deeper problems and a sharp break with 
the AIKC.
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International Court of Justice, Interestingly, Zafrulla Khan’s high-level positions and 
his accomplishments in international politics did not enable him to receive public 
recognition for his religious affiliations.
The Kashmir crisis served as a testing ground for political parties and for 
Muslim leaders and allowed a new leadership to emerge from Muslim South Asia 
following the partition. The continued strain of communal tensions coupled with the 
need for socio-economic reform provided the backdrop for Muslim leaders and 
organizations to prove their claims through the implementation of political policies. 
Mahmud Ahmad’s involvement in communal politics and his involvement in the 
formation of modem South Asia’s political machinery added a new political 
dimension to the Ahmadi identity. As Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya abandoned the other­
worldliness of Ghulam Ahmad’s Sufi metaphysics, they began to move away from 
the elitist circles that are affiliated with the upper classes, towards a populist approach 
that offered this-worldly gains for average Indian Muslims. With each new crisis, the 
Ahmadi identity changed little by little to appropriately accommodate each situation, 
which thereby made future changes a little easier. It is worth noting that none of the 
events discussed above have deep implications for Islamic theology, whereas all them 
had a profound impact on the political history of South Asia. Likewise, the above 
accounts are not intended to serve as a comprehensive source of history but rather as 
historical highlights o f Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s involvement in the politics o f South 
Asia. Although Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya has made a number of contributions towards 
the political development of South Asia, the focus of this study is limited to the 
influence of this involvement on the Ahmadi identity. As individual Ahmadis
218
became more accustomed to civic involvement, self-promoting publicity campaigns, 
and political activism, the process of changing their identity began to accelerate until 
it reached the point where political events in the 1970s and 1980s were no longer 
changing the Ahmadi identity as much as they were reinforcing it. In this sense, a 
great deal of the current Ahmadi identity is as much a reaction to the world around it 
as it is a response to theological concerns, but to get a more complete picture o f the 
further development of the Ahmadi identity, we must turn our attention to the outsider 
reactions of other Muslims to its presence in-the-world and to role of Ahmadi 
persecution.
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Chapter 5 
The Role of Persecution
In this chapter we will look at outsider influence on the Ahmadi identity 
through the role of Ahmadi persecution. We will see how some early cases of 
hostility towards Ahmadis shaped their perception towards non-Ahmadi Muslims. 
We will also look at how Jania‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s increased political involvement in 
the Kashmir crisis contributed to the politicization of the Ahmadi identity and 
moreover contributed to the politicization of Ahmadi persecution as it occurred. 
Soon after the partition in 1953, anti-Ahmadi disturbances led to Martial Law in the 
Punjab. Pakistan amended its constitution in 1974 to redefine Ahmadis as part of the 
non-Muslim minority. In 1984 stiffer sanctions were taken against Ahmadis which 
brought about the relocation of the movement’s headquarters to London. Finally, we 
will see how the role of this politicized persecution of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya has 
gradually influenced the reassessment of Ahmadi self-identification.
5.1 -  The Beginnings of Persecution
In recent years, the basis for the international attention surrounding Jamaeat-i 
Ahmadiyya has been for reasons other than its founder intended. The constant and 
consistent persecution of Ahmadis, primarily in South Asia, has stimulated a wave of 
humanitarian interest in the modernist messianic movement. This interest demands a 
basic overview of Ahmadi theology, which unavoidably highlights the distinctive
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features o f the movement and emphasizes the differences between Ahmadi Islam and 
the Muslim mainstream. Consequently, Ahmadis themselves have become rather 
efficient at pointing out the differences in their beliefs with the rest of Islam, and 
rather inefficient at recognizing their similarities with other Muslims. Over the past 
century, the negativity associated with Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya has developed into an 
extreme animosity, which amongst Muslims has transformed the perception of 
Ahmadis well beyond the tolerable yet taboo movement that we saw in the heyday of 
the Kashmir struggle o f the early 1930s, when Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi Muslims 
were still willing to work side by side. In many ways, the social stigmas attached to 
the Ahmadi identity no longer represent differences of opinion within a single 
religious tradition, but rather different religious traditions altogether. This treatment 
of Ahmadiyyat as other-than-Islam by non-Ahmadi Muslims has had a profound 
impact 011 how Ahmadis perceive themselves and how they view their own identity in 
relation to the identity of the Muslim mainstream. Now, Ahmadis themselves are 
beginning to detach their own tradition from its inherent Islamic context and establish 
‘Ahmadiyyaf as something altogether unique and separate from contemporary Islam. 
To get a better understanding of this process, we will look at how the transformation 
of the Ahmadi identity corresponds to the community’s persecution.
Most accounts of Ahmadi persecution centre around a historical approach, 
which establishes the chronology of specific events of persecution and aims to 
substantiate the severity o f Ahmadi persecution or the gravity o f the issues 
surrounding it. Although this approach is certainly worthy of further attention and 
scholarship, only a sketch of the history will suffice for this study. I fully
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acknowledge that the persecution of Ahmadi Muslims is a weighty problem, which 
too often pertains to matters of life and death, but this study is more concerned with 
how these cases relate to the emergence of the new Ahmadi identity, and how this 
identity is still pending a process of formalization. For this reason, there will be no 
analysis of the definition of religious persecution and no examination o f the ethical or 
legal ‘justifications’ for the numerous cases of persecution throughout the past 
century, even though they are indeed topics that are worthy of further discussion. 
Instead, we will look at how this persecution has influenced the precarious nature of 
the Ahmadi identity and significantly altered the overall theology o f the movement in 
a way comparable to the injunctions brought forth from the Ahmadi hierarchy or even 
the khalifa himself. With this in mind, we will look more at some of the potential 
causes for Ahmadi persecution, the Ahmadi responses to persecution, and the details 
of how the most intense cases of persecution have affected the Ahmadi identity.
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s controversial claims and interpretations of Islam 
have always provoked a sense of scepticism and distrust from the Sunni scholars of 
South Asia, and hence it was not long before their theological objections manifested 
themselves in a hostile and violent response. The first cases o f Ahmadi persecution 
date back to the early 1900s during Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s lifetime. The precise 
details of the earliest accounts vary considerably in some respects, even though the 
overall course of events yields the same conclusions. One Muslim scholar and 
intellectual named Sahibzada ‘Abd al-Latif of Khost had a prominent position in the 
Afghan court of the Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman.1 In 1893 ‘Abd al-Latif was sent as a
1 There are three main versions o f  the events that detail these earliest accounts o f  persecution, which  
loosely overlap: Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Tazkirat al-Shcihadatayn (Qadian: Riyaz Hind Press, 1903),
222
member of the Amir’s delegation to negotiate the border between British India and 
Afghanistan. The demarcation of the boundary resulted in the Durand line (named 
after Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and contentiously split the Pashtun tribal lands on 
each side of border. Here ‘Abd al-Latif met Chan Badshah of Peshawar, a staff 
member of the British delegation and an Ahmadi. Chan Badshah presented ‘Abd al- 
Latif with a copy of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s recently published A fn a -y i Kamalat-i 
Islam (Reflections of Islam’s Perfections), which sparked an interest in ‘Abd al- 
Latif.2
This curiosity motivated ‘Abd al-Latif to start sending some of his disciples 
and students to Qadian to investigate further, including Maulvi ‘Abd al-Rahman, 
Sayyid ‘Abd al-Sattar Shah, Maulvi ‘Abd al-Jalil, and Ahmad Nur Kabuli.3 Each 
visit must have lasted a few months which gave them the opportunity to grasp a better 
understanding of Ghulam Ahmad’s teachings. During one of these visits, Ghulam 
Ahmad had been writing some tracts condemning jihad, and he had convinced ‘Abd 
al-Rahman that violent jihad against the British was un-Islamic.4 Upon Maulvi ‘Abd 
al-Rahman’s return to Kabul, he stopped briefly in Peshawar where he met Khwaja 
Kamal al-Din, the devoted follower of Ghulam Ahmad who later co-founded the 
Lahori branch of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. ‘Abd al-Rahman’s visit with Khwaja Kamal 
al-Din only reinforced his view censuring jihad. Maulvi ‘Abd al-Rahman must have
Mirza Tahir Ahmad in his Friday Sermon (14 July 1989), and the compilation o f  accounts given by 
‘Abd al-L atif s students and family, which are described in B. A. Rafiq’s The Afghan M artyrs 
(London: Raqeem Press, 1995); see also Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: A spects o f  
Ahm adi R eligions Thought and Its M edieval B ackground  (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 
1989), pp. 26-27.
2 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, A ’ina-yi K am alat-i Islam , which makes up V ol. 5, o f  R uhdniK haza ’in.
3 This Sayyid ‘Abd al-Sattar Shah is not to be confused with the Ahmadi Doctor, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Sattar 
Shah, from Rawalpindi w hose daughter, Mariam (Umm Tahir), married Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud 
Ahmad, khalifat al-m asih  II.
4 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Tazkirat al-Shahadafayn, in Ruhdni Khaza 'in., Vol. 20, p. 48.
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already taken Ghulam Ahmad’s bay‘at by this time, because when he returned to 
Kabul he was openly preaching his Ahmadi views. The Amir had Maulvi ‘Abd al- 
Rahman imprisoned for his wilful disobedience where he died shortly thereafter from 
being strangled to death in 1901.5 It is not clear whether Maulvi ‘Abd al-Rahman’s 
death was officially an execution ordained by the state or whether he was simply 
murdered in prison. Either way, his arrest was due to his public denunciation of 
jihad, which resulted from his Ahmadi views, and he is considered to be the first 
Ahmadi martyr.
In October 1901, the Amir of Afghanistan, ‘Abd al-Rahman, died leaving the 
throne to his son Sardar Habibullah. The coronation of the new Amir Habibullah was 
described by a British engineer present at the event, and even though this account 
does not mention ‘Abd al-Latif by name, it describes how he placed the turban on the 
head of the new Amir, Habibullah, at the Juma Masjid.6 One year later in 1902 ‘Abd 
al-Latif sought Amir Habibullah’s permission to leave Afghanistan and perform the 
hajj at Mecca. The Amir honoured his request and funded the expedition for ‘Abd al- 
Latif and a small entourage o f students. For unknown reasons, the group began their 
journey travelling southeast to Lahore, presumably to fulfil some prior commitments. 
Due to the outbreak of plague at the time, restrictions had been placed on all pilgrims 
travelling through India, which prevented ‘Abd al-Latif from completing his hajj. 
Rather than returning to Kabul at once ‘Abd al-Latif decided to visit Ghulam Ahmad 
at his home in Qadian, which was within reasonable proximity of Lahore. ‘Abd al- 
Latif spent a few months in Qadian, where he spent considerable time with the
5 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
6 Frank A. Martin, Under the Absolute A m ir (London: Harper &  Brothers, 1907), pp. 132-133.
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promised messiah and his first khalifa Nur al-Din. ‘Abd al-Latif took Ghulam 
Ahmad’s bay‘at and recounted several visions and dreams during his stay. When 
they returned to Kabul, ‘Abd al-Latif announced his revised views on the death of 
Jesus and the prohibition of jihad against the British government to his colleagues and 
companions. Amir Habibullah had ‘Abd al-Latif imprisoned for his infidelity and 
ordered that the case be taken to trial. ‘Abd al-Latif remained in prison for several 
weeks while he attempted to convince others of his Ahmadi interpretations, which at 
times took the form of written debates. Refusing to desist, his views were deemed 
unacceptable and ‘Abd al-Latif was stoned to death in a public execution in July 
1903. Ghulam Ahmad declared that the ordeal was the fulfilment of one of his 
previous prophecies, and he wrote a confessional tract honouring the passion of the 
two martyrs.7 The sensitivity of Ahmadis regarding the martyrdom of Maulvi ‘Abd 
al-Rahman, and especially of Sahibzada ‘Abd al-Latif, has been largely shaped by 
Ghulam Ahmad’s grievous response and poignant retelling of the story. These two 
martyrs are undoubtedly amongst the most revered figures in Ahmadi history. 
Ghulam Ahmad argued in detail how ‘Abd al-Latif s sacrifice ‘may even surpass the 
sacrifice by Hadhrat Imam Hussain,’ who is unquestionably the quintessential martyr 
in Islamic history.8
The context of the circumstances surrounding the martyrdom of Sahibzada 
‘Abd al-Latif is uniquely interesting, primarily because o f his social standing in 
Afghan political and religious society. Although it is difficult to determine the scope
7 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Tazkirat al-Shahadatayn, in RuhanT Khaza 'in, V ol. 20, pp. 49-60, which 
contains Ghulam Ahm ad’s account o f ‘Abd a l-L atifs martyrdom, but the full booklet is from pp. 1- 
128.
8 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Badav  (8 January 1904), quoted in B. A. Rafiq, The Afghan M artyrs, p. 
33.
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of his influence as a dignitary or to appreciate his capacity as a scholar, we find 
enough relevant information from the family account to put these events into a 
broader perspective. ‘Abd al-Latif had devoted considerable time towards furthering 
his religious education, which demanded travelling to the various luminaries and 
educational institutions of India including Delhi, Lucknow, and Peshawar. He 
apparently spent significant time studying under Maulvi ‘Abd al-Hayy Lakhnawi (d. 
1886) the renowned hadith scholar of the Farangi Mahall. ‘Abd al-Hayy Lakhnawi’s 
Sufi affiliations were with the Qadiri order, even though he also had strong 
connections with leading members of the Ahl-i Hadith movement like Nawab Siddiq 
Hassan Khan of Bhopal. ‘Abd al-Hayy Lakhnawi’s affiliation with the Qadiri order 
may have been what influenced ‘Abd al-Latif to take the bay‘at o f ‘Abd al-Wahhab 
Manki after resettling in Kabul upon completing his education in India.9 ‘Abd al- 
Wahhab Manki was a prominent khalifa of the Qadiri shaykh ‘Abd al-Ghafur the 
Akhundzada of Swat.
Swat’s marginal location on the border of Afghanistan with British India 
made it a centre for political tension during the various boundary disputes that had 
been taking place over the frontier region for several decades. ‘Abd al-Ghufar’s 
khalifas, including ‘Abd al-Wahhab Manki, ‘were active in spreading the gospel of 
jihad throughout the region.’10 In actuality, Afghanistan had been militarily 
threatened by the British in the east and by the Russians in the north for the greater 
part o f the nineteenth century, from the time of the First Anglo-Afghan War
9 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
10 Senzil Nawid, ‘The State, the Cl erg)', and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan during the 19th and 
Early 20th Centuries,’ Internal] onal Journal o f  M iddle E ast Studies, Vol. 29, N o. 4, (Novem ber 1997), 
p. 593.
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beginning in 1838. And although the installation of ‘Abd al-Rahman as the Amir of 
Afghanistan was partially a direct outcome of British influence at the end of the 
Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), it did not persuade him to take a softer 
approach towards diplomacy. Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman used the idea of jihad as a 
means of forging unity amongst rival Afghan tribes against non-Muslim invaders or 
against ambitious dissenters seeking to spark an internal rebellion.11 The underlying 
threat of internal rebellion from influential religious leaders moved ‘Abd al-Rahman 
to expand his religious jurisdiction by seizing the traditional source o f income of the 
‘iilama and nationalizing the distribution of the awqaf (endowment) funds through a 
central administration.12 When the ‘ulama questioned his religious motivations or
13alleged manipulative treatment, he would torture or execute them.
Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman tried to repress the activities of the tribal clergy 
by transferring the authority to declare jihad to the state. To justify the 
usurpation, he ordered books written asserting that no one but the 
caliph, amir, or sultan was authorized to declare jihad. At the same 
time, the amir enhanced his image as a pious amir, or sultan, 
possessing religious and secular powers—the imamate and the 
amirate. Heresy, even contact with ‘infidels,’ was severely punished.14
In this respect, Maulvi ‘Abd al-Rahman and Sahibzada ‘Abd al-Latifs 
rejection of violent jihad posed a serious threat to the Amir’s religious and political 
authority at a time of uncertainty and armed hostility. The very idea of waging jihad 
against a common imperialist enemy of infidels was a major factor in binding the
11 Frank A. Martin, Under the Absolute Am ir, p. 299.
12 Senzil Naw id, ‘The State, the Clergy, and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan during the 19th and 
Early 20th Centuries,’ p. 593.
13 Frank A. Martin, Under the Absolute Am ir, pp. 269-270, and also chapter 10 on ‘Tortures and 
M ethods o f  Execution’, pp. 157-172.
14 Senzil Naw id, ‘The State, the Clergy, and British Imperial Policy in Afghanistan during the 19”' and 
Early 20th Centuries,’ p. 593.
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otherwise independent tribes o f Afghanistan into a single unified nation. Otherwise, 
the nationalistic idea o f uniting its inhabitants together under a single political 
authority as ‘Afghans’ purely for the preservation of ‘Afghanistan’ was largely a 
foreign one and was anyway unnecessary in the era before colonialization. ‘Abd al- 
Rahman and ‘Abd al-Latif were not executed purely for their heretical views, but also 
for posing a threat to the state. It is not clear that they would have undergone 
imprisonment or execution simply for being Ahmadi had this threat been absent, even 
though the formal rejection of violent jihad is considered to be an essential part of the 
Ahmadi interpretation of Islam. Both Amirs, ‘Abd al-Rahman and Habibullah, made 
examples of their opponents, and these two Ahmadis were treated as instigators of 
sedition.15
Sahibzada ‘Abd al-Latif s symbolic martyrdom set the Ahmadi standard for 
maintaining pious integrity and toleration in the face of abuse and punishment, and 
also introduced the generalization that all non-Ahmadi mullas are the enemy.16 
Although his martyrdom has become immortalized by Ahmadis, it is regrettable in 
the sense that Sahibzada ‘Abd al-Latif was one of the few members of the Jama‘at 
who had the potential to shape the community more in life than in his exemplary and 
untimely death. Although he may not have been one of the most influential scholars 
outside of his immediate circle, ‘Abd al-Latif had a respectable education under some 
of the more distinguished scholars of the subcontinent at his time. His spiritual
15 For a contrasting v iew  that argues that the Ahmadis rightfully deserved to be executed, see Sirdar 
Ikbal Ali Shah, Afghanistan o f  the Afghans (London: The Diamond Press Ltd., 1928), pp. 211-215.
16 Whereas the word ‘m ulla ’ should be an honorific term used with dignity and veneration, it has 
interestingly acquired a derogatory usage amongst most Punjabis, including Ahmadis, who use it 
exclusively in the pejorative. See the poem by khalifat al-tnasTh IV Mirza Tahir Ahmad on mullas in 
his book, K alam -i Tahir (Tilford: Islam International Publications, 2001), p. 104, 106, poem s §41 and 
§42.
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lineage consisted of taking sacred knowledge from authorized scholars, such as the 
notable hadith master 'Abd al-Hayy Lakhnawi of the Farangi Mahall, and his 
mystical training that followed his induction into the Qadiri order at the hands of the 
Shaykh ‘Abd al-Wahhab Manki is unparalleled in the restricted context of Ahmadi 
intellectuals. Virtually none of the early members of the community, including Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad,17 had such an extensive education in traditional Islam taught in the 
traditional method, with perhaps the exception of Maulvi Hakim Nur al-Din, who 
spent several years studying at the sacred mosques of Mecca and Medina where he 
was also initiated into the Naqshbandi order.18 Perhaps it was this lack of emphasis 
by early Ahmadis on the traditional conceptions of sacred Islamic knowledge and 
education that enabled such a smooth transition away from the classical Islamic 
sciences in favour o f the divine charisma bestowed upon a virtually infallible khalifa.
By the 1920s nearly ten Ahmadis had been stoned to death in Afghanistan. 
Once the precedent had been set, the association of Ahmadiyyat with heresy 
deepened. The Afghan penal code introduced in 1924-1925 stipulated being an 
Ahmadi as a capital offence.19 Meanwhile, the Jam a'at’s administration was pushing 
forward with its practices of proselytization around the world. Oddly enough, 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya faced its most bitter opposition from within the Muslim world, 
despite the fact that one of the main objectives of the promised messiah was breaking
17 The extent o f  Mirza Ghulam Ahm ad’s exposure to traditional Islamic scholarship is debatable 
despite the fact that the community contends that he was wmni (unlettered). For further discussion on 
Ghulam Ahm ad’s education and training see chapter 1 above.
18 Prior to his bciy'cit with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Nur al-Din had taken b a y ‘at with the Naqshbandi 
Shaykh, Shah ‘Abd al-Ghani, w hile studying in M ecca and Medina. He had also studied with Maulvi 
Nazir Husayn Dehlawi and a disciple o f  Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi. See ‘Abd al-Qadir, H ayydt-i Nur 
(Qadian: NizaratNashar-o-Isha‘at, 2003), pp. 54-56; for a less detailed account in English, see also 
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, H azrat M aulvi N ooruddeen Khalifatul M asih 1 (London: London M osque, 
1983?), pp. 12-13 ,24-25 .
19 See Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, pp. 28-29.
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the cross. Once again, the reasoning for this involves a rather complex explanation of 
Islamic legal injunctions for dealing with apostasy (irtidad) and infidelity (kiifr). It is 
the overall perception and presentation of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya in relation to these 
legal injunctions, which we will proceed to examine below.
5.2 -  Converting the Arabs
Ahmadis had some minimal contact with the Arab world almost from their 
very beginnings. Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad had toured the Middle East 
and performed the hajj in 1912 at age 23, two years prior to becoming the second 
khalifa. Although the Ahmadi mission in Britain had been established in 1912, 
proselytization efforts in the Arab speaking world did not materialize until the 
1920s.20 The first Ahmadi missionaries to the Middle East, Sayyid Zayn al-‘Abidin 
Waliullah Shah and Jalal al-Din Shams, were dispatched to Damascus in 1925 by the 
second khalifa where they set up their base. Around the same time, Maulvi Abu’l- 
‘Ata Allah Ditta Jalandhari was sent to Jerusalem. The missionaries were able to 
travel to some nearby cities like Haifa, Beirut, and even Cairo, as well as smaller 
locations throughout Syria and Palestine where they spread their Ahmadi mission. 
The reports given in the Review o f  Religions of that era acknowledged difficulties in 
Damascus, yet assured the readers that the mission was a success and that still ‘many 
joined the movement.’21 At some point between Mahmud Ahmad’s hajj and Jalal al- 
Din Shams’s arrival, Zayn al-‘Abidin Waliullah Shah acquired a lectureship at
20 There is a good discussion on these efforts in Ibid., pp. 24-25.
21 R eview  o f  R eligions (Novem ber 1931) V ol. 30, N o. 11, pp. 290-291, with a picture o f  M aulvi A bu’l 
‘Ata Jalandhari after the title page.
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22Sultania College, Damascus, although it is unclear what subjects he was teaching. 
This appointment suggests that the reception of Ahmadis in Damascus was not 
entirely unfavourable.
When Zayn al-‘ Abidin Waliullah Shah returned to Qadian, Jalal al-Din Shams 
was left alone in Damascus. The same account in the Review o f  Religions goes on to 
describe the opposition against Jalal al-Din Shams, including the refusal of local 
shops to serve him and the publication of cartoons in local newspapers that mocked 
the missionary. The tension appears to have escalated when ‘bigotted [sic] Mullahs’
23got involved and issued statements against Ahmadi interpretations of Islam. At the 
height of the tensions in December 1927 Jalal al-Din Shams was stabbed by a local 
fanatic, at which point the French authorities in Syria expelled him from the country 
in January 1928 for his own safety.
The British government’s records provide a fuller account o f the politics 
surrounding the missionary’s departure. Jalal al-Din Shams’s expulsion from Syria in 
1928 had a number of interesting aspects. Apparently, the British and French 
authorities in Syria had become concerned with Shams’s safety towards the end of 
1927. Although Shams was willing and eager to leave much earlier, Mirza Mahmud 
Ahmad refused to allow him to leave Damascus. It appears that Shams was expelled 
as a courtesy following his attack when local authorities saw that he could not leave 
Damascus on his own accord, and Qadian had refused to recall its missionary. In 
fact, when he left Damascus after the stabbing incident, Jalal al-Din Shams was
22 Ibid., p. 290; see also Bashir Ahmad, The Ahm adiyya Movement: British-Jewish Connections 
(Rawalpindi: Islamic Study Forum, 1994), p. 65.
23 R eview  o f  R eligions (January 1932) Vol. 31, N o. 1, p. 30, with a picture o f  Maulvi Jalal al-Din 
Shams after the title page.
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dispatched directly to Haifa rather than being permitted to return home to India. The 
French authorities felt that the only way to ensure public order and Shams’s personal 
safety was to expel him from the country. In a letter drafted by Mufti Muhammad 
Sadiq, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad protested from Qadian and demanded that Shams get 
the same rights and security granted to other missionaries in the region, such as the 
Christians. The response of the British Under-Secretary to the Government of India 
is interesting. He wrote that:
...the French authorities in ordering the expulsion of Maulvi Jalal-ud- 
din Shams was based on considerations of public order and the 
Maulvi’s own personal safety as it was felt that the activities of Maulvi 
Jalal-ud-din Shams which differed from those of other missionaries in 
Damascus in that they were a dissemination of a new religion rather 
than the ministration to adherents of established religions, were of a 
nature to provoke disturbances.24
Furthermore, a different letter from another British official reiterates the same 
sentiment, stating that:
...the missionaries of other denominations are...in a somewhat 
different position from that of the Ahmad i[s], as they are considered to 
provide for the spiritual welfare of an established community, whereas 
Jalal-ud-Din Shams was engaged in creating a new one.25
The perception o f the Ahmadi mission expressed above is insightful, bearing 
in mind that the British government officials were not in a position to determine what 
is or is not Islam. For this reason, we can presume that they must have been repeating 
the same allegations o f the Syrian ‘ulama, who did have some religious authority in
2410R  L /P .S ./l 1/263 in a le tter fro m  the Under-Secretary o f  the Governm ent o f  India, Foreign and  
P olitica l D epartm ent, under tab 4399.
25 Ibid. in a le tter a d dressed  to The Right H onourable Sir Austin Cham berlain , Foreign S ecre ta iy  (26 
Jun 1928) under tab 4399.
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this regard. Mufti Muhammad Sadiq found it necessary to point out in his letter that 
the opposition confronting Jalal al-Din Shams was based specifically on the Ahmadi 
interpretation of jihad,26 as opposed to other theological issues disputed by Ahmadis. 
It is difficult to determine how strong the opposition was in Damascus or how 
successful a couple of missionaries were at disseminating Ahmadi interpretations of 
Islam. The only hint of this emerges in a letter published by the Review o f  Religions 
nearly five years later by Muhammad Hashim Rashid, a local khatib of Damascus 
who, according to the editors of the Review o f  Religions, spearheaded the opposition 
against Jalal al-Din Shams.27 However, his letter did not take on a fanatical tone. 
Instead, his letter praised the commonalities between Ahmadis and other Muslims. 
Rashid wrote:
Members of the Ahmadiyya Community! You have no disagreement 
with the Muslims in most of their beliefs and religious practices. You 
are at one with the orthodox Muslims in fighting the false doctrines of 
the God-head of Jesus Christ and other similar polytheistic beliefs. I, 
therefore did not like the statement recorded by you in your tract made 
by a certain person to the effect that the Ulema of Islam look askance 
at the evangelistic activities of Ahmadiyya preachers. This statement 
is a lie and a libel against the Muslim Ulema. Disagreement in our 
views regarding the death of Jesus Christ cannot stand in the way of 
our presenting a united front to the preachers of false beliefs and in 
demolishing the edifice of totally wrong and erroneous doctrines. [I] 
have written these few lines to show that my unqualified and 
unreserved sympathy and support go with you in your discussions with 
the up-holders of idolatrous and polytheistic doctrines and in your 
endeavours to establish the true belief of the One-ness of God and to 
refute and to repudiate the doctrine o f the Divinity of anybody else 
beside Him. I request and hope that you would send me 15 or more 
copies of ‘ain-itz-zia that I may distribute them among Muslim
26 Ibid. in the letter from Mufti Muhammad Sadiq under tab 4399.
27 R eview  o f  R eligions (September-October 1934) Vol. 33, Nos, 9-10, pp. 402-403.
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brethern [sic] so that they may like me know of your great services in 
the cause o f Islam and recognize and appreciate them.28
Rashid’s tone is not consistent with someone advocating the murder of 
Ahmadi missionaries. Furthermore, as a local khatib in Damascus, Rashid may not 
have been a very influential scholar. His theological objections appear to be limited 
to the issue of the death of Jesus, which he was clearly willing to overlook. 
Interestingly, neither Rashid nor Mufti Muhammad Sadiq mentioned khatm al- 
mibirwwa (finality of prophethood) as a contributing factor to the Ahmadi-Sunni 
divide, with the exception of an inconclusive statement mentioned briefly by Rashid 
in the earlier part of his letter. Surprisingly, it appears that the biggest theological 
differences between Ahmadis and mainstream Muslims were centred on jihad and to 
some extent the death of Jesus. The centrality of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s 
prophethood did not play as critical a role in the justifications for Ahmadi persecution 
as it does today. Even in the foreword of his 1933 tract, The Cairo Debate, Maulvi 
Abu’l-‘Ata Jalandhari wrote that his foremost duty as an Ahmadi missionary ‘in the 
Arab Lands has been both to defend Islam against the onslaughts of Christian 
missionaries and to regenerate the true spirit of Islam among the Muslims.’29 He said 
nothing of khatm al-mibmvwa or of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s advent as the promised
28 Ibid., pp. 403-404. The italics were included in the original. The reference to ‘ 'am-uz-zia' was 
expanded earlier in the same article as ‘ ‘ain-itz-zia-Jir-rad-i- 'ala ’ Kashfil Ghcitci (the Fountain o f  Light 
in refutation o f  “a m isconception rem oved’' [ ‘ain al-ziya  f i  ra d d  'ala K ash f a l-G h itd ])I  But this 
translates as T h e  Fountain o f  Light in Refutation o f  “The Unveiling o f  the Covering”.’ it m ay have 
been a reference to som ething written about one o f  Ghulam Ahm ad’s less popular books, K a sh f al- 
Ghita  (The Unveiling o f  the Covering), which is available in Ruham K haza ’in, V ol. 14, pp. 177-226. 
However, Ghulam Ahmad also had a book called Ek G h ala tlka  Izdla, which has frequently been 
translated and publicized by the Jama'at, usually under a title similar to ‘A M isconception R em oved’. 
See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Ek G halatl ka Izdla, in Ruhdm Khaza 'in, Vol. 18, pp. 205-216; see also 
chapter 2 section 2.3 above. Ultimately, it is unclear which obscure booklet the khatib  was referring to 
in his letter.
29 A bu’l-‘Ata Jalandhari, The Cairo D ebate  (Rabwah; The Maktaba-al-Furqan, 4 th ed., 1963), p. in.
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messiah and m a h d i , which presumably should have been crucial information for 
fellow Muslims.
The attack 011 Jalal al-Din Shams must have involved other non-theological 
factors as well, but regardless of what they were, his stabbing was a serious incident 
that effectively deterred Ahmadis from proselytizing in Syria and increased their fear 
of other Muslims. Ahmadi missionaries remained confined to Haifa for the greater 
part o f the twentieth century with few exceptions. In the century following Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad’s death, Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya expanded its mission considerably, but 
not in Muslim lands, with the exception of rural parts of India, Pakistan, and more 
recently Bangladesh. The majority of Muslim countries that constitute the greater 
Middle East including Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey rejected the efforts of Ahmadi
• 30missionaries almost completely.
Perhaps the lack of urgency in spreading Ahmadi ideology to Muslim lands 
also reflects the different mentality and different priorities o f the members of the 
earlier Jama‘at who more closely identified with Islam. Furthermore, we have thus 
far completely ignored the most evident problem in this discussion. One cannot 
convert from Islam to ‘Ahmadiyyaf unless ‘Ahmadiyyaf is its own religion separate 
from Islam. Perhaps it was for this reason, as well as the early incidents of hostility 
towards Ahmadis by non-Ahmadi Muslims, that Jamakat-i Ahmadiyya relaxed its 
missionary activities in Muslim countries outside India. For whatever reason, since 
the 1930s Ahmadi missionaries have restricted their efforts almost exclusively to non- 
Muslims or the Muslims with whom they have contact much closer to home.
30 Yohanan Friedmann, P rophecy Continuous, p. 24.
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5.3 -  The Political Dimensions of Persecution
The events in Afghanistan and the Middle East distinctly influenced the 
Jama1 at leadership’s outlook towards the greater Muslim community. The violent 
hostility towards Ahmadis thwarted further missionary activities in the Muslim world 
and caused a re-evaluation of the original approach to propagating the Ahmadi 
message to other Muslims. Although the revised ideals, which now included the 
administration’s added precaution with other Muslims, filtered their way down 
through the hierarchy over the years, they had a limited impact on the Ahmadi 
identity. As alarming as the martyrdoms and the subsequent aggression may have 
been, they remain isolated cases of individual Ahmadis in conflict with their fellow 
Muslims. Even though the numerous other incidents of the violent treatment of 
Ahmadis outside the subcontinent at the time certainly contributed towards a gradual 
reassessment of the Ahmadi self-identity, they appear only to have amounted to little 
more than an added element of caution in dealing with unfamiliar Muslims. As the 
incidents increased, the precautions increased, but the general temperament of the 
members of the movement remained reasonably unchanged, in the sense that most 
Ahmadis still envisioned themselves leading normal lives as a legitimate part of the 
Muslim umma. Jama1 at-i Ahmadiyya was not isolated from its surroundings, 
however, and the attacks on Ahmadis were taking place in the broader context of 
global development and political change. If we consider this wider context, with 
respect to the above incidents o f Ahmadi persecution, we will see how outsiders’
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perceptions of Ahmadis, as well as the internal self-identity o f the movement 
gradually began to change.
By 1912, Khwaja Kamal al-Din had stationed himself in Woking, near 
London, as a barrister turned missionary. Although he represented the Lahori branch 
of the Jama‘at, his personal relations with several non-Lahori Ahmadis were still 
quite strong, and his presence in Woking facilitated an easy transition to Britain for 
Zafrulla Khan. As international tensions were rising in Europe, Muslims throughout 
the world were concerting their efforts into movements with Pan-Islamic sympathies. 
When the First World War broke out in 1914, Muslims at Khwaja Kamal al-Din’s 
Woking Mission attempted to rally support for Ottoman Turkey against popular 
opinion and against Britain, which was a bold move for an immigrant community at 
that time.31 In contrast, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad was rallying support 
for the British from Qadian, where Ahmadis were once again volunteering their 
services and support for Imperial Britain upon the firm request of their khalifa. One 
letter of appreciation from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to Mirza Mahmud 
Ahmad acknowledged the receipt of his ‘generous offer’ of 5000 rupees on behalf of 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, which was a sizable contribution in 1918.32 Such acts of 
hyper-fidelity towards the British were incomprehensible to the Muslim mainstream 
and frankly still may seem a little surprising today.33 This was at a time in India
31 Humayun Ansari, 'The Infidel Within M uslims in B ritain since 1800  (London: Hurst & Company, 
2004), p. 127.
32 Sufi ‘Abd al-Qadlr and Mirza Bashir Ahmad, The Fam ily o f  the Founder o f  the Ahm adiyya  
M ovement (Qadian: Book Depot T alif-o-lsha‘at, 1934), p. 33, and also, pp. 32-36, for som e other 
letters and notes regarding the war.
3j The secular British authorities in colonial India certainly made it possible for small dissident groups, 
like the Ahmadis and the Ism a‘ilis, to pursue their religious objectives without the fear o f  a backlash 
from the M uslim orthodoxy. The Ahmadis clearly valued this protection under the British and often 
showed their support in public. Over the years, these types o f  issues have given w ay to a slew  o f
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where the political atmosphere was such that most prudent Muslim loyalists preferred 
to remain silent on the issue rather than openly campaigning for the British against 
fellow Muslims.
Ahmadi relations with the Muslim mainstream only worsened after the war as 
the Muslim population o f South Asia occupied itself with the Khilafat Movement.34 
The Khilafat Movement was attractive to both activists and ‘idama alike, in that it 
incorporated theological and political aspirations deeply rooted in Islamic 
symbolism.35 The sentiment of the region conveyed an extraordinary confidence in 
the ability o f Pan-Islamic ideology to prevent and overcome the imminent 
partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and the dismantling of the last Sunni khilafat. 
While the subject of khilafat dominated the agenda for most of the itmma, Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya only committed partial support to the Khilafat Movement for various 
reasons. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad was keenly aware that the fantasy of a unified 
khilafat was a crucial part of his Islamic vision. The problem was that he could not 
support anyone else's right to khilafat while maintaining his own divine appointment 
as manifest through the fulfilment of his father's prophecy.36 No one besides the 
Ahmadi khalifa could have a legitimate claim to khilafat, because the Ahmadi khalifa 
was appointed by God. Had Mirza Mahmud Ahmad supported the Khilafat 
Movement, he would have provided a precedent for dealing with the challenges of
elaborate conspiracy theories regarding the inner motivations o f  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad or other leaders 
behind Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. For exam ple, see Bashir Ahmad The A hm adiyya M ovem ent: British- 
Jewish Connections (Rawalpindi: Islamic Study Forum, 1994).
34 See also M. Naeem  Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study o f  the Khilafat Movement, 
19IS-1924  (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
35 See Gail Minault, The Khilafat M ovement: Religious Symbolism and P olitica l M obilization  in India 
(N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
36 Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous: A spects o f  Ahmadi R eligious Thought an d  Its M edieval 
B ackground  (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1989), pp. 35-36.
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dissenting opinions that otherwise had no voice within the Jama‘at. This precedent 
would have opened the door to an unending debate on the authenticity of the 
charismatic authority of the Ahmadi khalifa, the jurisdiction of his rule, and the 
legitimacy of rival claims; yet on a superficial level, Mahmud Ahmad still needed to 
pose his Jama‘at in support of the Khilafat Movement to avoid looking like the only 
Muslim leader who opposed Muslim unity. The end result was a convoluted 
justification of Mahmud Ahmad’s own rule as khalifa in conjunction with a clouded 
attempt to win favour with the Muslim mainstream. In its essence, Mahmud Ahmad 
did support the idea of a single supreme khalifa who enjoyed complete and total 
sovereignty over the greater Muslim umma, but it was his contention that he himself 
was that khalifa. Mahmud Ahmad’s Islam represented God’s final message to the 
promised messiah and mahdi and could only be broken down into two subdivisions, 
Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi, where one was far superior to the other. In a half-hearted 
attempt to maintain Muslim unity, Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya officially endorsed the 
movement. Zaffulla Khan attempted to elaborate the official view:
I [Zaffulla Khan] did not take any active part in the Khilafat 
Movement myself. For one thing, I was rather young at that time; and 
for another, from the religious point of view, the Ahmadiyya 
Movement did not look upon the Turkish Sultanate as representing the 
Khilafat. Nevertheless, in one of the Khilafat Movement Conferences 
in Allahbad, an Ahmadiyya delegation, which was led by me, made it 
quite clear that we were in full support of the objectives of the 
Movement without accepting the claim or the position of the Sultan as 
spiritual head of Islam.J
37 Wayne W ilcox and A islie  T. Embree (interviewers), The Reminiscences o f  Sir M uham m ad Zafrulla  
Khan  (Maple, Canada: Oriental Publishers with permission from Columbia University, 2004), p. 8.
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A major theological contradiction was averted in favour of a minor one, which 
resulted in Mahmud Ahmad’s paradoxical support for the Khilafat Movement without 
the khilafat. As Zaffulla Khan stated above, Ahmadis officially supported the 
Khilafat Movement without supporting their khalifa, which most people interpreted 
as rejecting the movement altogether.38 Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya was seen as one of the 
few highly organized movements, if not the only one, that effectively opposed the 
grand unification of Indian Islam through the Khilafat Movement. Other prominent 
Khilafatists included Abu’l-Kalam Azad, Zafar £Ali Khan, Tnayatullah Khan 
Mashriqi (Khaksar Tahrik), Muhammad Ilyas Khandhalwi (Tablighi Jama4 at), and 
even the Aga Khan (Isma'ili). Mahmud Ahmad’s rigidly uncompromising stance 
undoubtedly left many Khilafatists distraught and bitter, especially when in 1918 
wartime celebrations in Qadian officially marked the British defeat o f Ottoman 
Turkey.39
The dissolution of the Khilafat Movement posed a serious problem for 
Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya, because it meant that the monolithic movement would 
subdivide into a number of non-Ahmadi alternatives for the Muslims of India. Given 
the political turmoil of the time, this begs the question of whether the inflexibility of 
Mahmud Ahmad’s stance led many of the ex-Khilaftists to hold some type o f grudge 
towards Ahmadis following the breach in their support for the movement, which
38 This is how Friedmann sim plified the Ahmadi position by asserting that Mirza Mahmud Ahmad just 
opposed the Khilafat M ovem ent, which is a fair stance in itself, even though it is not what M ahmud 
Ahmad would have said him self. See Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, pp. 35-36.
39 Government o f  Punjab, Report o f  the Court o f  Inquhy Constituted under Punjab A ct II o f 1954 to 
Enquire into the Punjab D isturbances o f 1953  (from here on The Munir R eport) (Lahore: 
Superintendent Government Printing, Punjab, 1954), p. 196.
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raised concerns regarding their loyalties to other Muslims and created a sense of 
apprehension towards the Jama‘at.
In the coming years, the opposition to Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya was taken to 
another level by two organizations in particular, Majlis-i Ahrar and Jama‘at-i Islami. 
Both groups were headed by ex-Khilafatists including ‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari, 
Mazhar ‘Ali Azhar, and Muhammad Da’ud Ghaznavi for the Ahrar, and Sayyid 
Abu’l-‘Ala Mawdudi for Jama‘at-i Islami. The Majlis-i Ahrar and Jama‘at-i Islami 
engaged with Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya differently from the way that others had done in 
the past, in that they did so from a political frame of reference. One observation in 
these regards is that these organizations represent Indo-Pakistani political parties as 
opposed to different schools of thought (madhhab) or sects (firqa) within Islam. And 
though both Ahrari and Jama‘at-i Islami ideologies were profoundly shaped by 
Islamic idealism, neither were sectarian movements. This is in contrast to Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya, which does claim to represent a new sect in Islam that is apolitical.
When the Kashmir riots broke out in 1931, fuelled by the Dogra governments 
unjust treatment of Muslims, Jama4 at-i Ahmadiyya responded. Mirza Mahmud 
Ahmad spearheaded the Muslim opposition as the president of the All-India Kashmir 
Committee (AIKC). As we saw in chapter four above, many Muslim leaders 
(perhaps grudgingly) came forward to offer their support to the AIKC and Mirza 
Mahmud Ahmad, but even this outward political compliance was too much for 
Majlis-i Ahrar. Despite their differing approaches to the handling o f the Kashmir 
crisis, there was a deeper element of distrust underlying the Ahrar’s non-compliance 
with the AIKC that was arguably not altogether unfounded. We saw how Muslim
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rivalries clearly hurt the Kashmiris more than they helped them, but given the context 
of the situation, we now see that these rivalries were not based on frivolous concerns 
or mere differences of opinion. However, we have yet to see how the resolution of 
these issues turned communalism into fanaticism.
Returning from his tour of London for the Round Table Conferences, Zafrulla 
Khan was elected president of the All-India Muslim League in December 1931 
months after rioting had broken out in Kashmir. Following the election, Zafrulla 
Khan hurried back to Delhi from London to accept the nomination and give his 
inaugural speech. Ahrari protesters greeted him at the station in Delhi waving black 
banners in protest.40 The demonstration did not prevent him from continuing at the 
post even though he could only do so for a few more months. By the summer of 1932 
he was forced to resign as president of the Muslim League in order to join the 
Viceroy’s Executive Council in place of Mian Fazl-i Husain who had fallen i l l41 
Zafrulla Khan’s rapid progress through the political ranks, from a Round Table 
Conference delegate, to president of the Muslim League, to member of the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council was enough to validate the rumours that the Ahrar had been 
spreading in a suspicious and increasingly paranoid environment. Given the 
instability of the time, it was reasonable for many to conclude that these honours were 
far too great for someone in his thirties to have achieved on his own without the aid 
of some sort of government conspiracy. Many began to re-evaluate the motivations 
of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya with a renewed sense of scepticism.
40 Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i A hrar, Vol. 1, (Lahore: Maktabah-i Tabassira, 1975), p. 238.
41 Wayne W ilcox and A islie  T. Embree (interviewers), The Reminiscences o f  S ir M uham m ad Zafrulla 
Khan, pp. 36-38.
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For the greater part of 1931 to 1933 both groups were preoccupied with the 
crisis that was unfolding in Kashmir.42 In addition, the Majlis-i Ahrar had to spend a 
significant amount of this time period building up its internal resources and 
establishing its internal organizational structure in order to give itself a chance at 
competing with the AIKC, the Muslim League, and Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. As the 
organization began to stabilize, the anti-Ahmadi activity could proceed to the next 
stage. In October 1934 the Ahrar decided to hold a Tabligh Conference in Qadian to 
refute false Ahmadi doctrines. In an attempt to avoid a potentially serious public 
agitation, the government of Punjab intervened, banned the conference from taking 
place in Qadian, and restricted any corresponding processions from passing through 
the village. Cleverly, the Ahrar made arrangements to move their conference to the 
grounds of the Dayanand Anglo-Vedic High School in the village o f Rajada about a 
mile away.43 Khalifat al-masih II, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, made a call for 2500 
Ahmadi volunteers from the greater Punjab region to report to Qadian for security 
duty. As the date of the conference approached, reports were made that large 
amounts of sticks and spears were being produced as weapons in Qadian in 
preparation 44 Three days prior to the conference the government of Punjab ordered 
Mahmud Ahmad to desist, unaware that he had already withdrawn his call for outside 
assistance on the previous day. The Ahrar carried on with their arrangements and the 
conference took place on 21 October 1934. Annr-i Shan 'a t (as he is fondly 
remembered by his supporters), ‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari, engaged a crowd of
42 See chapter 4 above.
4'’ Government o f  Punjab, The Munir Report, p. 12.
44 Spencer Lavan, The Ahmcidiyah M ovement: A H istory and P erspective  (Delhi: Manohar Book  
Service, 1974), p. 165.
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thousands in a five hour tirade that vilified Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya and spouted 
professions of peace that ‘alternated] with abuse and wit of a very low order.’45 The 
potential for a major agitation was quite high, even though the route o f the procession 
that followed the conference had been defined by the Punjab government in advance, 
and an additional 400 police and two superintendents were called in to Qadian as a 
precautionary measure in anticipation of mass violence 46
Bukhari was prosecuted for this speech and convicted at the 
conclusion of a sensational trial which created more interest and anti- 
Ahmadiya feelings than the speech itself. Since then every Ahrar 
speaker of note has been saying one thing or another against the 
Ahmadis, their leaders and their beliefs.47
‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari’s conference was a considerable success in terms of 
its value as an anti-Ahmadi campaign. The mere fact that thousands of people came 
out to express opposition against Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was very troubling for 
government officials. Nearly 300 manlvTs came from as far away as Deoband, though 
the vast majority of the participants came from the areas in the local vicinity 
surrounding Qadian.48 One might presume that the people who were geographically 
closest to Qadian, and therefore had the most contact and the most familiarity with 
Ahmadis, would be the most sympathetic towards their predicament. But in fact, the 
inverse was true. Those people who lived closer to the headquarters and were more 
likely to be familiar with the Jama‘at were the ones joining the opposition. Some of 
the Ahrar’s leaders themselves were also originally from within a reasonably close
45 Government o f  Punjab, The M unir R eport, p. 12.
46 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement, p. 165.
47 Government o f  Punjab, The M unir Report, p. 12. Ahmadiyya was spelt with one ‘y ’ in the original.
48 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement, p. 166.
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proximity to Qadian. Mazhar ‘Ali Azhar was from Batala, and Maulana Da’ud 
Ghaznavi was from Amritsar. Chief Secretary o f the Punjab C.C. Garbett noted that 
‘there is no doubt that many orthodox Muslims, who are ordinarily opposed to the 
Ahrars, are in sympathy with this side of their activities.’49 Garbett also noted in his 
explanation that ‘the Government often had received complaints from non-Ahmadi 
residents of Qadiyan that they had been harassed by Ahmadis.’50 Although the 
Ahrar’s political platform had many faces in the early 1930s, from British withdrawal 
to Kashmiri independence from Dogra rule, the acute sensitivity of the Ahmadi issue 
which now revolved around the dignity and stature of the Prophet Muhammad had 
struck a chord with the Punjabi Muslim mainstream.
5.4 -  The Politics of Partition and the 1953 Riots
Khalifat al-masTh II, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad, remained 
immersed in the Kashmir conflict through the remainder of the 1930s. Ahmadi 
tensions with the Ahrar remained in the background while both groups concentrated 
on other issues throughout the Second World War. By the 1940s the political focus 
was shifting again, this time towards ending the war and achieving political 
independence from Britain. As the end of the war drew near and talk of 
independence increased, India’s leaders began finalizing the various schemes that
49 This was from a L etter fro m  C.C. G arbett to  M.G. H allett as quoted in Spencer Lavan, The 
Ahm adiyah M ovem ent, p. 166.
30 Spencer Lavan, The Ahm adiyah M ovement, p. 166. Lavan spelt Qadian as ‘Qadiyan’.
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ultimately resulted in partition.51 There was no shortage o f ideas projecting the ideal 
political outcome for an independent India, most of which date back well into the 
nineteenth century. As initial ideas developed into theories and then into movements 
for governance, it was clear that there was one divide that sharply demarcated Indians 
into two camps, those of nationalism and religious separatism. The nationalist 
movements called for a single united India, whereas the religious separatist 
movements urged public opinion towards the formation of new religiously inspired 
states. As these ideas went through their respective formulations, it gradually became 
clear that India would be partitioned on religious grounds upon achieving its 
independence. The role of religion in the new states was not intended to dominate 
government policy, but rather was more of a means to determine international 
boundaries. The state of Punjab was problematic for partition advocates, because of 
the rich complexity and the heterogeneous distribution of its religious demographic.52 
Confusion and quarrelling about the population distributions stalled a forthright 
solution that could have identified an international border much earlier.
Mirza Mahmud Ahmad changed his opinion a number of times as the politics 
of partition evolved. In the very beginning, it is clear that Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
favoured an undivided India, but as partition grew nearer and the viability o f such an 
idea waned, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad found himself in a predicament. For at least 
some time shortly before the partition, Mahmud Ahmad had been considering the 
idea of establishing a separate Ahmadi state in Qadian, though he must have realized
51 See Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, M odern South Asia: History, Culture, P o litica l Economy  
(Lahore: Sang-e-M eel Publications, 1998), especially chapter 15, pp. 156-164.
52 See David Gilmartin, ‘R eligious Leadership and the Pakistan M ovem ent in the Punjab,’ M odern  
Asian Studies, V ol. 13, No. 3. (1979), pp. 485-517.
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that the idea was impractical under the current circumstances. After this, Mirza 
Mahmud Ahmad had been petitioning for the separate representation of Ahmadis in 
India with separate electorates from the non-Ahmadi Muslims. He argued that since 
Parsis had been given their own electorates, yet numbered half as much as Ahmadis, 
that Ahmadis too should be given their own electorates separate from the Muslims.53 
Moreover, the Hindu community apparently used the discrepancies in the Ahmadi 
position to further argue that Qadian should remain on the Indian side of the border 
since Ahmadis wanted separate electorates, which implied that they did not consider 
themselves Muslim.54 Justice Muhammad Munir commented on the inconsistencies 
in the Ahmadi stance:
Some of their [Ahmadi] writings from 1945 to early 1947 disclose that 
they expected to succeed to the British [as self-sovereigns in Qadian] 
but when the faint vision of Pakistan began to assume the form of a 
coming reality, they felt it to be somewhat difficult permanently to 
reconcile themselves with the idea of a new State. They must have 
found themselves on the horns of a dilemma because they could 
neither elect for India, a Hindu secular State, nor for Pakistan where 
schism was not expected to be encouraged. Some of their writings 
show that they were opposed to the Partition, and that if Partition 
came, they would strive for re-union. This was obviously due to the 
fact that uncertainty began to be felt about the fate o f Qadian, the 
home of Ahmadiyyat, about which several prophesies had been made 
by Mirza [Ghulam Ahmad] Sahib. Provisional Partition had placed 
Qadian in Pakistan, but Muslims in the district of Gurdaspur in which 
Qadian was situated were only in a majority of one per cent, and the 
Muslim population in that district was mostly concentrated in three 
towns including Qadian. Apprehensions about the final location of 
Qadian, therefore, began to be felt, and since they could obviously not 
ask for its inclusion in India, the only course left for them now was to
* r  c
fight for its inclusion in Pakistan.
53 See a!-Fazl (13 Novem ber 1946), which was quoted in Maulana Allah Wasaya, T ankh-i Khatm -i 
N ubm vwat 1974: O aw m l A ssem bly men Q adiydm  M uqaddam a, V ol. 2, (Multan: ‘Alarm Majlis 
Tahaffuz-i Khatm al-Nubuwwat, 1994), p. 162.
54 Maulana Allah Wasaya, Tdnkh-i Khatm -i N ubm vwat 1974 , Vol. 2, pp. 162-163.
55 Government o f  Punjab, The M unir R eport, pp. 196-197.
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By July 1947 when the time the Punjab Boundary Commission finally heard 
the Jam a'at’s case, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s position had changed again, and he was 
trying to have Qadian included in Pakistan.56 This has major implications for the 
current situation in Pakistan, where Ahmadis have been declared non-Muslim for 
purposes of constitutional law.57 The idea that Ahmadis initially wanted separate 
electorates from Muslims undermines their primary objection about the Pakistani 
Constitution classifying them as non-Muslims, because it means that they willingly 
entertained the idea of being counted separately from Muslims when it suited their 
interests and there was a potential to transform Qadian into an independent princely 
state.
As the idea of partition developed, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad had opposed the 
idea of Muslim majority lands going to Pakistan in favour of giving the Hindu 
majority lands to India. In this scenario he believed that the Punjab, which included 
large numbers of Sikhs and Ahmadis, would undoubtedly go to Pakistan. However, 
as it stands, the Sikhs, as non-Muslims were grouped with India, instead of as non- 
Hindus with Pakistan, which thereby forfeited large and otherwise disputable districts 
of the Punjab to India. The consequences of this decision had a major effect on 
district Gurdaspur, which contained large numbers of Sikhs and Ahmadis and most 
importantly Qadian. Nonetheless, one can not overlook the fact that it was the 
Muslims, and more specifically the Muslim League, who were making the call for
56 See Mian Muhammad Sadullah (ed.), The Partition  o f  the Punjab 1947: A C om pilation o f  Official 
Docum ents, Vol. 2, (Lahore: National Documentation Centre, 1983), pp. 244-252. In addition to 
religious concerns, Shaykh Bashir Ahmad, the Ahmadi advocate who represented the case before the 
Boundary Com m ission, interestingly placed considerable emphasis on the logistical difficulties o f  
collecting revenues in Qadian, India from disciples in Pakistan, which im plies that this was one o f  
Mahmud Ahm ad’s main concerns.
57 See section 5.6 below.
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partition, as opposed to the Congress party who only wanted independence from 
Britain but not from Islam.58 Of course, it is well known that the Hindus had a 
comfortable majority in undivided India and did not need to exclude anyone to 
maintain their democratic dominance.
To some extent, the subtleties of these controversies subdued many Muslim 
activists who backed partition with India and supported the formation o f Pakistan. 
For this reason, the majority of Muslim activists who favoured the Pakistan solution 
were apathetic towards the anti-Ahmadi polemic being propagated by the Ahrar. 
Many feared that any major controversy involving the mass excommunication of 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya from the Muslim itmma could potentially have a detrimental 
effect 011 the partitioning of the Punjab in particular. As a result, many Pakistan 
supporters were quite comfortable with diverting their attention when confronted by 
the dubious parts of Ahmadi theology. This fear of losing the entirety of the Punjab 
to India was exacerbated by the ambiguity of the actual size of Jama4 at-i Ahmadiyya, 
which was difficult to determine given the exaggerated figures that the Jama4at has 
been boastfully circulating since its inception.59 Additionally, Mahmud Ahmad’s 
continued involvement in the Kashmir crisis had been carried out rather smoothly,
58 It is interesting to note that Zafrulla Khan was representing the Muslim L eague’s position but not 
Jama‘at-i Ahm adiyya’s position before the Boundary Commission. This confirms that the Ahmadi 
position w as som ehow separate from the M uslim League’s position, which represented the Muslim  
mainstream. Considering that Zafrulla Khan was a key Ahmadi spokesperson, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad 
could easily have utilized the opportunity to preserve unity and to compromise a solution with the 
M uslim  League in order to present a unified M uslim front, but instead Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
designated a different representative to the Boundary Com m ission. For the full account o f  Zafrulla 
Khan’s arguments, see Mian Muhammad Sadullah (ed.), The Partition  o f  the Punjab 1947: A 
Com pilation o f  Official Docum ents, Vol. 2, pp. 252-538.
59 O fficial numbers on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya are not known, however the Jam a‘at still claims that the 
total Ahmadi population is around 200,000,000 worldwide. In my estimation, according to the latest 
available census figures, there are roughly 2-5 m illion Ahmadis worldwide at present, which is likely 
to be a generous estimate. For exam ple, see R eview  o f  Religions (April 2003) V ol. 98, N o. 4, pp. 4, 
25-26. On page 26, there is a helpful chart which shows the alleged figures o f  Ahmadi conversions in 
recent years.
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demonstrating that the Jama'at could sustain their subsidiaries and affiliates with 
uninterrupted finances and volunteers for an extended period of time without a major 
bureaucratic breakdown. There was enough doubt in the size o f the Ahmadi 
population and enough ambivalence towards Ahmadi theology to make political 
leaders reluctant to pursue sectarian issues that had the potential o f eroding the 
solidarity of the nmma in a time of political crisis. Minor fluctuations in the religious 
demographic could sway the Punjab in either direction. Besides, individual efforts by 
Ahmadis like Zafrulla Khan, who had demonstrated unqualified support for the 
Pakistan movement, had played an important role in raising the call for Pakistan and 
appeasing the Jama‘a fs  leaders. Nevertheless, none of this mattered once the 
partition had taken place and the division between the two countries had become 
permanent. After partition, intolerant leaders were free to excommunicate as many 
Muslims as they liked without having to deal with the recourse of a political pan- 
Islamic backlash that had all but lost its influence by 1947.
In juxtaposition to the Pakistan movement were the nationalist parties, along 
with the Majlis-i Ahrar, who wanted an independent and unified India. The 
discussion in chapter four of the conflict in Kashmir has already shown how the 
Ahrar party’s founders came together in 1931 following their fallout with Congress. 
The party exhibited individuality during the first couple of years of the Kashmir 
crisis, but this was largely a result of their opposition to the Ahmadi-inclined AIKC. 
When the AIKC disbanded in 1933 and Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad left the 
committee for good, the Ahrar were left without their favourite antagonists. There 
was a brief interlude following the Kashmir crisis when Ahraris flirted with an
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allegiance to the Muslim League and even considered helping Iqbal and Muhammad 
‘Ali Jinnah set up the League’s parliamentary board in the Punjab. But in August 
1936 the Ahrar officially broke off their relations while refusing to pay the election 
fee and demanding that the League declare Ahmadis non-Muslims.60 Despite their 
previous differences, the Ahrar continued to support the nationalist ideology with the 
Congress party, occasionally through their contact with the editor of the Zannndar, 
Maulana Zafar ‘Ali Khan, during the times when they were not bickering amongst 
themselves in the years leading up to partition. On 29 November 1941 Maulana 
Da’ud Ghaznavi issued a statement announcing the Ahrar’s decision to merge once 
again with Congress. Soon after, in 1943 they passed a resolution officially declaring 
themselves against partition,61 which posed another challenge in that it put them in 
direct opposition to the Muslim League. The sectarian side of the response was an 
attempt to smear Jinnah’s reputation and paint him as an impious infidel. Mazhar 
‘Ali Azhar mocked Jinnah*s marriage to a Parsi woman in his famous couplet which 
is still quoted as an example of the ease with which the Ahrar were willing to commit 
takftr (calling someone a kafir or non-believer).
He left Islam for a non-Muslim woman 
Is he a ‘great leader’ or is he a ‘great infidel’?
(Ek kdfira ke vdste isldm ko chhora,
Ye qa ’id-i a ‘zam hay, ke hay kafir-i a ‘zam?)
60 Ayesha Jalal, S e lf  an d  Sovereignty: Individual an d  Community in South A sian Islam  Since 1850  
(London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 374-375.
61 Government o f  Punjab, The Munir R eport, p. 11.
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As partition drew near, in a last effort three Ahrar candidates stood against 
Muslim League candidates in the 1946 elections, but all were defeated.62 Every 
attempt to salvage a united India failed as partition became inevitable. When the 
partition of India took place in 1947 and the Punjab was split by an international 
border, many from the Ahrari leadership were left with no choice but to move to 
Pakistan. The experience of partition was traumatic on many different levels, but it 
was also politically disillusioning for the members of the Ahrar. Of course, Qadian 
was on the Indian side of the border, which meant that the Ahmadi headquarters had 
to be shifted to Pakistan. The setbacks from partition were too great to allow things 
to carry on as normal for both groups. The Ahrar’s primary political objective of 
preventing the partition o f India had failed, and it appeared that the party would be 110 
more. A meeting was held in December 1947 to discuss all of the possible options 
for continuing their activities, from joining the Muslim League to accepting the 
reality of the situation and abandoning the party altogether. The only agreement they 
reached was that there was a desire to continue the party in some capacity and that 
they needed to make the necessary arrangements to create an All-Pakistan Majlis-i 
Ahrar. At the next meeting in June 1948 in Lahore the Ahrar affirmed their loyalty to 
Pakistan and concurred that they would not join the Muslim League due to the 
League’s tolerance o f Ahmadis. June 1948 was the same month that Mirza Mahmud 
Ahmad had created his Fitrqan Battalion of volunteer Ahmadi soldiers for 
deployment in the escalating conflict in Kashmir. In the next Ahrar meeting in 
January 1949, again in Lahore, the decision was announced ‘to cease functioning as a
62 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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political party and to continue their future activity as a religious group.’63 All o f these 
decisions were a bit puzzling because they entailed that the Ahrar would have to 
realign itself as a pro-Pakistan movement that largely conceded control of political 
affairs to the Muslim League, which in many ways contradicted nearly two decades 
of enthralling Ahrari activism. But there was no point in pursuing the antiquated 
political ideologies of pre-partition India any further.
The Ahrar attempted to create agitations without success in 1948, which 
resulted in the arrest of some Ahrari leaders. In 1949, after turning purely towards 
religion, the Ahrar began focusing much of their activity on denouncing Zafrulla 
Khan, who was then serving as Pakistan’s first Foreign Minister. Personal attacks on 
Zafrulla Khan were beginning to resonate with the Pakistani public ever since he had 
made headlines for refusing to say the funeral prayers of Muhammad ‘All Jinnah.64 
Many Pakistanis found this point unsettling, especially since it was well known that 
Zafrulla Khan and Jinnah had a close professional relationship. Although Zafrulla 
Khan’s reason for abstaining from the funeral prayers ultimately reduced to the 
Ahmadi doctrine of takfir, in this particular funeral there was one more reason why 
Zafrulla Khan refrained from joining the congregation, which goes all the way back 
to the stoning of Sahibzada ‘ Abd al-Latif in Afghanistan nearly 50 years prior.
Once the precedent had been set in the trial of Sahibzada ‘Abd al-Latif in 
1903, the sporadic execution of individual Ahmadis had continued in Afghanistan up 
to the 1920s. These cases received increasing publicity in the Indian press, until they 
peaked with the stoning o f Ne'matullah Khan in 1924, around the same time that
63 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
64 Ibid., p. 199.
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Mirza Mahmud Ahmad was discovering the power of propaganda. The stoning of 
Nehnatullah Khan was bitterly criticized by many prominent Indians, including 
Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali and Shawkat ‘Ali, and led to a minor controversy on the 
punishment for apostasy in Islam in the Indian press.65 To bolster support for the 
execution, Afghans looked outside to the Indian ‘idama to provide further 
justification for the stoning and to settle the dispute.
The request resulted in a pamphlet being written by a prominent Deobandi 
scholar named Maulana Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, which upheld the opinion that 
Ahmadis were apostates and worthy of execution. The pamphlet remained largely 
unknown and uninfluential until the Ahrari leaders obtained ‘Usmani’s permission to 
issue a reprint.66 By this time ‘Usmani had become a leading politician as well, 
primarily because of his role as the first president of the Jam‘iyyat-i ‘Ulama-i Islam, a 
party established in 1945 as a pro-Pakistan response to the Jam‘iyyat-i ‘Ulama-i 
Hind, which served as the Muslim wing of Congress and opposed partition. The 
Jam‘iyyat-i ‘Ulama-i Islam had received the Muslim League’s support and uniquely 
attracted both Deobandis and Barelwis alike, due to a mixed leadership.67 One could 
argue that this political relationship with the Muslim League was ultimately what 
influenced the decision, but for whatever reason, when Jinnah died in 1948, it was 
Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani who led the funeral prayers. Although the connection with 
‘Usmani may not be an adequate justification for Zafrulla Khan’s actions, the
65 Yohanan Friedmann, P rophecy Continuous, p. 29.
56 Government o f  Punjab, The Munir Report, p. 18.
67 For more on ‘Usmani and the religious politics o f  the Jam‘iyyat-i ‘Ulam a-i Islam, see Ayesha Jalal, 
S e lf  an d  Sovereignty, p. 454; see also David Gilmartin, ‘Religious Leadership and the Pakistan 
M ovem ent in the Punjab,’ M odern Asian Studies, Vol. 13, N o. 3. (1979), pp. 511-512.
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publicity of the event only showed an Ahmadi refusing to join in Qa’id-i A ‘zam’s 
funeral prayer, which was considered extremely insulting.
The Ahrar began to make public appeals for Pakistan to legally classify 
Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority in May 1949, which was something that they had 
been doing in India for a considerable amount of time. The Ahrar began organizing 
other TciblTgh Conferences almost monthly from November 1949, which again proved 
to be rather successful. The speeches at the conferences often attacked Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, and Zafrulla Khan, and at times even carried iconic 
representations o f the Ahmadis which could be dramatically abused in effigy. The 
Ahrar also made an appeal to have Zafrulla Khan removed from the cabinet. The 
Ahmadi response to the Ahrar’s TabUgh Conferences was to counter with their own 
conferences, which on one such occasion in January 1950 ended in violence.68 The 
Ahrar hurled bricks and stones on the Ahmadis until finally ‘the police had to resort 
to a mild lathi [lathi (club)] charge,’ to disburse the rioters. The Ahrar reassembled at 
a short distance and began making their demands on a loudspeaker.69
Incidents and violence began to increase steadily. In October 1950 some 
Ahmadis had gone on a proselytizing mission to a village, Chak Number 5, near 
Okara, district Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) when they were assaulted and chased out of 
the village. On the following day, one of the villagers pursued an Ahmadi, Ghulam 
Muhammad, and stabbed him to death.70 In May 1951 an Ahmadi mosque was
71burned down and a number of worshippers were pursued and beaten. The Ahrar
68 For the details o f  the above account, see Government o f  Punjab, The M unir Report, pp. 15-17.
69 Ibid., p. 17.
70 Ibid., p. 24.
71 Ibid., p. 30.
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increased their anti-Ahmadi propaganda in the Punjab, which often resorted to 
elaborate conspiracy theories involving high-ranking Ahmadis with the British or 
Pakistani governments. Although there were more speeches taking place in urban 
environments, it appears that the incidents of violence remained largely confined to 
rural areas. The Home Secretary o f Pakistan had been considering banning Majlis-i 
Ahrar since early in 1950, but never followed through with the recommendations out 
of fear o f provoking a public reaction that could make things worse.72
The Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya announced that they were having a public 
meeting on the 17 and 18 May 1952 at Jahangir Park, Karachi, where Zafrulla Khan 
would be a key speaker. He spoke on the second day and said that Ahmadis fully 
believe in the Prophet Muhammad being khatam al-nabiyym , no law or messenger 
could ever abrogate or supersede his final message, and that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
had been commissioned by God for the renewal of religion (tajdid-i dm).73 He 
concluded by stating that without Ahmadiyyat, ‘Islam would no longer be a live 
religion but would be like a dried up tree having no demonstrable superiority over 
other religions.’74 On the first day, demonstrators hurled bricks and stones on the 
audience and attempted to disrupt the meeting. The agitators were arrested, but 
fifteen police constables were injured in the process. On the second day, a belligerent 
crowd surrounded the audience and had to be dispersed with tear gas. A gang of 
rioters regrouped following the tear gas and proceeded to a number o f well-known 
Ahmadi businesses in central Karachi, where they vandalized the buildings and
72 Ibid., p. 57.
73 Ibid., p. 75.
74
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properties. The Shehzan Hotel and Shahnawaz Motors had their windows broken, 
and fire was set to an Ahmadi owned furniture store and library.75
Zafrulla Khan’s speech was widely condemned in the Pakistani press far 
beyond Karachi. Many believed that it was inappropriate for a government minister 
to be giving public endorsements of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. 
Many also believed that this was proof of the Jama‘a f  s manipulation of the Pakistani 
government. Some believed that the riots were a pro-British plot, while others 
accused the American involvement in the region for instigating the riots to serve their 
own post-war interests.76 Analogies were made in the press to the ongoing conflict in
* • 77Kashmir and Zafrulla Khan was blamed for failing to resolve the Kashmir crisis. 
Additionally, Zafrulla Khan was often attacked personally and accused of having 
numerous character flaws.
It was around this time, soon after the partition and after the Ahrar had 
downgraded from their political role to a more religious role, that ‘Ataullah Shah 
Bukhari began to expand the religious functions of the group through various sister 
organizations under a variety of names. Some were localized and had minimal formal 
connections with the Ahrar, whereas others had stronger endorsements and eventually 
took 011 more prominent roles in fighting Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya in Pakistan and 
throughout the world. The most successful affiliate that grew out o f Ahrari ideology 
was the Majlis-i Tahafftiz-i Khatm al-Nubuwwat (Organization for the Preservation 
of ‘the Finality of Prophethood’). The exact origins of the organization are unclear, 
but it appears that Bukhari himself served at least as a symbolic leader in the early
75 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
76 Ibid., p. 76.
77 Ibid., p. 105.
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days when the movement was being heavily publicized through the pages of the 
Zammdar,78
In the summer of 1952, allowing enough time to let Zafrulla Khan’s speech, 
the agitations in Karachi, and the subsequent reaction of the press to take hold, Ahrar 
leaders and their associates met in Karachi and decided to hold an All Muslim Parties 
Convention in Lahore the following year. The agenda of the conference was intended 
to be focused on the protection of the doctrine of khatm al-nubuwwa, which entailed 
the explicit demands to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims, to terminate Zafrulla 
Khan’s tenure as the country’s Foreign Minister, and to remove all Ahmadis from any 
high posts in the Pakistan. In the Zammdar of 3 July 1952 an advertisement appeared 
calling on all ‘ulama, khaffbs, pirs, and sajjada nishlns to attend. Formal invitations 
for the conference were sent out to many important leaders and movements including 
Jam‘iyyat-i ‘Ulama-i Pakistan, Jam‘iyyat-i ‘Ulama-i Islam, Jam‘iyyat-i Ahl-i Hadith, 
Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm al-Nubuwwat, Majlis-i Ahrar, and the promising new 
reform movement, Jama‘at-i Islami, which was headed by Sayyid Abu’l-ATa 
Mawdudi.
Mawdudi, like many of his anti-Ahmadi contemporaries, had his first serious 
encounter with political activism in the Khilafat Movement, which put him in contact 
with many of India’s prominent 'ulama. Despite his youth, he was allowed to work 
from 1924 to 1927 as the editor of the Jam'iyyati, the monthly mouthpiece o f India’s
78 One should note that Bukhari (b. 1891) was h im self about 60 at this point and no longer capable o f  
maintaining the same energetic lifestyle o f  his youth, especially after partition. The anti-Ahmadi 
rhetoric o f  the Zam m dar had passed from the pen o f  Maulana Zafar ‘A li Khan to his son, Maulana 
Akhtar ‘Ali Khan, who was now the editor o f  the paper and responsible for promoting M ajlis-i 
Tahaffuz-i Khatm al-Nubuwwat. See Ibid., p. I l l ,  for Akhtar ‘A li Khan’s role in campaigning for 
M ajlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm al-Nubuwwat.
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pro-Congress Muslims involved in the Jam‘iyyat-i ‘Ulama-i Hind.79 This exposure 
enabled him to meet other notables in the 1930s such as Iqbal, who was able to help 
Mawdudi find the necessary funding, despite the differences in their outlook, to 
establish a revivalist religious school that catered to his political ideology.80 By the 
end of August 1941 Mawdudi was able to formally establish the Jama‘at-i Islami, 
which at that time was intended to serve as another political rival to the Muslim 
League. In defiance o f partition in 1947, ‘the Jama‘at[-i Islami] forbade Pakistanis to 
take an oath of allegiance to the state until it became Islamic.’81 He even opposed the 
government action in Kashmir, claiming that a covert war was not a proper jihad, and 
ended up serving two years in prison for sedition,82 The Pakistani public did not look 
favourably upon anti-government conspirators, and as a result the Jama‘at-i Islami 
fell into disrepute. Mawdudi’s release in 1950 coincided with a rise in anti-Ahmadi 
agitations. The Ahrar had begun to reach out to the Muslim masses of the Punjab and 
polarize the political landscape by convincing Pakistanis that Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
was the source o f elitist politics. Mawdudi opportunistically aligned himself with 
Ahrari leaders, perhaps in hope that their populist patronage would help him achieve 
his own revivalist agenda, even though Mawdudi maintained rather different views of 
political Islam. When Ahrari leaders reacted to Zafrulla Khan’s controversial speech 
by forming the Majlis-i ‘Amal (Action Committee), Mawdudi first joined but then
79 F.C.R. Robinson, ‘Mawdudi, Sayyid Abu’l-AMa5 E ncyclopaedia o f  Islam, (second edition), P. 
Bearman (ed.), (Brill online: 2007).
80 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, M awdudi an d  the M aking o f  Islamic Revivalism  (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1996), pp. 35-36.
81 Ibid., p. 42.
82
259
83later withdrew as a result of his disdainful views towards Muslim vigilantes. 
Nonetheless, an open debate on the reordering of an Islamic constitution for Pakistan 
was too tempting an opportunity for Mawdudi to pass by, even if the debaters were 
largely fixated on the Ahmadi controversy. It was no coincidence that Mawdudi 
chose this period to write his short tract Qadiyam Masala (The Qadiani Problem), 
which conveniently discharged him of his religious responsibility to warn the
84iimma.
In January 1953 the Majlis-i ‘Amal met outside of the Punjab in Karachi. 
Their course of action was to present the Prime Minister, Kliwaja Nazim al-Din, with 
an ultimatum to address their grievances by accepting their demands regarding the 
role and status of Ahmadis. By 22 February 1953 about a month after addressing the 
Prime Minister, the ultimatum had expired, which was followed by a few peaceful 
days. The committee decided to have five representatives march to the Prime 
Minister’s residence with placards visibly bearing their demands and to remain there 
until their demands were met. If arrested, they were to be replaced by five more 
volunteers. Orders were sent from Karachi to the major centres of the Punjab to start 
a program of public disturbances and civil disobedience on 27 February. With news 
of the arrests on the following day, hostile crowds began to assemble in Lahore, 
Sialkot, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad), and Montgomery (now 
Sahiwal). By early March, ‘streams of [Ahrari] volunteers had now started pouring
83 See Seyyed Yali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard o f  the Islam ic Revolution: The Jam a'at-i Islam i o f  
Pakistan  (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1994), pp. 131-141.
841 have only seen the reprints, but the copyrights for the original first editions vary from 1951 to 
1953. See, Government o f  Punjab, The M unir Report, p. 250, which says O ddiyam  M asala  was 
published on 5 March 1953; see also the bibliography in Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, M aw dudi and the 
M aking o f  Islam ic Revivalism , p. 199, which cites 1951 as the publication date.
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into Lahore by rail and by road.’85 Various rumours began to spread about both, the 
Ahmadis and the agitators. In one such case, Maulana Akhtar ‘Ali Khan of the 
Zammdar gave an inflammatory speech in the Wazir Khan mosque o f Lahore to 
dispel false rumours that he had abandoned the Khatm al-Nubuwwat Movement, 
which resulted in a crowd of 10,000 supporters the same evening.86 The Wazir Khan 
mosque had become a hub for launching the next riot, and many of Lahore’s mullahs 
were taking full advantage of its reputation. The curfews put in place by the 
government had little avail. By 4 March the aggressive mood of the crowds had 
turned into militancy and the police had resorted to firing on the mobs, but the 
situation was still getting worse.87
The riots fragmented urban areas throughout the Punjab, and regional violence 
had brought the legal system to a standstill. Pakistan as a new country was facing its 
first domestic crisis since partition. Government buildings and post offices were 
being burned, shops were being looted, and several Ahmadis were being lynched by 
mobs at will. Even some unfortunate non-Ahmadis attempting to dissuade the angry 
mobs from persisting in their violence were dealt with brutally.88 A number of 
Ahmadis were forced to renounce their faith.89 When rioters advanced on the home 
of Shaykh Bashir Ahmad, a prominent attorney and amir of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
Lahore, he resorted to opening fire on the crowd in self-defence, but he was later tried
85 Government o f  Punjab, The Munir R eport, p. 155.
86 Ibid., p. 153.
87 Ibid., p. 157.
88 Ibid., p. 172.
89 Ibid., p. 176.
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and acquitted.90 By 5 March Maulana Mawdudi was openly declaring the situation to 
be a ‘civil war’ between the government and the public.91 The following day was a 
Friday, and the government was determined to bring the disturbances to an end. Civil 
unrest was bordering on anarchy. When the government baulked at meeting public 
demands, it lost control of the situation and was left with no clear resolution. The 
Chief Minister, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, panicked and called Karachi to request 
military support. He prepared a statement to be read in mosques during the Friday 
prayers, which conceded the Majlis-i ‘Amal’s demands. Although he never intended 
on actually giving in to the demands, Daultana was hopeful that the announcement 
would temporarily pacify public sentiment.92 The military arrived by prayer time and 
Martial Law was declared at 1:30 on 6 March 1953 for the first time (of many) in 
Pakistan’s turbulent history.
5.5 -  Between the Disturbances: 1953-1974
The upheaval resulting from the 1953 disturbances had religious and political 
consequences. In many ways, the imposition of Martial Law was a success for the 
Khatm al-Nubuwwat Movement. They had succeeded in effectively bringing down 
the government of the Punjab, even though their demands were never actually 
implemented. Political leaders had lost power to mullahs, who had been largely
90 Ibid., p. 166. This is the same Shaykh Bashir Ahmad mentioned above in reference to the Ahmadi 
advocate who represented the Jama1 at before the Punjab Boundary Com m ission prior to partition; see  
also chapter 4, section 4.3 above.
91 Government o f  Punjab, The M unir Report, p. 160.
92 For som e other considerations regarding Daultana’s disinterest in the Majlis-i ‘Amal and their 
demands, see Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A M odem  H istory  (London: Hurst & Company, 2005), p. 141.
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excluded from the political process until now. Many Muslim Leaguers had broken 
ranks during the disturbances and announced their support for the Khatm al- 
Nubuwwat movement. When coping with the fallout, political leaders had to 
recognize the power and potential danger of being seen as adverse to the doctrine of 
khatm al-mibnwwa. Although the brute force of military rule quieted rioters, it could 
not subdue the idea that lay underneath. Even Mawdudi was apprehended during this 
period and sentenced to death by a military tribunal for his sedition, but when civil 
law finally returned, the sentence was repeatedly reduced through a series of appeals. 
He eventually went free in 1955 after serving only two years of the original 
sentence.93 The power of the doctrine of khatm al-mibuwwa was serving as a catalyst 
for Islamization in Pakistan, and the word ‘Ahmadi’ had taken on a new meaning that 
had become synonymous with anti-Islamic. Mawdudi had his chance to contribute 
towards the drafting of the new Constitution of 1956, largely because of a 
longstanding relationship with the Prime Minister of the time, Chaudhri Muhammad 
‘Ali. This shows that Jama‘at-i Islami had taken significant strides in the political 
arena. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr noted that:
Acceptance of the constitution as Islamic paved the way for the 
Jama‘at[-i Islami] to become a full-fledged political party. In 1957, 
despite reservations in some quarters within the party, Mawdudi 
directed the Jama‘at[-i Islami] to participate in the national elections of 
1958. The constitutional victory was short-lived, however. The armed 
forces o f Pakistan, under the command of General Muhammad Ayub 
Khan (d. 1969), and with a modernizing agenda that opposed the 
encroachment of religion into politics, assumed power in 1958 and 
shelved the constitution.94
93 Seyyed Vaii Reza Nasr, M aw dudi an d  the M aking o f  Islam ic R evivalism , p. 43.
94 Ibid., p. 44.
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The role of military intervention in Pakistan’s government in the 1950s was in 
opposition to those in favour of Islamization, like Mawdudi. But aside from the 
military’s stamp on the political process, non-Muslim Leaguers were still making 
considerable strides in the way of Islamization, albeit at the expense of the Ahmadis.
It is not surprising that the economic situation in Pakistan leading up to the 
1953 riots was less than ideal.95 Food shortages in the summer of 1952 had tested the 
country’s patience with regards to the political process. In the meantime, opposition 
leaders had discovered an effective way of capturing and exploiting the attention of a 
large section of the public’s uneducated classes 96 With the Hindus, Sikhs, and 
British out of the picture, the time was right to unleash a new enemy of the state. In 
regards to the inflammatory speeches of the Ahrar, one government official noted:
The significant feature is that after attacking the Ahmadis, most of the 
speakers run down the Government and accuse it of inefficiency, 
corruption, food situation, etc. This inclines one to the view that the 
anti-Ahmadi agitation is used as a device for mobilising public opinion 
with a view to ultimately arousing contempt and hatred against 
Government.97
By scapegoating a controversial sectarian movement, the former activists from 
the anti-Pakistan movement had recaptured a share of political authority in their new 
country. We must not overlook the fact that the politicization of the anti-Ahmadi 
cause was primarily what shifted the balance of power away from the pro-partition 
Muslim Leaguers in favour o f their ex-Congress opponents for the first time. Once 
again, this correlation is not coincidental. It is not surprising that the most effective
95 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A M odern H istory, p. 141.
96 Ayesha Jalal, The State o f  M artia l Rale  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 152.
97 Government o f  Punjab, The M unir R eport, p. 115.
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Ahrari arguments revolved around the perceived political threats of Ahmadi 
conspiracies with whichever respective government in question, whether Britain, 
India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Israel, or America. For whatever reason, these conspiracy 
theories and loaded accusations against Ahmadi Muslims were the most convincing 
arguments that eventually led to Ahrari success through repeated mobilization of the 
masses. This was certainly the case in the Karachi demonstrations which followed 
Zafrulla Khan’s speech and ultimately served as the watershed for the riots. 
Likewise, it was these government conspiracies that served as the most significant 
part of the justification for subsequent anti-Ahmadi persecution, which was reflected 
in all of the demands made by the Majlis-i ‘Amal in 1953. We recall that each 
demand was underlined by an implicit fear that Ahmadis were advantageously using 
their political influence to exploit various resources in the country for their own 
nefarious ends. Interestingly, this has nothing to do with what many Muslims 
consider to be the numerous theological shortcomings in the fundamentals of Ahmadi 
‘aqida (creed).98
By the mid-1950s, public tensions simmered down and returned back to a 
situation similar to the one that had preceded the Martial Law. Much of the next 
decade’s armistice may have been related to Ayub Khan’s secularist reforms from 
which many religious minorities in Pakistan benefited. However, the unresolved 
issues of the status of Ahmadis continued to underlie political discussions throughout 
the country, and public opinion remained largely unsympathetic towards Ahmadi
98 Even i f  one is w illing to entertain the idea that the Ahmadis were in fact exploiting their power and 
wealth for their own m alicious reasons, technically it would not be an act o f  kitfr. The charge o f  kufr 
can only be linked to problems in their theology, which at most could result in an individual Ahmadi 
being subject to due process before a qa d i  (religious judge) on a case by case basis.
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Islam. The hostility of the environment was changing more than the outsiders’ 
perceptions of Ahmadiyyat, and the persecution itself was acting as a catalyst for 
internal changes in the Jama‘at. Considering the numerous speeches by angry 
mullahs throughout the course of the riots, and the countless attacks on innocent 
victims by Muslim vigilantes intent on lynching potential Ahmadis, it was only a 
matter of time before some over-enthusiastic individual assaulted the khalifa himself 
By this point, Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad was surrounded by professional 
bodyguards who accompanied him at all times. Nevertheless, on 10 March 1954 a 
local youth named ‘Abd al-Hamid from nearby Lyallpur aged around 15 stabbed 
Mirza Mahmud Ahmad with a knife following the prayers. The knife penetrated deep 
into the neck, but missed the most critical areas, so rather than killing the khalifa the 
attack led to chronic medical complications for the remaining 11 years o f his life." 
Mahmud Ahmad initially remained in Rabwah, but eventually had to seek further 
medical treatment abroad in London. Although his mental faculties apparently 
remained intact, Mahmud Ahmad was forced to spend the remainder o f his days 
confined to his personal quarters, often retired on a large stiff board that aided his 
comfort.100
Until Mahmud Ahmad’s death in 1965, Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was stuck in 
limbo with a charismatic leader who had seemingly lost his charisma. While 
Mahmud Ahmad was still being consulted on the biggest issues confronting the
99 Dost Muhammad Shahid, Tankh-i Ahm adiyya, Vol. 17, (Rabwah, 1983), pp. 21-37  contains the 
police report, and pp. 230-234, has Shahid’s account.
00 This is a difficult situation to assess because so little has been written about Mahmud Ahmad being 
stabbed. Perhaps the absence o f  these accounts w as itse lf a conscious decision by Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya to preserve what many Ahmadis consider to be a dignified memory o f  their beloved mtislih 
mm\> 'iid (promised reformer). In m y own assessm ent, I have prioritized the oral accounts o f  those 
Ahmadi elders who witnessed Mahmud Ahm ad’s condition and the sentiment o f  Rabwah throughout 
the various stages o f  the latter part o f  his life.
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Jama‘at, the face of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was increasingly being represented by his 
eldest son, Mirza Nasir Ahmad. Even though Mirza Nasir Ahmad eventually did 
succeed his father as khalifat al-maslh III, for the ten year period following the attack 
he was still not the khalifa. The ambivalent situation brought a number of theological 
ambiguities to light that had never been addressed by the Jama‘at in the past. If the 
khalifa indeed was appointed by Allah, as many had believed, then was it even 
possible for him to abdicate his khilafafl And since Mirza Nasir Ahmad was acting 
in full confidence of his ailing father, did this imply that he embodied the charisma of 
the khalifat al-maslh? Mian Nasir (as most Ahmadis affectionately called him) 
avoided further controversy by maintaining a low profile when formally acting as the 
official representative of his father, which consequently entailed receding from the 
political spotlight whenever possible. Whereas Mahmud Ahmad had made a point of 
thrusting his Jama‘at into virtually every political conflict that he could successfully 
publicize in rural Punjab, Mian Nasir took a more prudent approach, especially in the 
years between 1954 and 1965 that preceded his ascension to khilafat.m
From a historical perspective, one could further argue that this time period 
was characterized by a bitter power struggle that was taking place underneath the 
surface of khilafat-i Ahmadiyya. Mian Nasir’s subsequent position of elevated 
authority in the Jama‘at, which directly resulted from the attack on his father, was not 
received without internal opposition. The dubious nature of the transference of power 
following Mahmud Ahmad’s attack was questioned by a few key members of the 
Ahmadi hierarchy. It appears that a rivalry unfolded when Mian Nasir’s authority
101 Once again, this period corresponded with Ayub Khan’s administration who took a tougher 
approach to dealing with Pakistan’s internal dissidents. This certainly made it easier for Mirza Nasir 
Ahmad to avoid the political limelight.
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and Mahmud Ahmad’s competence as khalifa were questioned by a few other family 
members as well as by two sons of the first khalifat al-maslh, Nur al-Din. The fate of 
Nur al-Din’s lineage has been treated as an unspoken secret by Ahmadi historians 
whose silence on the issue itself speaks volumes. Many Ahmadis themselves would 
be surprised to learn that Nur al-Din married three times over the course of his life 
and had over 20 children, whose whereabouts are consistently missing from the 
Ahmadi biographical sources, with minimal exceptions; only two of his sons, ‘Abd 
al-Mannan ‘Umar and Abd al-Wahhab ‘Umar, from the second marriage to Sughra 
Begum are mentioned in rare circumstances.102 By itself, this observation is hardly 
significant. It is only in comparison to the excessive celebratory nature of the 
inexhaustible literature on Mirza Mahmud Ahmad and his descendants that the 
absence of the members of Nur al-Din’s progeny appears abnormally pronounced. It 
appears that the majority of Nur al-Din’s children, meaning his sons in particular, had 
left the Jama‘at fairly early in Ahmadi history. This must have taken place some time 
before 1950, if not much earlier, assuming that the children were brought up 
specifically as Ahmadi Muslims. With the exception of a few daughters who had 
married descendents of Ghulam Ahmad, practically none o f the other children appear 
to have had any significant ties to the Jama‘at, which is odd considering that their 
father had been Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s closest companion and first khalifa. Unlike 
their siblings, ‘Abd al-Mannan ‘Umar and ‘Abd al-Wahhab ‘Umar had followed in 
their father’s footsteps and demonstrated enduring loyalty and devotion to Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya throughout their lives. Most notably, ‘Abd al-Mannan ‘Umar taught at
102 For more on the biographical information concerning Nur al-Din, including his marriages and 
children, see 'Abd al-Qadir, Ha)>yal-i Nur (Qadian: Nizarat-iNashar-o-Isha‘at, 2003).
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the Ahmadi seminary for over ten years, which shows that he was respected enough 
and trusted enough to instil Ahmadi orthodoxy into future missionaries. He had given 
public speeches at the Jalsa (convention) in Rabwah as late as December 1954,103 and 
in 1956 the offices o f the Tahrik-i Jadid were still willing to hold ‘tea parties’ in his 
honour.104
Even though Mahmud Ahmad’s physical demeanour had visibly declined, he 
continued on as khalifa. The worst instances of his weakened condition were rare 
occasions when he went into paralysis, which caused mass alarm throughout 
Rabwah.105 It is clear that Mahmud Ahmad was perturbed by the uncertainty of his 
predicament and by the questions that were being raised by some of his closest 
relatives and companions. Before his departure from Rabwah to seek medical 
treatment abroad, Mahmud Ahmad issued a stark warning to ‘mischief mongers’ who 
questioned the practicality of his rule and made it clear that any dissension in the 
Jama‘at during his absence would not be tolerated, even if it originated from his own 
‘kith and kin’.106
It was at this time period that the Jama‘at leadership found it necessary to 
issue numerous statements clarifying how the khalifa was divinely appointed and
1 r y j
how, therefore, he could not abdicate under any circumstances. Although similar 
issues regarding the divine authority of the khalifa had been dealt with implicitly and 
explicitly during the split with the Lahoris, it was only now that these interpretations
103 R eview  o f  R eligions  (January 1955) Vol. 49, N o. 1, p. 57.
104 Review  o f  Religions  (July 1956) Vol. 50, N o. 7, p. 395.
105 R eview  o f  R eligions (March 1955) Vol. 49, N o. 3, p. 192.
106 Review  o f  R eligions  (M ay 1955) Vol. 49, N o. 5, p. 294.
107 For exam ples o f  a few  articles that illustrate the insecurities o f  the Ahmadi hierarchy, see R eview  o f  
Religions (Oct 1956) Vol. 50, N o. 10, pp. 503-505, 510-511, 519-524; R eview  o f  R eligions (Novem ber 
1956) Vol. 50, N o. 11, pp. 579-581.
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were becoming core Ahmadi beliefs. Additionally, rumours had been circulating in 
the Karachi press which detailed Mian Nasir’s ambitions of consolidating his 
authority of the Jama‘at during his father’s absence to ensure a smooth transition to 
his own khilafat. The Review o f  Religions then had to publish its own responses, 
which reassured the members of the Jama'at that Mian Nasir did not have any 
ambition whatsoever of becoming the khalifa.m  As the allegations continued, it is 
clear that the Ahmadi hierarchy, primarily centred around Mirza Nasir Ahmad, held 
Nur al-Din’s sons responsible for the upheaval. Unsurprisingly, Nur al-Din’s two 
sons were expelled from the Jama‘at shortly thereafter, most likely under Mian 
Nasir’s personal discretion while fulfilling the duties of the khalifa at the time. Since 
then, nasty rumours questioning the integrity and inner motivations of ‘Abd al- 
Mannan ‘Umar in particular have been circulating within the Jama‘at, which have 
little historical basis and are impossible to confirm.109
5 .6 -  Constitutional Islam: 1974 and 1984
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Pakistani electorate was indulging the 
charm of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the founder and leader of the new Pakistan People’s
108 The article in question is in The Times o f  Karachi (20 August 1956), which was rebutted in R eview  
o f  Religions (Oct 1956) Vol. 50, N o , 10, p. 548.
109 When ‘Abd al-Mannan ‘Umar left the Qadiani branch he began offering his services to the Lahoris. 
He claimed to have never taken formal bay'at (allegiance) with either side, which (although in fact it 
may be true) is irrelevant to his participation in both communities. He most notably appeared before 
the National A ssem bly on behalf o f  the Lahoris during the 1974 inquiry. Unfortunately, I was unable 
to speak to him before his recent death on 28 July 2006 in America. Before his passing he had 
published a new translation o f  the Qur’an and com piled a dictionary o f  Qur’anic words based on his 
father’s notes, both o f  which are easily available. See The H oly Q u r’an (H ockessin, DE: N oor  
Foundation International, 2002); see also D ictionary o f  (he H oly Our 'an (H ockessin, DE: N oor  
Foundation International, 2004).
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Party (PPP). The promise o f a more liberal and potentially more secular Pakistan had 
inspired many Ahmadis to support the party in their quest for a new regime. On an 
institutional level, many members of the Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya hierarchy openly 
campaigned for the PPP and urged subordinate Ahmadis to support Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto’s candidacy for president. Mirza Tahir Ahmad, the younger half-brother and 
successor o f Mirza Nasir Ahmad, had first met with Bhutto as a representative of the 
Jama‘at in the 1960s before his khilafat. He appears to have forged a strong political 
relationship with Bhutto during the campaign and continued to meet with him on a 
monthly basis following the elections.110 Ironically, Bhutto was the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan at the time when the first constitutional changes declaring Ahmadis as non- 
Muslims were passed. Although Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP achieved enormous 
political success in a short amount of time, tension arising from the religious 
opposition parties manifested itself in the form of the Ahmadi controversy once 
again.
In the spring of 1974, news of violent clashes between students at the train 
station in Rabwah had spread through the nation like wildfire, rekindling the old 
debate. Although Bhutto was initially reluctant to respond to the issue, when the 
opposition staged a walkout of the National Assembly, he was forced to take 
immediate action.111 The popularity of the anti-Ahmadi movement was remarkable, 
considering that at the time, one of the major religious opposition parties, Jama‘at-i 
Islami, had only four seats in the National Assembly.112 On 30 June 1974 the
110 See Iain Adamson, A M an o f  God: The Life o f  H is H oliness Khalifaiul M asih IV  (Bristol: George 
Shepherd Publishers, 1991), pp. 92-96.
111 Yohanan Friedmann, P rophecy Continuous, pp. 41-42.
112 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mcnvdudi an d  the M aking o f  Islam ic Revivalism , p. 45.
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National Assembly of Pakistan appointed a Special Committee of the whole House to 
determine the status of people who did not believe in the finality of the prophethood 
of Muhammad {khatm al-mibuwwa)}u  The Special Committee met with various 
representatives from both sides, including the presiding khalifa Mirza Nasir Ahmad 
himself and the head of the Anjuman-i lsha4at-i Islam Lahore. The results of the 
deliberations concluded on 7 September 1974 when all 130 members o f the National 
Assembly of Pakistan unanimously moved to amend Article 260 of the Constitution 
with the following clause:114
(3) A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified 
finality o f the Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him) the 
last of the Prophets, or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the 
word, or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (Peace be 
upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a prophet or a religious 
reformer is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.115
113 The N ational A ssem bly o f  Pakistan D ebates -  Official R eport, Vol. 4, N o . 26, (30 June 1974), pp. 
1302-1309.
114 The names o f  the National Assem bly members who voted on the motion were recorded in the 
government’s official report. Norm ally, this would not be worth mentioning, however, there is a 
popular m isconception that there were 72 members o f  the National A ssem bly who unanim ously voted 
against the one Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, which provided the literal fulfilment o f  a hadith narrated by 
Imam Tirmidhi regarding a chosen sect in the latter days. Neither the members o f  the National 
A ssem bly nor the members o f  the National A ssem bly’s Special Committee consisted o f  72 members or 
represented 72 different sects in Islam. For the names o f  the members who voted, see The National 
A ssem bly o f  Pakistan D ebates -  Official R eport, Vol. 5, N o. 39, (7 September 1974), pp. 571-574. 
Although this be lie f is based on false information, it appears that the source o f  the erroneous claim  
stemmed from two newspaper articles that mistakenly drew a literal connection from the vote o f  the 
National A ssem bly to the hadith. It is most likely that an Ahmadi initially provided the information 
(perhaps correctly) to the journalists, who confused the hadith with the number o f  National Assem bly  
members who participated in the vote. Since then, numerous Ahmadis quote the two newspaper 
articles as literal fulfillm ent o f  the hadith. See The Guardian, (9 September 1974); see  also N aw a-i- 
Waqt, (10 October 1974). One Ahmadi author wrote, ‘In 1974, som e newspapers published headlines 
that seventy two sects o f  Islam had agreed in this declaration about Ahmadis. W e are proud and happy 
to be in the minority' 73rd sect as predicted by the H oly Prophet, peace be upon him .’ See A ziz  Ahmad 
Chaudhry, The P rom ised  M essiah an d  M ahdi (Tilford, Surrey, UK: Islam International Publications 
Limited, 1996), p. 171. In addition, the fourth khalifa, Mirza Tahir Ahmad, discussed the literal 
fulfilment o f  the hadith in a question and answer session at the Fazl M osque, London (23 August 
1984).
115 The N ational A ssem bly o f  Pakistan D ebates  -  Official R eport, Vol. 5, N o. 39, (7 September 1974), 
p. 561.
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This effectively defined all Ahmadis, both Qadiani and Lahori, as non- 
Muslims according to Pakistan’s Constitution. Politically, Ahmadis have been 
declared non-Muslims by the 1974 National Assembly of Pakistan, but it is important 
to understand the theological subtleties of this decision. Theologically, one could at 
best, only show decisively that a certain individual Ahmadi maintained heretical 
beliefs, but the ruling cannot be applied to the entirety of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, even 
if the individual who was deemed an infidel was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself. 
When the leader of a community is deemed a kafir (infidel) or murtad (apostate), the 
designation does not inherently filter down to every member of that community.
For the sake of argument, even now after his death, if we assume that a qadi 
declared Mirza Ghulam Ahmad an apostate (imurtad) on the basis of previous 
publications and writings, the ruling could not be intrinsically applied to every 
subsequent member of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, especially if the member in question 
was bom into the Jama‘at. Firstly, one would need to distinguish between Muslims 
who converted to this new hypothetical religion ‘Ahmadiyyaf and those Ahmadis 
who were born into the Jama‘at, because Ahmadis bom into ‘Ahmadiyyaf could not 
be accused of apostasy by other Muslims since they were never ‘real’ Muslims in the 
first place. In contrast, each Ahmadi who converted to ‘Ahmadiyyaf from Islam, and 
therefore was not born into the Jama‘at, would still be subject to a trial by a qddi to 
determine whether he or she was guilty o f heretical beliefs as an individual. The 
remaining Muslim converts to ‘Ahmadiyyaf would not be affected by the outcome of 
such a trial and would not be liable for accusations of apostasy until it was firmly 
established, by something like a classical notion of consensus (ijm a ‘), that any
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individual affiliated with the Ahmadiyya community was a non-Muslim.116 
Logistically, this scenario is extremely difficult if not impossible to implement, but 
even so, the Pakistani National Assembly simply does not fulfil the qualifications to 
make this judgment theologically binding. Again, the 1974 ruling only represents a 
constitutional change made by one country’s National Assembly, presumably under 
political concerns for order and classification. This is not to say that the National 
Assembly’s decision was theologically unsound, but simply nonbinding and 
theologically invalid. The decision has no theological validity whatsoever and still to 
this day has the potential of being reversed by some subsequent government of 
Pakistan at anytime, unlike a theological consensus (i j m a ‘) which would remain 
unchanged and irreversible forever.
Aside from the theological subtleties of the decision, the government added a 
clarification to Section 295-A of the Pakistani Penal Code, which stated that:
A Muslim who professes, practises or propagates against the concept 
of the finality o f the Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him) 
as set out in clause (3) of Article 260 of the Constitution, shall be 
punishable under this section.117
The wording of this amendment to the Penal Code is confusing and 
contradictory in that it explicitly refers to those who do not believe in the ‘absolute 
and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad’ as Muslims. The verdict 
should have granted Ahmadis the right to have their own separate electoral
116 It may be useful to see a classical perspective such as al-Ghazali’s work on the issues o f  kufr and 
takjlr, F aysal al-Tafriqa bctyn a l-lslam  w a ’l-Zandaqa, which is available in translation in Richard 
Joseph McCarthy (trans.), D eliverance From Error: An A nnotated Translation o f  ai-M itnqidh min al- 
D ala l an d  Other Relevant Works o f  al-G hazaii, (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 1980).
1,7 The N ational A ssem bly o f  Pakistan D ebates  -  Official Report, Vol. 5, No. 39, (7 September 1974), 
p. 561.
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representation in the National Assembly along with the other non-Muslim minorities. 
However, Ahmadis have never taken advantage of this opportunity because it requires 
them to acknowledge and accept that they are a part of the non-Muslim minority.118 
Only one such attempt was made in 1976 by Bashir Tahir, an Ahmadi candidate who 
tried to claim the seat but was consequentially excommunicated from the Jama‘at as a 
result.119 Since then, no further attempts have been made.
Despite the efforts of the National Assembly, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s 
government was soon overthrown by a military coup in July 1977 that was headed by 
his commander in chief General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. This new government, 
headed by the military general, imposed even more stringent sanctions on Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya in Pakistan in late April 1984 when president Zia-ul-Haq passed 
Ordinance XX. Technically, the 1974 amendment only classified Ahmadis as non- 
Muslims, which had relatively small legal implications in comparison to the 1984 
ordinance which made most aspects of religious life for Ahmadis in Pakistan illegal. 
Equally, the ability for civil society to maintain a laissez-faire attitude towards 
Ahmadis became virtually impossible, which led to the continual and often 
unprovoked harassment of many Ahmadis who were otherwise politically 
disinterested. Section 298(C) of the ordinance states:
298C. Person of the Quadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or 
preaching or propagating his faith.
Any person o f the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who 
calls themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name) who, directly or 
indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as 
Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept 
his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible
118 See section 5.4 above.
119 Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, p. 45.
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representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious 
feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment o f either 
description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also 
be liable to a fine.120
The wording in this section of the ordinance is rather loose and ambiguous, 
especially considering the severity o f the consequences. For example, an action that 
‘outrages’ Muslim sentiments is punishable by up to three years imprisonment. It is 
impractical to determine and to regulate which actions rightfully qualify for such 
legally reprehensible ‘outrage5. Unlike the ordinance, classical Islamic law 
recognizes the fact that it is impossible to determine between those hypocrites who 
‘pose’ as Muslims and genuine Muslims, and thereby removes the responsibility of 
making such a distinction from any authoritative person or body. Once again, it is 
important to note that from the traditional perspective of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), 
this is a different issue from determining a murtad or a kdfir which is not a question 
offiqh  but rather ‘aqida (creed). Classically within Islam, anyone who takes shahada 
is legally a Muslim for purposes of Islamic law, unless they adopt an unsound ‘aqida, 
which is determined through a lengthy process case by case. The idea of determining 
an authentic Muslim from an inauthentic one who only poses as a Muslim is outside 
of both fiqh and ‘aqida. Determining sound ‘aqida is different from determining if 
someone is posing as a Muslim, but this is part of the broader theological problem, 
because many mainstream scholars consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to have unsound 
'aqida.
120 See O rdinance No. X X  o f  19S4  as published in The G azette o f  Pakistan. Islam abad, Thursday, 26  
A pril 1984.
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Other parts of the ordinance are much more specific about explicitly defining 
some of these actions, such as Ahmadis who give the ‘azaif (call to prayer), refer to 
their mosques as ‘mcisjids’ (mosques), or add ‘Rctzi Allah Anho' (may God be pleased 
with him) to the names of anyone other than the Prophet, his companions, or his 
caliphs,121 Since 1984 the precedent has been set to include other offences such as 
saying the standard Muslim greeting, al-salamu ‘alaykum (peace be upon you), or 
even reciting the kalima, there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his 
messenger.122 Once again, this is problematic, because the very utterance of the 
kalima is precisely what causes one to leave their former religion and enter into 
Islam. Pakistani legal authorities attempted to resolve the paradox by insisting that 
Ahmadis who recited the kalima were insincere in their beliefs and simply ‘posing’ as 
Muslims.
That changes in the external political situation coincided with major internal 
changes in the Jama1 at’s leadership was of no help in stabilizing the identity or 
diffusing Ahmadi anxiety. Mirza Nasir Ahmad passed away on 9 June 1982 eight 
years after the first constitutional changes had taken place. The following day Mirza 
Tahir Ahmad was elected as his successor, khalifat al-maslh IV. In many ways, this 
timing was extraordinary. Within two years of Mirza Tahir Ahmad’s ascension to the 
khildfat, on 26 April 1984 Zia-ul-Haq’s Ordinance XX went into affect. On 30 April 
1984 the newly elected fourth khalifa fled Pakistan forever, seeking asylum in 
London.123 Ahmadis often compare the story o f his remarkable escape from Pakistan
121 See Section 298(B ) o f  O rdinance No. X X o f  19S4.
122 Antonio R. Gualtieri, C onscience and Coercion: Ahm adi M uslims and  Orthodoxy in Pakistan  
(Montreal: Guernica, 1989), pp. 49, 57-58.
123 lain Adam son, A M an o f  God: The Life o f  H is H oliness Khalifatul M asih IV, pp. 198-199.
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to the hijra of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina. By establishing a new base in 
London, the khalifa was in a much better position to recast Ahmad i/non-Ahmadi 
tensions in a new light. In London, he found an avid western audience whose 
sympathies were increasingly responding to a fresh and fervent consciousness that 
was steadily evolving into a movement for Human Rights.
The re-centring of the khildfat in London was significantly different from the 
previous move from Qadian to Rabwah for several reasons. The migration of 
Ahmadis from India to Pakistan coincided with the flow of the Muslim mainstream, 
whereas the move from Pakistan to the UK had Ahmadis leaving an Islamic 
environment in favour o f seeking refuge with non-Muslims. The overall success of 
this move depended on convincing their western European hosts that they were in fact 
a persecuted minority. Even though the constitutional changes of 1974 and 1984 
ensured this was a reality for the majority of Ahmadis living in Pakistan, it had an 
unforeseen impact on the Ahmadi identity. The growth and development o f the 
diaspora community was inherently based on emphasizing the dichotomy between 
Ahmadis and non-Ahmadi Muslims, particularly in the west where obtaining 
immigration by conventional means was far more difficult. Accordingly, the new 
location of khildfat-i Ahmadiyya required some explanation, even for Ahmadi 
adherents who were not the only ones questioningly watching as the fourth khalifa 
himself was now carrying out the apocalyptic reforms of the imam mahdi from 
central London. The primary justification, for insiders and outsiders, would always 
return to the emphasis o f a fundamental incompatibility between Ahmadis and non- 
Ahmadis, even though such an incompatibility may never have existed. Likewise, the
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perception of Ahmadis being incompatible with non-Ahmadi Muslims has 
increasingly taken root in the Ahmadi identity, amongst insiders and outsiders, since 
the constitutional changes in Pakistan have taken place.
One can only speculate how that identity may have developed differently had 
the khalifa stayed in Pakistan or in any other Muslim country, even potentially under 
the continual threat of imprisonment, as opposed to moving to London. It is clear that 
the move to London encouraged a restatement of the Ahmadi worldview in a 
completely different context. Suddenly the western context reinvigorated Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad’s attack on Christian theology while simultaneously leaving his other 
religious rivals, such as the Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj and Brahmo Samaj, to fall 
by the wayside. Similarly, the western context has placed an extraordinarily high 
value on differentiating between Ahmadi Islam and non-Ahmadi Islam as a 
superficial explanation for the persecution. Some insiders themselves now 
acknowledge that many Ahmadis have begun to treat fellow Muslims as though they 
belong to an altogether different religion.
The situation has become even more complex in recent years since diplomatic 
relations between India and Pakistan have improved. At present, the presiding fifth 
khalifa, Mirza Masroor Ahmad,124 has the potential for the first time, to return his 
Jam a'af s headquarters to Qadian with minimal restrictions, even though this would 
involve foregoing the worldly benefits of heading an internationally involved global 
institution from London. It will be interesting to see whether Mirza Masroor Ahmad
124 Mirza Masroor Ahmad was elected khalifat al-masih  V  in London on 22 April 2004. He is the 
great-grandson o f  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, but unlike his two predecessors he is not a descendent o f  the 
second khalifa , Mirza Bashir al-Din Mahmud Ahmad. Instead, he is the grandson o f  Mirza Bashir al- 
Din Mahmud Ahm ad’s youngest brother, Mirza Sharif Ahmad.
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or any of his future successors succumb to religious concerns and return to the sacred 
village of Qadian where Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s remains lie in waiting. Perhaps one 
day the lure of the desire to build a magnificent shrine and mosque around the tomb 
of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in the consecrated lands of the bihishtl maqbara will be too 
great for Ahmadis to ignore and will not be postponed any further. In the meantime, 
there is no longer anything to prevent this from happening, and the political situation 
in India is stable enough to support an Ahmadi khalifa who may at any time choose to 
return.
5.7 -  Unconventional Explanations: The Case of the Common 
Lineage
We have seen how the persecution has been a part of Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya 
from the very beginning in various forms for differing reasons. Interestingly, we still 
have no satisfactory explanation as to why this persecution persists with such 
intensity one hundred years after Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s death, except for certain 
aspects o f the development o f Pakistan’s religious politics. It is important here to 
distinguish between the causes for controversy and the causes for persecution. Once 
again, we have seen how and why Ahmadi interpretations of Islam, at times, radically 
conflict with those of the Muslim mainstream; however, this is no different from 
several other messianic movements, like the Isma‘ilis or the Bahai, throughout the
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history of Islam.125 Although Ahmadi interpretations of Islam are indeed 
controversial deviations from the orthodoxy, we have not addressed why or how such 
subtle positions on randomly tangential points of Islamic theology became so heavily 
politicized. Surely, the subtleties regarding the indeterminable status of the mahdl, 
the true fate of Jesus immediately after his crucifixion, and a circumstantial rejection 
of violent jihad are peripheral issues in Sunni Islam at best. Even amongst these 
contentious issues, the rejected notion of violent jihad was reinstated in 1948 by the 
second khalifa, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, with his deployment of the Furqan Battalion 
in Kashmir.126 Similarly, many non-Ahmadi Muslims have held the belief that Jesus 
died naturally and is not currently alive in heaven, in the same way that Ahmadis 
themselves now claim. The only remaining issue is that of khatm al-nubuwwa 
(finality of prophethood). Even this is not a straightforward problem in the sense that 
Ahmadis do not reject khatm al-mibuwwa outright, but rather they interpret its 
meaning in an uncommon and potentially un-Islamic way. However, even if this 
interpretation amounts to straight kufr (infidelity), it does not justify the persecution 
of Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya that has taken place over the last century and continues to 
take place today.
We have already seen how many Muslim political leaders like Maulana 
Muhammad 4Ali and Shawkat ‘Ali, Iqbal, Mian Fazl-i Husain, Shaykh ‘Abdullah of 
Kashmir, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were willing to cooperate with and work alongside 
Mirza Mahmud Ahmad or other Ahmadi representatives despite their theological
525 See Oliver Scharbrodl, Islam  an d  the B aha'i Faith  (London: Routledge, 2008); see also See 
Shahzad Bashir, M essianic H opes an d  M ystical Visions: The Narbakhshiya Between M edieval and  
M odern Islam  (Columbia: University o f  South Carolina Press, 2003).
126 See chapter 4, section 4.7 above.
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differences. This again raises the question of why some Muslims were so tolerant 
whereas others were so intolerant.
It is interesting to note that many of the primary instigators o f Ahmadi 
persecution had close personal ties to Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya in some way. For 
example, the first fatwd  of Jatfr against Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was written in 1891 by 
his former teacher and friend, Maulvi Nazir Husayn Dehlawi, in response to the 
publication of TawzTh-i M aram}11 Maulvi Nazir Husayn was not a random scholar 
who incidentally decided to publicize his theological disagreement with Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad. Maulvi Nazir Husayn Dehlawi had been close enough to Ghulam 
Ahmad to have carried out the marriage ceremony to his second wife in Delhi. Their 
previous history together and Maulvi Nazir Husayn’s closeness to Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad clearly had an impact on the way in which he chose to handle their 
disagreement. Even as such, writing a fatwd  of kufi' against a religious rival was not 
altogether uncommon in the subcontinent during this period of Islamic history. And 
it certainly did not carry the weight that a fatwd  of kafr could carry in a different 
context or even today. As might be expected, Maulvi Nazir Husayn’s other students 
from the Ahl-i Hadith took an equally offensive approach to Ghulam Ahmad’s 
theology.
Maulvi Muhammad Husayn Batalwi was another student o f Maulvi Nazir 
Husayn Dehlawi and one of the more commonly quoted antagonists in early Ahmadi 
literature. He was a long time class fellow and childhood friend of Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad. Once again, it is not unreasonable to presume that the closeness between
127 See chapter 1, section 1.2 above. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad expounded som e o f  his more controversial 
view s regarding the death Jesus in TawzTh-i M aram , namely that Jesus Christ is not alive in heaven and 
will not physically return to Earth in the same corporeal flesh as the orthodox believe.
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Muhammad Husayn Batalwi and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, in addition to the tension 
between Ghulam Ahmad and Batalwi’s principal teacher, Maulvi Nazir Husayn 
Dehlawi, affected the severity of Batalwi’s response to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. 
Similarly, amongst Ghulam Ahmad’s other enthusiastic adversaries were Sana’ullah 
Amritsari and the sons of Shaykh 4 Abdullah Ghaznavi, both of whom had also been 
trained by the Ahl-i Hadith master, Maulvi Nazir Husayn.128 We saw how this 
tension between Ghulam Ahmad and the sons o f ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi periodically led 
to mubahala (prayer duel) challenges between the supporters of both camps, but most 
notably with Ghaznavi’s two sons, ‘Abd al-Jabbar Ghaznavi and ‘Abd al-Haq 
Ghaznavi.129 In the case of the Ghaznavis, their negativity towards Ghulam Ahmad 
may have been exacerbated by the fact that his theological offences were most likely 
perceived as having tarnished the reputations of not only their Ahl-i Hadith teacher, 
Maulvi Nazir Husayn, but also their father. The bitterness expressed by the Ghaznavi 
brothers was more than the mere result of a theological disagreement. Their close 
association with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a poor reflection on themselves, their 
teacher of Islam, and their father. Their outspoken responses were neurotically 
overstated in an attempt at salvaging the sanctity of their own reputations and 
distancing themselves from Ghulam Ahmad, who would have been seen as the 
renegade student of both their teacher and their father. Rather than softening their 
response, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s close personal connections and relationships made 
things worse. The alienation from his former teachers and mentors exaggerated the 
adverse reaction to his theological outlook. Furthermore, the adversity from this
I2S Barbara Daly M etcalf, Islamic R evival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), p. 292.
129 See chapter 1, section 1.2 above.
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opposition did not end with these individuals, but rather intensified through the 
successive generations when the personal rivalries entered the religious and political 
mainstream.
It is evident that the politicization o f the anti-Ahmadi movement was in many 
ways a direct reaction to the politicization of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya itself by the 
second khalifa, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, during the Kashmir crisis. In relation to 
Ahmadi persecution however, it was really the Majlis-i Ahrar who historically turned 
the anti-Ahmadi stance into a communal priority for South Asian Muslims. The 
natural next step would be to look at the founders of the Ahrar, their personal and 
religious affiliations, and their potential motivations for placing such an extraordinary 
emphasis on maligning what was then a rather obscure messianic movement of rural 
Punjab. The most dedicated members of the Ahrari leadership were ‘Ataullah Shah 
Bukhari, Mazhar ‘Ali Azhar, and Maulana Sayyid Muhammad Da’ud Ghaznavi. 
Maulana Da’ud Ghaznavi was the eldest son of ‘Abd al-Jabbar Ghaznavi, who was 
the eldest son of Shaykh ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi.130 It is clear that Shaykh ‘Abdullah 
Ghaznavi’s relationship with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was that of his mentor and 
potentially even his murshid. The relationship was close enough that ‘Abdullah 
Ghaznavi married his son, ‘Abd al-Wahid Ghaznavi, to Imama, the daughter of 
Ghulam Ahmad’s closest companion and first khalifa Nur al-Din, before Ghulam 
Ahmad had made any of his controversial claims. Although ‘Abd al-Wahid Ghaznavi
130 Muhammad D a’ud Ghaznavi, M aqalat M aulana M uhammad D a ’iid  Ghaznavi (Lahore: Maktaba 
Naziriyya, 1979), p. 19. This account describes D a’ud Ghaznavi as the sachche j d  nishin (true 
successor) o f  his father ‘Abd al-Jabbar Ghaznavi, which is a peculiar way o f  describing their 
relationship in that it may im ply that ‘Abd al-Jabbar had a false j d  nishin  (successor).
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remained opposed to Ghulam Ahmad despite his marriage,131 at least one of the 
couple’s four children, Muhammad IsmaTl Ghaznavi, was raised as an Ahmadi.132 
This explains Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s rationale in sending Isma‘il Ghaznavi on 
behalf o f the All-India Kashmir Committee to negotiate with his uncle, D a’ud 
Ghaznavi, who represented Majlis-i Ahrar.133 Although Da’ud Ghaznavi was himself 
bom in Amritsar, he too had spent some time studying in Delhi under Maulvi Nazir 
Husayn.134
The personal connection of the dominant spokesperson for Majlis-i Ahrar, 
‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari, to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was slightly different from the 
other rivals above, however, it is nonetheless revealing. ‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari was 
born in 1891 in Patna, Bihar but made his way to the Punjab to pursue Islamic 
studies. Bukhari went to the Golra district where he studied under the famous Chishti 
master Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah, whose shrine still stands at Golra Sharif between present 
day Islamabad and Rawalpindi. In 1915 ‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari formalized his 
affiliation with Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah by taking his ba)>‘at and becoming his spiritual 
disciple (mund).135 Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah Golrawi and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had a 
number of exchanges from 1899 to 1902.136 Aside from the smaller pamphlets, 
posters, and notices, Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah had written two books, Shams al-Hiddya and
131 Similar to his brothers, ‘Abd al-Wahid Ghaznavi had also been challenged to a m ubahala  (prayer 
duel) by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Anjam -i A t ham, in Ruham K haza ’in. Vol. 
11, p. 70.
132 See ‘Abd al-Qadir, H ayat-i Nur (Qadian: N izaratNashr-o-Isha‘at Qadian, 2003), p. 79; this was 
confirmed by Janbaz Mirza in his K arvan-i A hrar, Vol. 1, p, 319.
133 See chapter 4, section 4.4 above.
134 Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i Ahrar, Vol. 1, p. 143.
135 Janbaz Mirza, H ayat-i AmTr-i Shari'at (Lahore: Maktabah-i Tabassira, 1970), p. 37.
136 There are a number o f  leaflets pertaining to Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah Golrawi under various headings in 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, M ajm u ’a-i Ishtiharal, Vol. 3, pp. 325-341, 346-355.
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Sayf-i Chishtiyal, in direct response to Ghulam Ahmad and his theological claims.lj? 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s written contribution included Tohfa Golrawiyya, Arba In, 
and I'jdz al-Masih.,38 Despite the numerous attempts at holding a public debate from 
both camps, an oral discourse never took place. On one occasion in 1900, when 
threats and insults were mounting on both sides, a frustrated Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah made 
his way to Lahore in response to one of Ghulam Ahmad’s challenges. However, the 
dramatic display resulted in an anticlimactic ending when Ghulam Ahmad failed to 
appear.139 This shared history between Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah Golrawi and Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad puts ‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari’s heightened animosity towards 
Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya into a more appropriate context.140 Once again, it is not as 
surprising in this new context that the dispute between Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah and Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad carried on into the next generation between ‘Ataullah Shah Bukhari 
and Mirza Mahmud Ahmad.141
Although I was unable to find biographical information for the final Ahrari 
spokesperson, Mazhar ‘Ali Azhar, it is well known that Mazhar ‘Ali Azhar was born 
and raised in Batala, which is the closest neighbouring town to Qadian and home to 
the other Ahl-i Hadith rival, Muhammad Husayn Batalwi. This may or may not have 
been a significant factor in Mazhar ‘Ali Azhar’s theological outlook.
137 See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, H aqlqai cil-Wahy in Ruham Khaza 'in, Vol. 22, p. 356.
138 A ll o f  these are available in Ruham K h a za ’in, Vol. 17-18.
139 A. R. Dard, Life o f  A hm ad  (Lahore: Tabshir, 1948), pp. 592-593.
140 In addition to the direct rivalry w ith Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah, Ghulam Ahmad had also challenged Mian 
Allah Bakhsh Sangari, the sa jjada  nishin o f  Sulayman Taunswi, to m ubahala . Sulayman Taunswi was 
the teacher o f  Shams al-Din Siyalwi, who also taught Pir Mehr ‘Ali Shah. This is not likely to have 
improved their relations. For the mubahala  challenge, see Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, A njdm -i A t ham, in 
Ruham Khaza 'in, Vol. 11, p. 71.
141 In his letter to me on (7 March 2006) Dost Muhammad Shahid listed the name o f  a Chishti scholar, 
Hazrat Imam al-Din Gujrati (possibly from a place called Goliki?), who took b ay'a i with Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad. Interestingly, prior to his bay'ai with Ghulam Ahmad, Imam al-Din Gujrati was a 
m urid  o f  the Chishti Shaykh Shams al-Din SiyaiwT, who was the also the m urshid  and teacher o f  Pir 
Mehr ‘Ali Shah Golrawi.
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Maulvi Zafar ‘Ali Khan was another outspoken opponent o f Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya who is best known for his role as the editor of the ZamTndar. Although 
Zafar ‘Ali Khan had attended the foundational meeting of the Majis-i Ahrar, his 
allegiance to the group wavered erratically.142 His views expressed against the 
Jama‘at through the editorials of the Zammddr, however, were far more consistent.143 
Zafar ‘Ali Khan inherited the Zammddr from his father, Maulvi Siraj al-Din, who 
founded the newspaper and edited it before him. Siraj al-Din had known Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad from his early days as a reader in the Sialkot court during the early 
1860s. Although the nature of their relationship is unclear, I have found nothing to 
suggest that they were particularly close. However, Maulvi Siraj al-Din paid Ghulam 
Ahmad a personal visit at his home in Qadian in 1877. It is likely that their 
relationship was more of a businesslike nature later on in their lives when Siraj al-Din 
was in a position to assist and advise Ghulam Ahmad regarding his publications, 
which he appears to have done a number of occasions. When Ghulam Ahmad passed 
away, Maulvi Siraj al-Din published a dignified obituary of him in the Zammddr, 
which is still frequently quoted by Ahmadi sources today.144 Even though Maulvi 
Siraj al-Din never took bay‘at with Ghulam Ahmad, it is possible that Zafar ‘Ali 
Khan found the connection with his father particularly irritating. Similarly, perhaps 
Zafar ‘Ali Khan thought that any connection with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad would have 
tainted his father’s reputation. For whatever reason, Zafar ‘Ali Khan persistently
142 Janbaz Mirza, K arvan-i A hrar, V ol. 1, p. 83.
,43 See Zafar ‘Ali Khan’s anti-Ahmadi poetry in the section called "Qadiydm KlmrafaV  (Qadiani 
N onsense), in his Baharistan  (Lahore: Urdu Academ y Punjab, 1937), pp. 543-578.
144 Maulana Muhammad Ali, The Founder o f  the Ahm adiyya M ovement, 3rtl ed. (W embley: Ahmadiyya 
Anjuman Lahore Publications, U .K ., 2008), pp. 11, 104-105; the original obituary, which 1 have not 
been able to access is from: Zam m ddr (8 June 1908).
287
publicized anti-Ahmadi sentiment through the pages of the Zammddr, which was 
often during some of the more turbulent periods of Jama‘at-i Ahmad iyya’s political 
history. In this matter, he was succeeded by his son, Akhtar ‘Ali Khan, who took 
over the editorship of the Zammddr after his father. Similarly, Akhtar ‘Ali Khan’s 
role in politicizing anti-Ahmadi sentiment was well documented in the by the 
Pakistani government following the 1953 disturbances.145
We now turn our attention to Jama‘at-i Islami. We have seen above how 
Sayyid Abu’l-A‘la Mawdudi played a significant role in the spread of anti-Ahmadi 
activism, most often under the banner of his own Jama‘at-i Islami. Even though 
Jama‘at-i Islami’s opposition to Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya was far less sensational than 
the grandiose theatrics of the Ahrar’s political strategies, it was nonetheless 
meaningful. Mawdudi descended from a long line of Chishti pirs, and even though 
his father, Sayyid Ahmad Hasan, was eventually authenticated into the mystical 
lineage himself, it was Mawdudi’s grandfather who was a well-known and respected 
personality in the twilight years of the Mughal court.146 But, it is not well known that 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad once challenged Mawdudi’s grandfather, Sayyid Husayn Shah 
Mawdudi of Delhi, to a mubahala}47 The details of the interactions between Sayyid 
Husayn Shah Mawdudi and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad are not known, but the mubahala 
challenge indicates a certain level of aggression between the two of them. It is also 
worthwhile to note that Sayyid Husayn Shah was affiliated with the Chishti order. It
145 See Government o f  Punjab, The M unir Report, for numerous accounts o f  the role o f  Akhtar ‘Ali 
Khan and the Z am m ddr during the disturbances.
!4f5 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, M awdudi an d  the M aking o f  Islam ic Revivalism , p. 10. For a more 
thorough account o f  M awdudi’s father and his childhood, see also Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, ‘Mawlana 
M awdudi’s Autobiography,’ The M uslim World, Vol. 85, N o. 1-2, (January-April 1995), pp. 53-56.
147 Sayyid Husayn Shah Sahib M awdudi’s name is listed in the section o f  sa jjada  nishins who Ghulam 
Ahmad challenged to mubahala. See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Anjdm -i Atham , in Ruham Khazd 'in,
Vol. 11, p. 71.
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is certainly possible that many of these Chishti sajjada nishms and pirs simply united 
against Ghulam Ahmad in an exhibition of fraternal solidarity. We see from Ghulam 
Ahmad’s own account that he issued the mubahala challenges in reaction to those 
scholars who publicly renounced his views as heretical deceptions.148 Interestingly, 
some of the scholars on the list appear to have resolved their differences with Ghulam 
Ahmad at a later date.149 However, it is not surprising that Mawdudi rigidly 
maintained a stern attitude towards Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya considering his 
grandfather’s difficulties with Ghulam Ahmad in the past.
The final grouping of scholars with an overt affiliation to Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad and an active anti-Ahmadi agenda seems to be centred around Dar al-‘Ulum, 
Deoband. The Dar al-‘Ulum connection is unique in comparison to the other 
connections discussed above, because the others largely represent individuals and 
their spiritual disciples, whereas Dar al-‘Ulum represents an institution with entire 
generations of the subcontinent’s Muslim scholars who followed their path and 
religious methodology. Ghulam Ahmad experienced hostility from Maulvi Rashid 
Ahmad Gangohi, Muhammad Qasim Nanautwi, and their mutual murshid and teacher 
of Sufism, Hajji ‘Imadullah Makki. All three scholars played an instrumental role in 
the founding of Dar al-'Ulum, Deoband.150 Rashid Ahmad Gangohi was another one 
of the scholars Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had challenged to mubahala,X5X but again the
14S Ibid., p. 69.
149 In the sa jjada  nishin section, Ghulam Ahmad listed the name o f  ‘Mian Ghulam Farid Sahib Chishti
from Chacharan district Bahawalpur’ w hose relationship with Ghulam Ahmad is worthy o f  further
discussion. Although these two may have experienced som e tension, they appear to have resolved
their differences at a later date. See, Ibid., p. 71.
150 For a biographical account o f  the three scholars that describes their relations, see Barbara Daly 
M etcalf, Islam ic R evival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 , pp. 75-80.
!51 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Anjam -i Atham , in Ruham K haza ’in, Vol. 11, p. 69.
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challenge was never fulfilled.152 Ghulam Ahmad’s tension with the founders of the 
Deobandi school and tradition filtered down through the successive generations of 
scholars as well.153 We saw above how the pamphlet written by the Deobandi scholar 
Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani played a pivotal role in justifying the stoning of Ahmadis in 
Afghanistan in the 1920s.154 We also saw how Ahrari leaders later republished the 
pamphlet to publicize anti-Ahmadi sentiment in India and later in Pakistan. Shabbir 
Ahmad ‘Usmani’s involvement with Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya climaxed in 1948 at 
Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah’s funeral when Zafrulla Khan refused to pray behind the 
Deobandi scholar.155
Following the partition, Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani, along with some of his 
more eminent colleagues, established Dar al-‘Ulum, Karachi. One o f the prominent 
scholars involved in this establishment of Dar al-‘Ulum Karachi was a former student 
of Shabbir Ahmad ‘Usmani named Muhammad Shafi (‘Usmani) who since then has 
been renowned for his dedicated service as the Grand Mufti of Pakistan. Mufti 
Muhammad Shafi had a significant role in the aftermath of the 1953 riots when 
Pakistan’s Muslim leaders were struggling to declare Ahmadis as a non-Muslim 
minority.156 His political and religious influence remained quite strong through the 
time of his demise in 1976 and certainly laid the groundwork for the National
152 Ghulam Ahmad did write a lengthy response to Maulvi Rashid Ahmad Gangohi regarding his 
objections to Ghulam Ahm ad’s claim s concerning the com ing o f  the m ahdi and the m asih  in his 
supplement (zam im a ) to part five o f  Barahm -i Ahm adiyya. See Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Bardhin-i 
Ahm adiyya, (Part V), in Ruham K haza 'in, Vol. 1, pp. 371-410.
153 Dost Muhammad Shahid expressed these ideas to me during my visit to Rabwah in March, 2006. 1 
also have personal correspondence with him (7 March 2006) in which he included the name o f  Maulvi 
A sh raf‘Ali Thanwi with Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Muhammad Qasim Nanautwi, and Hajji 
‘lmdadullah Makki as opponents o f  Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya.
154 See section 5.4 above.
155 Ibid.
156 Government o f  Punjab, The M unir Report, pp. 77-78, 133, 136.
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Assembly’s 1974 decision.157 However, Mufti Muhammad Shaft’s activities had 
declined by the 1970s by which point his mantle had been passed to his son and 
Pakistan’s next great Deobandi Mufti, Mufti Muhammad Taqi ‘Usmani. Mufti Taqi 
‘Usmani had a more active role in the constitutional changes o f 1974 than his 
father.158 Similarly for Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, the passage of time meant that in 1974 
it was no longer Mirza Ghulam Ahmad or his son, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, but rather 
Ghulam Ahmad’s grandson, Mirza Nasir Ahmad, who was left to counter the 
government offensive. At present, Mufti Taqi ‘Usmani remains one o f Pakistan’s 
leading jurists with an esteemed and active role in society that has extended into his 
retirement.
157 See Muhammad Anwar Shah Kashmiri, al-Tasnh bi ma TawdtarjT Nuzu! at-M asih  (Aleppo: 
Maktab al-Matbu‘at al-Islamiyya, 1965), in which Mufti Muhammad Shaft apparently wrote a lengthy 
refutation o f  Jama'at-i Ahm adiyya’s beliefs regarding the death o f  Jesus. Unfortunately, I did not have 
access to the original source.
158 See Muhammad Taqi Usmani and Maulana Samiulhaq, Oadianism on Trial: The C ase o f  the 
M uslim  Ummah against Q adianis p resen ted  before the National Assem bly o f  Pakistan  (Karachi: 
Idaratul-Ma'arif, 2006).
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Conclusion
We see that the politicization of Ahmadi persecution has been far from the 
inevitable consequence of maintaining questionable theology. Remarkably over the 
past century a very limited group of people have been promoting Ahmadi and anti- 
Ahmadi interests throughout the subcontinent and throughout the world. The 
politicization of Ahmadi persecution has turned into somewhat of a neo-tribal conflict 
with affiliations that have extended back through multiple generations. The 
allegiances that had been drawn towards the end of British colonial rule have been 
passed down from father to son or teacher to student since the 19th century and now 
into the 21st century conflict of today. Each camp has maintained their links and 
ensured the transmission of these loyalties in uncorrupted chains that can be traced 
back to the time of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself.
In addition to the various chains and lineages discussed above, there appears 
to be an even larger pattern emerging between the instigators of the anti-Ahmadi 
conflict. Virtually all o f Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s rivals appear to have maintained 
some connection to the Chishti order at some point in their lives. Although I have 
found no evidence to support a working hypothesis in these regards, it is an 
observation that should be duly noted. I can only speculate that this may have its 
origins in the dubious relationship between Ghulam Ahmad and Shaykh ‘Abdullah 
Ghaznavi.
Once again, we cannot use these lineages to offer any satisfactory 
explanations of the anti-Ahmadi conflict. What the above affiliations do not show is
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why some people hate Ahmadis. The affiliations only show a potential reason for 
why some groups and some community leaders may have been exceedingly 
passionate about the issue. In fact, it is not the persecution itself that resulted from 
and was maintained through these affiliations, but the politicization of the 
persecution. The politicization of Ahmadi persecution was in part a direct result of 
the persistent efforts of a specific group of Muslims who repeatedly prioritized the 
issue for the ummci. Otherwise, there is no longer any substantial reason to suggest 
that Jama4 at-i Ahmadiyya should retain any significant influence in South Asian 
politics. But the publicity of the Jama‘at and the politicization of the persecution 
continues to be at the forefront of discussions o f religious corruption, deviant Islam, 
or Islamic authenticity and Muslim purification in South Asia today.
Since the 1980s the Ahmadi identity has shifted even further from its original 
position and has moulded itself around the outsider’s imposed identity which has 
been defined by the Pakistani Constitution. The increasing population of asylum 
seekers in Britain and North America have sufficiently reinforced an identity based 
on victimization, such that a problem has arisen from significant numbers of deceitful 
non-Ahmadis who take advantage of this perception to claim asylum and acquire 
western immigration. Jama4at-i Ahmadiyya continues to present itself in a way that 
highlights victimization and emphasizes persecution, as the persecution itself and the 
threat o f persecution is indeed a very serious and imminent reality in rural Pakistan 
today. However, the notion o f Ahmadi persecution as a political tool is still 
something that corresponds more with the political reality o f a Muslim politics that 
emerged out of the Islamic State seeking to define a clear boundary between authentic
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and inauthentic Islam. Furthermore, it is a result of what is entailed by the 
politicization of the Ahmadiyya debate that has had an even greater affect on Ahmadi 
self-perception and self-identification by widening the gap with non-Ahmadi Islam 
under the threat of violence. From the outside, politicians blame Ahmadis for social 
disparity and scapegoat Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya on a public platform for political gains. 
Correspondingly, the Ahmadi hierarchy portrays non-Ahmadi Muslims as malicious 
fundamentalists who are intolerably insistent on stamping out Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
from the umma by any means necessary. In recent years, the persecution of Ahmadis 
has spread most notably to Bangladesh and Indonesia, where political factions exploit 
the volatile nature of the sentiment surrounding the Ahmadi issue to win political 
favour.1
Unfortunately, it is most often the Ahmadis from underprivileged 
backgrounds who suffer the most abuse. Perhaps nothing can adequately justify the 
violence, discrimination, and harassment expressed towards Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya or 
any other persecuted religious organization. Simultaneously, it is rather misleading to 
conclude that the current political situation, including the role of Ahmadi persecution, 
spontaneously developed as the inevitable response to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s 
controversial claims. We have seen above how the justifications for Ahmadi 
persecution vary from time to time, from explanations based solely on jihad to 
explanations based solely on khatm al-mibuwwa. Despite what many anti-Ahmadi
1 Anti-Ahmadi rioting and demonstrations intensified in Bangladesh follow ing a government ban on 
the publication o f  Ahmadi literature in January 2004. See http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/ 
3985785.stm  (M ay 2009). Similarly, anti-Ahmadi demonstrations in Indonesia intensified in 2008.
See http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/7370650.stm  (May 2009). For an Ahmadi website  
with general information and current incidents o f  Ahmadi persecution, see www.thepersecution.org  
(May 2009).
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propagandists suggest, Ahmadis in no way bring such mindless persecution upon 
themselves; however, the persecution is undoubtedly an indirect result of the very 
issues that the Ahmadi hierarchy diligently publicized over the course of the past 
century. We have seen how Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya has exerted great efforts to ensure 
the publicity o f a distinctly Ahmadi Islam. We have also seen how the Ahmadi 
hierarchy consistently initiated and sustained virulent campaigns that vigorously 
propagated and hence politicized Ahmadi social involvement throughout the world, 
whether through their efforts in the way of humanitarian relief, their endeavours to 
alleviate social duress, or even in some cases their attempts at political and military 
mobilization.
The resulting politicized view of Ahmadi Islam, which has been adopted by 
both Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis, developed as a consequence o f their mutual 
interactions and interplay, which facilitated a polemic perception of Ahmadis and 
created the alienation required for an environment conducive to religious persecution. 
In these regards, it still may be possible for Ahmadis themselves to help reduce their 
own alienation through individual interactions and organizational participation in 
social and religious affairs with non-Ahmadi Muslims, which eventually may help to 
reduce the persecution of many innocent people. Otherwise, if the alienation 
intensifies and the gap with non-Ahmadi Muslims continues to widen, Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya may soon choose to dissociate itself from Islam altogether and form an 
altogether separate Ahmadi identity.
There are a number of findings that have emerged from this study which have 
been uniquely arranged to support this conclusion. We saw in the first chapter how
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the relationships between Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's family and the Imperial British 
were consistent with the political attitude that Ghulam Ahmad expressed throughout 
his career, which likewise contributed towards the development of his religious 
ideology. Although his formal studies were limited to language acquisition, Ghulam 
Ahmad continued his religious education and training with specialist teachers whose 
influence has been understated in the traditional biographical accounts. This enabled 
Ghulam Ahmad to develop a number of relationships with mentors like Shaykh 
‘Abdullah Ghaznavi, who himself claimed to receive divine revelation, and pir  
Mahbub ‘Alam, who was a celebrated Sufi master of the Naqshbandi order. 
Additionally, the Ahl-i Hadith influence on Ghulam Ahmad’s thought from 
individuals like ‘Abdullah Ghaznavi, Muhammad Husayn Batalwi, and Maulvi Nazir 
Husayn Dehlawi is clear in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s rejection of strict adherence to the 
legalist schools of thought (taqlTd of a madhhab) and their unsubstantiated and often 
arbitrary approach to fiqh.
These influences were elaborated in the second chapter when we examined 
the depth of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s claims of being a prophet. Although the 
influence of medieval Sufi thought has been connected with Ghulam Ahmad’s 
spiritual claims in the past,2 we expanded these claims beyond the mere use of Sufi 
terminology and showed how some of these ideas were used to accommodate the 
development of an inherently Ahmadi version of Islam. This included the expansion 
of Ghulam Ahmad’s explanation of Jesus’ survival from crucifixion and his 
subsequent journey with his mother Mary to his final resting place in Kashmir. 
Ghulam Ahmad exerted considerable effort to prove the natural death o f Jesus in
2 See Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, especially chapters 2-3.
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order to substantiate his own claim of being the second messiah. In contrast to this, 
he claimed that he acquired prophethood through his flawless display o f the 
perfections of the Prophet Muhammad and his perfect imitation of the Prophet’s 
example and character.
Our analysis further showed that when expressing his claims, Ghulam Ahmad 
blurred the meanings and the connotations of the terminology of wilaya (sainthood) 
with the terminology of mibinvwa (prophethood) in order to sustain an indefinite 
ambiguity surrounding his revelations which corresponded to his extraordinary self- 
image. Since these ideas previously had not been expanded in this way, we were able 
to show how they entailed particular consequences that were apparently contradictory 
and arguably outside the Islamic tradition, such as the implications of Ghulam 
Ahmad’s spiritual rank and its dependence on the prophets Jesus and Muhammad. 
Although in his own explanations, Ghulam Ahmad consistently used descriptive 
terminology to further qualify his spiritual rank and place limitations on his prophetic 
status, the confusion surrounding his claims led many Ahmadis to indoctrinate a 
Iiteralist interpretation o f his claims and to draw on his charisma in order to establish 
their own religious authority in a way that he apparently did not intend.
The consequences o f these interpretations by members of Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya resulted in a power struggle within the community following Ghulam 
Ahmad’s death, which was discussed in chapter three. This study has shown how the 
ambiguity regarding Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic status gave way to the ambiguity 
regarding the status of the people who rejected his claims and raised theological 
questions regarding takfir (calling someone a nonbeliever). The Qadiani branch
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removed all of the qualifying terminology that accompanied Ghulam Ahmad’s 
prophetic claims and adopted a strictly literalist interpretation o f his prophethood. 
This was combined with the sentiment and the revelations that were expressed in 
Ghulam Ahmad’s final will (a/-Wasiyyat) and used to establish the institution of 
khilafat-i Ahmadiyyci.
The Lahori branch abandoned the members in Qadian and renounced their 
literalist interpretations of Ghulam Ahmad’s mission by apologetically arguing that 
his repeated claims of prophethood were purely metaphorical. As the Lahoris 
desperately tried to realign themselves with the members of the Sunni orthodoxy, the 
Qadianis institutionalized their literalist interpretations of Ghulam Ahmad’s teachings 
and attempted to formalize their perspectives on his Islamic vision. This entailed a 
significant departure from Ghulam Ahmad’s original conditions of bay‘at, which 
were effectively replaced by an allegiance to the resulting institution of khilafat-i 
Ahmadiyya. This study showed how the bureaucratization o f Ghulam Ahmad’s 
charisma introduced a rigid hierarchical structure with an overt chain o f authority that 
extended from God Himself to the most menial Ahmad i disciple.
The changes in the ideological interpretations of Ghulam Ahmad’s message 
led to changes in the community’s administration and then to changes in Ahmadi 
religious practices. This study has shown how Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s insistence 
on the authenticity of his father’s prophethood led to the sociological isolation of his 
community, when he virtually forbade intermarriage with other (non-Ahmadi) 
Muslims. The marriage restrictions facilitated a new identity for the children of 
Ahmadi parents, by further isolating Ahmadi families and treating newborns as if
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they were born into a new religion, Ahmadiyyat. This was a sharp contrast from
*
other Muslim children whose parents may have maintained some type of formal 
allegiance {bay'at) with a particular spiritual teacher or openly professed their 
affiliation with a particular Sufi order, but still prioritized their Islamic identity. This 
permitted other sociological changes to take place in Ahmadi ritual practice, such as 
the separation of Ahmadis from other Muslims in the congregational prayer. Now, 
the absence of Ahmadis from non-Ahmadi mosques was being felt five times a day. 
This absence of Ahmadis from Islamic prayer rituals was particularly pronounced 
during the funeral prayers of fellow Muslims who may well have been friends, 
colleagues, or neighbours of the Ahmadis in question. Given the cultural context, it is 
understandable why funerals were regarded as an untimely occasion for Ahmadis to 
assert their religious identity or to imply their disapproval of non-Ahmadi Imams, 
which ultimately reduced to the Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s interpretation of his 
father’s prophethood and his divisive stance on takflr.
We have also traced the process of how more subtle ritual changes which took 
more time to develop were introduced into Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya, such as the 
elaborate financial schemes and the subsequent regulations surrounding the Ahmadi 
donation system {chanda). We discussed how these financial regulations have been 
used to determine an Ahmadi’s standing within the community as well as one’s 
eligibility for participating in the institutional hierarchy. The extraordinary value 
placed on the Ahmadi donation system {chanda) has arguably superseded the zakat in 
a similar way that the Ahmadi annual conventions {Jalsa Sdldna) may soon supersede 
the ritual hajj. Although the formalization of this process continues to this day, it is
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clear that the devaluation o f zakat and the devaluation o f hajj in Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
has occurred as a direct result of the organizational hierarchy’s overemphasis and 
promotion of inherently Ahmadi rituals which are exclusively intended for the 
members Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya.
In chapter four we looked at Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s political involvement 
in events like the Rangila Rasul incident in the late 1920s and the Kashmir crisis in 
the early 1930s. We saw how Mahmud Ahmad’s dual role as the president of the 
AIKC and the khalifat al-masih created a unique platform for Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya to 
expand its spiritual mission amongst members of the general public. Mahmud 
Ahmad devoted considerable time and resources from his Jama4at towards swaying 
public sentiment in his favour. His publicity of the events in Kashmir were intended 
to show the Muslim world how Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya could solve contemporary 
political problems. This study has shed light on the details of how Mahmud Ahmad 
forged a special relationship with Shaykh ‘Abdullah, the Sher-i Kashmir, and 
generously funded a movement that combined his political ambitions with his 
spiritual aspirations. This self-promotion campaign was strongly opposed by the 
Majlis-i Ahrar, who were trying to promote their own religious and political agenda 
in the subcontinent. However, Mahmud Ahmad’s relations with influential leaders 
who had some connection with his father, like Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali, Shawkat 
‘Ali, Iqbal, and Zafrulla Khan, enabled him to sustain his activities in the region and 
endure the external criticism from the Ahrar.
Finally, when the partition of India had taken place and Kashmir had acceded 
to India, Mahmud Ahmad assembled a force of Ahmadi volunteers for deployment as
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a militia in Kashmir. This study has detailed how Mahmud Ahmad’s actions 
undermined Ghulam Ahmad’s ban on jihad and adequately demonstrated the 
authority of an Ahmadi khalifa over the Jama'at. The cost of Mahmud Ahmad’s 
continued political involvement in the Kashmir crisis and the prolonged publicity of 
his efforts in the region was the politicization of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya. The 
politicization of the Ahmadi identity made it increasingly difficult to ignore the 
differences between Ahmadi Islam and the Muslim mainstream and increasingly 
difficult to defend Mahmud Ahmad’s theological positions.
We then turned our attention to the role of Ahmadi persecution in chapter five 
and saw how a few isolated cases of persecution were used by Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya 
to create a dichotomy between Ahmadi Islam and the rest of the non-Ahmadi umma. 
Ahmadis focused their missionary efforts in Western Europe and North America 
following discouraging confrontations with Muslims in the Middle East and 
Afghanistan. The politicization of Ahmadi Islam, which resulted from the .Tama'at’s 
involvement in South Asian politics, led to the politicization o f Ahmadi persecution. 
Interestingly, we have argued that the differences between Ahmadis and non-Ahmadi 
Muslims were overlooked during the partition, when many community leaders were 
struggling to bolster the figures of Punjab’s Muslim population. Despite Jama‘at-i 
Ahmadiyya’s attempts at gaining special recognition, either through the formation of 
an independent state at Qadian or ironically through the campaign for separate 
Ahmadi electorates, many Ahmadis were eventually left facing migration to Pakistan 
from the Indian side of the border. We next saw how the formation of Pakistan 
brought questions of Islamic authenticity to the forefront o f a public discourse on the
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status of Ahmadis, which contributed to the riots and the imposition of Martial Law 
in the Punjab in 1953. In 1974, the National Assembly of Pakistan moved to consider 
Ahmadis as part of the non-Muslim minority in Pakistan according to constitutional 
law. Further sanctions were imposed on Ahmadis in 1984, which prompted the 
migration of Mirza Tahir Ahmad, khalifat al~masih IV, to London where he 
continued to publicize the dichotomy between the Ahmadi interpretation and Islam.
Although the justifications for Ahmadi persecution varied from time to time, 
this study showed how the instigators of anti-Ahmadi sentiment and the promoters of 
Ahmadi persecution shared similar influential figures in their biographies that were 
connected to the opponents of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Likewise, the Ahmadi 
hierarchy has remained tightly focused around the immediate descendents of Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad and has excommunicated any potential dissenters or internal rivals 
from the Jama‘at. We have suggested that this process has ensured that the promoters 
of Ahmadiyyat and the antagonists of Ahmadi persecution have remained steadfast in 
their adherence to their respective ideologies, which has made reconciling the 
religious differences between Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya and Islam appear daunting.
Although other studies on Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya have discussed the Islamic 
foundations for certain aspects of Ahmadi theology, or have highlighted the historical 
context of certain aspects of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya’s political involvement, or have 
drawn attention to humanitarian concerns regarding certain aspects of Ahmadi 
persecution, they have not provided a comprehensive assessment of how Ahmadi 
theology developed from the messianic mission of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad into the 
controversial community that is persecuted around the Muslim world today. We have
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seen through this study how Ahmadi theology emerged out of the context of 19th 
century South Asia and developed under the influence of 20th century circumstances 
into the movement of today.
Considering Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s divine authority, the Jam a'at’s emphasis 
on blind obedience to an infallible charismatic khalifa, and the doctrine of takfii\ the 
theological foundations for a separate identity are already in place. Furthermore, 
Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya’s social isolation from other Muslims, which includes the 
hierarchy’s discouraging attitude towards intermarriage and their emphasis on 
separate congregations for ritual prayer, indicates that the possibility of a new 
religious identity may soon become a reality.
In recent years Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya has gone to great lengths to raise 
international awareness of the situation by attempting to rally western support against 
the countries and regimes that condone the persecution of Ahmadis. Although this 
may be an appropriate first step in ending Ahmadi persecution, unfortunately it may 
not be enough, especially if the Jama‘at itself consciously continues choosing to 
isolate itself from other individuals and organizations in the non-Ahmadi Muslim 
community simply because their Islam is not Ahmadi-Islam, even when they may not 
have hostile attitudes towards Ahmadis. Ultimately, it is the role of this politicized 
persecution of Jama‘at-i Ahmadiyya that has played a factor, gradually over the 
course of the last century, in influencing a continual reassessment of Ahmadi self- 
identification which has facilitated the development of the Ahmadiyya identity.
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Appendix
The Ahmadi Declaration Form
Registration Number:__________________________
Hadhrat Miiza Masroor Ahnmh 
Khalifhtul Masih V
As&alamo .4 kmikum Wa liahmaiu/lcihe Wa Barakanthoo
I hereby suhmit my Declaration o f  Initiation duly completed and signed- Please accept me 
into die fold o f  the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'atatid pray forme.
I  hear wittiess if tat there is none worthy o f  worship except Allah. He is One and has no partner.
And I  bear witness that Muhammad is His Sermnl and Messenger.
1 enter this day the Ahmadiyya htma'at in Islam at the hand o f MASROOR AHMAD. I 
have firm faith that Hadhrat Muhammad Rasoolullah (peace and blessings o f  Allah be upon him) 
is Khataman Nabiyyem, die Seal o f  all the Prophets. I also believe that Hadhrat Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad (peace be upon him) was the same Jmam Mahdi and Promised Messiah whose advent 
was prophesied by Hadhrat Muhammad Rasooluilah (peace and blessings o f  Allah be upon him) 
1 promise tot:
* 1 will always try my best to abide by the ten conditions o f Bai'at (initiation) as prescribed
by the Promised Messiah (peace be upon him).
* 1 will give precedence to my faith over all worldly objects.
* 1 will always remain loyal to t o  institution o f  Khilafat in Ahnuidiyyal and will obey you 
as Khalifatul Masih in everything good that you may require o f me, Insha'alMi.
O  my Lord M y Allah, I  wronged my soul and  I  confess all my sins; p ray  forgive me m y sins, for  
there is none else except Thee to forgives. Ameen!
j  j  ISH iSJDb iH H $
j JL^ t j 4i ^ ,si ^
j  wJh j r  ^  ^ 3 iuh 
<^ h 4i)?i j  wiS jit 3^ ^
[  begpanhn  frotti .4 Uah. m y Lord, from  all my sins and turn to Him.
Signature: Date:
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Hujjat al-Islam (The Proof of Islam), (1893)
Sachcha 7 ka Izhdr (Appearance of Truth), (1893)
Jang-i Muqaddas (Holy War), (1893)
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Volume 15:
Masih Hindustan Men (Jesus in India), (1899)
Sitdra Qaysara (Victorian Star), (1899)
Tiryaq al-Qulub (Antidote for the Heart), (1899)
Tohfa Ghaznaviyya (A Gift for the Ghaznavis), (1900)
Ru 'edad-i Jasla Du ‘a (An Eyewitness Account of the Jalsa Gathering Prayer), (1900) 
Volume 16:
Khutba Ilhamiyya (Revealed Sermon), (1901)
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Lujjat al-Nur (Abyss of Light), (1900)
Volume 17:
Government Angrezi awr Jihad  (The British Government and Jihad), (1900)
Tohfa Golrawiyya (A Gift for the People of Golra), (1900)
A rba‘in (Forty), (1900)
Volume 18:
1‘ja z  al-Masih (Miracles of the Messiah), (1901)
Ek Ghalati ka Izdla (The Correction of an Error), (1901)
Dafe ‘u 1-Bala 7 (Repelling Misfortunes), (1902)
Al-Huda (Guidance), (1902)
Nuzul al-Masih (The Descent of the Messiah), (1902)
Volume 19:
Kashtf Nuh (Noah’s Ark), (1902)
Tohfa al-Nadwa (A Gift for the People of Nadwa), (1902)
I ja z - i Ahmadi (Miracles of the Ahmad), (1902)
Mawlwi Abu Sa ‘idMuhammadHusayn Batalwiawr Mawlwi ‘Abdullah Sahib
Chah'dhvi ke Mubdhasa par Masih Maw ‘ud Hakam Rabbani ka. Review (A 
Review of the Debate between Maulvi Abu Sa‘id Muhammad Husayn Batalwi 
and Maulvi ‘Abdullah Chakralwi by the Divine Arbitrator, the Promised 
Messiah), (1902)
Mav\>ahib al-Rahmdn (Gifts of the Most Merciful), (1903)
Nasim-i Da ‘wat (The Gentle Breeze Inviting People to Islam), (1903)
Sanatan Dharam (Hindu Customs), (1903)
Volume 20:
Tazkirat al-Shahadatayn (Memoirs of the Two Martyrs), (1903)
Sirat al-Abddl (Biographies of the Virtuous), (1903)
Lecture Lahore, (1904)
Lecture Sialkot, (1904)
Lecture Ludhiana, (1905)
Al-Wasiyyat (The Will), (1905)
Chashm Masihi (The Christian Perspective), (1906)
Tajalliydt-i Ildhiyya (Divine Manifestations), (1906)
Qddiydn keAryd awr Ham (The Arya of Qadian and Us), (1907)
Volume 21:
Barahin-i Ahmadiyya, Vol. 5, (The Proofs of Islam), (1905)
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Haqiqat al-Wahy (The Reality of Revelation), (1907)
Volume 23:
Chashma-i Ma ‘rifat (The Spring of Gnosis), (1908)
Paygham-i Sidh (Message o f Peace), (1908)
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